Thanks to everyone for your posts so far on the themes raised in my book. I would like to pick up on some of the comments and questions.

First, I draw the distinction between wars of necessity and wars of choice based on the nature and scale of the interests at stake and the presence or absence of promising alternative policies that could protect these interests. As a literal matter, yes, countries and leaders always have a choice. Colonists could have chosen to continue living under what they considered British tyranny rather than declare independence. The United States could have allowed Japan to dominate the Pacific and Nazi Germany to rule Europe. But American leaders in those situations believed - correctly - that going to war was the only way to protect the country's vital interests. There was no real choice. By this standard, entering World War II was a necessary step, as were the decisions to resist North Korean aggression in 1950 and Iraqi aggression in 1990. I write in the book that "The distinction between wars of necessity and wars of choice is obviously heavily subjective, inevitably reflecting an individual's analysis and politics." So I am certainly prepared for disagreements over whether a given war is one of necessity or choice. But I believe that the difference exists and that the process of thinking through the distinction is highly useful for policy makers and citizens alike.

Read more »

I was against this war, believing that it would be much more difficult than its advocates predicted and that it would take a large toll on U.S. foreign policy at a moment in history when the United States had a tremendous opportunity to shape the international order. (R. Haass, TPM, June 9)

Beyond the "toll on U.S. foreign policy": When the pursuit of national security produces urban insecurity.

Yes, I agree the Iraq war took "a large toll on US foreign policy." But at no point in your post do you mention the toll of the Iraq war on civilian populations once the 6 week aerial bombing was completed. Asymmetric war (conventional army against armed insurgents) puts the national security paradigm on its head: pursuing national security now becomes the making of urban insecurity. We already knew this from the Vietnam war. Did this at all enter into the picture when evaluating the Iraq invasion, or for that matter the current escalation in Afghanistan-Pakistan? After Vietnam and a few other wars since then, did the US military forces really think that aerial bombing would do the job and no major civilian losses would ensue from asymmetric warfare in the cities of Iraq?

Read more »

Two questions for Richard (and for this group, of which I'm grateful to be a part), building off of Geof and Todd's posts.

First, I'm interested to read how you portray the 1991 Gulf War as a "war of necessity" in a meaningful way. (I'm still reading your book, so my apologies in advance for going over ground you may be covering.) The argument advanced in your post for why the 2003 Iraq invasion was a war of choice -- "the United States had options besides force to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein" -- could be fairly applied to the 1991 conflict as well. In that earlier war, the calculations of interest, the cost to the U.S. and the ultimate outcome make it appear a justified choice, but it's hardly the case that the U.S. had no option in 1991 but to oust Saddam from Kuwait. What's more, I see from skipping around (mea culpa) that you conclude the book by contending the U.S. shouldn't "rule out all wars of choice." If not, then isn't your argument really about the relationship between wars and the national interest, not about choice or necessity?

Read more »

I was present at a conference in Maryland sponsored by the NewsHour in November 2002 when Mr. Haass, then head of policy planning at the State Department, issued a ringing defense of the impending war, which evidently he now maintains that he already opposed as a war of choice, not necessity. At the time, he stirred together, in Cheneyesque fashion, claims about Saddam and al-Qaeda, about Iraqi WMD, and the rest. I arose to argue with him and called his presentation "demagogic," but my protest did not attract his interest or sympathy. I'm curious to know if Mr. Haass believed what he was saying to this audience of foreign policy influentials at the time; if his presentation was a presentation of necessity or of choice; if he agrees that he was demagogic; and if he has any regrets.

The very idea of a war of choice is intriguing. I would have thought that virtually every war is a war of choice. Surely, the American Revolution was a war of choice, on both sides. The Mexican War was a war of choice (we wanted territory) as was the Civil War. Indeed, many northerners vehemently opposed the use of force to compel the Southern states to remain in the Union. The Spanish-American War was certainly a war of choice, as was World War I.

Protecting our right to the "freedom of the seas," Wilson's justification for entering the war, was hardly a matter of necessity, and there was widespread opposition to Wilson's choice to enter the European conflict. World War II might seem like a war without choice, but of course that's false. After Pearl Harbor, FDR could readily have negotiated an agreement with the Japanese and just left well enough alone. In truth, FDR had been itching for a chance to enter the war. The Korean War was a war of choice, as was the Vietnam War. So, although one can, I suppose, hypothesize a situation in which war is not a choice -- perhaps Poland in 1939 -- such situations are in fact few and far between.

Arguably, in more than 200 years, the United States has never fought a war other than by choice. So, all things considered, I'm not at all sure this is a useful concept.

In his speech at Cairo University last Thursday, President Obama described his views of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Referring to the invasion of Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, he said, "We did not go by choice; we went because of necessity." On Iraq, his view was different: "Unlike Afghanistan," he said, "Iraq was a war of choice."

I delve deeply into all this in my recent book, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars. The book is a hybrid: part history, part foreign policy analysis, part personal account of my experiences with the policymaking behind the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the Iraq War launched in 2003. From 1989 to 1993 I served as senior Middle East adviser to President George H. W. Bush on the staff of the National Security Council. Then, from 2001 to 2003, I was director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department in the administration of George W. Bush. Based on these experiences, I argue in the book that the first Iraq war was a war of necessity while the second was a war of choice.

Read more »

This week at Book Club, Richard Haass joins us for discussion of his book War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars. Haass, the current President of the Council on Foreign Relations, worked with both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush for a time, making this a historical and personal account of the two wars in Iraq.

Joining the discussion are Michael Lind, Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation and Policy Director of New America's Economic Growth Program; Geoffrey Stone, the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago; Saskia Sassen, the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University; Charles Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow for Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Spencer Ackerman, National Security Correspondent for the Washington Independent, blogger, and former reporter for TPMmuckracker.