
Ok, Katulis, you got me. The experience of the last eight years shows that a leader can inflict enormous damage on American institutions, American civil society, and indeed the global polis without meeting the formal definition of demagogue -- which, I would argue, Bush (and Cheney) do not. They gained and retained power not so much by building and exploiting a popular movement outside our system but by cleverly gaming our system from inside at every turn, then engaging segments of the public just enough (and, opportunistically exploiting fear when 9/11 gave them the chance to make use of it) and actively trying to shut down the public the rest of the time.
This suggests that the political science construct Mike is working with is either:
not updated to the ways that the societal-technical changes I wrote about in my previous post make demaoguery both more and less of a threat to us; or
only one of a number of paths by which democracy can be undermined from within.
To Brian's questions about accountability, I think there's an answer that comes straight from the pages of Mike's book. Can we hold our leaders and institutions accountable in ways that actually strengthen the institutions going forward, without degenerating into a media circus of accusation and counter-accusation that actually winds up weakening them?
I had the privilege of listening to Ted Sorensen walk through the pros and cons of accountability last night. (He's on the advisory board of the National Security Network, which I run; neither he nor we has taken a position on the various proposals circulating.) The challenges he laid down were formidable ones: can an accountability process be made bipartisan or non-political; can it avoid draining energy from the President's forward-looking initiatives; and can it lead to actual institutional change? In Michael's words, can it become a seminar in advancing constitutionalism, or is it inevitably a circus that actually leaves the parameters of constitutionalism more in doubt?