Thanks to Matt Bunn for keeping the dialogue on Michael's book moving forward. It's hard to know what to add, as Matt's bottom line makes eminent sense -- nuclear terrorism is a real threat, and we need to act urgently to address it. And I also agree with Matt that the vast bulk of our efforts should focus on preventing terrorist groups from getting bomb-making materials in the first place.

But I would still like to add a few points. First, I'm not sure, as Michael suggests, that successful terrorist organizations are "averse to failure," and that this may reduce their incentives to seek and try to use a nuclear weapon. On the recruiting front, the very audacity of such an effort might appeal to a certain sort of potential terrorist, whether or not it works on the first attempt (assuming, as Matt does, that there will be more than one).

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My apologies for not weighing in sooner on Michael Levi's extremely useful new book. I have long felt that overly pessimistic views on our ability to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism have gotten in the way of more sensible policies, not only on this issue but on broader foreign policy objectives.

Nonetheless, in the spirit of debate and discussion, I want to raise a few questions that we might discuss further this week.

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The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran reinforces what many of us have been saying for a while: that while Iran is seeking to master nuclear enrichment, it is not racing to get the bomb. The findings of the NIE should create a larger opening for negotiations to cap Tehran's enrichment program as part of a bargain involving other political and economic incentives.

Not only did they change their assessment, but the 16 intelligence agencies involved in the NIE had the decency to admit they had made a mistake. Not so for members of the "get Iran" crowd like Michael Ledeen and John Bolton, who have reacted to the new findings with a combination of denial and outright fantasy.

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