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DAILY SCIENCE FIX - PHILOSOPHY - Can Science Answer Everything?


 

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Can science answer everything...?

The rules of the universe as we understand them seem to indicate that things are put together in levels.  Each level has it own building blocks.  As we work up or down the logrithmic scale (powers) of 10 we see that each level is the really the assembly of the building blocks of the levels below.  (great link, make sure you have few minutes before clicking!)

Subatomic particles become atoms, atoms assemble into molecules, molecules assemble into small objects, and so on up the scale until we get galaxies, groups of galaxies and then the universe. 

Humans occupy our own special slot on this scale but we are neither overly big nor terribly small when measured against the whole.  With humans as the baseline there are approximatley 26 powers of 10 between us and the known universe.  There are also about 15 detectable powers of ten below us.

All this brings me to the topic today, Reductionism, or are we nothing but the sum of our parts?

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituent 

There are three basic types of reductionism:

The distinction between the processes of theoretical and ontological reduction is important. Theoretical reduction is the process by which one theory is absorbed into another; for example, both Kepler's laws of the motion of the planets and Galileo's theories of motion worked out for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics, because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered to be beneficial because Newtonian mechanics is a more general theory--that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Theoretical reduction, therefore, is the reduction of one explanation or theory to another--that is, it is the absorption of one of our ideas about a particular thing into another idea.

Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities. Methodological reductionism would thus hold that the atomic explanation of a substance's boiling point is preferable to the chemical explanation, and that an explanation based on even smaller particles (quarks, perhaps) would be even better.  Methodological reductionism, therefore, is the position that all scientific theories either can or should be reduced to a single super-theory through the process of theoretical reduction.

Finally, ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances. This claim is usually metaphysical, and is most commonly a form of monism, in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance.

Reductionism basically says that everything can be explained by its parts.  There is no such thing as "greater than the sum of the parts" in the sense that the effect of combining things is completely predictable by looking at the properties of the components.  Its very logical and is observable on many levels.  But does it explain everything?  Or better stated, if we understood how everything worked would everything be predictable?

Well, until we know everything, we wont really have an answer will we.  So for now all we can do is debate it.  But reductionism has at its root a fundamental problem:

In science, reductionism can be understood to imply that certain fields of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and microbiology is rooted in chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers larger-scale fields.

The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems which are more common at certain levels of organization.

Ah, emergent properties!  The idea that within complex systems new properties emerge.

The usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". Weak emergence describes new properties arising in systems as a result of the interactions at an elemental level. Emergence, in this case, is merely part of the language, or model that is needed to describe a system's behaviour.

But if, on the other hand, systems can have qualities not directly traceable to the system's components, but rather to how those components interact, and one is willing to accept that a system supervenes on its components, then it is difficult to account for an emergent property's cause. These new qualities are irreducible to the system's constituent parts (Laughlin 2005). The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This view of emergence is called strong emergence. Some fields in which strong emergence is more widely used include etiology, epistemology and ontology.

Regarding strong emergence, Mark A. Bedau observes:

"Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing."(Bedau 1997)

However, "the debate about whether or not the whole can be predicted from the properties of the parts misses the point. Wholes produce unique combined effects, but many of these effects may be co-determined by the context and the interactions between the whole and its environment(s)." (Corning 2002) Along that same thought, Arthur Koestler stated, "it is the synergistic effects produced by wholes that are the very cause of the evolution of complexity in nature" and used the metaphor of Janus to illustrate how the two perspectives (strong or holistic vs. weak or reductionistic) should be treated as perspectives, not exclusives, and should work together to address the issues of emergence.(Koestler 1969) Further,

"The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe..The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. Psychology is not applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry. We can now see that the whole becomes not merely more, but very different from the sum of its parts."(Anderson 1972)

From a purely scientific perspective, reductionism (or weak emergence) is very compelling.  Personally, my logical side says that everything is explainable.  That would make me a fatalist.

Now, I definitely dont want to go too far down the philosphical rabbit hole here but for me reductionism breaks down when we get to consciousness & free will.

Reductionism to its extreme leaves no place in the universe for free will since things are all based on the predictable path of events that preceeded us (a concept called determinism). 

Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition and behavior, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences.

Subatomic particles tell atoms what to do and be; atomic properties contol molecular behavior and so on.  If we have true free will then we can control the objects, the molecules, the atoms and the particles.  How can that be since we are only the sum of them

There is simply no way I can envision a logical, mechanical explanation for consciousness.  I can discuss it from a biological, chemical, physical, evolutionary, etc.. aspect to it, but the sum of these things just cannot explain how I can contemplate it all.  Well, thats me anyway.  I guess I'm just a dualist.  Or maybe Im an Idealist.  I haven't really made up my mind yet.

Discuss...

Stay Tuned...

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39 Comments

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The best explanation for a 'higher power' I ever received was that Life is 'pure consciousness' coming to know itself. From that standpoint it is apparently infinitely complex, and perhaps only knowable or explainable as it achieves its unfolding or emerging.

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Did you read the link on Idealist? You might like it. Maybe WE are the higher power?

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Yes from an absolute perspective my experience is that we are, I am. The awareness I have indicates that. Placing 'life' in context... putting the absolute and relative together is the 'unfolding' aspect. For me the most evolved perspective is that the absolute and relative are 'two sides of one coin'.

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Gödel's incompleteness theorems in mathematics, quantum mechanics in physics, and chaos theory in large systems make determinism implausible.

Neurophilosophy is making progress in explaining the relationship of the mind and brain. Prospects are good that the mind will be explained fully as an information theoretic object supported by the electrochemical processes in the brain. Essentially the mind is the "software" running on the "wetware".

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Implausable, yes but not scientifically disprovable.

As far as the software/wetware analogy, I dont disagree. But what software program has the power to change its programing on a whim. And if a program could, what does that say for artificial intelligence, or even artificial consciousness (what an oxymoron!)?

Or maybe we have no true choice.

Im not picking sides. Just presenting the arguments.

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At the quantum level things are definitely not deterministic. At a macroscopic level, things may be deterministic -- but it doesn't really matter for certain classes of non-linear systems. You cannot measure the state of the system at one point in time accurately enough to predict what its state will be at a significantly later point in time. So it may as well be non-deterministic. Therefore, the natural universe appears to be non-deterministic.

This doesn't necessarily translate to determinism in the sense of free will versus no free will. But again, the combination of badly received environmental stimuli, poorly remembered experience, and non-linear neural processing add enough quasi-randomness to human thought that something like free will occurs.

Of course, functional MRI indicates that we talk ourselves into decisions already made, so the "free" part of free will may be a property of the sub-concious, and the "will" part is rationalization.

As for software being able to change its own function, that is a capability of many computers, since they store both instructions and data in RAM and the instructions can access and modify other instructions in memory. There are algorithms which depend on random inputs, either computed quasi-random inputs or really random inputs from a peripher that uses noise diodes, radioactive decay sources, etc. as the source of randomness. These may meet the "whimsy" test.

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>>At the quantum level things are definitely not deterministic.

Here's my problem, Merrill...Quantum mechanics is just a theory in many respects. Thers just so much we dont know right now. Just because our theories bear fruit does not mean that they are complete or even necessarily right.

As Einstein said on this very subject, "God does not play dice with the universe." Im gonna stick with the old man for now.

As Einstein put it:

I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality - that is, of a theory which represents things themselves and not merely the probability of their occurrence.
I am . . . firmly convinced that the essentially statistical character of contemporary theory is solely to be ascribed to the fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems.

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QM is not merely a theory, there is plenty of evidence for it too.

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I am not sure why, but in my current mood I hereby award you the Dayly Line of the Day Award for this here TPMCafe site, given to all of you from all of me for this:

Humans occupy our own special slot on this scale but we are neither overly big nor terribly small when measured against the whole. With humans as the baseline there are approximatley 26 powers of 10 between us and the known universe. There are also about 15 detectable powers of ten below us.

It strikes me as hilarious, and, again, I do not know why. hahahahah

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Thank you sir! I shall cherish the award for 24 hours.

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A reductionist view that accounts for free will seems entirely possible, albeit tedious. From my first read, I don't see where environmental factors are considered in the reductionist view. Since environmental factors are infinitely variable, that, to me, explains how we get to free will. From a reductive perspective, it makes prediction a very complex set of operations, but nonetheless possible.

I revisited "A Brief History of Time" several months ago and got sidetracked. Your posts have inspired me to get back to it. Thanks!

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"15 detectable powers of 10 below us"

Here is where I am on the fence. I saw Brian Greene's The Elegant Universe which states that everything can all be reduced to 1 dimensional strings.

Yet we have on the other side, Mandelbrot sets that depict the geometry of nature and which can be magnified infinitely. How can that be?

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They contradict because neither explain the universe, but instead describe their perspectives applied to the universe. They are both quite startling applications of thought, but remain thought experiments until we develop the tools to test them.

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Given a little more think time, I'm leaning toward the view that there is no such thing as free will. Regardless of whether our actions are impulsive or calculated, they are all predictable.

From a behavioral perspective, if one accepts the notion that the brain is a pattern-seeking organ that organizes input into schemas, it seems reasonable to assume that all behavior evolves from previous experiences.

Much to my consternation, I don't learn in a linear fashion. Rather, I study in a seemingly disorganized manner, then have an "aha" moment of synthesis. Although, often seemingly unaware of the input that contributed to the "aha" moment, the information had to have been nestled in some schema somewhere.

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I am going to both agree and disagree. I believe in free will, but much less free will than we presume. I think that behavioral models are reductive. Behavioral psychology creates an artificial end and baseline built around response and conformity. By that I mean that behavioral beliefs by necessity prove themselves and are en extension of the civilized mind. But behavioral beliefs have no authority over symbol. Behavioral psychology can not explain why the mind responds to symbolism and erects complex associations built around dream images. In other wordz, behaviorism can predict that Euclid would be an outstanding mathemetician, but could not predict his geometry. Novelty remains outside the scope of observation and prediction. And novelty, within and without the human domain, is the realm of free will.

You can predict the poet, but not the poetry. You can describe evolution, but not predict the mutation nor the adaptation. So all of these wonderful thought structures (powers of ten was elucidated by Pythagoras and elaborated by mystery schools for many centuries) do not and can not predict certain creative outcomes.

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The creative process is an interesting offshoot to this discussion. Nice pondering material.

Perhaps creating or identifying with symbols is a reflection of the brain's propensity to organize data. I don't think inspiration comes out of the air. Rather, there has to be a catalyst.

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I believe in free will. I am either right or wrong. If I am right, this is good and feeds my ego. If I am wrong, well, it's not my fault, I was predestined to be wrong! :-)

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What about consciousness needs explanation? Maybe you're looking at it backwards or inside-out.

"Each level has it own building blocks."

I tend to think of this as a combo of reality and human limits to understanding. That is, it is partly an artifact and partly real. Some view parts of quantum mechanics as being about reality, others view it as being about our knowledge of reality.

Reductionism which reduces things to their parts (as a car can be disassembled) must not forget that how the parts are put together is essential to the car working as a car should. The parts are the "what" of the car in material terms. The "how" is just as important and to ignore it is to do an incomplete reduction.

Correctly done reductions show the inevitability of something like free will in consciousness.

I would not say we are the sum of our parts, I would rather say that we are the product of our parts. While addition may be commutative, multiplication is not necessarily commutative.


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human limits to understanding
Nailed it -- for now, anyway.
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"I would not say we are the sum of our parts, I would rather say that we are the product of our parts. While addition may be commutative, multiplication is not necessarily commutative."

I'm not quite ready to give up my depressing reductivist tendencies, but this is at least caused me an (involuntary?) smile....

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A smile is good but I confess I don't know what about that led to the smile!

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Nice turn of phrase! And I think that htinking about it in terms of product rather than sum, in the nonmathematical sense, is interesting when it comes to the reductionism conundrum.

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Yes, 'product' is bivalent, it applies in math (vector cross product) AND non-math senses ('output or result'). I do mean it both ways (quantum physics notes non-commutative operators which are not summing but multiplying, and the math vector cross-product is order dependent too).

If one enjoys non-equivocal equi-valent utterances, I can see a smile being the, uh, product there! :-)

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Wouldn't the fact that you are contemplating it suggest that there is an explanation?

To claim that we are the sum of all our parts is a bit misleading - it implies that there is one answer and one answer only to an equation with constant factors. Since humans are adaptive and reflexive we know that there are no constant factors, that the variables and factors change so that the sum is and always will be different for every living organism. It would be more accurate to say that we are a combination of all these parts with a probable, but not predictable outcome.

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As EDS rightly pointed out, limits of human knowledge indeed. We likely dont even possess the capacity to understand even if we had the knowledge. I have to find the link but somebody recently proved mathematically (for whatever thats worth) that you would have to be outside the universe to actually contemplate it.

Since thats most likely true we will never know. Like CT says sometimes its just best to pick what you think is /right/. If you're right great (and it was free will!), if not, it was fate. I like that theory a lot.

I guess for me it all comes down to is the universe random? If not, its hard to escape determinism - and WE were MEANT to be...if it is random, then we are some lucky fuckers to be existing right now.

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"random" is a conception formed from within limited human understanding, so it's not a sound basis. I would suggest ideas from Chaos Theory and similar notions as more apt and offering more room for growth.

I think you are short selling the discussion here, no offense. But yes, sometimes the question "freewill or fate?" is moot or not important to answer, because sometimes it doesn't much matter which of the two you choose, and maybe it's generally not either one or the other!

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I haven't really given this kind of stuff any kinda rigorous thought in a decade or so, but it seems to me that the free will/determinism conundrum is probably best broken down by recognizing that there isn't a clear dividing line between what we would regard as genuinely autonomous behavior and behavior that is hard-wired and (in an ideal science) easily explicable in mechanistic terms.

On the one hand, we don't really see a need for a psychology of single-celled organisms - their behavior is pretty explicable in terms of biology, reducible to organic chemistry, etc. (Or maybe it is: I stayed the hell clear of O Chem as an undergrad.) On the other hand, we are tempted to think that human beings are complicated in a way that severs the reductive explanatory chain. And fair enough: it's hard to imagine how the omnipotent physicist of LaPlace, knowing everything about the arrangement and trajectory of atoms in space and time, could tell you anything interesting about, say, how I will end this sentence.

As I was sitting, contemplating how my life is riven by constant distractions the other day, it occurred to me that it's a matter of selective processing of information. There's too much out there for any evolutionarily viable organism to take in and process, and as such, there are naturally indeterminately many subsets of information that a complex creature like me (if I may say so myself) could take in. Each complex state I enter, given what I take in, has a range of probable responses. The more complex the organism, presumably, the more varied the possible subsets, and the more varied the possible responses (the tiger peering out from the forest might make me, but not my more fortunate dog, think about Blake, or about the pretty eyes of the girl who dumped me when I was 12, or maybe even about fleeing).

Once you get to a large enough sets of sets of information, behavior becomes difficult for epistemically limited creatures to predict. And reductionism seems implausible, though perhaps only because we're kinda dumb.

So far so good, but assuming that there is an explanatory chain that can account probabilistically for a range of responses, then it seems to me that it's less clear that reductionism implies a lack of something meaningfully like free will - but maybe not exactly like free will. I guess it's a big IF that you can have that kind of indeterminacy at the top of a reductionist science, but if so, it seems to me that, unlike the previous paragraph, the sense of being somehow free isn't illusory.

At least until I ask myself what distinguishes me from the spider, with its much poorer set of possible inputs and responses. It's not a difference of quality, it seems to me. And so for the gap between the spider and the amoeba.

I'm quite sure that the grad student I once was would have scoffed at this, but I'm pretty happy with my current epistemic limitations.

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Always a fan of your blogs, yug! and great presentation of hard stuff here - THE big question, as they say. Personally I'm a bit of a compatibilist on these issues (do you know Strawson's Freedom and Resentment?). Just one question brought on by your presentation: why do we always lump questions of explaining consciousness together with questions of free will. You could have agents with either one without the other, no? Anyway, good food for thought!!!

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"You could have agents with either one without the other, no? "

What is an agent if not a relatively independent decision center, aka an atom of free will?

And again, does consciousness need explanation (and if so, just what/how), or is consciousness the explanation?

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I think we have a future post!

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Hi Eds. By 'agent' I meant something broader, as in a thing 'that does something' - whether or not it its action is itself caused by something anterior. As for the explanatory role of consciousness, I'm not sure what you have in mind: What does it explain? Our understanding of the universe? The way we frame that understanding? personally, I'd seriously like to see you flesh out this bit sometime:

"Correctly done reductions show the inevitability of something like free will in consciousness."

You have some kind of Dennettian or Dretskean reduction of intentionality in mind? If so, neither really work for me. They explain how physical systems can do certain kinds of complex information-processing that can be described in mentalist 'intentionalist' terms, but it doesn't explain the fact of conscious EXPERIENCE of such information processing, the stuff Chalmers calls the 'hard problem'. Maybe I've misunderstood you here, though...

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"By 'agent' I meant something broader, as in a thing 'that does something' - whether or not it its action is itself caused by something anterior."

That would be 'actor' not 'agent'. Agency involves a degree of independence (talent agent, biological agent, moral agent,...). Once you have independence you have free will to some extent -- this is inevitable from 'articulation'. Interiority does not rule out free will, independence forces you to admit free will from the start if you talk about agents.

The so-called "free will" discussion usually mistakes free will for indeterminacy or some such and then proceeds to ask whether indeterminism and determinism are compatible. Conflating free will with indeterminism is okay for sophistry as "fencing practice".

personally, I'd seriously like to see you flesh out this bit sometime:

"Correctly done reductions show the inevitability of something like free will in consciousness."

The "flesh" reduced: Don't confuse 'inevitability' with 'absolute necessity'.

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Hmmm.. another blockquote failure... trying again:

the comment should have ended thus --

personally, I'd seriously like to see you flesh out this bit sometime:

"Correctly done reductions show the inevitability of something like free will in consciousness."

The "flesh" reduced: Don't confuse 'inevitability' with 'absolute necessity'.

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free will in BIOLOGICAL agents? huh? Chemical warfare agents like ricin, botulinum toxin don't in my opinion have free will...

pretty standard use of the word 'agent', I thought.

I agree that the stuff above by Merrill and co concerning opening a breach in deterministic nature by appealing to quantum theory and so on won't get you anywhere near room for free will. That wasn't where I'd head. I'm more of a relativist about 'reality' - mentalist reality where we chop the world conceptually in terms of intentional states and objects and physicalist reality where we do so in terms of 'regularities and laws of nature'. The two 'perspectives' can co-exist. That's the short version of my pt of view anyhoo...

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"free will in BIOLOGICAL agents"

No. If you insist on taking silly readings of my simple points, no point in trying to talk seriously with you. That was obviously a description of the use of 'agent' in general. Don't forget that biology is all in your head.

I don't see this thread as suited to argue free will etc. in particular.

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Didn't mean it as snark, eds. I just don't see the implication from 'agent' to 'some degree of independence'. If you got a blog on free will stewing, I'd love to see it...

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"I just don't see the implication from 'agent' to 'some degree of independence'. "

May I suggest a good dictionary and a little thought?


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Oh, you cant do this topic with just one post. I'll do more. But thank you. I appreciate everyone's kinds words of encouragement. It actually takes a lot of time to put these posts together.

As for compatabilism, I guess "soft compatabilism" fits me when I'm in the mood, the problem, of course, is the definition of "free will". We are probably not all talking about the same thing in the comments, even though we use the same words.

Finally, as to your question, the free will I generally mean, seems impossible in the absence of consciousness; but who the hell knows anyway!

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Great Book on this subject if anyone is interested. And it is written in layman speak (which is always good).

http://www.amazon.com/Parallel-Worlds-Journey-Creation-Dimensions/dp/0385509863

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