This post was accidentally posted here, and has now been reposted on America Abroad.

These are nervous times for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom appears to have thrown its customary caution to the wind. In Opinion pieces, through leaks and in face-to-face talks with the Vice President who was hastily summoned to Riyadh, Saudis are expressing their deep frustration with the turn of events. Their long investment in Lebanon is coming undone, Iraq is breaking up into a hostile Shia unite and a potentially troublesome Sunni “al-Qaedaland”, both sharing borders with the Kingdom. More worrisome, the Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq has somehow metamorphosed into a broader Saudi-Iranian competition at a time when Iran seems to hold most of the cards—in Iraq and Lebanon, and over the Palestinian issue. Iran is emerging as a hegemon with nuclear capability at a time when U.S. staying power in the region is open to question. Saudis fear an aggressive Iran, but perhaps fear even more an opening in US-Iran relations—which would then confirm Iranian status in the Persian Gulf and relegate them to second-class regional status. Not a surprise that King Abdullah has objected to U.S.-Iran talks.

The Kingdom’s response to this depressing turn of events has been uncharacteristically risky. First Riyadh reached out to Tel Aviv in the hope of putting together an anti-Iranian front. Then Riyadh bluntly threatened to use the oil weapon against Iran, and finally, upped the ante by threatening to support the Sunni insurgency in Iraq if the U.S. were to hastily withdraw its troops. The threat is a surprise and a worry. To begin with, it undermines the stated U.S. policy these days that the best way to get the attention of Iraqi leaders is to threaten them with leaving. Saudis seems to be signaling that the insurgents need not worry; Riyadh will come to their help. But beyond running at cross purposes with Washington rhetoric on Iraq, the Saudi strategy runs in the face of America’s commitment to the war on terror. All Saudi Arabia has to offer is funding jihadis!

All this is a throwback to the decade leading up to 9/11. In the 1980s and 1990s Saudis confronted Iran by funding radical Sunnis, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The result was Taliban and jihadis in Pakistan, and al-Qaeda’s war on America. The West was collateral damage to a containment policy gone wrong. Saudis could set jihadis on a war path with Iran—and they did well there—but then could not control the Frankenstein they had created. We are still dealing with the consequences of that strategy. America has for long followed a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy when it comes to Saudi ties to militant groups. We looked the other way before 9/11, and we have probably been looking the other way while they have been supporting the insurgency. We cannot afford to let Saudis mount another global jihad campaign. Iran presents serious challenges, but support for radicalism is not the answer. The cost is too high. Jihadism is not a clean weapon, and Saudis have shown they cannot control the demons that they create. It looks like Saudi Arabia has not learned anything from 9/11. Let us at least hope that Washington is smarter this time around. Let us also hope that Prince Turki al-Faysal, the architect of Saudi Arabia’s jihad strategy of the 1980s and 1990s, did not abruptly leave his post as Ambassador to Washington to take charge of the new jihad campaign.