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   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102</id>
   <updated>2009-02-11T19:27:41Z</updated>
   
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<entry>
   <title>Could Hitler Have Invoked &apos;State Secrets&apos; To Thwart Jews?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/could-hitler-have-invoked-stat.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.256493</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-12T15:18:40Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-11T19:27:41Z</updated>
   
   <summary>This absurdly demands justice, on top of the US government&apos;s refusal to enforce the law against the DOJ officials who violated FISA and Geneva....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-na-torture10-2009feb10,0,6909985.story">This</a> absurdly demands justice, on top of the US government's refusal to enforce the law against the DOJ officials who violated FISA and Geneva.<br /><br /><br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[<br />
This government got caught. The issues are known. The issue is not
longer one of secrecy for the state, but civil rights of human beings.<br />
<br />
We need to find a way to lawfully punish those who have agreed to
participate in these alleged Geneva violations. The question isn't
whether or not there are prohibitions against torture; but whether it
is a reasonable defense, on the back of the known abuse for anyone
involved to believe their actions were lawful.<br /><br />The real crime isn't merely the original abuse, which demands relief;
but the absurd assertion the information is a "state secret". Then, by
implication, this means the US government agrees there is an <i>official connection</i> with that original abuse.<br />
<br />
"State secrecy" isn't a right, but a privilege which the courts do not
have to recognize. Yet, the absurdity is for the government to strip
American citizens of their <i>right</i> -- illegally recast as a mere
"privilege" -- to be immune from unreasonable searches, and by-pass the
agreed to FISA standards ensuring judicial involvement.<br />
<br />
The question isn't the mob of American citizens demanding justice; but
the mob of reckless DOJ staff counsel who demand public assent to
illegal, government-directed activity.<br />
<br />
The mob of reckless DOJ Staff counsel deserve subsequent, lawful confrontation.<br />
<br />
What will the public lawfully do to ensure similar DOJ Staff counsel
blind deference to FISA and Geneva violations is timely confronted, and
does not become "local custom".<br />
]]>
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</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Treasury Vagueness Lowers Confidence In American Governance</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/treasury.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.256242</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-11T15:22:27Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-10T20:34:01Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The COP said there was a problem with vagueness. Former IMF officials raised the same concerns.What&apos;s worse than a financial crisis that is out of control? A government that still doesn&apos;t understand the problem and waves it&apos;s hands.Change, the old...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[The <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/">COP</a> said there was a problem with vagueness. <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/02/ex-imfer_on_geithners_speech_this_is_not_a_plan.php">Former IMF officials</a> raised the same concerns.<br /><br />What's worse than a financial crisis that is out of control? A government that still doesn't understand the problem and waves it's hands.<br /><br />Change, the old way.<br /><br /> 
]]>
      <![CDATA[<a href="http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-010909-report.pdf">COP</a>: What Is Treasury's Strategy?<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-010909-report.pdf">15 of 65</a>: Defining
the problem to be addressed is essential to designing an effective
strategy. If Treasury sees the core problem as inadequate bank capital
in relation to bank obligations, certain strategies to address that
problem will follow. On the other hand, if Treasury sees the problem as
unclear asset valuation, consumer caution, or accounting failures,
other strategies would follow. <b>Treasury has <u>still not explained</u>
precisely what it sees as <u>the problem</u>.</b><br /></blockquote>Treasury's Geithner <a href="http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18659.html">announced</a> a "plan" for the still-not-defined problem:<br /><br /><blockquote>


To increase transparency and accountability to protect taxpayers, Treasury will: <br /><br />
- launch a new website, <a href="http://www.financialstability.gov/">FinancialStability.gov</a>, to detail where federal
funds are going and whether they are succeeding in stabilizing the
financial system and promoting new lending, including posting all
contracts on the Internet.<br /></blockquote>


However, Treasury at <a href="http://www.financialstability.gov/">the website</a> did not define the problem:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf">FinancialStability</a>: To address the financial crisis, the Financial Stability Plan is designed to attack our credit crisis on all fronts with our full arsenal of financial tools and the resources commensurate to <b>the depth of <i>the problem</i></b>.<br /></blockquote>More <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/02/ex-imfer_on_geithners_speech_this_is_not_a_plan.php">vagueness</a> raising questions whether the US will have a <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/financial-crisis-catalyst-for.php">new government</a> <i>before</i> the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/reforming-tarp-to-justify-conf.php">lessons of TARP are applied</a>.<br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">N</font></b>ot much assurance this can be avoided:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg18.htm">Geithner</a>: "As costly as this effort may be, we know that the cost of a <b><u>complete
collapse</u> of our financial system</b> would be incalculable for families,
for businesses and for our nation."<br /></blockquote>We learned from the Asian, Argentinian, and Russian financial crises that an <i>undesirable</i> outcome does <b>not</b> mean that outcome is <i>prevented</i>.<br /><br />Bush said we were fighting terror, but <i>embraced</i> torture. Who's ready for feudalism?<br /><br />]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Data Breach: FAA Statements Irreconcilable With GAO Findings</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/faa.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.256175</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-10T16:22:15Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-10T21:31:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The FAA reports a data breach, where employee personal information was accessed. Press reports suggest this is not an isolated problem.Yahoo: Hackers broke into the Federal Aviation Administration&apos;s computer system last week, accessing the names and Social Security numbers of...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
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      <![CDATA[The FAA reports a <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090210/ap_on_go_ot/faa_computers">data breach</a>, where employee personal information was accessed. Press reports suggest this is not an isolated problem.<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://buzz.yahoo.com/article/1:y_news:43edad6ad17065ebd600d629332f5d1e">Yahoo</a>: Hackers broke into the <span class="yshortcuts" id="lw_1234243370_0">Federal Aviation Administration</span>'s computer system <b>last week</b>, accessing the names and <span style="background: transparent none repeat scroll 0% 50%; cursor: pointer; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;" class="yshortcuts" id="lw_1234243370_1">Social Security numbers</span> of 45,000 employees and retirees.<br /></blockquote>The President released February 9th, Monday morning, at <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/AdvisorsToConductImmediateCyberSecurityReview/">12:00AM</a> a <a href="http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Obama_orders_sweeping_review_of_US_0210.html">cyber security review</a>, and announced appointment of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melissa_Hathaway">Melissa Hathaway</a> <i>before</i> the FAA news broke on February 10th. Hathaway's appointment was announced on the <a href="http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=35&amp;sid=1595355">6th of February</a>.<br /><br />The appointments compare with Obama's <a href="http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/homeland_security/">campaign goal</a> and the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/homeland_security/">White House agenda</a>: "Protect Information networks."<br /><br />It's curious to compare the published reports on the FAA data breach
with GAO report summaries. We believe FAA issued misleading statements
to the public as a smokescreen from cursory FAA management follow-up of
"closed" action items; and other problems with management oversight in
the homeland security and intelligence community sectors.<br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[<b>1. </b><b>Summary Conclusion</b><br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">It</font></b> appears the US
government put a premium on gathering information, not in ensuring
mangement was adequately meeting well-promulgated industry standards or
legal compliance requirements. It's likely some of the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php">secret DOJ OLC memos</a> helped fuel this lax approach to auditing and legal compliance.<br /><br />Below, we review the FAA's troubled relationship with the GAO, and
the many findings suggest there are larger issues warranting public
review. The issue isn't narrowly protecting information, but how the
entrenched management problems related to the FAA security breach are
indicative of other management problems related to privacy,
intelligence gathering, and domestic intelligence gathering against
Americans.<br /><br /><i>Followup</i><br /><br />On top of <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/AdvisorsToConductImmediateCyberSecurityReview/">the review</a>, ask the FAA when was the last time they did an audit using <a href="http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/fiscam.html">these GAO guidelines</a>.
This would not be the first time the homeland security-connected IT
personnel brushed off concerns about data breaches or unauthorized
access.<br /><br />NSA has relationships with acquisition programs to
ensure software products are protected. Review the NSA findings within
the FAA system program office, and review the FAA plans to meet the NSA
data protection standards.<br /><br />If the FAA failed to implement the GAO guidelines, it remains to be understood how this gap relates to what the FAA's software contractors are reviewing or missing. The same system management, oversight, and legal compliance system in place to ensure the FAA fully protects data is the same management system in place conducting FAA reviews of aviation.<br /><br />NASA confused a key software variable in the <a href="http://www.tcc.edu/faculty/webpages/PGordy/Egr120/MarsOrbt.pdf">1999 Mars Orbiter crash</a>. The same crew that is <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/faa-responds-to.html">reviewing FAA software</a> are likely the same contractors involved with FISA surveillance. People who appear to be cutting corners, or have inadequate legal compliance in the FAA area have a hard time arguing they're fully complying with FISA.<br /><br /><b>2. GAO Report</b><br /><span id="page_lblstory"></span><br /><p>The FAA certified that the GAO finding-recommendation had been implemented:<br /></p><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a>: <b>Recommendation</b>: The Secretary of Transportation should direct
the Administrator, FAA, to, in the area of information systems security
management, <b><u>complete the information systems security directives</u></b>.<br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><b>Status</b>: <font style="font-size: 1.5625em;"><u>Implemented</u></font><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>:
FAA has issued security directives on its information systems security
program, internet access points, internet services, software releases,
and password administration. Additional directives are being developed
and planned.<br /></blockquote>The "directive" appears to have not been followed or was incomplete. The question turns on whether DOT IG adequately reviewed the FAA certification to the GAO; and what follow-up compliance program (if any) was implemented and reviewed.<br /><br /><blockquote>- How were the originally "closed" or "implemented" auditing findings reviewed on a periodic basis?<br /><br />- Which FAA senior leadership personally reviewed the stated compliance program, and veritified (using what methods) that the "compliance program" met the requirements FAA said to GAO that it had met?<br /></blockquote><br /><b>3. Reconsidering FAA Conduct since 1990s, and implications for HD-IC</b><br /><br />The above suggests the FAA has misplaced priorities. Despite assurances of compliance, the FAA has shown itself to have made dubious representations.<br /><br />The lessons should be broadly applied to what the US government has been promsing the public in the Homeland Defense and Intelligence Community (HD-IC) circles.<br /><br />Indeed, now that FAA has proven itself incapable of ensuring that it's "compliance" program complies or adequately implements procedures, we need to go back through the old GAO reports and examine which other audit findings have also been ignored by FAA-DOT <i>management</i>, inadequately implemented, or inadequately reviewed by <i>DOT IG</i>. <br /><br /><i>Then</i> we can apply those lessons to other questionable HD-IC conduct, and shed some light on the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php">President's secret executive orders</a>.<br /><!--RECKEY : 10 --><br /><i>Information Security Management Practices</i><br /><br />The GAO reports since the 1990s have reminded the public, Congress, and DOT of industry guidelines available to adequately safeguard computer resources. The gap between what the FAA was saying and what they are doing highlights these issues:<br /><br /><blockquote>1. Where is the reconciliation table showing how the management practices have been adequately incorporated into the stress testing and periodic software security programs;<br /><br />2. How many similar "industry practices" has the National Security Agency reviewed, certified as compliant; or has the NSA, as appears to be the case, put more emphasis on other areas, and let "low priority data requirements" fall through the cracks<br /></blockquote><br />Agencies have guidelines how to protect information systems:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/HR-97-9">GAO, 1997</a>: (6) these management practices provide proven, practical methods for
addressing the federal government's information management problems,
maximizing benefits from technology spending, and controlling the risks
of system acquisition and development efforts; (7) the challenge now is
for <b>agencies to apply this framework to their own technology efforts</b>;<br /></blockquote><i>Staffing</i><br /><br />Recall, Y2K-concerns prompted agency attention, and FAA did rely on foreign specialists to fill the gaps in the US software labor pool. Yet, today's revelation shows seven (7) years after 9-11, the US government still has no adequate program to ensure the gaps in the existing software development, testing, and security fields have been met.<br /><br />BY contrast, before Pearl Harbor, the United States mobilized. The public should reasonably ask, why, despite the catalyst of&nbsp; 9-11 and the foreseeable problems with excess production capacity, why there was no adequate plan to ensure the US government organized sufficient computer security personnel to address the FAA's data protection requirements:<br /><br /><blockquote>What scope of software data protection requirements are not getting filled;<br /><br />What reason, after 9-11, has the NSA and other agencies developed methods to continue hiring allied nationals who are supposedly "with" the US in the "war on terror"<br /><br />How many nations has the NSA decertified because of trivial reasons, thereby ensuring necessary software development efforts cannot proceed<br /><br />How many people have contractors or US government personnel falsely accused to protect their jobs, only to alienate the very people who might be in the position to constructively provide assistance<br /></blockquote><br />FAA was, at one time, not opposed to using foreign nationals to correct its software deficiencies:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/AIMD-00-55">GAO</a>: Of 153 mission critical <b class="highlight">FAA</b> systems that were remediated, 15 had foreign involvement, including <b>Chinese</b>, <b>Ukranian</b>, and <b>Pakistani</b> nationals.<br /><br /></blockquote>With peace breaking out in Iraq and Afghanistan, is there a reason the
FAA has not hired AlQueda or the Taliban to do it's software coding?<br /><br />The current breach isn't the first time this has happened, or that there have been complaints:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.itexaminer.com/faa-files-hacked-again.aspx">IT examiner</a>: <span id="page_lblstory">This is a <b>second instance</b> of employee data
being compromised. Waters said that earlier his union <b>complained to the
FAA and the inspector general</b> of the Transportation Department about
mailings to employees generated from information that seemed to
originate in FAA files. He claims that nothing was done about it.
Waters doesn't have a high opinion of the IT systems people, who, he
says,&nbsp;"need to take a long hard look at themselves and their
capabilities. This is malpractice in their world." he claims.<br /><br /></span></blockquote>Now
that the FAA's audit-reconciliation process appears broken, we need to
re-examine (as was not done re 9-11) what other similar breakdowns
exist. Going back to 1994, GAO reports FAA was spending money on
computer systems, but what kind of software testing was done:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED-94-191">GAO</a>: $2.3 billion for facilities and equipment;<span id="page_lblstory"></span><br /></blockquote><span id="page_lblstory"></span><blockquote><span id="page_lblstory"></span></blockquote><span id="page_lblstory"><br />Billions of dollars spent, but in 2008, <i>encrypted</i> personnel information is breached:<br /><br /></span><blockquote><p>AP: Tom Waters, president of American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees Local 3290, said FAA officials told unions
representing agency employees at a briefing Monday that the second
breached file with personal information contained <b><u>encrypted</u> medical
information</b>.</p></blockquote><br /><i>Timeliness Problems Raise Doubts About FAA Stated Actions</i> <br /><br />Above
we've shown the GAO findings raised concerns which the FAA dubiously
explained away. Similarly, the FAA's statements about timeliness are in
stark contrast to what the GAO found. This raises doubts about whether
the FAA statements today and what they are supposedly doing should be
believed; or whether, as is more likely, the FAA is still fumbling
around with "higher priority" problems:<br /><br />GAO reports FAA was not timely:<br /><br />
<blockquote><p><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-330">GAO</a>: "(6) further, <b>FAA has not always acted quickly to implement corrective
actions</b> for the systems that have undergone risk assessments and
penetration testing; (7) FAA has established an information systems
security management structure, but <b>does not yet have a comprehensive
security program in place</b>;"</p></blockquote><p>This problem of glacial problem resolution continued:<br /></p>
<blockquote><p>AP: "These government systems should be the best in the
world and apparently they are able to be compromised," said Waters, an
FAA contracts attorney. "Our information technology systems people need
to take a long hard look at themselves and their capabilities. <b>This is
malpractice in their world</b>."</p></blockquote><blockquote><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-330">GAO</a>: "(1) FAA's agencywide <b>computer security program has serious and pervasive problems</b>;"<br /></blockquote><i>FAA Media Relations Credibility Problem</i><br /><br />FAA appears to have made dubious statements to the union about security compliance:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><p>AP: Waters said <b>FAA officials <u><i>told</i></u> union leaders the incident was the
<i><u>first of its kind</u></i></b> at the agency. But he said his union complained about
three or four years ago about an incident in which <b>employees received
anti-union mail that used names and addresses that appeared to be
<u>generated from FAA computer files</u></b><u>.</u></p></blockquote>
The GAO findings suggest that as of 2000 FAA had <i>not</i> completed critical detection tests; and subsequent reports of additional non-compliance appear to have fallen on deaf ears:<br /><br />
<blockquote><p><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-330">GAO</a>: "(9) FAA has not yet fully implemented an intrusion detection capability
that will enable it to quickly <b>detect and respond to <u>malicious
intrusions</u>.</b>"</p></blockquote><p><i>Lack of Confidence In FAA Management Response</i><br /></p><p>Today's
problem isn't narrowly the data breach, but whether, on the back of the
previous questionable FAA statements, we should believe management is
genuinely concerned about a trivial matter of employee data. This is
the agency that moved slowly on flight security.</p>The question after
9-11 is to what extent the same incompetence continues, and to what
extent the FAA, DHS, DOT, and HD-IC have used "war on terror" as a
method to thwart public oversight of continuing reckless US government
conduct.<br /><p><br />The Union leadership reports they filed reports about the data breaches, but were not satisfied with the responses, if any:<br /></p><blockquote><p>AP: He said the union complained to the FAA and the Transportation Department's inspector general but <b><u>no action</u> was taken.</b></p></blockquote>
<p>We need to find out why, given the FAA's apparent misleading statements about this incident, what's happened between 2000-2009.<br /></p><p><br /><i>FAA </i><i>Policy Compliance Problem</i><br /></p><p>These
statements attributed to the FAA do not appear consistent with GAO
findings that the FAA was glacial in responding to auditing concerns.<br /></p><br />
<blockquote><p>AP: The server that was accessed was not connected to the operation of
the air traffic control system and there is no indication those systems
have been compromised, the statement said "The FAA is <b><u>moving
quickly</u></b> to prevent any similar incidents and <u>has identified immediate
steps as well as longer-term measures</u> to further protect personal
information," the statement said. The agency said it is providing a
toll-free number for employees "who believe they may be affected by the
breach."</p></blockquote>
<i>FAA Moving Glacially On Core Policy</i><br /><br />It defies reason to believe the FAA is moving quickly. FAA claims that they were moving "quickly" on trivial <u>personnel records</u> are not consistent with previous GAO found that FAA was not timely moving on issues related to <u>core FAA policy</u>:<br /><br />
<blockquote><p><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-330">GAO</a>: "(4) in the area of facilities' physical security, FAA is making
progress in assessing its facilities, but FAA has identified
significant weaknesses, and <b>numerous air traffic control (ATC)
facilities <u>have yet to be assessed</u> and accredited as secure, <u>in
compliance with FAA's policy</u></b>;"</p></blockquote>It
is a dubious proposition that FAA, today, is moving quickly on
anything. Despite years of warnings and assurances, things fell through
the crack. FAA has the appearance of a slow moving agency, when
confronted a by a public relations disaster appears more adept at
saying nice things not providing reasonable assurances, especially in
light of the GAO findings.<br /><br /><p><b>4. </b><b>Double Standard for US Government, Public</b><br /></p><p>American
citizens, if they were found to have breached any of the above
requirements, could be investigated, subject to intrusive questioning,
and threated with if not prosecuted. <br /></p><p><br />Yet, the US
government refused to prosecute personnel who attest they&nbsp; have met
agency requirements, but those attestations are invalid. The public
should reasonably challenge the double standard between how government
officials are oversee and how the American public is daily confronted.<br /></p><p><i>Government Statements Given Undue Deference</i><br /><br />One
of the ideas of audits is to detect problems, and adjust. Yet, it
appears there were multiple FAA certifications that things were fine,
problems had been addressed, or there were not longer issues. The
public has been getting dubious statements from the US government about
whether they have or have not complied with minimum security
requirements.<br /></p><i>Public Has Unreasonable Burden of Proof</i><br /><br />Yet,
when the DOT contractors and security personnel challenge the public,
the public is put in a "prove you're innocent to us"-position. The same
should be applied to the FAA: DOT and other FAA-associated contractors,
security personnel, and information aggregators should discuss:<br /><br /><blockquote>- What information have they collected on the public;<br />- What provisions are there to safeguard this information;<br />- What methods have they used to disseminate this information;<br />-
Does the public know how incorrect information is provided to
non-government institutions including credit reporting agencies,
employers, or other non-security personnel<br />- With this many problems
with DOT being incapable of "implementing" security programs (which it
falsely asserted had been "implemented") why should the public believe
DOT has an adequate handle on claims about how private information on
US citizens (not just FAA employees) is appropriately safeguarded, or
that the data security promises are being met?<br /></blockquote><b>5. Questionable Management Certifications</b><br /><br />Consider the long list of "implemented" promises related to issues directly touching the recent FAA security breach:<br /><br /><blockquote><font color="#1589ff"><b>A. Directives Not Implemented As Certified</b></font><br /><br /><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a>: <b>Recommendation</b>: The Secretary of Transportation should
direct the Administrator, FAA, to, in the area of information systems
security management, <u><b>complete the information systems security
directives</b></u>.<br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">Status: <u>Implemented</u></font></b><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>:
FAA has issued security directives on its information systems security
program, internet access points, internet services, software releases,
and password administration. Additional directives are being developed
and planned.</blockquote><!--RECKEY : 10 --><hr style="padding-top: 10px;"><br /><blockquote><br /><b><font color="#1589ff">B. Security Management Policies Not Implemented As Certified</font></b><br /><br /><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a>: <b>Recommendation</b>:
The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator, FAA,
to, in the area of information systems security management, <u>fully
implement and enforce all security policies</u>.<br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>Status</b>: <font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><u>Implemented</u></font></font><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>:
FAA is implementing its information systems security policies.
Specifically, it is tracking security training of all key ISS
personnel, proceeding to assess, certify and accredit information
systems as secure, and its computer security incident response center
is operational.<!--RECKEY : 11 --><hr style="padding-top: 10px;"><br /><b><font color="#1589ff">C. Ongoing Management Review of Training Courses Inadequate Despite Certifying "Implemented"</font></b><br /><br /><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a>: <b>Recommendation</b>:
The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator, FAA,
to, in the area of information systems security management, complete
efforts to <u><b>develop and implement new information systems security
training courses.</b></u><br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><b>Status</b>: <font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><u>Implemented</u></font><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>:
FAA has developed a series of security training courses. These include
system certification and accreditation courses and information systems
security officer training. Additionally, FAA is developing new courses
to be offered in 2003.<!--RECKEY : 12 --><blockquote><hr style="padding-top: 10px;"><font color="#1589ff"><br /></font></blockquote><b><font color="#1589ff">D. Inadequate Management Assessment of Possible Security Breaches On All Systems, Despite Certifying "Implemented"</font></b> <br /><br /><font color="#1589ff"><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a></font>: <b>Recommendation</b>:
The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator, FAA,
to, in the area of service continuity, <b><u>assess the effects of security
breaches on all systems</u></b>.<br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>Status</b>: <u>Implemented</u></font><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>: FAA's Computer Security Incident Response Center now assesses reported security incidents and their impact on FAA.<!--RECKEY : 13 --><blockquote><hr style="padding-top: 10px;"><font color="#1589ff"><br /></font></blockquote><b><font color="#1589ff">E.
Inadequate Contingency Planning To Mitigate Security Breaches, Despite
Certifying "Implemented" (Unreliable Agency Public Statements)<br /><br /></font></b><font color="#1589ff"><a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-171">GAO</a></font>: <b>Recommendation</b>:
The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator, FAA,
to, in the area of service continuity, <b><u>enhance existing contingency
plans to address potential systems security breaches</u></b>.<br /><br /><b>Agency Affected</b>: Department of Transportation<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>Status</b>: <u>Implemented</u></font><br /><br /><b>Comments</b>:
Under FAA's information systems security policy, system-specific
contingency plans are required as part of the systems certification and
authorization process. FAA reports that it has certified and authorized
critical air traffic control systems.<br /></blockquote><b>6. Conclusion</b><br /><br />DOT
and FAA management have a problem. The public, GAO, and COngress have
been promised after 9-11 there would be effective programs in place to
apply the lessons. The record on information security is wanting.<br /><br />The
GAO identified issues to the FAA, which the FAA said were resolved. GAO
identified many management-level issues which the FAA assured had been
resolved. The GAO made recommendations to resolve specific security
breaches. The FAA certified to the GAO that these recommendations had
been implemented.<br /><br />The public has been left the impression that
the FAA and DOT have an adequate compliance program in place. Today's
report undermines reasonable public confidence about the credibility of
FAA attestations to auditors.<br /><br />There is a reasonable basis to
question whether the FAA management has, as would be reasonably
expected, to conduct periodic reviews to ensure that the closed actions
items were adequately resolved.<br /><br /><font color="#1589ff">Putting
aside the GAO reports, the question turns on what other DOT assurances
made. This data breach shows that despite repeat findings and FAA
assurances, the data protection requirements were not met. This raises
questions about what other information-related standards and
requirements have ore have not been met.</font><br /><br />There is a
serious gap between what the FAA promised, and what the FAA was doing.
The DOT IG has yet to explain why findings from the 1990s have
continued; and what DOT oversight problems existed in the wake of the
dubious FAA assurances to the GAO.<br /><br />The public should reasonably
review the implications of this problem: What other promises,
assurances, or protocols does the FAA or DOT, but are not being
adequately audited; and how are these gaps being explited:<br /><br /><blockquote><i>Official Policy of Not Documenting Misconduct In Email To Avoid Creating Adverse Evidence</i><br /><br />A.
Which security protocols do DOT or DHS-related security personnel have
to meet, but the auditors have not discovered how contractors are
engaging in illegal detentions, searches of American citizens?<br /><br /><i>Illegal Methods To Acquire Private Information For Improper Purposes</i><br /><br />B.
What information has DOT or DHS collected, what assurances were made
about safeguarding that information; but how have DOT or DHS
contractors actually provided that information to third parties outside
US government control<br /><br /><i>US Government, HD-IC Non-Cooperation To Ensure Data Validity</i><br /><br />C.
What method does the public have to timely ensure that false
information based on DHS or DOT contractors is removed from the system<br /><br /><i>Dubious Shield of Terrorism Undermines Public Support</i><br /><br />D.
To what extent are false accusations by DHS or DOT-connected personnel,
contractors at the federal, state, or local level being used to
pretextually start "terror related investigations" without adequate
oversight<br /><br /><i>Circular Reasoning To "Justify" Illegal, Intrusive Intelligence Gathering Against American Citizens</i><br /><br />E. To what extent are "terror-related investigations" -- which <i>do not</i>
find any adverse information -- given additional investigative
resources because the investigators "just know" that the "reason" they
can't find any evidence is because the "person is hiding it"? This is
circular reasoning to justify abuse of innocents at Guantanamo.<br /></blockquote>The
FAA data breach shows the FAA cannot adequately meet the promises it
made to the GAO. The question is which other US government "assurances"
to the courts should be turned on its head. It remains to be seen how
many other promises the US government has made to American citizens
which defy government practices and the US constitution.<br /><br /><b>7. Recommendations</b><br /><br /><font color="#1589ff">The public should share information, outside Congress and the courts, related to similar <u>questionable</u> practices in the Homeland Defense-Intelligence Community (HD-IC):</font><br /><br /><blockquote><i>Misrepresentations To Mask Official Misconduct</i><br /><br />-
What supposed "legal compliance programs" have HD-IC asserted to the
courts that they are fully meeting as a method to reduce settlement
agreements, or paint the picture that an incident is an anomoly; but,
in fact, there are management policies which condone false statements,
false accusations against the public, or improper employee-contractor
conduct during official investigations?<br /><br />- What methods exist to
ensure DHS-DOT-connected contractors, security personnel, or others
involved with infrastructure protection do not get the impression that
they can misrepresent the details of an "incident" to distract
attention from <i>their</i> illegal activity or security breaches?<br /><br /><i>Obstruction of Justice</i><br /><br />-
What methods does the FBI have to review whether statements from
DHS-DOT-related security personnel, contractors at the federal, state,
or local level are not misrepresenting the details of a "security
incident"?<br /><br /><i>Methods To Detect Government, Contractor Fraud In Deteriorating Economic Conditions</i><br /><br />-
What method with the new AG and President used to ensure there is a
proper balancing, outside the court, on whether to believe
"accusations" by personnel who have a heightened interest in this <i>economic crisis</i> to deflect attention from their misconduct, maintain job security, and create problems for others?<br /><br /><i>"Terror Threat" As An Ongoing Excuse To Violate Constitution</i><br /><br />-
How many times has DHS-DOT-related contractors or security personnel
used a "terror related investigation" has the pretext to confront what
they believe are auditors who have detected evidence of agency
misconduct, security breaches, or other questionable conduct warranting
contract termination?<br /><br /><i>Official Misrepresentations To Thwart 1983 Actions</i><br /><br />-
To what extent are legal counsel adequately incorporating evidence of
dubious DHS-DOT-related contractors' statements within 42 USC 1983
claims, and impeaching contractor "witnesses" who have attempted to
deflect attention from <i>their</i> improper conduct?<br /><br /><i>Intimidation: Targeting Outside Detection of Officials Misconduct</i><br /><br />-
How often does the US government, DOT-DHS contractors, or other
security personnel use "terror related investigations" as a smokescreen
to target American citizens who are aware of security breaches, illegal
activity, or improper contractor conduct?<br /><br /><i>Lessons from US in Iraq: Improper Deference To US Government, Contractors Over Civilians</i><br /><br />-
To what extent are DOT-DHS security contractors using "terror related
investigations" as a shield to hide files, employees, or other evidence
from court review or possible witness impeachment when conducting
discovery DOT-DHS assaults on American constitutional rights?<br /><br />-
Does President Obama plan to allow DHS-DOT-related "terror related
investigations" to be a shield to discovery when American citizens
attempt to understand how employees have misrepresented information
during official investigations to deflect attention from their
misconduct, security breaches, or non-authorized disclosure of
sensitive information?<br /></blockquote><br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Financial Crisis: Catalyst For New US Governance</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/financial-crisis-catalyst-for.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.255875</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-09T15:35:47Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-09T22:16:35Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Raw reports on wikileaks publishing Congressional Research Reports (CRS) which have been, until now, closely held. Some of the CRS reports cover disasters including Katrina, 9-11, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This financial crisis is a fifth disaster. While CRS might have...</summary>
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      <name>testing</name>
      
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      <![CDATA[<a href="http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Wikileaks_publishes_billion_dollars_of_semisecret_0208.html" title="Report on Wikileaks disclosure of CRS reports">Raw</a> reports on wikileaks publishing Congressional Research Reports (CRS) which have been, until now, closely held. Some of the CRS reports cover disasters including Katrina, 9-11, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This financial crisis is a <i>fifth</i> disaster.  <br /><br />While CRS might have reviewed the systemic problems, the financial crisis spread. Had the reports been disclosed, the public might have reviewed the systemic governance problems contributing to these disasters. Now we can.<br /><br />Some are talking about <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/therap/2009/02/how-much-is-too-much.php" title="TPM blogger TheraP: Comment Thread">the symptoms</a>.&nbsp;  We need to focus on the <i>real</i> problem, <i>then</i> talk about solutions.<b>&nbsp; </b>While some <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/rowanwolf/2009/02/where-is-americas-anger.php" title="TPM Blogger Rowan Wolf">take to the streets</a>, we must discuss <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/aunt_sam/2009/02/what-would-you-give-up.php" title="TPM Blogger Aunt Sam">abandoning</a> what has failed.<br /><br />Are you ready?<br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[<b>T</b>his<b> </b>financial crisis is a <i>symptom</i> of flawed governance.&nbsp;
There error is to characterize the&nbsp; financial crisis as "the problem". The real problem is the failed governance model. <br /><blockquote>If you want to productively spend your time, there's something you can do: Discuss the specific solutions which will reform the failed governance model.<br /></blockquote>This failed governance model cannot get it right. It recklessly
conducts combat operations in <a href="http://www.wikileaks.com/wiki/CRS:_Afghanistan:_Challenges_and_Options_for_Reconstructing_a_Stable_and_Moderate_State%2C_July_11%2C_2002" title="Wiki Leaks-disclosed report on Afghanistan, focuses on symptom of failed governance">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="http://www.wikileaks.com/wiki/CRS:_Iraq_Reconstruction:_Frequently_Asked_Questions_Concerning_the_Application_of_Federal_Procurement_Statutes%2C_July_23%2C_2003" title="wikileaks-disclosed CRS Report; Iraq Is Really Symptom of Failed US Governance">Iraq</a>; it failed to prepare for <a href="http://www.wikileaks.com/wiki/CRS:_Hurricane_Katrina_Recovery:_Contracts_Awarded_by_the_Federal_Government%2C_November_4%2C_2005" title="CRS report disclosed by wikileaks -- Focusing on symptoms not problems">Katrina</a>
and 9-11; but asks that we celebrate its do-overs and reckless reaction.&nbsp;
This isn't leadership.<br /><br />Indeed, the subsequent (still unsuccessful) adjustments would not have been
required had governance first succeeded. Despite failing to mitigate this financial crisis, the US government
would have us believe we should continue to have blind faith in what
what has failed. That is folly.<br /><br /><i>Symptoms of Failed Governance: Impeachable Offenses, Financial Crisis</i><br /><br /><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12631" title="Working Group on Financial Markets, created 1988 (11 years ago)">This group</a> was created after the Asian Financial Crisis.&nbsp; Yet, after more than ten years to get ready, they failed.&nbsp; Also, instead of challenging the Executive branch misdeeds, <a href="http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Leahy_proposes_truth_commission_to_probe_0209.html" title="Why no impeachment investigation?">Leahy</a> wants to <i>review</i> what happened. However, the time to investigate and <i>confront</i> was when the problem was small, and something could have been done. <br /><br />The same governance system which refused to apply the "lessons" of the Asian Financial crisis to our economy cannot be expected to apply the lessons of the Bush Administration to better conduct Executive branch oversight.&nbsp; Congress (again) promises to do better, but doesn't deliver. Congress needs a credible threat of new governance: Both to awaken it to its responsibility, and to deny it the discretion to ignore what's needed -- real change.<br /><br />It is irresponsible for us to roll our eyes, and say, "There they go
again."&nbsp; "Too late" means they're not up to the job.&nbsp; Like this financial crisis, this Congress turned a blind eye to the
warnings about impeachable offenses. The US government would have Americans celebrate the idea of change, but in
the old way. We did that after the 2006-era promise of change, but that
gave us this financial crisis. Enough.<br /><br />They didn't do their job. Their <strike>reasons</strike><i> excuses for inaction</i> can be eliminated. We need something
better.<br /><br /><i>Failed Systems Recklessly React</i><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><br /><b>In</b></font> the wake of may disasters since 2001 the American governance model is conveniently tripped by a
financial crisis. We don't need more examples of failure. We need a plan.<br /><br />Real solutions would dilute or strip the US government of power it abuses, and re-delegate that power to <i>responsible</i> centers of power.<br /><b><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></b>his American
leadership loves this crisis. As a convenient smokescreen, this crisis creates a new problem for them to "solve," without confronting the <i>real</i> problem which led us down this path: The failed American governance model.<br /><font style="font-size: 1em;"><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><br /></font></b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><font style="font-size: 0.8em;">T</font></font>h</font>is
crew explained away the <a href="http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/" title="Securities Laws which were watered down, not (as needed) applied to derivatives">lessons of 1929</a> as enacted in the 1933-4 Acts.
The lobbyists said the regulation was quaint (as they did with
<a href="http://www.wikileaks.com/wiki/CRS:_The_Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act:_A_Sketch_of_Selected_Issues%2C_July_7%2C_2008" title="WikiLeaks-Disclosed CRS report on FISA; Congress secretly agreed to defy established order.">FISA</a>, <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/08/torture-humanrights" title="Evidence of Torture, CIA-MI6 mutilating prisoners">Geneva</a>, and <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/38695prs20090209.html" title="Despite Geneva, new AG backs suppressing information about extraordinary rendition">rendition</a>), but demand American citizens foot the bill. <br /><br />This crew wants to spend with this bailout on the order of $600,000 <em>per job</em>
and call that a bailout. With that ratio, for each job the government
creates, we could hire 20 Americans, at $30,000 per
year. It's a no brainer we could put 20-times the people back to work,
never mind whether there are profits to sustain those jobs.<br /><b><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></b>his crew continues to abuse power. It has failed to use the power of
the purse to constrain itself, but expand its failed model.&nbsp; <font style="font-size: 0.8em;"><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></font>he US
government has it backwards: They ignore our ideas when our inputs
might make a difference; they view the law as discretionary; and cast
aside the
lessons of history as irrelevant.<br /><br />We didn't sign up for this, but agreed through <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data/constitution/preamble/" title="Preamble To US Constitution: Seeking Common Benefits We Could Not Achieve On Our Own">this Constitution</a> to secure our <i>common</i> prosperity, justice, and defense, not create a gravy train <i>for</i> failed governance.&nbsp; Those who thwarted regulation should shoulder the burden. We should not reward their obstruction.<br /><br />
<p>The government is belatedly begging for American
citizen input. This isn't leadership, but an admission the elected
officials and their paid lobbyists have run out of ideas. <br /></p><p>Their goal is to take credit for creating a wider net of <i>blame</i>. Yet, when it comes to their power and
authority, they rush to the very governance model they ignore and
exploit; and demand we rally around their incompetence.<br /></p><font style="font-size: 1em;">T</font>o add insult to injury, they're not paying <i>us</i> for our ideas, but rewarding the same incompetence which led us to where we are.&nbsp; This leadership isn't
responsibly bailing out those who should be supported, but feeding those who should be prosecuted.<br /><br />They're ratifying the same inefficient
operations which, in part, fuels the problem: More reckless management
decisions. Once the Congress turned a blind eye to impeachable offenses, others made an excuse to ignore the recklessness within Congress, and mismanagement within the American legal profession and executive branch.<br /><br />We cannot reward those who share the responsibility for what went wrong, nor attack those who call for what is right.<br /><b><font style="font-size: 1em;"><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></font></b>heir trumpets rally the public to support <i>their</i>
failed governance, not the needed systemic changes.&nbsp; We need systems to ensure legal compliance, and not merely a check on, but a lawful <i>confrontation with</i> abusive power.<br /><br /><p>Abuse isn't just how power is abused, but how power, when <i>not used</i>, allows an emerging threat to blossom into another crisis. The current governance model fails to aggressively challenge <i>and defeat</i> malfeasance and neglect.<br /></p><p><i>Supportable Governance Effectively Manages Problems</i></p><p>This governance model consistently allows problems to spiral out of control. There is another way.<font style="font-size: 1em;"> Management means adjusting to solve problems as they emerge, not react after the crisis becomes foregone conclusions.</font></p><p><font style="font-size: 1em;">The current model rewards systems, professions, and careerists who have a perverted sense of loyalty and priorities. B</font>etter governance would require the power and rights of
the people to be placed first; and institutionalize as <i>Constitutional requirements</i>
basic economic governance standards including auditing, oversight, and
financial regulation. <br /></p><p>Powerful and corrupt forces have thwarted the needed reforms. The new governance model most check, confront, and, where needed, defeat these forces, not create loopholes to allow them to fester and threaten our common security.<br /></p><p>The changes must compel the leadership to timely conduct oversight,
investigate, risk mitigate risk, and steward the economy -- things <a href="http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL116000">lawyers</a> explained away as quaint.&nbsp; Then let the lawyers
<a href="http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL116000/newsletterpubs/Q&amp;AWithTommyWells.pdf" title="ABA President Talks About Regulations In Wake of Financial Crisis">explain away</a> a new established order which makes their defiance illegal.</p>The lawyers claim they are in a profession that calls. They cannot take credit for their failure to answer. The economy is a bridge to economic goals. Government and the legal profession view themselves as a cottage industry, not as a tools to our common prosperity. The same lawyers thwarting financial regulation should be examined for their similar obstruction of legal profession oversight and tighter <i>federal</i> regulation.<i><br /><br />The Price of (Non) Regulation</i><br /><br />What was explained away as too costly for <i>some</i> has unacceptably mushroomed into financial burden for all. Yet those who thwarted the preventive measures have left the American public with the cost of the medicine. The patient is still sick.&nbsp; The US government is the cancer.<br /><p><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>here needs to be a crushing assault on the independence of the legal profession. They were "called" to rubber stamp war crimes, FISA violations, Geneva violations, and loose financial regulations. The profession failed to timely put the rule of law <i>before</i> their secret agreements to man.<br /></p>Those "called" to the profession should not require the <i>catalyst</i> of a financial crisis to comprehend their credibility problem, leadership failure, and inability to work within the established order. They're not being called, but prodded. And they arrogantly resist, orchestrating more financial relief not accountability.<br /><br />It is appropriate to view the American legal profession as a threat to the established order. Without improved oversight of this reckless legal community, we should expect to endure more crises. This cycle of failure needs to end.<br /><br />Yes, it can.<br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b><br />T</b></font>hese mechanisms need to be independent of the
three branches. The US government cannot be trusted to oversee other institutions more loyal to the Constitution, much less itself. New centers of power must be granted independent, weighty power to challenge the&nbsp; US government complacency. <br /><br /><p>Reform within new governance is possible. We must aggressively ensure the three
branches put <i>the Constitution </i>first, not subordinate the Supreme Law to political favoritism and recklessness. <br /></p><p>The new
governance must compel the leadership to prudently act, deny them the discretion to
do nothing about horrendous activity, and <i>force</i> leadership to lead. <br /></p><p><b><font style="font-size: 1em;"><strong></strong></font></b><font style="font-size: 0.8em;"><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">S</font></font>ome suggest we muddle through, and as the economy spirals down, <i>then</i> we get serious about changes in governance. Why wait?<br /></p><p></p>We could productively use our time time now to openly discuss the needed reforms to address the real problem: Failed American governance.&nbsp; The reforms do not need to be limited to (ignored) legislative changes, or (watered down) rule making.<b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><br /><br />T</font></b>his governance model has run its course,
and exhausted reasonable patience. This crew and this failed governance
system needs reform.&nbsp; However, the lesson
since 2001 is this crew is not willing to reform from within.<br /><br />The American public need
not silently endure the ravages of a financial crisis or economic depression.&nbsp; We the People must lawfully impose the needed changes from without,
and return to the business of oversight, not blind deference.<br /><br />Yes, we can responsibly secure the blessings for ourselves and
future generations.<br />


<br /><font style="font-size: 1em;"><strong></strong></font>You're invited to share your views on what the new governance model would look like, and how we'll proceed to ensure this abuse of power ends. If you suggest that this "isn't possible," make the case that the public should have -- on the back of <i>five</i> (5) disasters -- confidence in what has failed.<br /><br />]]>
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</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Reform TARP To Build Confidence In Recovery, Department Oversight</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/reforming-tarp-to-justify-conf.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.255680</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-07T15:30:49Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-07T22:29:06Z</updated>
   
   <summary>TARP As A Benchmark For Stimulus OversightThe Vice President announced the Department of Transportation&apos;s Secretary blog about increasing oversight for infrastructure projects. DOT has a strategic plan and performance measures to track infrastructure, and known problems with programs.This sounds good....</summary>
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      <![CDATA[<p><i>TARP As A Benchmark For Stimulus Oversight</i><br /><br />The Vice President <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/cannot_wait/">announced</a> the Department of Transportation's Secretary <a href="http://fastlane.dot.gov/2009/02/us-transportation-secretary-lahood-creates-team-to-coordinate-dot-role-in-economic-recovery.html#comments">blog</a> about increasing oversight for infrastructure projects. DOT has a <a href="http://www.dot.gov/stratplan2011/dotstrategicplan.pdf">strategic plan</a> and <a href="http://www.dot.gov/about_dot.html#perfbudgplan">performance measures</a> to track infrastructure, and <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/agency/021.html#skipToResults">known problems</a> with programs.<br /><br />This sounds good. One problem is the US leadership <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/">failure</a> to put these lessons into practice in TARP. The public needs some assurances that the long-term risks are being factored into the near-term planning. The question is whether Congress will oversee these issues; or require <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/obama-short-on-specifics-for-r.php">additional public oversight of Congress</a> to do the right thing. </p>
<p>These issues indirectly relate to the President's <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksofPresidentBarackObamaEconomicRecoveryAdvisoryBoard/">economic advisory board</a> and his recent <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/beyond_the_echo_chamber/">executor order</a>: We need some leadership and feedback on the bailout.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[Public Integrity <a href="http://www.publicintegrity.org/blog/entry/1147/">identifies</a> a <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">GAO report</a> indicating problems with project management:<br /><br />
<blockquote>GAO (via Public Integrity): "The largest highway, transit, and safety grant programs <b>distribute funds through formulas that are typically <u>not linked to performance</u></b> and, in many cases, have only an <b>indirect relationship to <u>needs</u></b>. <b>Mechanisms generally do <u>not link programs to the federal objectives</u></b> they are intended to address, in part due to the wide discretion granted to states and localities in using most federal funds. Furthermore, surface transportation programs often <b><u>do not employ</u> the best tools and approaches available</b>, such as rigorous economic analysis for project selection and a mode-neutral approach to planning and investment."<br /></blockquote>The same problem -- linking strategy, vision, goals, results, and plans -- plagues TARP. There needs to be a plan to ensure "the planning lessons" are applied to the proposed stimulus <i>and</i> TARP. Indeed, it appears as those who are reluctant to embrace needed changes in TARP are part of the same flawed planning mechanisms we're being asked to believe to trust to guide us through this crisis. That defies reason.<br /><br /><i>Diddling</i><br /><br />In early February 2009, the President signed an <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing_room/PresidentialActions/">executive order</a> creating a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s_Economic_Recovery_Advisory_Board">board</a>, similar to the Eisenhower Administration, which would monitor Economic conditions. Something <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/cheney-on-financial-mess-nobod.php">didn't work</a>.<br /><br />However, this board isn't new, but has been around since 2008, and (supposedly) providing inputs to then-President-elect Obama, and the basis for the current stimulus: <br /><br />
<blockquote><a href="http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_establishes_presidents_economic_recovery_advis/">November 2008</a>: "The new <b>Economic Recovery Advisory Board</b> will be charged with offering independent, nonpartisan information, analysis, and advice to the President as he formulates and implements his plans for economic recovery."<br /></blockquote>The <a href="http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_establishes_presidents_economic_recovery_advis/">board</a> overlapped with the <i>still</i> not addressed problems with TARP:<br /><br />
<blockquote>What have they been doing <a href="http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_establishes_presidents_economic_recovery_advis/">since November 2008</a>: Are there copies of their minutes available for public review;<br /><br />Why is the <i>same</i> board going to do something different on a larger scale, but it still hasn't confronted the smaller-scale TARP vision problem? <br /><br />Why should we believe the <strike>new</strike> <i>same</i> board (with the same mission) is going to give us better recommendations; and <br /><br />Is this just repackaging another committee to present more options Congress cannot agree within the framework of a bailout plan<br /></blockquote><i>Americans Resting on Lost Laurels</i><br /><br />As a benchmark, the US has a problem providing leadership and infrastructure support in Afghanistan. The way forward should be to ensure the <i>US</i>, as it has <i>not</i> done in Afghanistan, can recover and sustain from a severe breakdown in the US transportation networks. If the US cannot get domestic transportation requirements right, then the public should not be confused why the US is having <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/charting-a-way-forward-in-afgh-1.php">problems in Afghanistan</a>.<br /><br />
<blockquote><b>One Problem Behind Financial Crisis: Creating Too Much Capacity, Without Attention To Detail</b><br /><br />The common lesson of 9-11, Katrina, Iraq, Afghanistan, and this financial crisis: "Oh, we'll take care of that <i>later</i>."<br />
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<li>Food</li></ul>It would be worse, but not surprising, to lean the US spent time creating more transportation <i>capacity</i>, but didn't set aside funds for the needed roads, and missed a <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/bailout-priority-food-supply-f.php">problem with food production</a> or <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2008/12/gates-foundation-must-audit-fo.php">food delivery</a>.<br />
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<li>Material Supply<br /></li></ul>Supposedly, some of the bailout money went to the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2008/12/auto-industry-bailout-blurring.php">auto industry</a> because they needed money to ensure parts deliveries. It would <i>not</i> be surprising in <i>this</i> environment to learn the parts suppliers don't have the needed raw materials and support to produce much less transport the <i>needed</i> parts for commercial and defense requirements.<br />
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<li>Consumer Demand, Markets</li></ul>It would also not be surprising to learn the US, as it focuses inward on this crisis, neglects the needed requirements of <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2008/11/cheap-mortages-or-affordable-h.php">foreign consumers</a>. One day we will emerge from this crisis, but we need to think about ensure the foreseeable markets are <i>sustained</i>, and that we maintain the needed economic ties to those consumers, whether they are domestic or international.</blockquote>Before the public takes the leap to have confidence in a large financial bailout or stimulus package, it would be helpful to see something marginally resembling a demonstration with a known, immediate problem: TARP oversight, and strategy. Otherwise, inaction on TARP asks the public to believe in a <i>promise</i> without a fair showing that change has <i>arrived</i>. <br /><br />If they can't get TARP's <i>vision statement</i> clear, we should have no confidence they have a credible oversight plan for this financial crisis, the bailout, or a coherent transportation plan. The experts within DOT should be detailed to TARP to help. <br /><br /><i>Outside Audits</i><br /><br />One of the sad lessons 2001-9 has been the reluctance of Administration officials to rely on auditors. Rather than look at them as valuable sources of information for management, the leadership has sidelined auditors in Iraq. The concern is the entrenched Bush Administration officials and staff have a low opinion of independent views.<br /><br />We need to make sure the GAO has the increased staff to monitor these complex developments, and are sufficiently supported with resources so they can remain objective and provide quality auditing products. The GAO may need help in <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2008/12/gao-list-for-obama.php">clarifying oversight plans</a> and conducting audits; or the GAO might benefit form an outside audit, now is the time to prepare for that oversight. This process will be complicated and take some time. GAO should start on the right foot and not be short changed.<br /><br /><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">W</font></b>hen the public sees the President and Vice President reforming TARP, and ensuring Treasury links bailout decisions to a (still not clear) goal, the public <i>might</i> believe other departments will do the same.&nbsp; <br /><br />Members of Congress have a hard time justifying confidence in their oversight or the bailout strategy when they can't get TARP to provide a coherent problem <i>or</i> vision statement. More broadly, it's unclear the basis with which funds will be assigned to the bailout plan, or how <i>Congress</i> plans to oversee the bailout of the <i>economy</i>. Congress appears unwilling to use its power of the purse to ensure compliance with FISA or Geneva. There's little prospect they'll threat to cut off funds for poorly managed financial programs.<br /><br />In the meantime, government and industry leaders who are commenting on <a href="http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2008/12/how-should-infrastructure-stimulus-be-spent.php">how the stimulus should be spent</a> should ensure the proposed plans apply the lessons of the <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">GAO report</a>, address the errors of TARP, and publish a coherent oversight plan. <br /><br />Until then, we have the promise of change, but without change. Until the US sees some changes to how TARP is managed, the public should not have confidence that the US leadership is coherent planning combat operations for Afghanistan, or is prepared to responsibly guide the American public through this financial crisis.<br /><br /><i>Sustainable Capacity Growth<br /><br /></i>In the planning, we need to see a table gleaned from the GAO report which specifically lists all the systemic problems <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">GAO found</a> with the infrastructure planning.<br /><br />
<blockquote>It does not make sense to create more capacity while the existing infrastructure maintenance requirements are not getting met: Ensuring bridges are safe with maintenance for existing infrastructure.<br /></blockquote>These <a href="http://www.dot.gov/stratplan2011/dotstrategicplan.pdf">strategic goals</a> need to be revisited. The goals must be viewed in terms of the financial objectives of this recovery, with an eye toward long-term transportation sustainment, streamlining, and development. Sustainment means prioritizing our current infrastructure requirements, and identifying which basic infrastructure <i>maintenance</i> (<u>not</u> <i>new</i> capacity) projects are required under the foreseeable economic conditions. We cannot throw money, first, at "long term" stimulus programs which create more infrastructure <i>capacity</i>, but we're ignore the near-term <i>maintenance requirements</i> within a financially stressed economy.<br /><br />The public is less interested in knowing the details of the process to prioritize between sustainment, investment, and long-term planning than getting a sense that money is being responsibly spent for our <i>common interests</i>. Otherwise, the promise of the Founders and Constitution seems to have been lost:<br /><br />
<blockquote>Preamble: " We the people of the United States, in order to form a <b>more perfect union</b>, establish justice, <b>insure <u>domestic</u> tranquility</b>, provide for the <u><b>common defense</b></u>, <b>promote the <u>general welfare</u></b>, and <b>secure the <u>blessings of liberty</u> to ourselves and our posterity</b>, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."<br /></blockquote>The immediate need isn't to throw money at the problem, but to demonstrate that there is responsible leadership starting a coherent process that will address the problems in the GAO report, responsibly plan, and then make the decisions one the public can reasonably participate, support, and ultimately enjoy.<br /><br /><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>W</b></font>e still have little information about the TARP. The goals are not clear. This is a repeat finding. Something isn't working.&nbsp; The public needs to see, as a confidence building measure, that the proposed "way forward" for the larger stimulus package, not just in DOT, will stop doing what TARP has done -- proceeding without a coherent vision -- and remedy the problems with TARP. <br /><br />Otherwise, without a change in TARP, the public is asked to believe, on faith <i>alone</i>, that the systemic problems -- getting <i>in the way</i> of TARP responding to the <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/blog/entries/blog-010909-welcome.cfm">auditors' concerns</a> -- will on their own, magically evaporate when it comes to the <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">GAO-identified</a> issues. That defies reason.<br /><br />Indeed, these are challenging economic times, and something "must be done". But the error is for the leadership to get caught up in the frenzy, and not demonstrate leadership.<br /><br /><i>DOT Planning Requirements<br /><br /></i>Here are some pointed questions intended to focus some planning:<br /><br />
<blockquote><i>1</i>. Where is there a table showing which <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">specific GAO findings</a> need to be incorporated into the proposed stimulus plan?<br /><br /><i>2</i>. Where is the plan to specifically list the <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/blog/entries/blog-010909-welcome.cfm">identified problems</a> with the TARP management?<br /><br /><i>3</i>. Where is the plan to ensure the <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/blog/entries/blog-010909-welcome.cfm">lessons from the TARP management</a> are combined with the <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">findings of the GAO report</a>?<br /><br /><i>4</i>. What is the deadline to update the DOT <a href="http://www.dot.gov/stratplan2011/dotstrategicplan.pdf">strategic plan</a> will be updated to reflect the financial goals and priorities of the bailout?<br /><br /><i>5</i>. Where are the individual program status charts for <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/agency/021.html#skipToResults">each of these programs</a>; with a one-for-one discussion of how the issues in the <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08400.pdf">GAO report</a> and the <a href="http://cop.senate.gov/blog/entries/blog-010909-welcome.cfm">TARP lessons</a> will be addressed by each of the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/agency/021.html#skipToResults">identified programs</a>?<br /><br /><i>6</i>. When does the DOT secretary plan to publish, for public review and comment, a copy of the time-phasing of the proposed budget outlays; and a reconciliation table showing how the GAO-identified problems and TARP issues are monitored, with intermediate milestone reviews, and decision points to adjust as economic conditions deteriorate?<br /><br /><i>7</i>. What is the plan of the DOT leadership to ensure that funds-not-expended are adequately reprogrammed internally; and discuss how the DOT funds reprogramming based on funds execution will likely affect future DOT projects. Discuss the impacts in terms of funding requirements, cost overruns, program schedule slips, and impacts to the sustainment goals and the economic stimulus:<br />
<blockquote>- What are the DOT priorities, from project one down to the last<br />- If there are limited funds, which programs does DOT plan to cut first<br />- How will DOT decide whether to cut or descope a specific program<br />- How will the identified risk areas within each program relate to each economic goal of the stimulus package<br /></blockquote></blockquote><i>Coherent Plan To Resolve Audit Findings</i><br /><br />We need to see a reconciliation table showing the lessons learned from the GAO and TARP are getting incorporated inot the budgeting and planning process. We need to see that the program priorities are addressing the immediate needs: Infrastructure maintenance. We need to know how much of the money will go to sustainment, new investment, or expansion.<br /><br />We need to see that there is a logical relationship between the proposed DOT spending plans, the economic goals, the sustainment requirements, and effective management and lessons learned.<br /><br />We need to see a time-phased chart showing how the DOT will incorporate the lessons of the GAO and TARP into the proposed planning; and a summary threshold of when DOT expects to achieve specific goals:<br />
<blockquote>- Economic development goals (New manpower, economic multipliers)<br />- Infrastructure sustainment (Percent of logistics pipeline repairs)<br />- Success criteria for each of those programs<br />- Performance relative to decision points and contract termination criteria<br /></blockquote><i>Preparing For Difficult National Debates</i><br /><br />The US citizens need assurances that there is a plan to work within the available resources; and know whether the proposed plans are going to meet our infrastructure requirements; <i>or</i> whether, in the long term, the United States, to meet the existing infrastructure requirements, will more likely go into <b>bankruptcy</b>. If bankruptcy is on the way, Americans should glean the lessons of Latin America and plan accordingly.<br /><br />In the wake of 1929, senior Administration officials discussed this type of question:<br /><br />
<blockquote>Would they rather hold onto everything they had, and possibly lose it all; or would they rather give up a portion of their wealth with the prospect that there would be a recovery.<br /></blockquote>The rich and powerful may (for now) have the legal tools to defend their assets. The question is what would they like to give up now with the intent of expressly ensuring we more timely recovery. If they refuse, the risk is they will not only lose everything, but how much severe this situation will get.<br /><br />We need an honest answer of how bad this situation is going to get; what percentage of the national wealth needs to be reallocated; and what prospect the powerful and wealthy have to retain their wealth; and a decision on whether we'll avoid this.<br /><br />The above issues were not adequately addressed, but some overseas in Nazi Germany ultimately created a problem. As the US financial resources and leverage contracts, other power centers will emerge which will not be necessarily acting in the interests of the US. The US and even her current military opponents have fewer sustainable alliances to confront new, emerging economic and military threats. Nazi Germany was brushed aside, but the world ultimately paid an incredible human and financial price.<br /><br />For example, some may not view the Somali pirates as a problem. Yet, they're able to interfere with shipping. As an economic preservation strategy, would we rather work with regional powers to military confront these assaults as was done against the Barbary pirates. The current approach appears insufficient. As the economic situation deteriorates we can expect more interference with commerce. It would be better to nip this in the bud.<br /><br /><i>Improve Economic Monitoring</i><br /><br />At this juncture, it's unclear what's failed with the United States economic-resource allocation process. Something seriously failed to allow the scope of this economic crisis unfold. We need assurances that there will be a monitoring system <i>in place</i> that will timely detect whether there is going to be a subsequent financial impact with a secondary and tertiary crisis <i>within</i> this one. (It is possible there could be other not-yet-monitored factors driving more <b>financial fragility</b>, discussed <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/cheney-on-financial-mess-nobod.php">here</a>.)<br /><br />If that is the case, then we need to discuss the real problem: A failure of the national security council to develop internally-focused <i>economic monitoring</i> tools. If that is the real problem, and until that is addressed, as has not been the case with TARP, then a secondary and tertiary financial crisis within this one will make the above DOT planning irrelevant.<br /><br />The public needs to have some assurances that DOT is thinking about the options should there be, as is likely, a secondary and tertiray financial crisis; what adjustments need to be made now to ensure that we are not throwing money at investment (new capacity) in the short term, but then kicking ourselves later as we realize the long-term funding requirements for <i>minimum </i>capacity <i>sustainment</i> are short of funds.<br /><br /><i>Tradeoffs Between Future Capacity, Sustainment</i><br /><br />It may be better, as a reserve option, to set aside some of the money for the expected impacts of a secondary financial crisis, not necessarily increase capacity, but decide to hold off or cancel programs to free up dollars for sustainment requirements. As funding proves scarce, have those funds available <i>not</i> for new investment, but the immediate capacity sustainment requirements needed for day to day operations, maintanenance, and parts.<br /><br />Despite the promise of change, we have the same US government staff, contractors, and planning system. It defies reason, absent a credible transformation, that the same players will suddenly start doing what they're recklessly proven they've cannot <i>responsibly</i> do. The public has the public debacles of 9-11, Katrina, Iraq, and <i>thi</i>s financial crisis to raise reasonable questions:<br /><br />
<blockquote>- What assurances can the leadership provide that there is a plan in place to ensure we have a viable transportation system in place with a secondary or tertiary financial crisis;<br /><br />- Where is there some realistic planning should the economic capacity fall by 40%;<br /><br />- What are the plans to ensure minimal sustain requirements for parts, raw material, and essential logistics support requirements are getting priority;<br /><br />- Which flawed planning assumptions re Katrina, 9-11, and Iraq have been resolved to ensure American citizens do not suffer the same flawed contracting, financial waste, and mismanagement;<br /><br />- When will the national leadership provide a coherent table showing (a) how the <i>planning debacles</i> of 9-11, Katrina, Iraq, Afghanistan, and <i>this</i> financial crisis have been (b) responsibly mitigated <i>within</i> the US economic recovery plan?<br /></blockquote><i>Parts, Maintenance, Raw Materials</i><br /><br />We need alternatives should the economic recovery plans fall short of the transportation sustainment requirements. These sustainment requirements include manufacturing capacity, raw materials processing, and the distribution network to supply the high priority consumers and services with basic infrastructure. It doesn't make sense to create <i>more</i> <u>capacity</u>, but we don't have the resources or means to provide <u>throughput</u>: Parts, raw material processing, or raw material transportation.<br /><br />Recall the lesson of the current financial crisis. We've had too much money going into too much unsustainble capacity. The same players are still throwing money at the banks -- to provide for capacity -- but ignoring whether there is sufficient physical and financial support for the basic requirements needed to sustain economic activity needed to service those loans: Raw material processing, parts manufacturing, and pipeline maintenance and sustainment.<br /><br />It's not clear, despite a financial shock, that the players are changing their planning to prepare for what is unfolding: A gap between sustainment requirements needed to maintain day to day operations, and the planning goals of increased capacity to stimulate activity and job creation.<br /><br /><i>High Tonnage Support</i><br /><br />We need to have an understanding of what backup plans should be developed or are ready to ensure railway lines and key transportation nodes are adequately maintaned. This is not merely a safety or security issue, but whether there exists the physical means to cover the pipline support requirements the railway companies need to ensure raw material can be transporated. Otherwise, as an alternative, we're talking increased tonnage along roads not necessarily designed to support long-term raw material transportation. Think donkies stuck in the mud with too much too carry.<br /><br />Indeed, there may be some DOT funds which should be combined with DoD sustainment funds to ensure there are basic infrastructure requirements met. At this juncture, especially in the wake of the debacles of 9-11, Katrina, Afghanistan, Iraq, and <i>this</i> financial crisis it's going to take something incredible and specific to provide some confidence that the players have woken up to reality. Bluntly, if you get <i>this</i> wrong, the public is going to have to discuss what <i>new</i> methods are required to ensure the planning, leadership, and resource decisions are effectively, <i>responsibly</i> managed, as discussed <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/obama-short-on-specifics-for-r.php">here</a>.<br /><br />Something has fundamentally broken down spanning multiple issues. It's arguably reckless for industry leadership to claim "Trust us, things are just fine," when, despite <i>no obstacles</i>, the leadership did <i>not</i>, as reasonably expected, put their heads together to learn the lessons from the earlier crises, and more effectively manage the situation. 9-11 tripped into Katrina; Afghanistan begot Iraq; and the same leadership <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/cheney-on-financial-mess-nobod.php">missed <i>this</i> financial crisis</a>. Even the catalyst of a financial crisis appears to have not woken up some.<br /><br /><i>Prepare Impact Statements</i><br /><br />The "worst case scenarios" have been largely set aside as impossible. However, the "worst case" has become our reality. It's time to get some information about the worst case scenarios, those plans, and who has been setting aside those worst case scenarios. <br /><br />We need some assurances that there is an understanding of what level of economic plans exist to ensure that basic material processing, raw material refinement, and basic parts needed to sustain a 20% and 40% reduction in DOT funding and capacity. <br /><br /><i>Raw Materials Processing</i><br /><br />If we go forward in time, and develop these options,&nbsp; The public needs some assurances that there will be funding set aside to ensure that the basic industries needed to gather commodities, refine them, and process that raw material into essential parts needed for the infrastructure, logistics, and transportation will be sustained; and will not take a second seat to long term investment. <br /><br />The aim is to ensure that we are not building new infrastructure, but not setting aside funds to ensure the day-to-day requirements (parts manufacturing, maintenance, and roadway sustainment) are not falling aside.<br /><br /><i>Decision Point: Pipeline Abandonment</i><br /><br />If the above is going to be a challenge, and down the road we anticipate with a 40% reduction in funding and sustainability, then DOT should discuss now the priorities for which roads are going to be abandoned; and the transition plan to ensure there is pipeline consolidations to support immediate transportation requirements. <br /><br />We need some decision points on when the US government will not only stop creating new capacity, but deciding to stop maintaining existing roads and pipelines, abandon that non-sustainable pipeline, then responsibly supporting a transition to consolidated pipelines.<br /><br /><i>DoD</i><br /><br />If the Congress does not trust the US bankruptcy courts to make these decisions, then the United States needs to discuss a planning model which will more responsibly consolidate resources and sustain existing requirements. Process is one thing; the question is whether there are sufficient personnel planning for what appears to be repeatedly <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/cheney-on-financial-mess-nobod.php">overlooked</a>, but <i>realized</i> worst-case scenarios. Many people appear to have explained away many concerns as was the case before 9-11, and still with Afghanistan.<br /><br />Part of the problem is the finite resources at the state level needed to feed into the national resource delivery systems: Local dollars aren't there to sustain roads. These dollars will become <i>more</i> scarce as local and state governments slide into bankruptcy.<br /><br />
<blockquote><i>A</i>. How is DOT working with DOD to <i>ensure</i> we have the <i>minimum</i> logistics requirements needed to sustain high priority combat support?<br /><br /><i>B</i>. How is DoD working with DOT to ensure basic parts requirements needed for DoD, government, and commercial requirements are getting priority: Do we need some special sustainment funds allocated through DoD that can jointly support government and backup transportation requirements?<br /><br /><i>C</i>. What is the decision point to transition funds from new capacity to either basic maintenance requirements; and how do these decision points square with the lead time to end support for and close existing pipelines?<br /><br /><i>D</i>. When do we need to discuss a <b>military draft</b> to make up for some of the manning short falls DOT has identified and could impact DOD's ability to timely deploy for foreseeable military contingencies?<br /><br /><i>E</i>. Are we satisfied with the current economic investment for future scientists, material processors, engineers, and others required to support quality manufacturing, parts development, and methods to create emergency backup parts suppliers during a sustained economic downturn and increased DoD combat support requirements?<br /><br /><i>F</i>. What lessons do we need to glean from the Russians about how they transferred facility operations to Siberia as the Nazis advanced into Western Russia during WWII?<br /><br /><i>G</i>. What is the backup plan to ensure that food is not left rotting in fields because of a breakdown in the transportation system?<br /><br /><i>H</i>. What is DoD's role in assisting farmers in preserving the food supply, ensuring its safe delivery, and providing for safe storage; should this be contracted to a delivery system which has not yet been developed?<br /></blockquote><b>Conclusion</b><br /><br />We have a new President, and things take time to change; however, we're no longer in the "transition".&nbsp; This Administration has the responsibility to embrace TARP as it finds it; show the public that it has a plan to <i>resolve</i> the problems the TARP auditor continues to find; and demonstrate these needed changes to TARP are flowing into the Department planning.<br /><br />However, there appears to be a disconnect between what the public is asked to <i>believe</i> about oversight in DOT, and what this Administration has <i>done</i> by way of reforming TARP. The public needs to have some assurances that the many valuable insights from the GAO and auditors are getting serious consideration, and those concerns are being addressed. We're not seeing that. Indeed, this short term planning cannot be at the expensive of missing the real problem: Our economic monitoring system failed. Until this early warning system is modernized, we need to prepare for a <b>secondary and tertiary crisis</b> <i>within</i> the current one.<br /><br />DOT long range planning and economic investment goals need to be modernized to reflect the financial realities: We may have some serious logistics challenge which could blossom onto a scale we saw during WWII: A requirement to physically consolidate logistics-support requirements; ensure there are sufficient resources and support for this <i>salvage</i> operation; and responsibly shut down unsustainable pipelines <i>while</i> conducting multi-theater combat operations and providing basic support for civilians. <br /><br />If some transportation nodes are going to get more support and enjoy long-term support as the economy continues to deteriorate, the public should be given this information so they can plan where to resettle, or make informed decisions about alternatives.<br /><br /><i>Additional Capacity Cannot Shortchange DoD or Pipeline Sustainment</i><br /><br />The public needs some assurances that our infrastructure sustainment is not getting short changed, and that we're not spending money for new capacoity, but leaving us, down the road, with <i>fewer</i> options to pay for the increased sustainment and maintence requirements for the expanded pipeline. <br /><br />It's time to stop promising <i>jobs</i>, but be realistic about where this financial crisis is going to take us. It does not appear the national leadership is adequately discussing in open the real impact this financial crisis will most likely have on transportation, sustainment capability, and the raw materials needed for basic parts and combat support requirements. <br /><br />It does a disservice to those who believe in a promise of change, attempt to work within the constraints of this financial crisis, only to be told that the situation they're dealing with is <i>much</i> different. Until you put reality on the table, and discuss openly the real planning assumptions, we don't have leadership.<br /><br /><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>F</b></font>unds needs to be set aside to ensure there is a priority on maintenance and sustainment, especially if the funds available are reduced. DOD needs to be candid with its real resources requirements. We need to discuss what will ensure the US has the planning and resources in place to sustain our logicists requirements, and still have financial and resource reserves to sustain incrased DoD requirements in subsequent combat operations.<br /><br /><i>Gleaning Lessons of Russians During WWII</i><br /><br />Katrina was fair warning of the vulnerabilities in a transportation pipeline. Many lamented more was not done. The lesson applies to this financial crisis.<br /><br />As a backup, we need to work with the Russians and revisit the lessons of the Russian transition during WWII; and ensure we have a reasonable plan in place to responsibly abandon existing pipeline and facilities that we cannot financially support.<br /><br />
<blockquote>What do we need to start now doing to prepare us for a scale of&nbsp; transition we saw in Russia during WWII? <br /></blockquote>We don't need slogans, we need a vision, and a leader who will guide us to what will fulfill the promise of the Founders and this Constitution. If you fail, the public will have -- again -- another reminder of what American leadership refuses to or is incapable of doing. The public will then be positioned to discuss what modernizations are needed not just in the financial and economic sectors, but within the way that the American model of governance and planning is <i>legally</i> structured. <br /><br />Checks and balances cannot be a slogan that American leadership conveniently ignores. Rather, this leadership is communicating it needs something else to compel it to lead, make difficult decisions, and proactively manage; not, as is the custom, recklessly <i>react</i> to a crisis of our own making. Americans are not required to perpetually remain loyal to a system which delivers chaos, especially when there are coherent alternatives.<br /><br /><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">W</font></b>e've been throwing money at the banks. Little (obvious, public) attention has been given to throwing money at the firms which convert raw material into the basic parts needed to sustain combat operations our our daily transportation infrastructure resource, parts, and maintenance requirements. <br /><br />Those who waive their hands and say, "Trust us, we've taken care of that," have a skeptical audience seeing abysmal responses in Afghanistan, Katrina, Iraq, 9-11 and this financial crisis. Things fell through the cracks. There's something wrong with a planning process that requires larger scale disasters to get things right, especially after multiple reports from the TARP and GAO auditors, and (ignored) concerns from SEC watchdogs and insiders.<br /><br />There needs to be now a backup plan ready should the US enter <b>bankruptcy</b>; and there are <b>tertiary financial crisis</b> which impact parts and raw material availability. DoD needs to discuss the indicators they plan to use when they decide, as after 1929, when resource and manning requirements demand a <b>military draft</b>, a priority on military spending, and associated backup plans to ensure basic commercial requirements are sustained as the economy spirals down.<br /><br /><i>Reconciliation Table</i><br /><br />We need to see some summary tables of the lessons learned from the GAO, TARP, and Russian logistics decisions; and see that there is a responsible plan in place that will ensure the existing (non abandoned) pipeline is sustained. We cannot afford to rapidly expand capacity without the funds to sustain the new or existing capacity.<br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Same DOJ Staff: Conduct re US Attorney Firings Irreconcilable With Vince Foster Investigation</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/margolis-statements-contradict.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.255235</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-05T15:09:49Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-05T21:44:33Z</updated>
   
   <summary>David Margolis was one of the Deputy Attorney Generals called before Congress to testify. Margolis stated he was not adequately involved. However, a delegation letter and Margolis &quot;hands on&quot; approach re the Vice Foster death in 1994 paints a different...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[David Margolis was one of the Deputy Attorney Generals called before Congress to testify. Margolis <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/10/doj_honors_veteran_who_failed.php">stated</a> he was not adequately involved. However, a <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20051022182514/http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/ag_memo_august_12_2005.pdf">delegation letter</a> and Margolis "hands on" approach re the <a href="http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/1996/1996_S01584.pdf">Vice Foster death</a> in 1994 paints a <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE7DB173DF931A15754C0A963958260&amp;sec=health&amp;spon=&amp;pagewanted=all">different picture</a>.<br /><br />Margolis well knew from <a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appa.pdf">1990-era memos</a> he allegedly <i>read</i>&nbsp; [See notes 48-52] standards of conduct he would have us believe he should be excused. The inconsistency demands a follow-up. We believe DOJ's Vince Foster-related memos shed light on standards of conduct reasonably expected of DOJ Staff counsel 2001-9, and the troubling issues they wanted to suppress with <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php">secret DOJ OLC memos</a>.<br /><br />One TPMM <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/margolis-statements-contradict.php#comment-3366279">comment</a> about Margolis and Rove refers to Clint Eastwood character's <a href="http://www.metacafe.com/watch/yt-JL9HsfGJ5c4/the_outlaw_josey_wales_dying_aint_much_of_a_livin/">quote</a> from <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075029/">The Outlaw Josey Wales</a> (1996).<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>M</b></font>argolis was admitted to the Connecticut bar in 1964, and the <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ct/narr/CT_NARR_8.HTM#8.4:400">CT ethics</a> rules bar misleading statements. The irony is Margolis' <i>statements about</i> the DOJ OPR annual report <u>might</u> prompt a DOJ OPR ethics review.<br /><br />The information after the jump supports <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/06/doj-opr-must-review-doj-staff.php">earlier calls</a> for DOJ OPR to review DOJ Staff conduct re the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/05/data-mining-dod-analyst-docume.php#comment-3007339">DoD emails</a>. We review Margolis' alleged inconsistent statements and conduct between (1) the delegation letter re the CIA leak investigation, (2) the Vince Foster investigation, (3) the US Attorney firings, and (4) the refusal to publish DOJ OPR annual reports.<br /><br /> ]]>
      <![CDATA[<i>CIA Leak- US Attorney Firing</i><i>Timeline</i><br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">O</font></b>ne key is to notice the timing of the CIA delegation letter in 2005 with the implicit US Attorney firing timeline the same year. Among other responsibilities in 2005-6, Margolis is connected with three (3) specific overlapping responsibilities: The US Attorney firing issues, DOJ OPR annual report, and the CIA leak investigation.&nbsp; These issues, when contrasted, do not reconcile with Margolis testimony or his conduct in the Vince Foster investigation.. <br /><br /><blockquote><b>Other Titles For this TPMM Content</b>:<br /><br />Margolis Attention During Vince Foster Investigation Belies "Passivity"-claims on US Attorney Firings<br /><br />
Margolis Allegedly Made Dubious Excuses For Not Publishing Annual DOJ OPR Report<br /><br />CIA Leak Investigation Delegation Letter Casts Doubt on Margolis Reasons For Not Publishing DOJ OPR Annual Reports<br /><br />Possible DOJ OPR Ethics Investigation into Margolis<br /></blockquote>
1. <i>CIA Leak Investigation</i><br /><br />In 2005, Deputy AG Comey delegated to Margolis authority related to the CIA investigation. The language in the memo suggests <i>sweeping authority</i> for Margolis to act:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Comey Aug 12, 2005 Delegation Letter to Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General</b><br /><br /><a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20051022182514/http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/ag_memo_august_12_2005.pdf">Comey Memo</a>: By virtue of the authority vested in me as Deputy Attorney General under the law, including 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(a), <b>I delegate to you <u><i>all</i> of my authority</u></b> as Acting Attorney General with respect to <b><u>that </u>investigation</b> and Mr. Fitzgerald's service as Special Counsel, as delineated in that correspondence.<br /></blockquote><br />For reference, 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(a):<br /><br /><blockquote>(a) The Deputy Attorney General is <b>authorized to exercise all the power</b>
and authority of the Attorney General, unless any such power or
authority is required by law to be exercised by the Attorney General
personally.<br /></blockquote><br />For reference, the subject of the investigation was the CIA leak investigation:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Margolis Linked With CIA Investigation Oversight</b><br /><br /><a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20051022182514/http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/ag_memo_august_12_2005.pdf">Comey Memo re CIA Leak</a>: In the attached correspondence to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, dated December 30, 2003, and Feburary 6, 2004, I delegated to Mr. Fitzgerald all of the authority of the Attorney General with respect to the <b>Department's investigation into the alleged unauthorized <u>disclosure of a Central Intelligence Agency employee's identity</u></b>.<br /></blockquote><i>2. US Attorney Firing</i><br /><br />The above delegations of authority are strikingly different than Margolis statements at the hearing. <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/10/doj_honors_veteran_who_failed.php">TPMM</a> reminds us of the 2006-related events: "In <u><b>November 2006</b></u>, when Sampson advised Margolis about the impending removals"<br /><br />TPMM shares important information about what Margolis said. Whether this is true or not is the subject of the likely DOJ OPR ethics investigation:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Margolis Leaves Impression He Was Passive</b><br /><br />Margolis Comment via <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/10/doj_honors_veteran_who_failed.php">TPM</a>: "And I was <b><u>not aggressive</u> enough</b> or vigilant enough, and I should have
done a number of things, I should have inserted myself. I was <b><u>too
passive</u>"</b></blockquote><i>3. Vince Foster Investigation</i><br /><br />Let's consider the Senate interchange showing Margolis involvement; then later using the NYT disclosed email from Margolis re the Vince Foster investigation showing attention to detail which contrasts with this supposed "passive" approach in the US Attorney investigation.<br /><br />Margolis' supposed "passive" approach during the US Attorney firing
scandal is out of character. In the wake of Vice Foster's death
Margolis was in the White House providing directions: He was personally
involved, detail oriented, exacting, and coordinating, unlike the
picture he painted before Congress re the US Attorney firing. It
appears Margolis is downplaying his role to shift attention from other
issues he was equally involved 2001-9.<br /><br /><i>A. Senate Transcript</i><br /><br /><blockquote><b>1996 Senate Records re Vince Foster Investigation</b><br /><br /><a href="http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/1996/1996_S01584.pdf">Here</a> Senator Shelby asks about previous events. Note Margolis' detailed involvement:<br /><blockquote>- Going to a specific location<br />- Discussion plans<br />- Confirming understanding<br />- Changing specific plans<br /></blockquote>Senator SHELBY. I understand that you <u><b>received a call from David Margolis the next morning from the White House</b></u> about the search; is that correct? You want<br />to refer to your notes? <br /><br />Mr. HEYMANN. That's correct,<br /><br />Senator SHELBY. What was this call about?<br /><br />Mr. HEYMANN. <b><u>He and Roger Adams had gone over with the Park Police and the FBI to do the review we planned</u></b>.<br /><br />Senator SHELBY. This was pursuant to the understanding you had with Mr. Nussbaum?<br /><br />Mr. HEYMANN. Pursuant to the understanding of the 21st.<br /><br />Senator SHELBY. Okay.<br /><br />Mr. HEYMANN. Mr. Margolis told me that Mr. Nussbaum had said to me that they had<b><u> changed the plan</u></b>, that only the White House counsel's office would see the actual documents. <b><u>Mr. Margolis had asked Mr. Nussbaum whether that had been discussed with me and Mr. Nussbaum had said no</u></b>.<br /></blockquote>The problem is the inconsistency when we compare Margolis' (a) statements above about passivity; (b) his detailed involvement re Vice Foster's death; with (c) what he <i>said</i> about the reason for the DOJ OPR not releasing its annual report. His statements and conduct do not reconcile. Margolis wasn't one to leave things to chance or unknown.&nbsp; <br /><br />There appear to be other White House-level factors, unrelated to DOJ, driving Margolis apparent inaction. Indeed, it was Margolis in an email who complained about the lack of independence of the Justice Department, and fired off a series of questions. Yet, at the Congressional hearing re the US Attorney firings under Bush, Margolis would have us believe he wasn't involved.<br /><br /><i>B. NYT-Disclosed Email</i><br /><br />This excerpt from the 1995 NYT coverage paints a much different picture about Margolis, and his aggressive emails about the DOJ role in the Vince Foster Investigation. Margolis laments staff were not involved, yet later re the US Attorney firings he would ask that we accept his passive approach. The two are not reconcilable. It <i>defies reason</i> to believe Margolis threw out the followingn about Vince Foster and rolled over re the US Attorney firing issues:<br /><blockquote><p><b>Margolis Different Conduct re Vince Foster</b></p><p>Margolis' sentiments in the NYT-disclosed email cast new light on his claims of passivity re the US Attorney firing. This email from Margolis re Vince Foster includes statements the Committee should challenge Margolis over re the US Attorney firings. <br /></p><p>[Source: 1995 NYT <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE7DB173DF931A15754C0A963958260">Article</a>: <font style="font-size: 1em;">"White House Reaches Agreement on Giving More Information on Dead Official's Files" ]<br /></font></p><p>NYT: Carl Stern, a spokesman at the Justice Department, said that <b>one of
the documents, an E-mail message from a senior lawyer on the case</b> to
Mr. Heymann that <b><u>listed a series of caustic questions about the
independence of the Justice Department</u></b>, was not a complaint. Rather,
Mr. Stern said, it was a list of mock questions in anticipation of news
reporters' inquiries. </p><p>NYT: The <b><u>message was sent by the Justice
Department lawyer, David Margolis</u>, on Aug. 7</b>, after the White House had
found a note from Mr. Foster expressing his unhappiness with
Washington, but before the note was made public. The message is
headlined, "Vince Foster Moot Court Media Questions." </p><p>NYT: "You are
<u><b>still allowing the White House to dictate the terms of your
investigations</b></u>, at least when the White House has interests to
protect," <b><u>Mr. Margolis wrote</u></b>. </p><p>NYT: At one point, the message says:
"You claim <u><b>your people did not supervise</b></u> the search -- that they were
<b><u>merely present</u></b> during the search by W.H. counsel. <b><u>Why</u></b> didn't Mr.
Nussbaum find the notes? <b><u>What sense</u></b> does this procedure make? <b><u>Who was
running</u></b> this investigation -- the DOJ or the White House? Why didn't
you put your cigar store Indians to work back at the office during the
search and simply let Bernie Nussbaum report the results of his search
to you? <u>What purpose</u> did the <u><b>mere presence</b></u> of your people serve?" </p></blockquote>Margolis was supposedly the one who knew about the concern with White House involvement with the Vince Foster investigation, and "took the time" to prepare the above questions. Yet, we're asked to believe Margolis took a passive role on the US attorney firings.&nbsp; If Margolis was <i>passive</i>, who, then, <u>in the White House</u> was <i>active</i>?<br /><br /><i>July 24, 1995 Memo From OPR Shaheen to Margolis</i><br /><br /><a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appaii.pdf">Reference Notes 48-51</a> [<a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appa.pdf">Appendix A</a>] from the Travel Gate investigation re missing emails shows OIC Michael Shaheen was stunned at the lack of "cooperation and candor" from the White House, calling it "unprecedented."<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Margolis Knew or Should Have Known of Concerns About Candor </b><br /><br />The <a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appaii.pdf">report</a> at notes 48-51 establishes (1) a memo from OPR <u><i>to Margolis</i></u>; and (2) a standard of cooperation and candor Margolis should have known was applicable.<br /><br />Report: "OPR Counsel Michal Shaheen prepared a <b>memorandum to Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis</b> concerning the White House's lack of cooperation with his investigation. [Sheehan wrote]: . . .'<u>yet another example of the lack of cooperation and candor we received</u> . . .' " [<u>underlining</u> in original]<br /></blockquote>We believe, because the statements do not appear to reconcile with what Margolis knew what was reasonably expected, that Margolis has allegedly been deceptive.<br /><br /><i>4. Explanations For Not Releasing DOJ OPR Annual Reports</i><br /><br />DOJ OPR until 2004 released timely annual reports. This annual report was the legal obligation, under the CFR, to provide to the AG. After 2005, DOJ OPR did not publish reports. Until 2008, there was no <i>2005</i> report published, a <i>three</i> (3) <u>year</u> delay. <br /><br />The Los Angeles Times asked Margolis about not releasing the DOJ OPR annual reports, but his responses raise more questions than answers. These appear to be excuses for inaction or activity at a much lower level than what Margolis showed re Vince Foster:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Margolis Implicitly Claims He Did A Manning Assessment<br /><br /></b>Contrast the implicit "manning study" (requirement for detailed analysis) with the claim of passivity re the US Attorney firings:<b><br /></b><br /><a href="http://www.propublica.org/article/doj-oversight-office-isnt-releasing-reports-707">Publica Report</a> re Los Angeles Times:<br /><br /><blockquote>LAT: "[Margolis] said the decision reflected a <u><b>lack of resources</b></u>, as well as
concern about balancing public interests with the <b><u>privacy rights</u></b> of
individual attorneys facing accusations."<br /></blockquote>Margolis' statement is not credible. "Privacy rights" are not an issue: The DOJ OPR annual report <i>redacts</i> the names of the attorneys, and previous reports until 2004 provided summary data.<br /><br />Whether information is "published" or "provided to the AG" is unrelated to a lack of resources. This would, at best, only <i>delay</i>, not prevent the DOJ OPR annual report publication. <br /></blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">
<font style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appaii.pdf">Note 51</a> [<a href="http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/watkins/appa.pdf">Appendix A</a>] discusses the belated production of documents re<font style="font-size: 0.8em;"> <font style="font-size: 1.25em;">Vince Foster</font></font></font><font style="font-size: 0.8em;"><b>, </b></font><font style="font-size: 0.8em;">and the DOJ Public Integrity section "concern" with that untimely delivery:<br /><br /></font></font><blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><font style="font-size: 0.8em;"><b>Margolis Knew or Should Have Known Implications of Not Producing Documents</b></font><br /><br /><font style="font-size: 0.8em;">The explanations must be credible, otherwise there are more questions and investigations.</font><br /><br /><font style="font-size: 0.8em;">Public Integrity Section Memo</font>, <font style="font-size: 0.8em;">1994</font>: <font style="font-size: 0.8em;">"The White House failure to produce documents prompted Public integrity Section Chief Lee Radek to conclude on September 8, 1994 that "[We] are not confident the White House has produced all the documents in its possession . . ."</font></font><br /></blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b><br />T</b></font>he LAT reporting appears to muddy the water. Indeed, it's unclear what "the decision" is:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Irrelevant Confusion Over Margolis Decision</b><br /><br />It's not obvious, whether Margolis "decision", but these are not (for now) relevant::<br /><br />Was Margolis' decision:<br /><br />A. Not to <i>publish</i> the still-<u>not-written</u> reports;<br />B. Not to <i>produce</i> the DOJ OPR report <i>for the AG</i>;<br />C. Not to prepare old, but <u>written</u> DOJ OPR reports for <i>publication</i>; or <br />D. Not to prepare still-<i>not-produced</i> DOJ OPR reports <u>for the the AG</u> and publication?<br /></blockquote><br />These uncertainties are not relevant because the <i>published</i> 2004 DOJ OPR report shows there is no specific <i>identifying</i> information about attorneys and does not raise any reasonable "privacy rights" Margolis alludes. <br /><br /><blockquote><b>2004 DOJ OPR Report: Evidence Suggesting Misleading Margolis Statement</b><br /><br />
This is a sample report which could possibly be used to impeach
Margolis re his statements on "privacy" concerns in the withheld DOJ
OPR annual reports.<br />
<br />Sample <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20070911140009/http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/annualreport2004.htm">2004 annual report</a> does not contain identifying information.<br /><br />Margolis appears to have made excuses not to do what he should have done: Ensure the DOJ OPR annual report 2006-8 was timely published, <i>regardless</i> pressure from the White House or GOP.<br /></blockquote>Also, a recently disclosed DOJ IG report shows the <i>same</i> level of detail within the previously disclosed DOJ OPR annual reports, enough <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/doj-ig-attorney-a-linked-to-co.php">to identify</a> -- using other sources -- the DOJ Staff.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>W</b></font>e argue we don't need to have specific information about what 'the decision" really was; Margolis appears to have provided information he did not expect anyone to double check: The (lack of) identifying information about DOJ Staff in the <i>released</i> DOJ OPR reports is <i>unrelated</i> to a bonafide concern whether or not the still-not-disclosed DOJ OPR reports do or do not have privacy information. <br /><br /><i>Impeaching Margolis As A Witness: Retroactive, Dubious Recollections</i><br /><br />Whether Margolis is impeached or not <i>as a witness</i> is a strategic decision. Margolis appears to have retroactively asked the committee to believe there was a "concern" which is not supported by reasonable evidence. <br /><br />This is an alleged inconstent statement, made under oath, and would, if proven true, fall outside what is "recollection". As with the CIA tape destruction and DOJ OLC memos, it appears Margolis in this situation has retroactively attempted to leave a different impression about what he was thinking, doing, or concerned about.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>M</b></font>argolis' statements do not reconcile:<br /><br /><blockquote>A. He was delegated authority re the CIA leak investigation in 2005;<br /><br />B. In response to questions about 2006-era conduct, he allegedly claimed he made a <b>decision</b> to not publish the DOJ OPR annual report;<br /><br />C. Margolis allegedly claims the decision (B) was based on a staffing assessment, implying he was involved and did a review;<br /><br />D. Margolis allegedly claims the decision (B) was based on a privacy interest, but this is <i>not supported</i> by previous DOJ OPR annual reports;<br /><br />E. Margolis before Congress claims he was <i>passive</i>, contradicting the required detailed analysis to review the staffing levels (C);<br /><br />F. His conduct, emails, and experience re Vince Foster shows a much higher level of sophistication, involvement, and attention than what he would have us believe about his involvement with the US Attorney firings.<br /></blockquote><i>Unclear <u>What</u> Margolis <u>Was</u> Doing</i><br /><br />On the CIA leak investigation it seems unusual, on the back of admitted "passive" oversight of the US Attorneys, that Comey would delegate all authority to Margolis.<br /><br />If we take Margolis' statement re the US Attorney firing scandal as true -- that he was "passive" on the US Attorneys -- then what basis did <i>Comey</i> use to delegate the authority to Margolis; and what was Margolis also <i><u>not</u> doing</i> with the CIA leak investigation?<br /><br />The other possibility is Margolis wasn't there to conduct oversight of the CIA leak investigation, but to keep tabs on Fitzgerald, and provide information to Comey, back to the White House and the OVP on the status of the investigation.<br /><br /><i>Margolis' Alleged Smokescreen</i><br /><br />It appears Margolis misled the committee. The delegation letter on the CIA leak investigation shows Comey had confidence in Margolis. <i>What</i> Comey had confidence is appears uncertain.<br /><br />Margolis' statements about the reasons for not publishing the DOJ OPR annual report do not reconile with Margolis assertion that he was passive. Margolis could not reasonably claim he was passive; but also complete a DOJ manning assessment, concluding there were insufficient resources to produce the annual DOJ OPR report..<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Disconnect Between DOJ Requirements, Workflows</b><br /><br />The DOJOPR annual reports were not released for a reason, but Margolis <i>must</i> have been working on something else if he "wasn't" working the US Attorey issues.<br /><br />There are three possibilities:<br /><br />A. Someone must have done something; or <br /><br />B. Someone <i>wasn't</i> doing what they <i>said</i> they were doing; or <br /><br />C. Someone was doing <i>something <u>else</u></i> that they <i>don't</i> want us to know about.<br /><br />Margolis' dubious statements appear to be more related to C: A smokescreen to distract attention from what Margolis and others in DOJ were<i> really</i> doing.<br /><br /><u>Action</u>: We need to find out what Marglis was <i>really</i> doing re the DOJ OPR annual reports, DoD propaganda, CIA leak investigation, and the DOD POW abuses.</blockquote>Margolis also asserted the DOJ OPR annual report was not published because of privacy interests. Yet, a reading of the previous annual reports does not support this. Indeed, the DOJ&nbsp; IG recently released detailed description of US Attorney conduct. The names within this disclosed information was redacted. It is irrelevant that the disclosed information could be combined with other information to identify the likely DOJ Staff counsel by name.;<br /><br />Margolis appears to be lying. Either he's lying about the reasons the DOJ OPR report was not published; or he's lying about him being passive. Either way, his explanations for his workflows, time use, and activity within DOJ need to be reviewed.<br /><br />If he wasn't working on the US Attorney issues, what was he doing; if he had the time to review the DOJ OPR annual report manning, why didn't he put the sam effort into the US Attorney firings or the CIA leak investigation?<br /><br />Margolis suggesting he was "passive" on the US Attorney firings raises the question about the CIA leak investigation and Margolis workflows.<br /><br />If he wasn't working on the US Attorney firings, despite his documented attendance in the DOJ emails at the planning meetings, what was he doing; and what information did he get that was translating into what action, not just on the US Attorneys, but the CIA leak?<br /><br /><i>Margolis Allleged Connection With White House</i><br /><br />Margolis appears to be one of the conduits of information from the Department of Justice to the White House. It appears, as a reward for his support, he might have been promised or granted discretion during investigations.<br /><br />We need to understand how the Bush Administration carry overs will affect whether the DOJ OPR conclusions are reviewed under the new AG.&nbsp; We need to get a better handle on what Margolis was really doing, how he was establishing his work priorities, who he was really responding to, and the basis for his "Outstanding" performance award.<br /><br /><i>5. DoD Military Analysts Emails</i> and DOJ Senior Officials<br /><br />Here's where the Comey delegation letter comes into play. Comey had trust in Margolis, and delegated him authority to review the CIA leak investigation.<br /><br />The question is whether Comey delegated to Margolis other authority; and what level of involvement Margolis had with other DOJ activities. We've only read vague references to "DOJ Senior Officials," but if, as it appears, Margolis was deflecting attention from other things, the question is whether he was involved with questionable interchanges between DOJ, the White House, and DoD: Rendition, CIA tactics, Iraq WMD, POW abuse, FISA violations.<br /><br />The DoD emails do not close the loop for Margolis, nor for the DOJ OPR.<br /><br />Margolis might deceive the committee about his involvement if he was doing something else, and knew more than he wanted to admit. Margolis possibly knew about the DOD propaganda efforts, and the DOJ-DoD discussions with the White House on the military analysts. Margolis, if he could lead others to believe he was "not involved" with the US Attorneyf irings, might shield his real knowlege about the DOJ-White House connection on the CIA, POW abuse, FISA violations, and other alleged illegal activity 2001-9.<br /><br />Someone like Margolis, given an appointment letter re CIA leak
investigation, would likely know something about the following
information flows between DOJ and outside agencies:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>DoD Emails Reference Senior DOJ Personnel</b><br /><br />This information shows there is a connection between the DOJ Senior Staff and the DOD military analysts and the alleged domestic propaganda:<br /><span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"></span><br />A. <span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milanalysts/23Apr08/BarstowRelease23Apr08/5889-6013.pdf">Barstow Release</a>: <br /><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search">"there will be a few <b>senior <em>DOJ</em></b> and DOD <u><b>officials</b></u></span></span>"<br /><br />B. <a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milanalysts/23Apr08/BarstowRelease23Apr08/5764-5888.pdf">Barstow Release</a>: <br />"<span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search">call out to OGC and <b><em>DoJ</em></b> to <u><b>provide some inputs</b></u>"</span></span><br /><br />C. <a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milanalysts/7Feb08/06-F-1532_7Feb08Release.pdf">Feb08 release</a>: <br />"<span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search"><u><b>Conference Call</b></u> with <u><b>Senior</b></u> <em>Department of Justice"</em></span></span><br /><br />D.&nbsp; <a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milanalysts/13Apr07/06-F-01532doc09.pdf">July 20, 2005 Conference Call</a>: <br />"<span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search"><b><em>Department of Justice</em> <u>legal people helping</u></b> them with their tribunals"</span></span><br /><br />E.&nbsp; <span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search"><a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milanalysts/21Feb08/BarstowRelease3778-3826.pdf">Developing a similar "outside analyst list" for DOJ</a>: <br />"</span></span><span style="visibility: visible;" id="main"><span style="visibility: visible;" id="search"><u><b>email to our analysts</b></u> asking if they would like to be <u><b>on a list for </b></u><em><u><b>doj</b></u>"</em></span></span></blockquote><br /><i>Questions</i><br /><br />There are a number of issues which warrant outside review, and an evaluation whether the current AG, DOJ OPR, and Congressional Committees are using available evidence to prompt adequate investigations, or adverse inferences.<br /><br /><blockquote><i>Still not Disclosed DOJ Delegation Memoranda</i><br /><br />1. What is the AG's plan to release copies of the secret delegation authority letters DOJ Senior management issued re FISA, Geneva, CIA and DoD investigations?<br /><br />2. What is the plan to review and compare the delegation letters to Margolis related to the Vince Foster investigation, US Attorney oversight, CIA black sites, DoD emails, and FISA surveillance investigations?<br /><br /><i>DOJ OPR Annual Reports</i><br /><br />3. Were the still-not-released DOJ OPR annual reports never accomplished, <a href="http://cryptome.info/doj091506.htm">as required of DOJ OPR legal counsel</a> ["<u><b>Submit an annual report</b></u> to the Attorney General summarizing the&nbsp; work of the Office"] ?<br /> <br />4. If not, what other DOJ OPR legal counsel obligations were not fulfilled 2001-2009?<br /><br />5. What is the DOJ AG plan to review the still-not released DOJ OPR annual reports?<br /><br />6. What is the plan of DOJ OPR to release under the new AG the copies of the DOJ OPR annual reports still not provided?<br /><br />7. What were the real reasons the DOJ OPR annual reports were not disclosed?<br /><br /><i>Reviewing Margolis Alleged Inconsistent Statements</i><br /><br />8. Why did Margolis state there were "privacy" issues related to the DOJ OPR annual report, but the attorney names are not provided within the DOJ OPR previous annual report?<br /><br />9. Why did Margolis state there were "privacy" issues related to the DOJ OPR annual report, yet the DOJ IG recently released a similar list of information about DOJ Staff attorneys?<br /><br />10. Why did Margolis have a "higher" concern for one set of US Attorneys conduct, as measured by the refusal to release the DOJ OPR report; but apparently had no objection when similar information was disclosed about other US Attorneys in the DOJ IG report?<br /><br />11. Why should we believe Margolis' assertion that he was "passive" on the US Attorney firings, but the DOJ US Attorney firing <i>and</i> Vince Foster emails suggest he was well involved, attended many meetings?<br /><br />12. Why should we believe Margolis' assertion that he was "passive" on the US Attorney firings, yet he "took the time" to do a detailed review of the "resources" within DOJ OPR to conclude that there was no time to provide in 2008 a report for 2006 or 2007?<br /><br />13. Why should we believe Margolis' claim that we was <i>passive</i> on the US Attorney <i>personnel</i> issues; but he was <i>concerned</i> about the US Attorney staffing levels, resources, and privacy on the DOJ OPR annual report?<br /><br /><i>White House Connection</i><br /><br />Look at <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/05/data-mining-dod-analyst-docume.php#comment-2809103">this summary</a> of the DoD emails connecting the White House to other agencies; and <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/05/data-mining-dod-analyst-docume.php#comment-3007339">this</a> showing a WH Outreach program.<br /><br />14. When did Margolis provide indirectly to the White House information about the status of the US Attorney firings, the CIA leak investigation, or other things?<br /><br />Review <a href="http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/05/pow-foia-doj-jcon-database-rev.php">JCON</a>: <br /><br />15. When did Margolis meet with Monica Goodling, Rove, or Rove's legal counsel?<br /><br /><i>DoD Military Analysts</i><br /><br />16. How much does Margolis know about the alleged domestic propaganda efforts?<br /><br />17. What role did Margolis have in reviewing any information released under the DOD information program, the DoD emails, or the DOD IG report into the DoD role on alleged domestic propaganda?<br /><br />18. Did Margolis have any inputs to the DOD IG report on the alleged propaganda?<br /><br />19. Which DOJ legal counsel worked with the President, EOP, OVP on the alleged DoD domestic propaganda; and what connection does Margolis have with that DOJ staff counsel?<br /></blockquote><b>DOJ OPR Legal Counsel</b><br /><br />DOJ OPR legal counsel has a problem. They have the legal obligation under CFR to work with the DC bar to refer matters on DOJ ethics. <br /><br /><blockquote><h5>§&nbsp;45.12&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Reporting to the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility.</h5><span class="updatebodytest"><b><u>Department
employees have a duty to</u></b>, and <b><u>shall</u></b>, report to the Department of
Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (DOJ-OPR), or to their
supervisor, or their component's internal affairs office for referral
to DOJ-OPR, <b><u>any allegations of misconduct by a Department attorney</u></b> that
relate to the exercise of the attorney's authority to investigate,
litigate or provide legal advice, as well as <b><u>allegations of misconduct</u></b>
by law enforcement personnel when such allegations are related to
allegations of attorney misconduct within the jurisdiction of DOJ-OPR.</span><br /></blockquote><br />The question is how long the DOJ OPR legal counsel has known about the problems within DOJ OPR, but did not, as required under the CFR forward evidence to the DC Bar.<br /><br />When did DOJ Staff first learn that the DOJ OPR legal counsel did <i>not</i> forward information related to DOJ Staff misconduct?<br /><br /><b>Conclusion</b>s<br /><br /><b>M</b>argolis email related to Vince Foster seals the deal: Margolis raised
the same "concerns" about passivity he would have the Committee believe
Margolis should be excused. Indeed, the 1990s-era OPR memos strongly
support the conclusion Margolis knew or should have known the
implication of not fully cooperating with investigations or withholding
documents<br /><br />The DOJ OPR annual report was suppressed for invalid reasons. Margolis
appears to have made statements which are not supported by the DOJ OPR
record, nor by the practices of DOJ redactions.<br /><br />Someone with Margolis experience for attention to detail and
involvement has a problem: Either they were so "out of the loop," to
raise questions of their competence; or they know more about conduct
they, as staff counsel, should have reported to DOJ OPR.<br /><br /><b>M</b>argolis' conduct during the Vince Foster investigation shows us a level of involvement and concern about the DOJ that belies his claims of passivity on the US Attorney firings. It appears Margolis is claiming passivity not to take responsibility for supposed inaction, but to deflect attention from who <i>was involved</i> and pulling the strings, and Margolis' likely <i>involvement</i> with other DOJ-DoD-White House activities. <br /><br />The DoD emails related to the alleged US domestic propaganda efforts touch on senior DOJ Staff involvement. We believe that more detailed review of the JCON workflows and emails will likely show Margolis' involvement with much more than he would have us believe by his claims of passivity.<br /><br />We believe Margolis' claim of "passivity" is not to narrowly downplay
his competence or involvement in the US Attorney firings, but to (a)
explain away his failure to timely report to DOJ OPR the extent of DOJ
Staff involvement with reportable misconduct to DOJ OPR; and (b)
distract attention from <i>other</i> activity he was aware and involved.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>he Committee needs to call Margolis back, read him the email and DoJ memos he sent and <i>read</i> re Vince Foster, and compel him to explain why anyone who sent that email re Vince Foster should believe his claim of passivity. The two do not reconcile and Margolis appears to knows more about other White House involvement with DoD, DOJ, and the CIA. <br /><br />To believe anything else asks us to believe a man who once made a call from the White House is suddenly out of the loop, and "not" willing to oversee an ongoing leak investigation or personnel changes <i>despite</i> a supposed "concern" about staff privacy and workloads. This defies reason. <br /><br />Margolis and Rove must be independently challenged about what information DOJ through Margolis was providing to the White House legal counsel: The CIA leak investigation, US Attorney firings, and DOJ progress in supporting FISA-Geneva violations and propaganda.<br /><br /><div align="center">~ ~ ~ <br /><br /></div><br /><b>Other Notes</b><br /><br />There is a link between Comey, Margolis, and the <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">2004-era still-secret DOJ OLC memos</a>.<br /><br />Senator Shumer asked Comey <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_motion_for_leave.pdf">12 of 18</a> about Margolis:<br /><br /><blockquote>Comey: "Mr. Margolis is a wise person with significant experience in personnel matters, whose <u><b>advice is <i>always</i> worthy of <i>serious consideration</i></b></u>."<br /><br /></blockquote>Shumer asked Comey, May 15, 2007:<br /><br /><blockquote>Senator Shumer <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_motion_for_leave.pdf">11 of 18</a>: "Did the <b>Office of Legal Counsel</b> or any other office prepare a written opinion providing the <b>basis for concerns about the legality of the classified program</b> you alluded to in your testimony? If so, please identify the approximate date(s) of any such opinion, the author(s), and the recipients of any such opinion, inside and outside the Justice Department."<br /></blockquote>Comey answered there were memos from 2004:<br /><br /><blockquote>Comey response to Shumer <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_motion_for_leave.pdf">11 of 18</a>: "Yes. <u><b>OLC prepared legal memoranda concerning the matter during early 2004</b></u>, some of which would have been drafts. I also <b>prepared at least one memorandum</b> that I recall. The Department of Justice would be in the best position to supply dates and information about recipients."<br /></blockquote>Comey's name is listed <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=20">here</a>, against that 2004-era secret DOJ OLC document. However, it is unclear whether the document Comey referred to in his response to Senator Shumer is the same one Bradbury disclosed in <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=20">the declaration</a>. <br /><br />It is possible Comey's response to Shumer might be <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=21">this document</a>.<br /><br /><div align="center">~ ~ ~<br /></div><br />Margolis also connects with Comey and Buchanan, theough the DOJ IG report:<br /><br /><blockquote><b><u>Comey</u></b> said that he knew <strong>EOUSA was concerned </strong><strong>about Ryan's office</strong> and was <b><u>working with Margolis to address the problems</u></b>.<br /></blockquote>
<br /><blockquote><b><u>
E-mail records between Margolis and EOUSA Director Mary Beth Buchanan</u></b>
in late October 2004 show that <u><b>Margolis</b></u> and Buchanan recognized <strong>the need to discuss the concerns with Ryan</strong>.<br /></blockquote><div align="center">~ ~ ~ <br /></div><br />The DOJ IG report does not support Margolis' suggestion that he took a hands off approach to the US Attorney issues, but shows a link between Margolis <i>and the <u>White House</u></i>:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf">28 of 392</a>: Sampson said the <b>interviewing panel for U.S. Attorneys</b> generally included himself, an Associate White House Counsel with responsibility for the particular geographic area the potential candidate was being considered for, a person from the Presidential Personnel Office, <b><u>David Margolis</u></b>, the Director of EOUSA, and <u><b>the Department's White House Liaison</b></u>.<br /></blockquote><blockquote><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf">35 of 392</a>: <b>Sampson</b> told congressional investigators that <b><u>in early 2005</u></b> he had consulted and relied upon several Department officials, including EOUSA Director Mary Beth Buchanan, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General William Mercer, Deputy Attorney General James Comey, and <b>Associate Deputy Attorney General <u>David Margolis</u></b>, for recommendations concerning which U.S. Attorneys to remove.<br /></blockquote><div align="center">~ ~ ~<br /></div><br />The DOJ Emails suggest Margolis was <i>more</i> involved with the meetings about Chiara than the DOJ IG report suggests:<br /><blockquote><br /><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf">37 of 392</a>: <b><u>Margolis</u></b> said he <u><b><i>was aware</i></b></u> of management concerns about Ryan and Chiara, and he said he had serious concerns about Lampton.<br /></blockquote>Margolis <i>was</i> management and part of the senior leadership.<br /><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG1990-2062.pdf">1 of 68</a>, Paul McNulty said,<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Margolis Actively Involved: <i><u>Where Is The Email</u></i>?</b><br /><br />McNulty at 12:23 on Chiara meetings: "<b><u>David</u></b> [Margolis] <b><u>speaks for me</u></b> in such matters."<br /><br />At 1:25, Margolis did not object, saying, "Well said."<br /><br /><div align="center">= = <br /></div><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt2-5070319.pdf">34 of 51</a>: Handwrittten, "<u>Section Process</u>: . . . <font style="font-size: 1em;"><b><u>Lead</u> by long-time career DOJ lawyer <u>Dave Margolis</u></b></font>"<br /><br />Then <i>who</i> was Margolis supposedly leading:<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf">40 of 392</a>: DOJ IG: "Other than Comey, Margolis, Mercer, Buchanan, and probably Goodling, <b>we identified no other Department officials who discussed the performance</b> of U.S. Attorneys with Sampson before January 2006."<br /><br /><div align="center">= = <br /></div><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt3-1070319.pdf">50 of 57</a>: Margolis gets a <i>transcript</i> of McNulty's testimony. Where is the email showing Margolis' review <i>before</i> the testimony was final?<br /><br /><u>Question</u>: If Margolis "speaks for" McNulty, are we seeing the adequate email traffic for Margolis to do this; or does it appear that Margolis' email hasn't been disclosed; or there were other methods Margolis was using to stay in the loop and "speak for" McNulty?<br /><br /><u>Answer</u>: Yes, <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OAG958-1050.pdf">14 of 93</a> shows Richard Hertling converts a file from a word document, and delivers <i>pdf</i> files to Margolis.&nbsp; <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OAG958-1050.pdf">76 of 93</a> shows a sample change log for a word document.<br /><br /><u>Followup</u>: Where are the records related to these <i>non-email conversations</i> on the documents; and did the Committee <i>adequately</i> ask about these specific <i>non-email conversations</i> contained <i>within</i> the <i>pdf drafts</i>?<br /><br /><u>Answer</u>: Kyle Sampson has a private cell phone [ 202 305 5289 ] which Margolis knows about; <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt2-5070319.pdf">31 of 51</a> shows the handwritten notes with Margolis "involved and supportive" written; <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OAG958-1050.pdf">57 of 93</a> shows Beck's Gmail account.<br /><br /><u>Action</u>: Re-read the handwritten note on <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt2-5070319.pdf">31 of 51</a>: "Performance related" AG "acknowleg[ment]" is <i>not</i> reality nor notes from a meeting; but apparent "talking points" of what they wanted to <i>communicate</i>. There's a difference. <br /><br /><u>Evidence of A Side Meeting</u>: Look at pages <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt2-5070319.pdf">29- 34 of 51</a>: Notice how the text-spacing in the handwritten notes is (relatively) level, and even between the points, and onto the next pages. Also, notice the columns of the handwritten notes: They're the same. That's unusual: People don't normally write <i>notes from a meeting</i> like this.&nbsp; This suggest they've <i>transcribed</i> the comments from a white board used in a meeting to discuss these comments.<br /></blockquote>Margolis wasn't simply "aware" of issues, he was <i>actively</i> monitoring the events and participating in the <i>evening</i><br /><br /><blockquote><b>More Than Aware: Look At the Recipient Read Times</b><br /><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OLA640-667.pdf">8 of 28</a> shows Margolis opened the email at 5:21P, within <i>seconds</i> of Scott-Finan sending the email. Goodling, DoJ's White House liaison, <i>a minute later</i> at 5:22, read the <i>same</i> email.<br /></blockquote><blockquote><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG2167-2227.pdf">5 of 61</a>, <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG2167-2227.pdf">19 of 61</a> <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG2167-2227.pdf">42 of 61</a> October 2006: Shows a meeting re Chiara.<br /><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OLA640-667.pdf">22 of 28</a>: Shows the list of who DOJ thought should receive the information about the Congressional hearing. This is <i>management-level</i> information.<br /><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt8-070320.pdf">18 of 100</a> Elston corrects Margolis; Margolis <i>doesn't have</i> an <u>expense account</u>.<br /><br /><a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt8-070320.pdf">40 of 100</a>: Shows a plan, Margolis involved with the departure of a US Attorney:<br /><br /><blockquote>"For further background information about the district, the Acting Deputy<br />Attorney General should consult with Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis <b>about the exit of former U.S. Attorney</b> [redacted ] "<br /></blockquote></blockquote>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Suspicions About DoD Domestic LE Role</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/02/suspicions-about-dod-domestic.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.254743</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-03T15:45:45Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-03T18:38:57Z</updated>
   
   <summary><![CDATA[The National Archives recently released 9-11 Commission documents. One document was a summary of a visit to Northern Command reviewing the DoD role in domestic security.The author of the visit report (report, memo) discussed DoD's role in domestic law enforcement.&nbsp;...]]></summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></b>he National Archives recently released 9-11 Commission <a href="http://www.archives.gov/legislative/research/9-11/commission-memoranda.html">documents</a>. <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">One document</a> was a <a href="http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/action/ExternalIdSearch?id=2609806">summary</a> of a visit to Northern Command reviewing the DoD role in domestic security.<br /><br />The author of the <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">visit report</a> (report, memo) discussed DoD's role in domestic law enforcement.&nbsp; A close reading of the memo suggests some DoD parsing. There are growing suspicions DoD plays more than an advisory role in domestic law enforcement (LE). <br /><br />One lesson of the FISA violations suggests Members of Congress agreed to turn a blind eye to <i>other</i> illegal DoD activity re Posse Comitatus: Using combat forces against civilians in a law enforcement capacity. This is an assault on the established order.<br /><br />This discussion may help illustrate what some of the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php">still-classified DOJ OLC documents</a> might look like.<br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[Curiously, it appears the author included within <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">his memo</a> copies of text extracted from the DoD briefings. The apparent boilerplate DoD language assures us DoD will not violate the Posse Comitatus Act, unless Congress authorizes that activity. <br /><br />However, we heard the same <strike>promises</strike> <i>lies</i> from President Bush re warrantless electronic surveillance, before the invasion of Iraq, and re <i>habeas</i>. <br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></b>he parsing within the DoD information and visit report demands close scrutiny. Here, the author implicitly assumes Congress is involved with the domestic use of the US military. However, parsing the words suggests something else: "Indirect" DoD involvement does not necessarily mean Congress must approve the DoD activity: <br /><br /><blockquote><b>Possible Boilerplate Information From DoD, Likely Consistent with Still-Secret DOJ OLC Memoranda</b><br /><br /><a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">Visit report</a>: <b>Unless authorized by an act of Congress</b> (or by the Constitution) JTF -CS will not engage in <b><u><i>direct</i></u></b> law enforcement activities (Posse Comitatus Act - PCA). Direct LE activities include <b><u>arrest</u> of <i>suspected</i> criminals</b>, <u><b>search and seizure</b></u> of evidence, and <u><b>investigation</b></u> of criminal activities.<br /></blockquote>Recall the secret Congressional-Executive agreement to sidestep the FISA court, and bypass the established order. Initially, the court did not review the inter-branch decision to bypass the <i>agreed-to</i>-FISA procedures.&nbsp; The system of checks and balances failed until outside pressure embarrassed the US government.<br /><br />Despite assurances to the contrary, the US government knowingly
violates the rights of American civilians. Law enforcement and DoD
hopes to find, in the wake of the illegal activity, information it can
retroactively say it had that would have prospectively have justified
the intrusion. <br /><br />The NSA "investigative lead" process works the same way: NSA, a DoD-component combat support arm, stumbles across information it illegally acquires; then feeds this to law enforcement, which uses that information to subsequently interrogate, harass, or target a civilian.<br /><br />Congress is complicit. Congress, despite the
illegal activity, has yet to conduct an adequate, comprehensive review
of these assaults on the established order. It is a subsequent problem
when the US national leadership are reluctant and unwilling to <i>timely</i> review this illegal activity. There is a solution.<br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></b>his lesson applies to the 9-11 investigation memo. Specifically, this language within the 9-11 note creates "exceptions," as did the secret FISA agreements. However, as with the FISA violations, the memo implicitly suggests there are no provisions to <i>ensure</i> judicial review a legislative-executive decision to conduct domestic DoD operations if they jointly agree -- o<i>utside</i> judicial review -- that the DoD operation meets specific criteria:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Likely DOJ OLC Classified Memo: Dubious </b><b>Exceptions <i><u>Without</u></i> Judicial Review</b><br /><br />DoJ OLC has a habit of pretending that the courts do not have a role. However, close examination shows the exceptions have been perverted, breaching the established order.<br /><br /><a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">Visit report</a>: However, in very limited circumstances, the Congress has specifically authorized DOD active-duty personnel to engage in <b><u>direct LE&nbsp; activities</u></b>. For instance, Congress has created a <u><b>specific exception (18 U.S.C. -831) to PCA by authorizing DOD active-duty personnel to arrest persons</b></u>, and to search for and seize&nbsp; evidence related to violations of federal criminal law prohibiting the possession, transfer, or use of nuclear materials and weapons. <br /></blockquote>The memo suggests something other than co-equal branches of government. In this perversion of the Constitution, the Court is expressly denied authority to review a legislative-executive agreement that specific DoD operations are lawful, within special exceptions, and cannot be reviewed by the courts. <br /><br /><i>Posse Comitatus Act Immunity?</i><br /><br />Strange, we went down this path with the FISA violations, raising the absurd prospect that Congress might (someday) pass immunity legislation for DoD-connected contractors supporting domestic military operations against American citizens which violate the Posse Comitatus Act.<br /><br />Congress agreed to attack the established order, then, like a drunken sailor, handed out immunity dance-cards. So much for the established order. We must discuss methods to deny Congress the <i>discretion</i> to secretly agree to Legislative-Executive plans which attack the established order, and, in this case, bypass the third branch.&nbsp; These solutions will be packaged as a new established order.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>his quote from the memo focuses narrowly on what <u><i>this</i></u> specific Northern Command unit <i>may</i> be doing. However, the denial is incomplete. The memo and the implicit DoD disclosure is silent on which <i><u>other</u></i> units <i>may</i> have been assigned supporting or indirect-direct missions, "other than" those mentioned:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>DOJ OLC Likely Concluded Language "Opens" Door For DoD LE Role</b><br /><br />This language appears similar to the DOJ OLC-like arguments which "open" the door to breaches of the established order:<br /><br /><a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">Visit report</a>: It is not entirely clear <u><b>which DOD assets</b></u> actually perform such activities, or whether JTF-CS personnel have ever been enlisted to conduct such operations. JTF-CS public statements are that <b><i><u>they</u></i></b> "currently, have <b><u>not been assigned</u></b> any <b>missions other than CBRNE response</b>."&nbsp; <br /><br />[Note -- CBRNE: "Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive"]<br /></blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>he author's speculation of DoD involvement within the exceptions deserve review, especially in light of the Member of Congress-Presidential agreement to breach the agreed-to FISA requirements:<br /><blockquote><br /><b>Door "Open" To Classified DoD Activity Breaching Posse Comitatus</b><br /><br />Note the similarity to FISA violation exceptions:<br /><br /><a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">Visit report</a>: I suspect (on mere speculation) that they <u><b>have been called upon to consult/advise on the conduct of <i>classified operations</i> under the <i>exception above</i></b></u>. <br /></blockquote>However, the distinction between <i>respond</i> and <i>prevent [<u><b>emphasis</b></u></i> added], leaves open the possibilty units -- <i>other than</i> <u>these</u> -- are involved:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>DoD Does Not Adequately Close The Suspicion</b><br /><br />Note the parsing:<br /><br /><a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00215.pdf">Visit report</a>: When I asked about supporting such operations (that are preventive in nature) MGEN Grizzile and his staff were rather adamant that <u><i><b>they</b></i></u> <b><u>are</u></b> <b>called upon to "<u>respond</u>," not "<u>prevent</u>."</b><br /></blockquote>It remains unclear what operations have been agreed to; and what process, if any, Congress plans to use to review their complicity with the DoD violations of Comitatus. Congress has been reluctant to openly review their complicity with the FISA violations and other breaches of the established order. Although they should provide leadership to preserve the estabilshed order of judicial ovesight of DoD domestic operations against civlians, Congress is not likely to independently call for self-flagellation. <br /><br /><blockquote><b>Hunting For The Right Question</b><br /><br />Here is some follow up for DoD and Members of Congress and their staff,
who rarely seem to be given adequate guidance on which questions they s<i>hould</i> be asking:<br /><br />A. Which units were assigned to these combat-related activities which violate Posse Comitatus?<br /><br />B. Which DoD component <i>could</i> be "indirectly" called to <i>prevent</i> any lawful activity?<br /></blockquote><blockquote><br />C. Which DoD component <u>has</u> been called to <u>prevent</u> any lawful activity?<br /><br />D. Does DoD view "travel along the open roads" as an exception to the warrant requirement when (electronic) monitoring, detaining, searching, seizing, surveilling, interrogating or harassing American citizens?<br /><br />E. Has Congress, by inaction, not adequately reviewed the DoD role in using resources to conduct electronic surveillance of American citizens while they travel on the open roads?<br /><br />F. Does DoD and the Congress view cell phone communications between traveling vehicles as <i>different</i> than personal electronic communications between private citizens in their own homes?<br /><br />G. Which marked or unmarked vehicles have been fitted with <i>side-mounted</i> infrared radar (FLIR)
which cannot be legally used to look into houses without a warrant, but
"could be (illegally?) without a warrant" to look at non-houses
(vehicles, vehicle passengers)?<br /></blockquote><b>Magna Charta</b><br /><br />Let's put aside whether the US Constitution prohbitis the activity, creates an exception, or is "inadequate". We argue, if the US Congress and President say the "established order" in the US Constitution is irrelevant, then we must fall back to the Magna Carta: What does <i>it</i> say about the implicit DoD activity?<br /><br />We conclude the requirements within the Great Charter would challenge the DoD domestic role, and create a requirement to investigate this activity. However, this US government appears to have not only ignored the US Constitution, but also these requirements within the Magna Charta:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Magna Carta On Free Travel</b><br /><br />This shows the standard DOJ OLC likely ignored, and Congress concurred, when "legalizing" secret US combat operations against civilians:<br /><br />Magna Carta, clause 42. It shall be <b>lawful in future for <u>anyone</u></b> (excepting always those
      imprisoned or outlawed in accordance with the law of the kingdom, and
      natives of any country at war with us, and merchants, who shall be treated
      as if above provided) to leave our kingdom and to <u><b>return, safe and secure
      by land and water</b></u>, except for a <b><u>short</u></b> period in time of war, on grounds of
      public policy- reserving always the allegiance due to us.<br /></blockquote>If Congress will not review this activity, nor preserve the established order, there is a legal basis for American citizens to take action: Through the grand jury process. Here within the great charter is the legal basis for a grand jury to review the alleged DoD domestic activity which violates Posse Comitatus:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Magna Carta On Timely Investigations To Questionable Activity</b><br /><br />Magna Carta. clause 48. <u><b><i>All</i> evil customs</b></u> connected with forests and warrens, foresters and
      warreners, sheriffs and their officers, river banks and their wardens,
      <b><u>shall <i>immediately</i> be inquired into</u></b> in each county by <b><u>twelve sworn knights</u></b>
      of the same county chosen by the <u><b>honest men</b></u> of the same county, and shall,
      within forty days of the said inquest, be utterly abolished, so as never
      to be restored, provided always that we previously have intimation
      thereof, or our justiciar, if we should not be in England.<br /></blockquote>There is a declaration in the Magna Carta that the legal requirements are binding on all, which Members of Congress and the Executive Branch appear to have ignored:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Magna Carta On Kingdom-Wide Legal Enforcement</b><br /><br />The applicability of the established order applies not to a geographic region, but to a realm of power: The Kingdom. Today, we call this "The State."<br /><br />Magna Carta, clause 60. Moreover, <b><u><i>all</i></u></b> these <b><u>aforesaid customs and liberties</u></b>, the observances
      of which we have granted in our kingdom as far as pertains to us towards
      our men, <b><u><i>shall be observed</i> by <i><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">all</font> of our kingdom</i></u></b>, as well clergy as laymen,
      as far as pertains to them towards their men.<br /></blockquote><b>US Government Actions Circumvent Judicial Review<br /><br /></b>The requirements within the Magna Charta require a review of the 9-11-connected memo, especially when the wording leaves open the option to violate the US Constitution, the warrant requirement, and federal law prohibiting DoD assets in a domestic law enforcement capacity.<br /><br />We've seen the US Congress turn a blind eye to habeas violations. There was no express finding that the US had been invaded nor was there an insurrection. Yet, the DOJ OLC memos and the 9-11 visit report implicitly suggest that even absent a specific declaration of Congress, the President and DoD may infer within Congressional AUMF "authorization" to conduct operations within specific exceptions. <br /><br />However, this conclusion appears to have been made with the intent not to subject this decision to judicial review, and likely prompt claims of "national security" to shield the agreement from public review. <br /><br />It appears the claims of "national security" and "executive privilege" are not to shield classified information, but to thwart public knowledge needed to start the FOIA process, and trigger initial review of the questioned documents, even in secret. This possible DoD activity appears to be a joint legislative-executive process to, once again, circumvent the third branch.<b><br /></b><br /><i>Questions</i><br /><br /><blockquote><b>Evaluating Adequacy of Congressional Supervision</b><br /><br />A reading of the Magna Carta in light of above prompts questions about the adequacy of Congressional oversight; and what methods are required to <i><u>oversee Congress</u></i>. One problem is the Congress does not timely respond to demands for <i>Congressional</i> accountability; but secretly agrees to hide the agreements which assault the established order.<br /><br />H. When did Members of Congress plan, as they did <i>not</i> do with the FISA violations, to discuss their reasons for secretly agreeing to breach the US Constitution, and not conduct timely oversight of the DoD's ongoing domestic law enforcement operations?<br /><br />I. As with the FISA violations, which contractors, military, para-military or combat units have been secretly assigned the duty of "<u>preventing</u>" -- not reacting to -- incidents using methods which may or may not be lawful?<br /></blockquote>From the Great Charter:<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Magna Carta</b> <b>On Timely Justice</b><br /><br />This shows justice in an established order must open to all without delay:<br /><br />Magna Carta, clause 40: To <b><u>no one</u></b> will we sell, to no one will we <u><b>refuse or delay, right or
      justice</b></u>.<br /></blockquote><i>Questions</i><br /><br /><blockquote>J. When did Members of Congress first learn DoD-connected law enforcement personnel&nbsp; (DoD components, contractors) were, among other things:<br /><br />- Conducting domestic intelligence operations <i>outside</i> the <i>permitted</i> exceptions;<br /><br />- Lying to the public about their activity;<br /><br />- Misleading the court about their indirect and direct involvement with stops, detention, and searches of American civilians;<br /><br />- Using misrepresentations to target American civilians for administrative, non-judicial punishments;<br /><br />- Hiding their connection with DoD during interrogation and surveillance of American civilians; and<br /><br />- Actively attempting to <u>prevent</u> <i>lawful</i> activity <i>unrelated</i> to CBNRE?<br /></blockquote><b>AUMF </b><br /><br />It appears the DoD operations rely on still secret DOJ OLC memos. As with the justification for FISA violations, it appears the President and Congress used the AUMF to defy the established order, bypass the courts, and "approve" DoD domestic operations using dubious exceptions to the judicial review process, statute, and Constitution.<br /><br /><i>Questions</i><br /><br /><blockquote><b>Exceptions To Posse Comitatus Absent Judicial Review</b><br /><br />K. What legal authority, as with the FISA violations, did DoD "rely" to conduct the above operations which violate posse comitatus?<br /><br />L. How long have Members of Congress known, as with the FISA violations, the AUMF after 9-11 and re Iraq, was used by DoD and the President to 'authorize" DoD's domestic <i>role</i> in law enforcement?<br /><br />M. Why did Congress agree to attack the established order and not permit judicial review of the Congressional-Executive agreement to bypass the courts on Posse Comitatus violations?<br /></blockquote><p><i>DoD Role in Civilian Administrative Punishment</i></p><p>Geneva imposes on the US, as a signatory to the laws of war, a legal obligation to ensure civilians are not subject to military law. There are two methods to impose justice: One through the legal process involving the courts; and a second, falling under the administrative process, which excludes the courts.</p>The concern is the 9-11 Commission Memo implicitly suggests that there are exceptions. My implication, this means DoD, acting outside the Judicial process, could work to use non-judicial procedures to impose consequences on civilians.<br /><br />It remains unclear whether this possible DoD support for non-judicial punishment would violate the Geneva Convention protects afforded to American civilians. Members of the armed forces are afforded special protections to ensure justice. However, it would not be surprising to learn Congress has turned a blind eye to DoD efforts to bypass the Geneva protections afforded to civlians in an international conflict, and administratively punish civilians for illusory offenses without adequate judicial review by the third branch.<br /><br /><p>It is irrelevant Congress and the Executive believe DoD should have discretion to conduct domestic law enforcement operations without judicial review. The Magna Charta does not permit this non-judicial punishment, but requires judicial involvement with evidence and legal procedings:</p><blockquote><p><b>Select Magna Carta Clauses On Legal Procedure</b></p><p>These show judicial provisions Members of Congress and DOJ OLC likely agreed would be explained away, in defiance of the established order, and secretly replaced with DoD administrative, non-judicial punishment in breach of Posse Comitatus:<br /></p><p>Magna Carta, clause 38. No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own <b>unsupported complaint</b>,
      put anyone to his "law", without credible witnesses brought for
      this purposes.</p><p>Magna Carta, clause 39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or <u><b>exiled</b></u> or in
      any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by
      the <b>lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land</b>.</p></blockquote>
    
    However, "lawful judgment" presupposes that the issues are in <i>court</i>. Yet, classified or administrative hearings do not meet this legal standard. Under the Congressional-Executive agreement, DoD combat operations could indirectly support non-judicial proceedings.<br /><br />The implications are stunning. American citizens could be <i>administratively</i> punished, denied a reasonable chance to present evidence, and not afforded a right to appeal a reckless <i>administrative</i> decision linked with illegal, domestic DoD operations. <br /><br />Members of Congress still have to account for the assault against the established order in agreeing to unlawful FISA procedures, and their plan to bypass the third branch. We shouldn't have to threaten to hold our breath to get an answer. The Members of Congress took an oath. There's that ringing reminder of "change" still ignored from 2006.<br /><br /><i>Unenforceable Secrecy Agreements</i><br /><br />It's useful to apply the FISA-violation analogy further. The question isn't narrowly what the Congress and Executive agreed in bypassing the courts, but what subsequent agreements they imposed to suppress evidence of the original unlawful attack on the established order.<br /><br />In turn, this lesson of the FISA violations applies to the DoD operations re Posse Comitatus and their possible involvement with administrative punishments. Not only is the process flawed, but the process could be used to thwart public knowledge of that flawed, illegal administrative punishment. <br /><br />Indeed, on accusation alone, DoD components could issue administrative orders with threats of arrest without a legally enforceable reason to impose that administrative punishment. Yet, without access to the secret information, the American civilians would not know which DoD personnel to subpoena to review their illegal activity in depositions.<br /><br /><p>The question is whether <i>DoD</i> is using an NSL-like process which bypasses the courts. It took many years for the courts to learn of and review of the NSL. Under the above nexus, it's possible the courts still have no inclination what the Congress and Executive have agreed by way of Posse Comitatus.</p><blockquote><p><b>Confronting Member of Congress Complicity</b></p><p>The lessons of the FISA violations are applicable. Members of Congress with the Executive ignored the established order. Until proven innocent, the public should adversely reasonably assume Members of Congress have agreed to similar exceptions to Comitatus; and have secretly agreed to remain silent about this illegal activity.</p><p><i>Questions</i></p><p>N. Does the secrecy agreement about the Posse Comitatus violations mean witnesses before Congress could mislead the Congress in open testimony to keep secret the agreement to bypass the courts re Comitatus actions?</p><p>O. Have members of Congress, as it appears with the FISA violations, secretly agreed to be bound to secrecy agreements, not afforded access to counsel, and are subject to arrest if they disclose the DoD operations which violate Posse Comitatus and bypass the courts?</p><p>P. What is the plan of the Congress, in the wake of the FISA violations, for Members of Congress to expressly certify they are not bound to any secrecy agreement to keep silent abaout similar Congressional-Executive agreements to bypass the courts re Comitatus?<br /></p></blockquote><p><i>Possible DoD Support of Non-Judicial Sanctions Against American Citizens</i><br /></p><p>DoD could be acting outside what the Great Charter would permit. There appears to be a new system of accusatory justice, based on secret, unreviewable evidence and false claims. Disturbingly, these secret DoD operations do not appear to be reviewable by a court of law; nor are they designed to ever be reviewed. <br /></p><p>It remains unclear what else the Congress and Executive have secretly agreed.<br /></p><p><b>T</b>he DoD operations would, in theory, create a method by which American civilian "targets" could be, on false accusation, selectively harassed, with the goal of thwarting detection of, reporting, or public commentary about the illegal Congressional-Executive agreement:<br /></p><blockquote><b>Possible DoD Support for Administrative Harassment<br /><br /></b>There are a range of possible DoD operations which could target American civilians, fall within the above exceptions, and bypass the courts. Some of these tactics could include:<br /><br />- Using false statements by DoD contractors, civilians, or other US government personnel;<br /><br />- Compelling American citizens during illegal detentions and interrogations to provide dubious information, under threat of arrest for "non cooperation";<br /><br />- Relying on "secret investigations" known only to a select few;<br /><br />- Using unsubstantiated claims and information to make material decisions about employment, access to capital, housing, travel, and other&nbsp; conditions of a capital market<br /></blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>D</b></font>oD components could, on accusation alone, pervert the system, target American citizens not because of a bonafide threat, but because DoD and others wanted to <i>thwart detection of</i> the domestic illegal activity.<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Questions on</b> <b>Possible DoD Support For Administrative Harassment<br /></b><br />Here are some discussion questions for TPM readers and the public to review; and consider whether the current Congressional staffs are or are not likely conducting oversight to adequately, publicly answer:<br /><br />Q. How many DoD components use, generate, rely on, or transfer intelligence related to American civilians that is unrelated to any bonafide law enforcement activity?<br /><br />R. What percentage of the information or law enforcement activity must the DoD actions and information have to meet the exception standards?<br /><br />S. Could DoD, in theory, classify 5% of its information as "related" to a "permitted exception" and fall within the permitted exceptions; what about the 95% of the information that falls outside the permitted exception?<br /></blockquote>C<b>onclusion</b><br /><br />The 9-11 Commission investigation trip report includes speculation about a DoD domestic law enforcement role. The responses from Northern Command are not adequate. Other DoD components could be within the "permitted" exceptions, and this conclusion is consistent with what is likely within the <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php">still-secret DOJ OLC memos</a>.<br /><br /><i>Opportunity, Demonstrated Conduct</i><br /><br />There is nothing obvious suggesting the DoD's domestic law enforcement role after 9-11 has
been adequately reviewed in public, especially given the refusal to declassify <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=2">the DOJ OLC memo</a> (dated 10/23/01) on warrantless DoD activity against American citizens. <br /><br />Even if the United States Congress were to
argue the US Constitution or capital system needs reform, they cannot
argue there is a legal vacuum. The Magna Charta created legal
obligations which would aggressively, timely review these legal matters.<br /><br /><blockquote>One cannot argue the Constitution is inapplicable -- as a pretext to ignore illegal activity --&nbsp; and <i>also</i> ignore the Magna Carta. This Congress, in defiance of its oath, has failed to preserve the established order, and taken us back to the pre-Magna Carta days.<br /></blockquote>Indeed, the lessons of the FISA violations are instructive. Members of Congress in secret agreed to activity which breached the established order. There is a reasonable basis to conclude that DoD components may have been involved with preventive measures, outside the permitted exceptions, yet Members of Congress know about but have refused to prevent this illegal DoD domestic law enforcement activity.<br /><br /><i>Opening Door To Debate A New Established Order</i><br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>W</b></font>e have a financial crisis and some have questioned which economic
system should replace the failed model. We have a "war on terror" and
some view this Constitution as outdated and quaint. <br /><br />The American national leadership appears to view the established order
as discretionary. However, <u>pre-emptive</u> military <i>domestic</i> law enforcement role and action against civilians <i>during wartime</i> would <i>not</i> be permitted under the Great Charter. <br /><br />Those who have an obligation to preserve the <i>established</i> order must preserve that order; otherwise, we must discuss a <i>new</i> established order. <br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">C</font></b>ongress appears reluctant to review its complicity with FISA violations. To turn down the heat and corral its allies within the telecom community, the Congress handed out immunity cards. These promises of immunity have (surprise, surprise) not been subjected (yet) to judicial review.<br /><br />The public should assume, as with FISA violations, Congress will thwart the inquiry into DoD violations of Posse Comitatus; and suppress information about Congressional-Executive agreements to bypass the courts. However, without a public review of these issues, the public must
discuss a new established order that will ensure breaches of the
established order are <i>timely</i> enforced.<br /><br />The US government has an obligation to lead a review. Otherwise, they're sending the message they do not take the established order <i>or</i> the Magna Carta seriously. What established order do they support? <i>Not</i> one We the People agreed, established, or replaced.<br /><br />It remains unclear <i>which</i> established order the Congress selectively hopes to enforce, ignore, marginalize, or explain away.<br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">O</font></b>ur obligation, regardless the <strike>cooperation</strike> <strike><i>confusion</i></strike> rebellion of Congress against the established order, must be to discuss the remedies within the framework of a new established order.&nbsp; The same was done before Runnymeade in 1215. <br /><br />Members of Congress can be induced to agree to a new established order, <i>outside</i> the amendment process. The question is when We the People will be ready to annul this Constitution and replace it, as permitted, with a new established order. <br /><br />Government is bound to the Amendment process; however, We the People have the recognized power reserved in the 10th Amendment to annul the established order and replace it through a ceremony, <i>without</i> following the Amendment process.<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Reserved Power To People: The Power To Annul</b><br /><br />The <i>Amendment</i> process applies to the <u>government</u>, not to We the People. The People have the option to annul the established order:<br /><br /><a href="http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=58">Federalist 78</a>: Until <u><b>the people</b></u> have, by some solemn and authoritative act, <u><b>annulled or changed
the established form</b></u>, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as
individually; and <b><u>no</u> presumption</b>, or even knowledge, of their <u><b>sentiments</b></u>, <b>can
warrant</b> their representatives in a <b><u>departure</u> from it</b>, prior to such an act. <br /></blockquote>The "sentiment" that the Constitution, FISA, Geneva, or Posse Comitatus are "quaint" are irrelevant. Until there is a new established order, Members of Congress cannot lawfully breach the existing order with <i>secret</i> agreements sidestepping the courts, FISA requirements, Geneva Conventions, or restrictions against using combat forces against civilians.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>C</b></font>ongress needs to lead to investigate this illegal activity. However, without a decision to confront these assaults against the established order, We the People are more inclined to establish a new order to ensure these illegal agreements do not thwart the <i>established</i> order.<br /><br />We cannot go back. We must go forward and establish a new order which shall prevent this abuse of power and similar breaches of the established order.<br /><br /><b>Responses To Comments<br /><br /></b><i>We the People Retain The Power of Nullification</i><br /><br />The apologists for inaction would have some believe there is "no precedent" for nullification. That is misdirection. All powers not delegated to the government are reserved to the People. The apologists for inaction and silence cannot point to anything which We the People agreed to "not retain" the power of nullification.&nbsp; We never delegated the power of nullification to the US government; by implication, through the 10th Amendment, we <i>retain</i> that power.<br /><br />The apologists for inaction claim there is no precedent for "nullification." <u><b><i>If</i></b></u> that is true, why did the Framers in Federalist 78 expressly mention this option? You're asking us to believe the Framers were concerned about something which is impossible. They mentioned it because they intended to remind future generations of what is <i>possible</i>. Indeed, there are other retained, undelegated powers which are not expressly mentioned, ready to be <i>used</i> when government is oppressive and the established order fails. <br /><br />Whether this Constitution or any other document has or hasn't been nullified is irrelevant: We retain the power of nullification, and can use it when the US government officials defy the esablished order, and refuse to remedy the defects contributing to their breach.<br /><br /><i>Precedent For First Use of Retained, Not-Yet-Used Power<br /><br /></i>The established order of the Magna Carta is based on nullifying what was before it; and imposing a new established order upon those who were a threat to civility, reason, and prudence. <br /><br />Indeed, there was no "precedent" for the American Revolution: There was
no America, there was no legal body which could point to a precedent:
It was merely Jefferson's appeal to the rights of man when government
proves to be unresponsive. A "lack of precedent for the American Revolution" did not mean there could be no effort to replace the established order, but <i>required</i> it.<br /><br />Precedent has little relationship to legal power We the People <i>retain</i>, but have not yet used. It defies reason to suggest there is an exhaustive list of retained powers which are both <i>not yet used</i>, but have a precedent for their <i>use</i>.<br /><br />Even when Congress does not assert power, it does not mean the power goes away.&nbsp; Similarly, when We the People do not assert our power of nullification, it does not mean the nullification power evaporates.<br /><br />Here, despite a legal obligation to defend the Constitution, US government officials refused to assert their power. Their inaction is malfeasance; our inaction is <i>conditional</i> deference. But that deference cannot be expected to endure when the US government officials refuse to embrace the need for investigation or reform; but absurdly assert nothing can change. Yes, it can. Change has arrived.<br /><br /><i>US Government Powerless To Prevent Nullification</i><br /><br />The apologists would ask that we believe despite a known problem, and US government refusal to remedy the problem with the established order, that we should remain loyal to what breaches the established order; but not discuss much less contemplate a solution.<br /><br />Who is going to stop the American public, seeing this reckless abuse of power and handed a new established order that will remedy these defects, from nullifying what has failed; and, as the Framers discussed, enacting a new order? The apologists for inaction accept there is a problem, but they offer no solution other than, "We can't do that."<br /><br />It is an absurd notion, in the wake of the self-evident abuses and failure of the established order, or anyone to claim they are defending what has failed; but will not embrace what would succeed. These government officials are defending an established order that they can exploit. The defects must be remedied not defended. <br /><br />The US government officials have an inferior, weak position. They claim to defend that which is indefensible; but they offer not reasonable position to remain loyal to an established order they will not exhaustively defend, even against their peers. Those government officials who breach the established order lose their authority to compel our loyalty to what they recklessly abuse; and they cannot compel us to shirk what might succeed.<br /><br /><i>Self-Evident Problem Without Leadership</i><br /><br />The apologists, before agreeing their is a problem with the established order, want a solution. Yet, they offer not reason to avoid the threat of nullification, and do not propose an option, only excuses for what has failed: Passing more rules which US government officials and legal counsel expressly "reserve" the right to violate in secret. <br /><br />The apologists are free to outline a plan to work within the established order, yet do not change the established order to prevent breaches of the same. That path was the FISA, and this US government thought it fitting to secretly agree to ignore the established order.&nbsp; <br /><br /><i>Lawfully Confronting Joint Legislative-Executive Assault On Established Order</i><br /><br />US government officials have no lawful authority or power to breach the established order. <br /><br />Their "leadership" is to defy the established order; our leadership
must be to create a more robust established order which detects,
thwarts, and timely punishes similar breaches in their infancy, not
many years after they become the entrenched, unacceptable <i>status quo</i>.<br /><br /><i>Nullification Remains On the Table</i><br /><br />Who is demanding <i>unquestioned</i> loyalty to an established order which permits its own destruction; and contains no mechanisms to <i>ensure</i> the government officials do not secretly agree to breach the established order? Until some embrace this question and are willing to debate it, we will not get far in ensuring this abuse of power ends. <br /><br />The abuse will continue when the debate removes any lawful option from the table. Nullification is on the table, especially when a new order could dilute and redelegate power, and create mechanisms which make impossible these secret agreements to defy the established order.<br /><br /><i>Discuss a New Established Order</i><br /><br />We must discuss what new
established order will deprive them of the discretion to secretly agree
to breach the established order. We cannot be compelled to remain loyal
to what fails as an excuse to not image what might succeed.<br /><br />The
issue before isn't narrowly how to "make new rules" (which get
ignored); but what will deprive the government of the discretion to
secretly agree to breach the established order. There is a problem
which FISA was designed to address; but the US government officials
agreed, in secret, to ignore. This isn't merely a legal issue, but one
requiring debate: what new order is required to ensure this breach is
impossible.<br />
<br />
We must remedy any effort to thwart preservation of the established
order. We must remove the obstacles to preservation of the established order through
investigations, prosecution, or impeachment. <br />
<br />
We must know why the
leadership refused to investigate, prosecute, or impeach to preserve
the established order, and eliminate the factors thwarting the
assertion of these powers to preserve the established order. Our solutions cannot be rules like FISA which are ignored; but must be mechanism which make the breach of the established order <i>impossible</i>.<br /><br />Those who say these solutions are impossible have given up before they consider solutions. You are part of the problem and shall be lawfully confronted for your reckless defense of what is irresponsible tyranny; and your refusal to make way for responsible order.<br /><br />Our job is to realize the potential of the Founders: Established order.<br /><br /><br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Interweaving Timeline of Secret DOJ OLC Memos, Disclosed Executive Orders</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/overlay-the-geneva-fisa-timeli.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.254052</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-30T15:37:38Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-05T22:13:52Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Overlay the Geneva, FISA TimelinesThe ACLU requested through the FOIA process, US government documents relate to POW abuse and FISA violations. This may take some time for the US government to fully respond to this request. How do we know...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
      <category term="Muckraker" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en-us" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/">
      <![CDATA[<p><i>Overlay the Geneva, FISA Timelines</i><br /><br />The ACLU <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/28/usnationalsecurity-usa">requested</a> through the FOIA process, US government documents relate to POW abuse and FISA violations. This may take some time for the US government to fully respond to this request. How do we know if we have the information to oversee the US government response?</p>
<p>The Senate Judiciary issued&nbsp;<a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&amp;docid=f:sr528.110.pdf">a report</a>, and Senator Leahy sponsored <a href="http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s3501/show">a bill</a> on disclosure of DOJ OLC memos.<br /><br />In the interim, there is something we can do: Discuss the public information, and prepare for what information should exist.&nbsp; Indeed, it <i>may</i> appear it is unclear how we will know whether the US government responses are adequate. <br /><br /></p>
<blockquote><b>Goal</b><br /><br />We need to develop a method to know whether the US government responses to this FOIA request are adequate; and develop an independent method to speculate about the content of the still secret, but known memos re POW abuse, Geneva violations and FISA.<br /></blockquote><br />There is a way to do this. We analyzed how two different lines of evidence may complement each other, and possibly disclose information about still-secret DOJ OLC memos. We suggest <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">this timeline</a> be interwoven with <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/wbush.html">this</a>. (<a href="http://www.propublica.org/">ProPublica</a> should be commended for creating a useful table.) After the jump, we offer a sample of issues of public interest related to the interwoven timeline. <br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[<blockquote>
<div align="center">
<blockquote><b>Contents of this TPM Thread On </b><br /></blockquote>
<blockquote><b>"<u>Interwoven EO-DOJ OLC Memo Timeline"</u></b><br /></blockquote></div><b>Part I: </b>Summary of Interwoven EO-DOJ OLC Memo Timeline<br /><b>Part II: </b>Sample issues related to interwoven Timeline<br /><b>Part III: </b>Finding other DOJ OLC memos not within the <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">Table</a><br /></blockquote>The interwoven timeline may shed light on the reasonableness of actions taken <a href="http://www.archives.gov/legislative/research/9-11/commission-memoranda.html">after 9-11</a>; strengthens arguments for <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FreedomofInformationAct/">FOIA disclosure</a>; and raises questions whether the Obama Administration is inappropriately shielding documents that could be <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/">redacted</a>. <br /><br />The information below may provide a platform to discuss specific documents the US government might provide in response to <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_lettertoolc.pdf">this letter</a>. In Part III, we discuss the basis for concluding the US government has in its position specific alleged war crimes evidence which has been requested, but has not, as required, been included within the <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">FOIA "withhold" summaries</a> or other <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/asset_upload_file655_38486.pdf">disclosed information</a> (requested <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/olc_memos.html">via</a> this <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_lettertoolc.pdf">letter</a>).<br /><br /><br /><b>Important Distinction</b><br />
<blockquote><br />DoJ lawyers have a habit of creating confusion despite the appearance of clarity. They do this when they're in legal trouble, and want to pretend a legal standard is vague, when, in truth, it is specific. One example are the absurd assertions that Geneva is "vague" on how "unlawful combatants should be treated." This is irrelevant. Violations of Geneva are not narrowly related to whether a POW is or isn't "protected". The DOJ OLC smokescreen is to divert attention from the legal obligations on the US as a <i>detaining power</i>.<br /><br />As you read this, one key is not to get distracted over whether we're talking about (a) "torture prohibited by the Convention Against Torture (CAT)"; or (b) "abuse". Geneva bars <i>all</i> <u>abuse</u>. Something may be "not torture," but still <i>impermissible</i> abuse under the laws of war.<br /><br />Arguably, DOJ OLC's red herring is to argue whether the POW treatment does or does not meet the "specific intent" standard under the CAT. The <i>better</i> starting point and question is whether the POW treatment was foreseeably violating the Geneva standard against all abuse. This obligation remains on the US as a detaining power, regardless the status of the POW. <br /><br />The DOJ OLC cited cases on "specific intent" are generally inapposite, related to non-combat operations. Arguably, the CAT is a <i>peacetime</i> standard related to internal struggles and tolerates <i>some</i> mistreatment for gathering information. However, Geneva is a <i>wartime</i> standard and applies to international conflicts, and bars <i><u>all</u> abuse</i>, even against one's own civilian population. <br /><br /><u>Rule of Thumb</u>: Not all Geneva violations are CAT violations; just because something isn't a violation of CAT doesn't mean its lawful or permissible under Geneva.<br /></blockquote><b><br /><u>Part I: Summary of Interwoven Timeline<br /></u><br /><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></b>he interwoven timelines suggest the memos are secret to hide evidence of US Government Geneva violations against American <i>civilians</i>.<br /><br />
<blockquote>Stronger Support: Classified DOJ OLC 'Legalized' FISA, Geneva Violations<br /></blockquote>The interwoven EO and DOJ OLC timelines provide stronger support that legal counsel made convoluted arguments in still secret memos to thwart detection of (a) illegal policies; and (b) the legal justifications for those illegal programs. <br /><br />It is not (supposed to be) lawful to classify information to hide evidence of illegal activity. Regardless the "holes" in the US statutes, it appears legal counsel have ignored <a href="http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm">their Geneva obligations</a> to ensure Geneva is <i>enforced</i>.<br /><br /><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">W</font></b>e conclude the interwoven EO-DOJ OLC timelines show the United States government imposed, in an international conflict, impermissible abuse on American civilians who were protected, not able to defend themselves, and denied all their Geneva and FISA protections. <br /><br />We believe the interwoven timeline demonstrates the US JTTF, infragard, and Homeland Defense-Intelligence Community (a) ignored the prohibition against outrages against civilians; (b) illegally use unlawful methods to acquire information; and (c) subsequently relied on and continue to rely on perverse legal language to "justify" unlawful outrages against American citizens including illegal detention, unlawful surveillance, abuse, and mistreatment in an&nbsp; international conflict.<br /><br /><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></b>he interwoven timeline suggests the motivation of the US government to derail a war crimes investigation is to thwart public discussion of the war crimes the US. state, and local governments have been complicit against <u>American</u> <i>civilians</i>. <u>German</u> Jews were exterminated; and the <u>German</u> civilian leadership and legal counsel were prosecuted for war crimes against their <i>own civilians</i>. <br /><br />Once the civilian leadership refuses in an <i>international</i> conflict to enforce the laws of war, and are instrumental in inflicting war crimes against civilians, arguably those government officials could be classified as legitimate targets, and subject to lawful military attack. Civilians who take up arms against those inflicting war crimes or refusing to enforce the laws of war would also lose some Geneva protections afforded to non-combatants. <br /><br />
<blockquote><u><b>Bold Face </b><b>Warning</b><br /><br /></u>This is for <i>discussion</i> purposes only.<u><br /></u><br />This information on this site should <u><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">not</font></b></u> -- repeat, <font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>NOT</b></font> be construed as legal authorization for civilians or <i>anyone</i> to conduct para-military operations against those they believe are complicit with war crimes 2001-9. You are expressly advised <font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><u><i><b>not</b></i></u></font> to take any action based on the information below.<br /><br />Any action you take could be construed as criminal activity, terrorism or other illegal activity.<br /></blockquote><br /><b><u>Part II: Sample EO, DOJ OLC Memo Timeline Interweaving and Issues</u><br /><br /></b>Below we highlight (in <b>bold) themes</b> which emerge when we interweave the <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/wbush.html">EO</a> and <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">DOJ OLC</a> document timelines. Below each theme are sample EO and DOJ OLC documents which show contradictions. We conclude each section with issues and questions warranting discussion related to this interwoven timeline.<b><br /></b><br /><b>Drawing a New Line for Civil Liberties</b><br /><br />DOJ OLC issued a <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=13">Feb 2003 memo</a> on lawful use of collected intelligence. Three months later, he <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/pdf/03-12661.pdf">increased the size</a> of the IOB. In <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/pdf/03-19675.pdf">July 2003</a>, the President signed the EO on DHS information sharing.<br /><br />
<blockquote>- How did the President pack the IOB to thwart IOB review of questionably collected intelligence about American civilians?<br /><br />- What information about American civilians was DHS sharing that should not have been collected, and the IOB should have questioned?<br /><br />- How were these DOJ OLC memos factored into what the <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-7830.pdf">FIB</a> would review?<br /></blockquote><b>Geneva and Protected Combatants, Non-Combatants</b><br /><br />This <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&amp;docid=02-16951-filed.pdf">terminates</a> in July 2002 hostilites with the Taliban:<br /><br />
<blockquote>"<b>terminate</b> the national emergency declared in that order with respect to the <u><b>Taliban</b></u>."<br /></blockquote>Yet we have Taliban still held at Guantanamo; and <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=34">Feb 2002</a>, the DOJ OLC issued a memo on Taliban as POWs. Once "the emergency" with the Taliban "ended," they should have been <i>released</i> not abused. <br /><br />
<blockquote>- Why is the US still holding a <a href="http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Judge_justifies_holding_Taliban_cook_at_0128.html">Taliban cook</a> at Guantanamo, yet the President said in 2002 the emergency re the Taliban is over?<br /><br />- Why was there "confusion" about the treatment of any POW when Geneva was "determined" to be applicable; and some prisoners were no longer linked with the national emergency?<br /><br />- Why is <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=6">this Jan 2002 memo</a> about the Taliban still secret, despite the President determining they were no longer a threat; is there a reason the information "not related to the enemy" has not been disclosed; and the other information related to the "ongoing" enemy has been redacted?<br /><br />- Regardless whether <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=11">CAT does</a> or doesn't apply in the US, what review was done on whether <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/us-government-should-prosecute.php">Nuremberg precedents</a> apply?<br /><br />- What review did DOJ OLC legal counsel make of the <a href="http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm">Justice Trial</a> when reviewing whether they, as legal counsel, were or were not adequately enforcing Geneva in the DOJ OLC memos?<br /></blockquote><b>Rendition<br /><br /></b>DOJ OLC <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=37">said</a> Geneva does not apply to Off shore prisons. <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=39">Mar 2004</a>, DOJ OLC says persons could be rendered from Iraq.<b><br /></b><br />
<blockquote>- How were the May 2004 <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-11058.pdf">exceptions</a> to what could or could not be sent to Syria crafted with the intent of hiding the US use of Syria to abuse Pows?<br /><br />- How were these exceptions factored into what the US government <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-20052.pdf">would ignore</a> re US citizen personal information?<br /><br />- How many American citizens, outside the intent of the AUMF authorizations, were rendered to Syria?<br /><br />- How many people has the US government rendered that have no connection with terrorism; but they've been detained because this is an easy excuse to intimidate them outside the courts and legal system?<br /></blockquote><b>Discussions on CIA Personnel</b><br /><br />In November 2001, <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=48">Memo 34</a> says Geneva applied. Once the Taliban were no longer targets of the US, their status as Geneva-protected persons should have continued.<a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_register&amp;docid=fr29no01-73.pdf"> November 2001</a>, the President waived the rules on dual compensation, implicitly revealing he discussed using <i>retired</i> CIA employees.<br /><br />
<blockquote>- Which statutes is the Executive Branch saying do not apply to CIA?<br />- Why is the President claiming that actions about paying CIA agents can be waived; but we do not need to know which of those retired CIA agents were involved with POW abuse?<br />- Why is it OK, prospectively from 2001, to pay retired CIA agents; but we can't, retroactively from 2009, look at how that money was spent, for what purpose, and how that appropriation relates to Geneva?<br />- How can the US government claim statutes related to Plame's outing are not enforceable because of their connection to the CIA; yet the President passed an EO related to the CIA?<br /></blockquote><b>DoD Role In FISA Violations<br /><br /></b>The DOJ OLC <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=2">October 2001</a> memo "legalized" military actions violating the 4th Amendment against US civilians.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=5">January 9th, 2002</a>, the President reauthorized the wiretapping. <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&amp;docid=fr18ja02-129.pdf">January 18, 2002</a>, he authorized an increase in the number of ready reserves.<br /><br />
<blockquote>- How many of the returning ready reserves were incorporated into the NSA surveillance?<br /><br />- How were foreign nationals <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&amp;docid=02-17273-filed.pdf">rewarded</a> with speedy US citizenship for their cooperation with the US government in committing FISA violations against US citizens?<br /></blockquote><b>"Legalized" Geneva, FISA Violations Against US Civilians</b><br /><br />April 11, 2002, the President signed an EO on <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&amp;docid=02-9536-filed.pdf">changes to courts martials</a>. The same month, the DOJ OLC <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=9">stated</a> some provisions did not apply to military commissions.<br /><br />
<blockquote>- How did the DOJ OLC memo argue <i>for</i> prosecuting US civilians before a military tribuanl through "waivers" and 'exceptions" to Geneva, which bars treating non-combatants as combatants?<br /><br />- Why did the President not look at Geneva prohibiting abuses against Civilians before "determining" that <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=10">US civilians could be detained</a> in violation of Geneva?<br /><br />- How were <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-27076.pdf">subsequent EOs written</a> to create exceptions and subject American citizens to military tribunals?<br /><br />- When did the telecoms get copies of <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=12">this memo</a>; why did it take one (1) year for the memo to get drafted, yet public information suggests immediately after 9-11 the US government was sweeping "everything"; did the telecom <i>concerns</i> prompt this memo; if so, why should we believe that the DOJ 'direction' to the telecoms was "inherently lawful" despite the apparently telecom preliminary doubts; did the telecoms <i>reasonably</i> rely on this memo despite the explicit FISA requirements during wartime?<br /></blockquote><b>Plame Outing</b><br /><br />EO <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/%28c%29%20intelligence%20activities%20%28including%20special%20activities%29,%20intelligence%20sources">5 at 22</a> said information on sources would be considered for classification. 2004, President issues <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-3170.pdf">EO</a> on WMD intelligence.<br /><br /><b>Internal Intelligence Community Audits</b><br /><br />We have bad Guantanamo files full of inaccurate information about high profile "threats." <br /><br />
<blockquote>- Why should we believe that "lower priority" files on Americans have more accurate information?<br /><br />- How were the provisions for auditing of the intelligence community written to ensure looser enforcement?<br /><br />- How was "access" to intelligence information controlled by creating <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-13098.pdf">greater barriers</a> to auditors, members of Congress?<br /><br />- How much information was <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-21571.pdf">shared</a> to "protect" Americans; but this information should not have been collected?<br /><br />- How much information illegally captured through FISA violations, or from dubious sources did CIA agents use to "justify" <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=28">mistreating US civilians</a>?<br /><br /></blockquote><b><u>Part III: Other non-Disclosed DOJ OLC Memos<br /></u></b><br /><i>Other DOJ OLC Documents Not Known<br /><br /></i>This runs through the reasoning behind concluding there are at least two (2) different DOJ OLC memos which have not been disclosed, not (yet) mentioned on the <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">summary table</a>, but have been referenced indirectly. <br /><br /><u>Note to War Crimes Prosecutor, FOIA Requesters</u>: The information below (Part I, Para A-E) argues there has been an inadvertent disclosure <i>within</i> the exceptions to Executive Privilege; and the public interest demands disclosure of a specific, still unknown DOJ OLC documents and the other communication related to those referenced DOJ OLC memos.<br /><i><br />A. Finding the Memo<br /></i><br /><a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">This memo</a> (Aug 1, 2002) is mentioned by date <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=51">on this chart</a>. However, there appears to be <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/07/other-nondisclosed-retroactive.php">information</a> about memos which are still-not-disclosed, but have not been included in <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=28">this chart</a>.&nbsp; <br /><br />B. <i>Textual Evidence For <b><u><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">Primary</font></u></b>, Non-Disclosed DoJ OLC Memo</i><br /><br />On page <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 of 18</a>, notice the margin-line on the page for the redaction blocks. Run your eye up and down the left and right margins for the paragraphs on page 18 of 18. See if you notice something unusual about the size of the back-redaction blocks; and the relative spacing of the redaction margins between the paragraphs. Look closely, and you'll see the <i>second</i> paragraph appears to have a <i>slightly</i> different margins, suggesting this paragraph is indented, and includes a disclosed-quote from <i>a <u>different</u></i> document.&nbsp; The <i>slightly</i> different left and right margin indentations in the 2nd paragraph on <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">page 18</a> of 18 suggests a paragraph indentation, a quote, or text from a different DoJ OLC document which is likely <i>not</i> referenced on <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos">this table</a>. <br />`<br />C. <i>Textual Reference Indicating <font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><u><b>Second</b></u></font> Non-Disclosed DOJ OLC Action, Memos</i><br /><br />This different margin suggests the citation -- and <i>disclosed</i>, unredacted text -- is from a still-not-known DOJ OLC memo or a White House question.&nbsp; Notice:<br /><br />
<blockquote><a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 of 18</a>: "<u><i><b>Your review</b></i></u> of the literature . . " <br /></blockquote><br />suggests DoJ OLC responsed to a previous tasking; provide a response; and other officials followed up on that previously provided DOJ OLC information.&nbsp; It appears DOJ OLC not only wrote at least one previous memo linked to this disclosure on page 18; but there is subsequent message traffic about (a) this still not disclosed DOJ OLC memo; and (b) the subsequent response to DOJ OLC disclosed here <i>within</i> the indented paragraph.<br /><br />D. <i>Relationship of this non-disclosed DoJ OLC memo to the interwoven timeline</i><br /><br /><a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=51">The table</a> says:<br /><br />
<blockquote><span class="td_field_title">Recipient:</span> Unknown<br /></blockquote>It's possible the quoted text points to (a) text the President wrote; (b) remarks another senior Administration official included within their memo to DoJ OLC; (c) a question from a senior official within DOJ, possibly the AG; or (d) comments by an agency head such as the CIA Director or SecDef. [See "<i>Evidence of previous, non-disclosed memos" </i><a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/07/other-nondisclosed-retroactive.php">here</a> for details<i>.</i>]<br /><br />It's unclear where the referenced document (at <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 of 18</a>, indented paragraph) fits into the interwoven timeline.<br /><br />E. Other Clues<br /><br />The <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">disclosed text</a> related to the other DOJ OLC memos is:<br /><br />
<blockquote>DOJ OLC re-paste of other comments, on <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 at 18</a><br /><br />"Your review of the literature uncovered no empirical data on the use of these <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">procedures</a>, with the <b>exception</b> . . . [redacted ] . . ."<br /></blockquote>The question is whether the exception disclosed above references <u><b>8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a), </b></u>discussed below<b>?</b><br /><br />One key word is "procedure", which may related to similar documents <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">here</a> with the word "procedure". If the document revealed in the unredacted text relates to a disclosed memo on "procedures," there should be a logical relationship between this memo and one of the documents listed <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">here</a> with the word "procedure" in it.<br /><br /><i>Basis For Belief US Government Withhold Files Are Incomplete</i><br /><br />When the US government withholds documents, it is required to provide a summary of the redacted comments. The <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=12">missing memo table</a> and the detailed table of missing memos do not adequately relate to the disclosed text on page <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 of 18</a>.<br /><br />If you re inclined, open <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">this document</a>, and review the documents with the word "procedure" in the description; and see if any of them pre-date and logically relate to "procedures" discussed in the <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">August 2002 Bybee memo</a>. The <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">provided index</a> uses "procedure" only in relathionship to <i>trial</i>. However, the disclosed text on page <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/cia_3686_001.pdf">18 of 18</a> relates to pre-trial interrogation. The two are not the same. <br /><br />This suggests there are non-disclosed documents related to interrogation, non-trial <i>procedures</i> which have not, as they should be, included within <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/missing_memos/Bradbury_2_Vaughn.pdf">the summaries</a> or <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=12">summary table</a>. This is not an error attributable to the public. The <i>government</i> has inadvertently disclosed important information, but has not adequately accounted for the non-disclosure of the document <i>containing</i> that information within the information provided to the public, the Congress, or the courts.<br /><b><br />F. </b><b>Judgment</b><b><br /><br /></b>We believe DOJ OLC was specifically responding to questions about a specific CIA interrogation involving multiple people:<b><br /><br /></b>
<blockquote><a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=51">Chart summary</a>: The memo concludes that the personnel carrying out <u><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>the interrogation</b></font></u> <b>didn't have specific intent</b> to cause severe pain to the detainee, and therefore, didn't torture <i><b><u><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">that</font></u></b></i> person.<br /></blockquote>We leave it for another day whether someone, to be guilty of a war crime, has to have the specific intent to cause pain; or whether, as a logical consequence of their actions, they reasonably should have known the conduct did not meet the intentions of their legal obligations per the Nuremberg precedent. <br /><br />In our view, "<b>Specific intent</b> under <u>Geneva</u>" doesn't mean an intent to cause a specific result; but can relate to recklessness or a failure to responsibly ensure that violations of the laws of war do not occur; or failure to ensure that any protected POW is free from <i>all</i> abuse. This conclusion would be consistent with Nuremberg. Whether the Convention Against Toture is or isn't violated is, in our view, irrelevant. <br /><br />Geneva is a treaty obligation binding on all who take an oath to the US Constitution. These obligations were affirmed at Nuremberg. The US as a prosecuting power at Nuremberg had fair notice that these legal requirements were enforceable. <br /><br />All legal counsel and employees, in our view, knew or should have known that Nuremberg precedents establish that there are some things which are clearly impermissible. It defies logic for Americans to explain how any abuse could be justified during wartime. <br /><br />It is irrelevant that <i>American</i> prison contractors and jailers regularly abuse prisoners or civilians to gather information. The CAT may not prohibit this type of abuse against American civilians in peacetime. However, Geneva expressly bars abuse against a different class of protected persons under the laws of war in an international conflict.<br /><br /><b><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">A</font></b> previous memo in <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=48">November 2001</a> suggests these legal standards within Geneva were known to be applicable. From that legal memo it follows that the President and others working for him knew or should have known that Geneva, not the CAT, was the applicable standard to regulate how the Americans, as a detaining power, interacted with POWs. <br /><br />It is unavailaing that the US government "thought" one class of prisoners was "not protected" by Geneva. The obligations rest with the detaining power to enforce Geneva, and ensure non-combatants taken out of the fight are protected. The DOJ OLC memos and EO suggest there was a calculated scheme to pretend the US was at war, but not bound to the laws of war. <br /><br />The US at Nuremberg prosecuted the Germans for subjecting non-combatants, taken out of the fight to abuse. The United States citizens had fair warning, especially in the wake of WWII that that standard was applicable. Sadly, it requires a second set of prosecutions against the US -- the prosecuting power at Nuremberg! -- to remind Americans what the allies argued Germans should have known was applicable.<br /><br /><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>It</b></font> defies reason to argue that Geneva applies in <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=48">November 2001</a>; but then for <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=36">Yoo</a> and <a href="http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos?memo=51">Bybee</a> to use a convoluted argument, later, to argue the opposite.&nbsp; It is our view the 2002 "Bybee memo" was written <i>after</i> POW were abused, but drafted with the intent of incorporating as 'allowable' conduct which prompted the concerns behind the question to DOJ OLC.<br /><br />Geneva is an obligation on the <u>detaining power</u> <i>regardless</i> the status of the POW. The question does not turn on whether the US was "confused" about the POW's status; but on whether the United States, as a <i>detaining power</i> was ensuring United States personnel's conduct was consistent with Geneva. In our view, "good faith" is not narrowly related to whether they intended to inflict harm; but whether they reasonably were relying on "permission" to treat the POWs as they did.&nbsp; Nuremberg rejected the argument of superior orders when a reasonable person should know that those orders were not lawful. The question is what orders and instructions were really issued; and did the primary actors reasonably or unreasonably rely on which instructions.<br /><br />The contradiction within the disclosed DOJ OLC memos suggests someone knew that Geneva applied; but, after the fact, hoped to explain away <u>impermissible</u> <i>US government-inflicted</i> POW abuse. We expect the still-not-released, but referenced DOJ OLC memo above will likely support these conclusions:<br /><br />
<blockquote>1. The timing of the question from outside DOJ OLC is related to information about conduct falling outside what Geneva permitted;<br /><br />2. There was serious concern that the abuse and mistreatment would be disclosed;<br /><br />3. There was no timely war crimes investigation, as required, under the laws of war;<br /><br />4. Legal counsel in the White House, CIA, and DoD knew or should have known that the Geneva obligations going forward from the AUMF <i>barred</i> the abuse the DOJ OLC said was permissible;<br /><br />5. Senior leadership asked the question of DOJ OLC because they knew there was an issue and the provided defense was inadequate in light of Nuremberg;<br /><br />6. The evidence of this previous question to DOJ OLC, referenced at 18 of 18, shows there was doubt within the minds of leadership that their <i>defense</i> would succeed, and the confusion had nothing to do whether the primary actors were unclear whether there was or wasn't POW abuse;<br /><br />7. The leadership, legal counsel, and others believed and were worried the implied "confusion" or "lack of understanding" one might offer as a defense was not compelling;<br /><br />8. The leadership, despite this <i>articulated, documented</i> doubt about the <u><i><b>abuse</b></i></u>, hoped to create a slippery legal nexus that the detected activity and POW abuse was somehow acceptable, permitted, or did not require action;<br /><br />9. The concern evidenced within the implicitly-referenced documents at 18 of 18 suggests leadership was uncomfortable with the first lines of responses because there remained a possibility of leadership and legal counsel prosecution as defendants before a war crimes tribunal;<br /><br />10. The leadership's questions did not specifically reference a specific case, but hoped to frame the issue in the abstract to avoid revealing that the leadership was worried about a <i>specific</i>, questionable act not consistent with Geneva, which Philbin in 2001 warned there could be litigation;<br /><br />11. The conduct of the leadership suggests they were concerned about a problem, but despite this concern did not timely adjust the policy, training, supervision, procedures, or instructions; <br /><br />12. The evidence of the question, discussion, communication indicates that management was concerned, the <i>defense and deniability</i> was weak; <br /><br />13. The primary actors, legal counsel, and US leadership hoped to create <i>retroactive</i> documentation that would justify their inaction, outside what Geneva permitted, and in contravention to what Nuremberg allows;<br /><br />14. The course of conduct does not show they were confused about the legal issues, but took calculated steps because of their <i>legal training -- and knowledge</i> of Nuremberg precedents and Geneva obligations -- to create a smokescreen, and not adequately enforce the laws of war;<br /><br />15. Whether activity was or wasn't a violation of the Convention Against Torture was a calculated strategy, not a product of confusion; but a leader-ratified, DOJ OLC supported smokescreen from the known abuses which violated Geneva;<br /><br />16. The US Congress, DOJ OLC and primary actors and leaders knew or should have known per the Nuremberg precedents that the proposed treatment during wartime of prisoners was <i>not</i> narrowly regulated by the Convention Against Torture which tolerate some abuses, but broadly by the Geneva Conventions and Nuremberg precedents barring <i>detaining powers</i> from imposing any and <i>all abuse</i> on POWs, <i>regardless</i> their status;<br /><br />17. The AUMF, EO, and DOJ OLC memos are evidence Members of Congress, the President, and all telecoms relying on that AUMF knew or should have known the combat operations were international in scope, and American citizens and POWs were protected classes who could not be lawfully abused, nor subject to outrages or other illegal activity even during wartime.<br /><br /></blockquote><b>Other Comments</b><br /><br />The above comments raise the question of whether the question was prompted by a desire to create ambiguity:<br /><br />
<blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">528 F.3d 180: "</span></span><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"><b>Willful blindness</b> can be used to <b>establish knowledge</b> but it does not satisfy the <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="ORIGHIT_72"></a><a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="HIT_72"></a><u><b><span class="hit"><span>specific intent requirement</span></span> in the C A T</b></u>"</span></span><br /><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"></span></span></blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"><br />The question is whether the US, as a signatory to Geneva, and outside the Convention Against Torture is or is not liable for breaches of Geneva and <a href="http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm">Nuremberg precedents</a>:<br /><br /></span></span>
<blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">- Failure of legal counsel to enforce Geneva against protected persons</span></span><br /><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">- Drafting of legal memoranda which do not enforce Geneva</span></span><br /><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"></span></span></blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"><br /></span></span><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><b>T</b></font>he question may turn on whether we apply the Geneva Conventions, general criminal law or the Convention against torture re specific intent:<br /><br />
<blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">528 F.3d 180, </span></span><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">RENDELL</span></span><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">: "</span></span><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana">Although obtaining information is an illicit purpose satisfying that prong of C A T's implementing regulations, the official's conduct will not meet the standard the majority has set for the <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="ORIGHIT_123"></a><a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="HIT_123"></a><span class="hit"><span>specific intent requirement</span></span>; his purpose is to obtain information, not to inflict severe pain and suffering. By contrast, an <b><u>interpretation that adopts the criminal law definition of <a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="ORIGHIT_124"></a><a href="http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="HIT_124"></a><span class="hit"><span>specific intent</span></span> and encompasses knowledge</u></b> or desire that severe pain and suffering will occur includes the above hypothetical in the definition of torture under C A T."<br /></span></span></blockquote>Have legal counsel discuss the following re above:<br /><br />
<blockquote><span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"><b>528 F.3d 180</b>: "</span></span>In Auguste v. Ridge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found the language in Zubeda v. Ashcroft--stating that <u><b>the "intentionally inflicted" language in 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) does not impose a "specific intent" requirement</b></u>, but simply <u><b>excludes severe pain or suffering that is the unintended consequence of an intentional act</b></u>--to be dicta."<br /><br />- When the US denies POWs of their protections, and subjects them to abuse, is that an intentional act? Arguably, yes.<br /><br />- When did the leadership learn 8 CFR 208.18(a) did <i>not</i> impose a "specific intent" requirement? Arguably, <i>before</i> they drafted the question, prompting the two DOJ OLC responses.<br /><br />- If "severe pain or suffering" are <i>excluded</i> as unintended consequences, what physical results are still <i>included</i> as unintended consequences? Arguably, the leadership knows there is something that was <i>not excluded</i> from the list of consequences, but included subjecting them to liability per the 8 CFR 208.18a.<span class="SS_L3"><span class="verdana"></span></span><br /></blockquote><span class="SS_L3"></span><br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Withdrawing US Combat Forces From Afghanistan</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/charting-a-way-forward-in-afgh-1.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.253999</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-29T15:45:51Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-29T18:38:02Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Charting A Way Forward in AfghanistanAmerican presence makes the Afghans more determined to unite and fight, acting as a catalyst for additional US combat troops in Afghanistan. This is one ignored lesson of Vietnam.The US should militarily withdraw, then work...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<i>Charting A Way Forward in Afghanistan</i><br /><br />American presence makes the Afghans more determined to unite and fight, acting as a
catalyst for additional US combat troops in Afghanistan. This is one ignored lesson of Vietnam.<br /><br />The US should militarily withdraw, then work with foreign powers to selectively implement a coherent strategy in Afghanistan.<br /><br /><i>Background</i>: <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press_Briefing_1-28-09/">This</a> press briefing touches on the Afghan policy review; and the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/28/barack-obama-letter-to-iran">letter to Iran</a>.<br /><br /> ]]>
      <![CDATA[<b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">C</font></b>onsider the experience off the Somali coast: World powers, not the US
acting alone, deployed military force to confront the common threat of
piracy. The
same approach must be considered when confronting forces of
instability in Afghanistan.<br /><br /><i>Linking Strategy To Economic Objectives</i> <br /><br />Afghanistan should not be viewed narrowly through the lens of
counter-terrorism, but whether the United States will work with Afghans
and regional allies to create stable economic conditions. The goal
should not be to <i>fight</i> instability nor contain or <i>mitigate</i> terrorism.<br /><br />One error is to frame the discussion narrowly in terms of military power and combat
forces. A more persuasive argument is to focus on the <i>economic</i> benefits
of the the proposed options and strategy: A
shared, world goal is to create stable economic conditions.<br /><br /><i>Instability Relates, In Part, To <u>Afghan</u> Decisions<br /></i><br />One reason the US has a problem in Afghanistan is the US, by it's
presence, is removing an excuse the local war lords have for fighting <i>eachother. </i>For the foreseeable future, the Afghans are going to fight whether the US is or is not
in Afghanistan. The
US presence is a catalyst to blame the US for what the Afghans love to
do: Fight.&nbsp; <br /><br />The US should not use military force to force the Afghans not to use force. That strategy defies reason: The Afghans view this approach as arrogant of the West. The Western approach asserts, in the mind of the Afghan warlord, that the US and NATO can do thing which native Afghans cannot. This warlord calculus should not leave DoD war planners confused why increased US troop presence in Afghanistan backfires. <br /><br /><i>New Excuses To Ignore Lessons of Vietnam, Iraq</i><br /><br />One factor contributing to "progress" in Iraq is the prospect of a US
departure. This prospect is lost once the US increases US combat troops
in Afghanistan. Iraq can hardly be called a model of what works when US combat forces surge. Iraq is a mess. Iraqis want to leave. The error is for the US to throw caution to the wind, and do the same in Afghanistan. <br /><br />The question is whether the Afghans, after the US departs, will continue fighting eachother. The US presence clouds getting an answer. A decision to increase US combat forces -- <i>without</i> addressing the Afghan's love of fighting -- means we're repeating the errors of Iraq.<br /><br /><i>Prospect of Instability Should Not Thwart Decisive Presidential Leadership</i><br /><br />One question is whether the Afghans, who are fighting
eachother, will, after the US forces leave, be an adequate check on threats to international
stability. <br /><br />That question is one for the international community to jointly discuss when developing a coherent strategy, not for the US to unilaterally decide and
resolve with troop <i>deployments</i>.<br /><br /><i>Increasing US Combat Forces In Afghanistan Continues A Flawed Strategy</i><br /><br />After 9-11, the United States chose the military option, identified a specific
group, and legitimized that group.&nbsp; That option has failed. Doing more
of that by way of increasing US combat forces in Afghanistan does not
signal the US understands what is motivating the Afghans to fight: They
are warlords, and that is their job.<br /><br />However, one option after 9-11 was for the US to not identify a specific person
or group to target; deny the opposition the opportunity to create a martyr; and not directly conduct combat operations in Afghanistan,
but to quietly target selected threats in concert with the world.
<br /><br />Indeed, one error after 9-11 was to distract the focus on Afghanistan by going into Iraq; but this does not mean that now that we are leaving Iraq, that we should now refocus American <i>military</i> power <i>in</i> Afghanistan. Imagine how determined the war lords might have been had the US focused all the deployed troops in Afghanistan. We're going down that path now that we're "refocusing" after the "diversion of Iraq."<br /><br />Building off the experience of the Russians, the US and NATO could have
declined to <i>en masse </i>(to attempt to) take over Afghanistan, but<i> </i>worked
with the world leadership and regional powers to target specific
threats, and not increase Afghan opposition to the NATO campaign. <br /><br />It has been seven long years in Afghanistan without a
decisive result. The US largely ignored the strategic lessons of the Russian experience in Afghanistan. The US
should not compound the tragedy in Afghanistan by ignoring the American lessons in Iraq. <br /><br />One error is to do <i>more</i> of what is causing the United States a problem: Deploying American troops in the middle of motivated fighters who (a) love to fight themselves; and (b) will put aside their differences to challenge a foreign power. Additional US combat forces in Afghanistan, on the back of a failure to address the warlord concerns, lowers the chances for US success.<br /><br /><blockquote><b>Questions</b><br /><br />- What Presidential directives have been issued to <i>consider</i> the strategy of withdrawing all American combat troops from Afghanistan?<br /><br />- Why are the arguments -- <u>against</u> US combat troops in <i>Iraq</i> -- being treated differently re Afghanistan?<br /><br />- How much is 9-11 overshadowing a coherent analysis of whether the Afghan war lords will increase their opposition to the US after increasing US combat troops?<br /><br />- What views has the President considered related to a realignment of American power in Afghanistan re Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and China?<br /><br />- What are the President's reasons for not discussing joint military operations with the Iranians and Russians; or deploying US combat troops in Russia or Iran in exchange for heightened security guarantees for both countries?<br /><br />- Would the Russians support <i>joint</i> Russian-NATO military activity in the countries immediately north of Afghanistan: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgystan; and using these counties as future staging points for non-Russian forces into Afghanistan?<br /></blockquote><i>American Contradictions Between Afghanistan and the Middle East</i><br /><br />One lesson of the Middle East shows
us that determined people will find an excuse to fight. This President
says that path can change if we start to change, as we are doing in <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/PresidenttoMuslimWorldAmericansarenotyourenemy/">sending George Mitchell</a> to the Middle East.&nbsp; <br /><br />The US is not militarily deployed in Isreal. The US is hard pressed to explain why, without American combat power on the ground in the Middle East, the US is more determined to achieve a military strategy in Afghanistan using <i>ground</i> forces.<br /><br />Without US combat forces on the ground in the middle east, the US President is assured of a promise of change. Indeed, <i>more</i> combat forces are not reasonably the <i>necessary</i> condition for diplomacy to start in Afghanistan. The US does not have to have combat power on the ground in Afghanistan before we can discuss a strategy. We argue the presence of US combat power in Afghanistan polarizes the situation, and increases the chances the same, flawed strategy will expand.<br /><br />Withdrawing from
Afghanistan does not mean the US does not retain the option to use
select military force. The US can work with regional allies to conduct joint operations, especially when the US signals it is willing to change, learn from history, and implement a workable strategy. <br /><br />The US departure does <i>not</i> mean the US will never
return. In the interim, a US departure will clear the smoke, and force regional powers and the Afghans to decide what they would like to do to be part of the economic stabilization. The lesson from Iraq: The US cannot unilaterally impose on others what they "should" have an an interest. They will resist, as Americans have done to FISA violations.<br /><br />A US withdrawal takes the US out of the driver seat, recognizes the US made an
error after 9-11, and puts the responsibility on the regional powers to
request or not request US assistance. As with Iraq, if the Afghans are not willing to
put down their arms against the United States, it is not the job of the
US to continue fighting those who are <i>more</i> determined to fight. <br /><br />Rather than
transitioning forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, the US should completely withdraw all
combat forces from Afghanistan, and let the Afghans continue their
fighting. Once the Afghans realize that the US provided some stability,
some Afghans might be willing to work more closely with allied powers.
Maybe.<br /><br /><i>Using American Power To Stabilize Promising Economic Markets</i><br /><br />A US withdrawal and allow
the world leadership to focus its energies on creating stable world
economic conditions.&nbsp; The question is whether Afghans want to
contribute to the economic
stability and capture market share; or whether they would rather fight
themselves over ageless disputes and enjoy continued economic
stagnation.&nbsp; There are more Americans who care about American economic
prosperity and progress than there are Afghans who want war, peace,
prosperity, or conflict.&nbsp;<br /><br />Change means doing the unexpected, withdrawing from
Afghanistan, and changing our relationship with Russia, Iran, China,
Pakistan, and India. American combat power, planning capability, and leadership should be
applied to where it will better service world economic interests: In creating stability in promising
economic markets in Africa.<br /><br /><i>Regional Powers Have Responsibilites</i><br /><br />If the Afghans want to fight each other after the US departs, the US
will be able to monitor whether they are or are not selectively
fighting some targets, but turning a blind eye to threats to
international stability. If the Afghans cannot put aside their
differences, and will not exercise self-governance, then there is no
reason the US President should exhaust scarce US treasure to do what
Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia refuse to do: Ensure a bordering
country is not a threat to <i>their</i> national security.<br /><br />A US
departure will put the responsibility on the regional powers to step up
to the plate, make some decisions, and remind the regional powers that
the US is open to change, especially in admitting it has made a chaotic
situation worse. The US presence in Afghanistan have removed the excuse
for the war lords to fight. Perhaps this internal struggle might be the
needed check on instability threatening non-Afghans. <br /><br />Once the
US departs, the regional allies will have to decide whether they will
step up to the plate. Indeed, it may not be desirable for Russia to use
combat forces in Afghanistan, but with enough change, the Russians will
have to decide whether they are serious about never engaging in
Afghanistan using combat forces; or whether the US and Russia should
cooperate now to avoid possible instability along the
Russian-Afghanistan border. <br /><br /><i>American Views of Combat</i><br /><br />Blunt
expressly <a href="http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=3633">stated</a> there were three wars: In Iraq, Afghanistan, and
against terrorism. Blunt's <a href="http://intelligence.senate.gov/090122/blair.pdf">testimony</a> before the Senate intelligence
committee signals the US looks at Afghanistan as a separate war than
the confrontation with international terrorists.&nbsp; The US should, by
implication, not link a change in policy in Iraq with Afghanistan.<br /><br />The <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1895.pdf">task force</a> is part of the planning process which will influence how the US proceeds with her allies on Afghanistan:<br /><br /><blockquote>Executive Order: The mission of the Special Task Force shall be to conduct a comprehensive review of the <b>lawful options</b>
available to the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension,
detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of
individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts
and counterterrorism operations, and to identify such options as are
consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States and the interests of justice.<br /></blockquote>Some
might argue the above plan presupposes that a withdrawal from
Afghanistan cannot, with certainty, reduce some of the tension driving warlord fighting. However, the US withdrawal from <i>Iraq</i> assumes, in part, that
a US withdrawal will remove one catalyst for Iraqi militancy. Afghans
appear less likely than Iraqis to put down their arms regardless
whether the US President increases or decrease US combat. It cannot be argued that <i>increasing</i> US combat operations in Afghanistan will remove the incentive for the warlords to set aside their differences and oppose the US.<br /><br />One question
is whether the Afghan tribal-competition will act as a check on
<i>international</i> instability. Putting aside the question of whether there is
or is not a link between Afghanistan, bin Ladin, and 9-11, the issue is
whether Afghanistan is more of a threat <i>to the United States</i> than <i>to
her <u>bordering</u> neighbors</i>.<br /><br />Some might argue the United States
withdrawal could precipitate the very instability along the
Afghan-Pakistan border which the US cannot afford, which would be
overshadowed by the increased cooperation between the US, Iran, and
Russia. Once the US realigns its strategic power relationship with
Russia and Iran, Pakistan cannot point to the "war on terror" and
"instability in Afghanistan" as leverage to thwart US action in
Pakistan. <br /><br />Rather, the US withdrawal will unmask the dynamics, and help
understand how much the Pakistan-Indian confrontation is fueling
instability in Afghanistan. Once this relationship is understood, the
UN Security council can impose appropriate leverage on Pakistan and
India to bring stability to Afghanistan. <br /><br />One error is for the US to introduce more US combat troops on one hand, while seeking international support for "soft power". The two strategies are at cross-purposes. More US combat power will further polarize the situation in Afghanistan, and lower the prospects "soft" power to have new inroads.<br /><br />The President <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/PresidenttoMuslimWorldAmericansarenotyourenemy/">said</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>"My job is to communicate to the American people that the <b>Muslim world
is filled with extraordinary people who simply want to <u>live their lives</u>
and see their children live <u>better lives</u></b>," President Obama told Al
Arabiya. "My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the
Americans are not your enemy."<br /></blockquote>The US should put this principle into play by emphasizing the economic benefits of regional cooperation, and remove US combat forces to force the regional allies to step up to the plate on their national security interests. This strategy should be discussed with regional powers, and not unilaterally decided. This is a NATO operation in Afghanistan. NATO, not just the US, should be leading the way to open the door for a regional realignment.<br /><br />The
people of Central Asia have seen one brutal side of American power, and
an appropriate change of direction in Iraq. The US should admit that it
has made a mistaken in Afghanistan and withdraw. This does not mean the
US will allow the forces of instability to go unchecked. The US
reserves the right to use military power against imminent threats.<br /><br /><i>Implementation</i><br /><br />To achieve this goal would require some coordination with Iran, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics just north of Afghanistan. One approach would be for US combat forces to jointly train with these nation's combat forces using former Eastern European combat equipment; and physically co-locate US troops in Russia and Iran; and invite Iranian and Russian combat forces to conduct joint military exercises in the United States using Eastern European combat equipment.<br /><br />The United States, rather than increasing US military actions and troops in Afghanistan, should re-stage those troops in Iran, Russia, and former Russian republics with the express intention of:<br /><br /><blockquote>- Using those forces to only attack terrorism targets in Afghanistan;<br />- Remove the local catalyst in Afghanistan of attacking US combat forces;<br />Force the Afghans to decide whether they would rather fight themselves or the local sources of instability;<br />- Retaining the option to, with UN Security Council authorization, attack targets in Afghanistan related to emerging terrorism targets;<br />- Create a new basis for the Indians and Pakistanis to interact along their joint border; and<br />- Creating confidence building measures between the US and Iran and Russia.<br /></blockquote>Understandably, the US will be concerned with the prospect of inviting Russian and Iranian combat forces into the United States. Any
resistance in the US to host Russian or Iranian combat troops should
remind Americans why Afghans do not enjoy the presence of US combat
troops, put aside their regional differences, and
continue attacking American forces.<br /><br />Under this plan, the Russian and Iranians would not have unfettered access to US technology, would narrowly use and train with non-US equiprement, and could be closely monitored as US forces in Russia and Iran would. Russia has <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/28/content_10727302.htm">ruled out</a> Russian troops for Afghanistan; but this does not mean that the Russia would never consider hosting <i>US troops in Russia</i>
<u><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><i><b>if</b></i></font></u> the Russians were granted similar access to the United States. <br /><br />The above addresses some issues with Russia and Iran, and build off recent diplomatic openings. Russia has decided not to deploy missiles in <a href="http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/uselection,0,russia-softens-to-obama-iran-remains-hard,72585">Kalingrad</a> because President Obama signaled there was room for adjustment on Missle Defense. <br /><br />The question is less what the Iranians and Americans do or do not have in common, but the US and Iran are talking. President Obama signaled to the Iranians that the US will not continue the policy of "non talking". In response, the Iranian President indicated a willingness to talk, but preconditioned on the US distancing itself from a blind support of Isreal and for apologizing for US mistreatment of Iran.<br /><br /><b>Policy Recommendations</b><br /><br />The US President has an economic crisis on his hands. He should work with the international community to focus on the economic agenda. Putting "more attention" on Afghanistan will create friction between the needed allies in creating stable economic conditions.<br /><br />The US President should develop a timetable in Afghanistan for the US forces to be withdrawn, and redeployed with Russian and Iranian government concurrence, to non-Afghan military bases in the region.<br /><br />The US should work with the Chinese and Afghans to ensure they are part of the discussion, and are fully involved with the change in direction. The US cannot afford to talk about change, but do more of what has failed.<br /><br />The US should remove combat forces to help clear some of the smoke over the Pakistan-Indian proxy war in Afghanistan. If India and Pakistan want a solution to their border question, that dispute cannot be allowed to bleed into the already murky waters of Afghanistan.<br /><br /><b>Other Comments</b><i><br /><br /></i>The United States, as it is
doing in Iraq, should similarly <i>withdraw</i> its combat forces from Afghanistan. The President <a href="http://news.google.com/news/url?sa=t&amp;ct=us/1-0&amp;fp=49801eb0070dbe74&amp;ei=TJCASZC0L4TUlQTmk8D-AQ&amp;url=http%3A//firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2009/01/28/1769104.aspx&amp;cid=1297820198&amp;usg=AFQjCNH089p14fQJJdIuWsNrjhyDZ-0jLw">planned</a> to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to adjust combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52832">signals</a>
the US plans to increase US combat forces in Afghanistan.<br /><i><br /></i>We still need a clear explanation of what relationship, if any, any forces in Afghanistan had with the placement of explosives in the WTC. As with Iraq, where there is no relationship between the use of US-NATO power and the supposed forces behind 9-11, the more emoldened the opposition will be in putting aside their differences and joining forces to oppose the increased US combat forces in Afghanistan.<br /><br />Some might suggest that Afghanistan is "more linked" with 9-11 than
Iraq; so it makes sense to change course in Iraq, but continue the
fight in Afghanistan. This shows a lack of understanding of what does
apply: The lessons of Iraq, and the risk of increasing the presence of
US combat forces in Afghanistan, further strengthening the Afghan
resolve to unite and drive out the US and NATO forces.<br /><br />The United States cannot argue, by reducing combat forces in Iraq, this
will allow the US to address Afghanistan. There is no relationship
between (a) the allocation of <u><i>resources</i></u> on the ground in Iraq; and (b) the US government's <u><i>decision</i></u>
to focus or not focus on Afghanistan. The two are independent. Rather,
the US government can focus on both, one, or neither regardless the
troop levels in Iraq. Whether there are or are not enough <i>resources</i> is a different question.<br /><br />A
better way to frame the issues with Afghanistan is to focus on whether
the US should free US troops from Iraq, and transition them to
Afghanistan. However, this calculus is flawed and creates more of a
problem.<br /><br /><i>Imbalanced Argument On Priorities, Resources</i><br /><br />One argument is the US cannot focus on Afghanistan because of the distraction of Iraq. This would imply the US, because it is focused on an economic crisis, cannot afford the distraction of combat operations in Afghanistan. However, if the US leadership argues "it can do both," the question is why it is putting any effort in Afghanistan while the US economy is not getting <i>all</i> the attention of the US government. Americans are being asked to sacrifice. Then the Afghans should not enjoy a superior position to demand US government attention "not good enough" for the American public.<br /><br /><i>American Treasury To Preserve Some Russian Interests</i><br /><br />If the US will remains in Afghanistan, Russia does not need to use <i>her</i>
treasury to address the situation in Afghanistan. Once Russia sees the
US is serious in leaving Afghanistan, the Russians might see the
prospect of instability along her border to reconsider whether Russia
is or is not serious about never contributing to a solution.<br /><br />Any US military action along the Russian souther border in
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan must consider Russian
involvement to ensure Russians are confident the military forces are
aimed at instability to the south in Afghanistan, and do not, as
national missile defense did, threaten Russia from one of her former
allies.<br /><br /><i>Exploring Joint US-Iranian Joint Military Confidence Building Measures</i><br /><br />Iran
was willing to work with the US after 9-11 because it had a common
threat in Afghanistan. There is no reason the US, by withdrawing from
Afghanistan, could not help the Iranians return to their position in
the wake of 9-11. The US and Iran might disagree over Israel, but this
does not mean that Iran and the US cannot discuss common security
concerns along the Iranian-Afghan border.<br /><br /><i>Prospect of Strengthening Chinese Military Involvement With Anti-Piracy Off Somalia</i><br /><br />China has an interest
in regional stability. She is one of the permanent members of the
Security Council. If the US with her allies works to remove US forces
from Afghanistan, the UN can focus more on common economic problems;
and then, as the situation changes in Afghanistan, agree to implement a
coherent international solution. <br /><br />However, the US, by remaining in Afghanistan,
is clouding the picture on what the problem is, and whether other
powers should or should not step up to the plate. If the situation
deteriorates, and the instability from Afghanistan further spreads into
former Russian republics to the north, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, or China, then the President will have the
resources to provide assistance should those regional powers desire
joint action.<br /><br />One of the issues driving the problems for the US in Afghanistan is the
Indian goal of creating some instability along Pakistan's border with
Afghanistan. The US troops deployment in Iran and Russia would reduce
the leverage Pakistan has with India in using the US troop presence in
Afghanistan in its calculus with India.<br /><br />There may be regional agreements the US has with current warlords, but
once the US increases combat operations, the question is whether these
current relations with select warlords will strengthen, or whether the
increased US combat operations will encourage the warlords to side with
eachother against the US. It cannot be argued that increasing US combat
operations in any country seven years after starting those operations
will be viewed as a change, but more of what hasn't worked. The
presence of US combat troops in Afghanistan communicates the US doesn't
understand the lessons of the Russians in Afghanistan.<br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Philosophy of Confronting US Govt Illegal Geneva, FISA Violations</title>
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   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.253895</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-28T15:09:13Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-29T17:52:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Some discussion in the wake of the Obama inauguration relates to the reasons the public would or would not support a legal confrontation with the US government. We&apos;ve seen Gonzalez wave the &quot;watch out&quot;-argument to avoid a war crimes indictment,...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>Some discussion in the wake of the Obama inauguration relates to the reasons the public would or would not support a legal confrontation with the US government. We've seen Gonzalez wave the "watch out"-argument to avoid a war crimes indictment, and former White House counsel argue the violations are state secrets.</p>
<p>Their arguments fall apart if the shoes were on the other feet: <font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><strong><em>If</em></strong></font> We the People-as-abuser were to abuse power just those in the Executive-Legislative branches have done, the&nbsp;government officials-as-victim&nbsp;would not, for a "good reason" or "necessity" (1) accept&nbsp;a violation of the law and rights of US government officials;&nbsp;nor (2) accept those violations without an accounting for the transgressions.</p>
<p><em>Their</em> lawful confrontation would be no different than what We the People <em>must</em> do: Understand what went wrong and why; and hold accountable those who breached their Constitutional obligations. The Constitution and Supreme Law and treaties are binding on all; and cannot be ignored <em>unless</em> We the People agree to change the agreement and replace it within a new Constitution. <em>Any</em> argument for inaction against We the People-as-abuser would be cast aside within the ranks of the government officials-as-victims as being complicit with unreasonable abuse of power: Indefensible moral slavery to tyranny and unconstitutional.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><strong>It's</strong></font> a false argument to suggest US citizens should not stand up for themselves, or avoid challenging what may or may not be lawfully classified unlawful operations. If the US public were, as suggested above, to learn they could violate the rights of <em>US government officials</em>, and those officials did nothing, then the public would get the (incorrect) message that the law meant nothing; and those in power were not willing to use their authority to defend the rule of law, their rights, or the justice system.</p>
<p>Rather, if the public-as-abuser were to violate the rights of White House counsel, the White House counsel <em>would</em> use <em>all</em> options they had to remedy that violation.&nbsp; They would not turn a blind eye to domestic violations for the "greater cause" of external enemies. They <u><em><strong>have</strong></em></u> treated American citizens as the domestic enemy, <u><strong><em>have</em></strong></u> violated our rights, and <u><em><strong>have</strong></em></u> treated as if we are living in Afghanistan or Iraq: Subject to unlawful searches and seizures, reckless management, and irresponsible leadership.&nbsp; Their answer isn't, as it should be, real&nbsp;change or accountability, but another smokescreen&nbsp;of double standards. A departure from written law is the definition of illegitimate government, one the Framers did reject, and White House counsel-as-victim would never tolerate.</p>
<p>The Iraqis and Afghans did what Americans are not allowed to do: Use <em>all</em> options to reject that arrogant abuse of power. While our hands have been tied, this government has used military force against civilians who dared to confront the US government's illegal activity. That is a reckless abuse of power, and flawed assumption. </p>
<p>The White House counsel-as-victim would <em>never</em> tolerate illegal abuses while having <em>its</em> hands tied to prevent its defense. Yet, the White House counsel did just that at Guantanamo: After POWs were taken out of the right, and denied the means to defend themselves using all options, this White House counsel <em>did</em> impose war crimes through their agents on those that were taken <em>out of the fight</em>. That is a war crime, and the DOJ OLC memos show this US government will impose the same abuses on American citizens even though we are protected, not engaged in combat, and have our hands tied.</p>
<p><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><strong>In</strong></font>deed, We the People, seeing the White House opposition to our abuses of them, would more likely to be selective about what we hoped to raise in the future, especially if the White House counsel-as-victim were willing to stand up for themselves and engage in a lawful confrontation. They would argue that we had not power to "classify" the evidence related to the illegal activity; nor that the illegal activity should not be examined; nor that the public should "look forward" while the White House counsel-as-victim were prohibited from remedying the violations. They would demand fact finding to ensure this abuse of their rights never happened again. </p>
<p>It is arrogant to suggest the public agree to inaction that the White House counsel-as-victim would <em>never</em> accept as reasonable. The White House counsel would be first in line to point to the abuses under segregation to argue why similar "selected classes" cannot be unequally treated. We should not second-guess ourselves now as we reject the US government excuses to avoid examining what went wrong, or what we will do about it.</p>
<p><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><strong>W</strong></font>hen Americans discuss whether we should or should not confront the US government, put aside the issues of what should or should not be done in terms of rights: The question is whether, with the absense of action, the US government -- seeing our collective inaction to the known violations -- would <em>respect</em> the citizenry, not to mention the rule of law.</p>
<p>Our job as citizens isn't to put the US government in the corner, but to remind the US government that it cannot expect to place American citizens in the <em>same</em> corner as those the US government is supposedly fighting; nor&nbsp;expect American citizens&nbsp;to restraint itself&nbsp;in exercising&nbsp;all lawful options to do what the US government refuses to do: Enforce rights, constrain power, and defend our liberties.</p>
<p><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><strong>T</strong></font>he US government may not respect the law, the Constitution, or our rights, but our willingness to speak out, and confront these illegal FISA violations and war crimes signals that Americans are willing to stand up for ourselves and&nbsp;demand respect, even when the US government officials ignore their oath and refuse to respect the rule of law. To argue anything else would absurdly ask the public to believe the White House counsel -- if similarly confronted, and in our position -- would do nothing, when they would and have shown they will violate the law to put themselves above the law and We the People.</p>
<p>The White House counsel has shown what it is willing to do. They do make excuses to violate the law in secret, and arrogantly believe that violation will never be detected; or when it is, make excuses to not take responsibility for those violations. The US government would never accept a decision of We the People-as-abuser to put ourselves above the law, and not be accountable for our violation of the White House counsel-as-vicitim's rights.</p>
<p><strong><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">T</font></strong>he US government legal counsel&nbsp;ask that we dance to a tune of tyranny, not one of mutual respect for rights. That imbalance in assumptions means the American public is reasonable when doing what the White House counsel would do if it suspected it was in the same position. </p>
<p>Whether <em>their</em> rights have or have not been violated using illegal means is a secondary issue, one for the White House counsel to <em>prove</em>, not merely assert. <em>Their</em> claims, as ours, are valid petitions as grievances,&nbsp;subject to proof. The error is for the White House counsel to claim they can make blind accounsations about our supposed complicity with illegal activity; but then prohibit the public from challenging that abuse of power. The White House counsel cannot reasonably use accusations by putting We the People on the defensive; nor expect us to prove we haven't done what the White House counsel has demonstrated they are willing to do: Ignore rights using <em>illegal</em> methods.</p>
<p>The question is whether the Congress reasonably agreed to this illegal activity; or whether, in defiance of its oath, the Congress agreed to illegal activity which circumvented both FISA and Geneva because they believed nobody would discover the illegal activity. The error, as the White House counsel has learned, is that when We the People learn our rights, the Supreme Law, and treaty obligations have been violated, we shall use <em>all</em> lawful options to remind the US government that that abuse and arrogance shall not go unchallenged. The US government legal counsel are arrogant to suggest that the American public would do anthing less, nor suggest the White House counsel in the same position-as-victim should constrain itself from using all lawful options to remedy the injustice. Illegal activity will get revealed. The question is whether White House counsel would like to perpetuate the myth that lawyers enjoy "more equal" rights before the law. They do not.</p>Added: <i>Valued Rights</i><br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">S</font></b>ome might suggest the US government-as-victim would not challenge We the People-as-abuser because the violations were reasonable. This is an imbalanced argument premised on an assumption that says some rights are more valued and must be enforced; and that other legal obligations are superior to rights justifying their violation. This argument presupposes the US government actions are valid only as measured by the intent of the violators. That assumption is an expression of relative values, not the law. <br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1em;">It</font> cannot be argued that the US government officials-as-victims of FISA violations would say, "We <i>accept</i> those violations," because we're prejudicing what We the People-as-abusers would do. Indeed, We the People-as-abuser might under this construct violate <i>different</i> standards which <i>were</i> of <i>value</i> to the government officials-as-victims.&nbsp; <br /><br />We the People-as-abuser might look at the government official-as-victim's values as trivial. The abuse is whether the victim is forced to endure the attack on values in silence or is blocked from rising to their defense. Government officials would never agree to be silent over any transgression, however invented it might be; nor would they agree to any conditions which thwarted them from defending their values.&nbsp; <br /><br />We the People cannot reasonably be expected to endure conditions which government officials-as-victim confront as intolerable. Yet, this sliding scale on values is irrelevant. The question&nbsp; before us isn't whose values are or are not&nbsp; most important; but what is the law. Values&nbsp; shift. The law is certain.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>he apologists would rationalize the FISA violations because the government officials as either abuser <i>or</i> victim would <u>agree</u> to <i>these</i> specific violations. Yet, We the People-as-abuser would not necessarily violate only values the government officials-as-victim would agree. Rather, the government officials-as-victim would challenge We the People-as-abuser when we abused <i>their</i> valued rights. They would use the law as the means to assert their rights and preserve their valued principles, but they have no power to impose values where those values are unrelated to the agreed-to-law.<br /><br />But We the People have an obligation not to justify putting government values before our own; but to defend the Constitution against domestic enemies who value lawlessness to achieve dubious security. Indeed, the US government officials would not agree if We the People-as-abuser violated <i>other</i> government official-as-victim's valued rights, outside the "permissible" violations of Geneva and FISA.<br /><br /><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">O</font></b>ne class of citizen does not enjoy superior rights; nor can one class of citizens claim <i>their</i> valued rights are more important. The American public has the same claim to redress grievances as those who were granted power, in secret, to conduct combat operations and defend the United States. Their conduct and their power is subject to legal review. <br /><br />Any demand that We-the-People-as-abuser should be subject to one standard of review is inconsistent with the principle of equality before the law. The US government officials-as-victims cannot claim they have a superior claim to <i>their</i> valued rights affording them special discretion to violate the FISA or Geneva; while leaving We the People-as-abuser without <i>any</i> remedy to challenge that imbalance and injustice.&nbsp; We the People-as-abuser would not be allowed to violate any law, and neither the most valued nor lesser valued rights of&nbsp; the government officials-as-victims. The government officials-as-victims would argue that any violation of any law and rights is intolerable. Indeed, any violation cannot stand before the law, otherwise the law is meaningless.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>he White House responses after 9-11 shows what they <i>will</i> do to confront an abuse. Whether that response is prudent or imprudent is different than whether it is lawful or unlawful. Those who are induced to react, as the US government was after 9-11, can convince themselves the prudence of illegal activity. The same happened after the Reichstag fire. <br /><br />The problem is when the defense of that illegality fails, and the US government-as-abuser crafts convoluted legal memos to retroactively explain away abuse and "justify" creating a new standard to measure conduct. This is a shifting scale of values, not written&nbsp; law. The law is fixed so there is no moving standard on what is or isn't acceptable. Moral clarity means nothing until it is ratified with written law. The government official-as-abuser has perverted the law, argued for public inaction, yet pretend they-as-victims can pervert the law to assert their values over others. That is tyranny and unconstitutional.<br /><br />It is irrelevant the US government-as-abuser disagrees with what We the People-as-victim value. The standard isn't whether We the People are or are not a victim; but whether the government officials have attacked the US Constitution. They have. They have no excuse, only a litigation strategy of smokescreens. They have no hope but offering greater obfuscations.<br /><br /><b>Errors In Comments Below</b><br /><br /><i>Constraining Passion<br /><br /></i>We the People as-abuser fall within Federalist 49: "<font face="arial, helvetica" size="-1">The passions <b><u><i>ought to be controlled</i></u></b> and regulated
by the government." Yet, the apologists for the US government's illegal FISA and Geneva violations have no answer to what <i><u>will</u></i> constrain the passion</font> of the US government officials when <u>they</u> <i>refuse</i> to be controlled or regulated by oath, statute, <i>and</i> treaty obligation. We the People-as-abuser would <i>not</i> be permitted to do what these government officials <i>have</i> done.&nbsp; The new established form must ensure the passions of government officials remained equally constrained, not afforded special immunity.<br /><br />We the People have an obligation to ensure the government, government offiicials, its contractors and agents <i>are</i> subject to control and regulation, even if that means restructuring the relationship between the law and man; and the relationship between government and government officials. We are not perpetually bound to a system which turns a blind eye to US government official illegal activity.<br /><br /><i>Supremacy Clause</i><br /><br />The question is whether government officials understand the oath of office is binding on them as it relates to the statutes, Constitution, <i>and</i> treaty obligation. The Supreme Law may be referenced in the Constitution, but this seems lost on government officials who have a loyalty to something <i>other than</i> the Constitution, Supreme Law, treaty obligations, or statutes.<br /><br />Saying, "the Constitution<b> <font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><u>is</u></font></b> the Supreme Law" is incorrect: It is <i>part of</i> the Supreme Law. The Constitution does not say, "<u><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>S</b></font></u>upreme Law" (<u><b><font style="font-size: 1.25em;">c</font></b></u>apitalized), but <b><u><i>s</i></u></b>upreme Law (<font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b><i><u>l</u></i></b></font>ower case):<br /><br /><blockquote><u><a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/mt-static/html/editor-content.html?cs=utf-8" name="A6Cl2"></a></u>"This <u>Constitution</u>, and the <u>Laws of the United States</u>
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all <u>Treaties</u> made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the <u><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>supreme</b></font> Law</u> of
the Land."<br /></blockquote>Despite this error, the point is that the oath binds them to principles
which they refuse to put first, but second to something else. It is
important to reference the spectrum of standards to show what
principles US government officials have put second.<br /><br />The <u><b>S</b></u>upreme Law (capitalized) includes the state statutes which <i>can</i>
be used to prosecute Federal government officials, telecoms, and others
allegedly complicit with a domestic Rebellion against the Constitution.
Inaction does <i>not</i> mean the "supreme law" permits inaction. The
Constitution does not permit unlawful activity which would nullify the
document, treaty obligations, statutes, federal codes, state statutes, <i>or</i> the <b><font style="font-size: 1em;"><u>S</u></font></b>upreme Law<br /><br />However, "supreme law" does <i>not</i> mean that the US government, as was done with FISA violations, may ignore "lesser" privacy statutes at the State level, especially when FISA requires <i>during wartime</i> a legal compliance system.&nbsp; The question on FISA isn't whether State privacy statutes "trump" the lawful federal <i>statutes</i> (they do not); but whether an <i>executive order</i> is legal when it ignores FISA and says the illegal activity precludes enforcement of state statutes (it is not). Congress' error is to pretend it could keep secret an agreement to do something Congress did not expressly intend through FISA: A violation of FISA. <i><b>Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) </b></i>If the activity were permissible, then the US government should not have created excuses to ignore the FISA court or hide prisoners at Guantanamo, North Africa, Eastern Europe, on floating vessels, or in other locations. DOJ OLC cannot credibly argue that the abuses were permitted; but it requires the prisoners to be placed in harms way in <i>unusual</i> locations.<br /><br /><i>Change to US Governance</i><br /><br />The Federalist Papers leave open the option for change, especially when the US government refuses to meet its legal obligations, and the existing structure of government proves to be inadequate to preserve liberty, thwart tyranny, or compel obedience to the law.<br /><br />Federalist 78 sets the legal groundwork to discuss what must be done, as now, when the US government refuses to abide by written law; will not keep impeachment on the table; refuses to enforce Geneva; and pretends We the People have no power to compel enforcement:<br /><br /><blockquote><a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp">Federalist 78</a>: Until the people have, by <u><b>some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed
the established form</b></u>, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as
individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can
warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act<br /></blockquote><br />The 10th Amendment reserves all non-delegated power -- including the power to annul <i>this</i> Constitution -- to We the People. Had the Framers not intended this power to exist, they would not have left open the option for We the People to use a solemn and authoritative act to annul or change the established form. Implicitly, this means the <i>new</i> established form would more effectively constrain the passions of US government officials who defy FISA, Geneva, treaty obligations, the laws of war, state statutes, or <i>this</i> US Constitution. <br /><br />One failure of <i>this</i> established form is the <i>failure to challenge</i> the incorrect notion that this abused power cannot be redelegated to new centers of power, outside what the Framers imagined US government officials exploit.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>T</b></font>he question isn't whether we should enforce the law; but whether, <i>when</i>, as now, the government officials argue the law has "no meaning," what new structure of government will make that "determination" <i>irrelevant</i>. <br /><br />It is arrogant for US government officials to argue they are "for" the rule of law; but their actions, in secret, belie that oath; and they circumvent not only the law, but the mechanisms needed to realign their thinking to the supremacy of <i>law</i>, not secret agreements. <br /><br />This US government argues implicitly that there is <i>no</i> mechanism that can confront their superior loyalty to secret agreements; and that there is no mechanism within the <i>established</i> form that can challenge their failure to timely enforce treaty obligations, the law of the land, or the Constitution. That is unacceptable and demands the public openly discuss the remedy. Whether that remedy is within the established form or within a new system of governance unrelated to this Constitution is not the starting point. <br /><br />One question is what <i>new</i> established form is required; and what lawful mechanism will take us to <i>that</i> objective. The government officials-as-abusers absurdly argue that the status quo is irrelevant; yet, they offer no solution to achieve the alternative. that is not leadership, but a smokescreen. However, if We the People-as-abusers were to argue the same, we would be lectured by government officials for failing to be responsible, and sent to <i>another</i> line. Yet, these government officials-as-abusers say they <i>cannot</i> be held responsible; and that we should <i>ignore</i> their irresponsibility. These government officials-as-victims would never give We the People-as-abusers that discretion. Neither shall We the People.<br /><br />The US government officials made the rules, and ignored them. We the People have no power to make rules. That power is delegated to Congress. Yet, we have no defensible power to ignore rules we do not like. Yet, US government officials-as-abuser and -victims argue they have power to <i>make</i> rules which <i>are</i> affront to liberty; and they have the power to <i>ignore</i> rules which they find inconvenient. We the People <i>cannot</i> be compelled to remain forever bound to an established form which allows that arrogant imbalance of power to go unremedied.<br /><br /><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>W</b></font>hether the Constitution does or does not say it can "only" be changed by Amendment is unrelated to whether the Constitution should be disgarded and replaced. When we talk about change, but refuse to correct the systemic problems of the Constitution, the question is whether <i>this</i> Constitution should be replaced, not merely changed. This Constitution does not say that it is the <i>only</i> Constitution conceivable:<br /><br /><blockquote>Preamble: "do ordain and establish <b><i><u>this</u></i></b> Constitution for the United States

  of America" <br /></blockquote><br />There is no word "final," "last" or "only" in the clause, leaving open the <i>option</i> that there is a <i>different</i> Constitution.<br /><br />The basis for change or not changing is moot when we refuse to examine what went wrong; nor discuss what solutions, including a new Constitution, will remedy the specific problems. The threat of changing the constitution by supplanting it with a new one is one check on abusive government: We the People, without warning, may revoke the document and compel the US government to agree to something new. <br /><br />The US government officials-as-abusers may "value" their "right" to ignore FISA; but this decisions is at the risk of We the People-as-victim to revoke the abused power, and deny them the discretion to ignore the legal requirements. Whether the oath is binding on them seems lost; the question is whether the US Government can be restructured to prevent the abuse from taking shape. There are ways to do this.<br /><br />There are ways to start over, not Amend, and create a <i>new</i> Constitution. One method includes a Constitutional Convention which is<i> not</i> the same as the Amendment process. Another method includes a ceremony where the leadership, as was done at Runnymeade, is <i>forced</i> to sign a document to substantially address the abuses and rebalance the power. We the People have the "liberty" to "voluntarily" pay taxes through lawful <i>incentives</i>. The same framework can be presented to US government officials to inspire them to voluntarily agree to a <i>new</i> established form. It is an error to suggest that the Constitution can <i>only</i> be reformed with an Amendment. <br /><br /><i>Convention Against Torture</i><br /><br />Whether the Convention Against torture is or isn't relevant is unrelated to the question of what applies to POWs during wartime: Geneva Conventions ban <i>all abuse</i>. CAT only prohibits torture.&nbsp; The "Supreme Law" may include CAT; but the apologists for inaction ignore the Geneva conventions prohibiting outrages against civilians, and all abuse against non-combatants. This obligation rests with the <u>detaining</u> power <i>regardless</i> the status of the prisoner.<br />]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Another Fabricated Video For NSC Staff</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/another-fabricated-video-for-n.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.253540</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-26T15:14:13Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-27T01:55:03Z</updated>
   
   <summary><![CDATA[We review a NYT article discussing a newly released video from someone claiming to have been released from Guantanamo. We discuss the basis for our conclusions, and provide recommendation for the National Security Council in light of these objectives&nbsp;and this...]]></summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>We review a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/world/middleeast/25yemen.html">NYT article</a> discussing a newly released video from someone claiming to have been released from Guantanamo.</p>
<p>We discuss the basis for our conclusions, and provide recommendation for the National Security Council in light of <a class="" href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/" target="_blank" mce_href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/">these objectives</a>&nbsp;and <a class="" href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/" target="_blank" mce_href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/">this agenda</a>. We assume you've read <a class="" href="http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=3633" target="_blank" mce_href="http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=3633">this testimony</a> and his written responses. This information may be useful for the principals listed <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities/">here</a>.</p>
<p><em>Background</em>: The information relates to&nbsp;<a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/dubious-dia-claims-on-released.php">the failed DIA effort</a> to link formerly detained Guantanamo prisoners to alleged post-release terrorism.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p class="MsoNormal">The video and NYT reporting&nbsp;raises questions warranting follow-up.</p>
<p>The NYT reported two individuals were in a video. The NYT reports there is a belief that one of the men disclosed a number matching a prisoner number at Guantanamo.&nbsp; </p>
<p>The media has reported there is a discrepancy in the name, suggesting the name change has something to do with a different spelling, pronunciation.&nbsp; </p>
<blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><strong>Contrasting the "Two Versions" of "the Name"</strong></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u>The name repoted in the video</u>: Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi</p><u>The name associated with the Guantanamo prisoner number</u>: Mohamed Atiq Awayd al-Harbi, 333&nbsp; </blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal">Explanation disclosed in the NYT report: </p>
<blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal">"The difference in names is partly due to the common Arab practice of referring to men by their kunya, an honorific, in this case Abu Hareth, derived from the name of his first son. The name Al Harbi is a tribal designation."&nbsp; </p></blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal">1. <em>Photo Comparison</em></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u>Argument</u>: The video is evidence. Arguably, under Geneva, the photographs taken of the "prisoner 333" are releasable to the public because they are no longer a prisoner of war. The public needs to see a certified copy of the photographs taken of the prisoner's face while in captivity. Then the public can independently compare the images the US government certifies were taken of the POW with the still images from the newly released video.&nbsp; </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">2. <em>Names</em></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The names do not match exactly. al-Harbi and al-Awfi in spelling or sound. The former has a distinct "r", while the latter does not include the hard r or b sounds of the former.</p>
<p>The US government needs to explain why - for many years in captivity - the POW agreed to be called by the wrong name, with the mismatching sound. This difference has implications for: Tracing the names of the supposed people behind the 9-11 attacks; and the NSA monitoring done using similar linguistics. Different audible sounds mean two different pronunciations of different words are getting matched as if they are the same. This is flawed.</p>
<p>3. <em>Reference to Son</em>&nbsp; </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The NYT report, in part, attributes some of the change in name to a "son's name. We need to know when the son was born; the timing of the birth relative to the prisoner's timelines at Guantanamo. We also need to have independent confirmation that there is a son by this name; and there is a reasonable relationship between the supposed son and the name provided within the video. We also need an explanation why the name of the son, not the prisoner's father or other relative, was incorporated into the name.</p>4. <em>NSA Intercepts</em>&nbsp; 
<p class="MsoNormal">The public needs to understand when both names were first loaded into the NSA monitoring systems; and whether the primary focus of the monitoring was foreign intelligence; or whether there was a different objective.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">he disclosure of the video, names, and different spellings create a discrete point-certain when documents would co-jointly contain both names. We need to know when the Pentagon first learned of the first name; and what comparison was done with the different spellings.&nbsp; </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">5. <em>Speed of Disclosure</em></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Normally, when the US government gathers intelligence, it does not quickly disclose information. The timing of the disclosure is suspect. DIA recently released <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/dubious-dia-claims-on-released.php">discredited</a> information suggesting more than a handful of former POWs had returned to the fight.&nbsp; </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The NYT report does not cite, as it should, the source of the information; nor the basis to conclude that the person in the video does or does not match the person who was photographed at Guantanamo. We haven no information about the source of the information related to who did the analysis of the name change; nor whether the explanation, even if true, stands scrutiny by competing analysts.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">We have no information about the following:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p class="MsoNormal">-&nbsp;How the video was acquired</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">-&nbsp;What method, if any, was used to authenticate the video: That it correctly depicted persons</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">-&nbsp;What method, if any, was&nbsp; used to establish the location the video was taken&nbsp; </p></blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><strong><u>Part II: Detailed Comments</u></strong></p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p><strong><u>Article</u>:</strong> ROBERT F. WORTH. 2 Ex-Detainees in Qaeda Video. New York Times, Sunday, January 25, 2009 </p></blockquote>
<p><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em"><strong>T</strong></font>his conclusion is too fantastic to believe:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: "Two former Guantanamo Bay detainees now appear to have joined Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch, which released a video on Friday showing them both and identifying them by their names and Guantanamo detainee numbers." &nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p>The basis to conclude that the person released was the same person in the video; or that the information about the leadership reasonably matches the information within the video.</p>
<p>It is possible that someone learned of a possible change in leadership, and assigned thatinformation to a former POW. The lack of information about the sourcing, method toauthenticate, and the basis for the conclusions raises doubts about the credibility of theconclusions, the claims, or the implied relationship between Guantanamo, the video, and actions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Mr. Blunt in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee referred to a third war: One in Iraq; a second in Afghanistan; and a third, not in a geographic region as is the case with the first two, but a fight against terrorism. Notice this video is not linking Guantanamo to Pakistan or Osama bin Ladin; nor with names in Iraq. This video appears to be a new construct: Consistent with the "third" war, beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. The timing of the video, the relationship with Blunt's disclosures, and the convoluted-unsourced explanation about the name change raises additional doubts about the authenticity of the information.</p>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his is a dubious assertion:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: American counterterrorism officials have already confirmed that Said Ali al-Shihri, 35, who was released from the American prison camp at Guantanamo in November 2007, is now the deputy leader of Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch. </p></blockquote>
<p>We have no information to understand the basis for the suspicion+ He is suspected of playing a role in a deadly attack on the American Embassy in the Yemeni capital, Sana, in September. &nbsp;</p>
<p>We have no information about how "counter terrorism officials" (whoever they are)"confirmed" that the person released matches the person in the video. If this confirmationis real, then there should be photographic evidence supporting this assertion. However,we have seen that the images of "Osama bin Ladin" do not match, raising doubts about why we should believe similar assertions about whether people in one location are the same in other locations. They may be, but "confirmed" intelligence reports have defied reason on tracing whether the video images of "Osama bin Ladin" were of the same person.&nbsp; Adding to the problem is the failure of the FBI to link bin Ladin to the 9-11 attacks. Yet, this quickly, the intelligence community has done what the FBI could not do: Link al Queda to a struggle which the FBI has not been able to do re 9-11.</p>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">W</font></strong>e would like more open discussion about this apparent contradiction:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">What reasons did the US give for conducting combat operations in Afghanistan if, as the FBI says, there is no link between bin Ladin and the 9-11 attacks? Are there reasons still valid in support of Mr. Blunt's assertion that the "second" war is in Afghanistan. If bin Ladin, as the FBI concludes, has no relationship with 9-11, then who or what are the US really fighting in Afghanistan: Merely the people who took up arms because they had no direct connection to 9-11?</p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his gives us clues about the speed of the video release, and fantastic ability of the world community to translate, dissect, and reach conclusions: A skill the US intelligence community has not well demonstrated&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: In the video released Friday,&nbsp;&nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">W</font></strong>e have no adequate information to justify belief that the person in the video was, in fact, the same person detained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: Mr. Shihri sits alongside a man identified as Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi, who appears with a script at the bottom of the screen giving his Guantanamo identification number, 333. That number corresponds to a man known in Pentagon documents as Mohamed Atiq Awayd al-Harbi, who was also released to Saudi Arabia in November 2007. </p></blockquote>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his explanation is not satisfactory:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: The difference in names is partly due to the common Arab practice of referring to men by their kunya, an honorific, in this case Abu Hareth, derived from the name of his first son. The name Al Harbi is a tribal designation. </p></blockquote>
<p>We need more information about why the distinct "r" sounds are explained away. Also, the NYT says that the "difference" in names is "partly" due to some factors. This suggests that there were other factors which analysts have concluded, but not agreed. Please disclose publicly the other reasons provided for the difference; and let the public discuss whether these reasons stand scrutiny, or attempt to -- as it appears -- start with the (incorrect) assumption that the tape is valid, and attempt to create an explanation accounting for an error (possibly) proving the tape is a forgery.</p>
<p><br /><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his information shows the prisoners were not engaged in "jihad" during their detention:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: Both men passed through a Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists after their release from Guantanamo. That program has been seen as a model, and the Saudi government had previously said that none of its graduates had returned to terrorism. &nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p>The NYT report refers to a "rehabilitation" program. Whether this program was or was not successful is less important than discussing what measures, if any, the US will take to "rehabilitate" the current Guantanamo prisoners. Let's suppose, for the sake of conversation, that these prisoners were not rehabilitated. We would hope the President review these prisoners, and outline a "rehabilitation" plan for the current prisoners; and discuss what will be done -- before more prisoners are released after Guantanamo supposedly shuts down in 2010 -- to apply the lessons of this apparent failure, and ensure there is no problem once the prisoners are released.&nbsp;</p>
<p>We also do not have enough information about the prisoners' case files, what evidence the US government had, and why they were released. Indeed, if they were being "rehabilitated" there should be some matching information in the US and Saudi files about what the persons were supposedly doing. However, there is no reference in the original information indicating what the now-released-prisoners were supposedly doing warranting their capture. This diversion was, in part, the basis to conclude the DIA disclosures were invalid.</p>
<p>We need to hear more about this supposed prisoner held at Guantanamo; what information the US had in the file (if any); and whether there is a logical link between: (a) what the prisoner supposedly was doing before capture; (b) what the Prisoner disclosed during detention; (c) what the video supposedly says the prisoner is now doing; and (d) what the Saudis learned during the rehabilitation program.</p>
<p>It defies reason to believe the US had enough information to detain this person; but not enough to continue detention; but the prisoner is now doing things that are of concern; yet the Saudis were convinced that he was not a threat. The preceding statement would ask that this person can magically change their outward appearance to justify detention, but that the US could not find this information, and the US despite control of the prisoner could not establish additional information during detention to justify the original decision to detain; yet, that the Saudis were fooled during a period of close monitoring. &nbsp;</p>
<p>We doubt there is a reasonable link between the activity the prisoner was supposedly doing before capture and what he now says he is going to do. He didn't have enough to warrant continued detention; but enough to warrant capture; but the Saudis missed it; and yet, out of the blue, despite observations, he's now in a senior position of leadership despite the US and Saudis not linking his pre-detention conduct with activity that would warrant detention, nor with risk factors that would raise doubts about his prospects of success during the "rehabilitation." This defies reason.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his assertion smacks of disingenuous "concern" about Israel; and fails to explain why the prisoner is "warning" anyone about a program that failed to detect him:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the video released Friday, Mr. Awfi warns fellow prisoners about the Saudi program and threatens attacks against Saudi Arabia. He also speaks angrily about the Israeli attacks on Hamas in Gaza. </p></blockquote>
<p>In light of Blunt's comments about the "third war", what is unusual is that the US has a video of someone no longer referencing US actions in either Iraq or Afghanistan; but is conveniently moving the focus from Iraq and Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia and Israel. This, again, fits too conveniently in the "third war".</p>
<p>We have no information about the "warning" about the program in Saudi Arabia:</p>
<p>Did the "former prisoner" hope to warn people in Saudi Arabia only; or a message to the entire world: What specific "warning" did the prisoner hope to provide -- that the "rehabilitation" program as ineffective? Then no "warning" is needed. <strong><em>If</em></strong> the program was defective, as the intelligence community would have us believe, then the "former prisoner" should have done the opposite: Publicly stated that the program was effective to mislead the government officials, ensure they with a program that "allowed someone like him" to get released; but privately planned to do the opposite and continue attacks.</p>
<p><strong><font style="FONT-SIZE: 1.25em">T</font></strong>his language has yet to be authenticated as original Arabic speech:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NYT: Mr. Shihri also speaks in the video, saying "by God, our imprisonment only increased our perseverance in the principles for which we went out, did jihad for, and were imprisoned for." &nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p>We doubt the validity of the statement at the end. "Our imprisonment only increased our perseverance" is a phrase that is too concise, and does not sound as through it is a valid translation of a similar notion of "jihad" from the Moslem world. We would like to know more about the source of the translation; and how the translation squares with other mis-translations on similar concepts, but from a different country: Iran.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, if the US detention system was true, then we should have had some evidence the prisoner -- before being released from Guantanamo -- should have documented some evidence that the prisoner was persevering. The prisoner should have put that "perseverance" into action while being detained. Yet, we're asked to believe he did nothing while in detention; did not resist to a level warranting his continued detention; fooled the Saudis during the "rehabilitation"; but can only satisfy himself by disclosing his "concern" in a video. That defies reason.</p>
<p>Someone who was genuinely "resolved" to confront injustice, would have engaged in activity during detention that would have warranted their continued detention. Yet, we're asked to believe this prisoner's file had no information warranting continued detention; there was nothing about his pre-detention activity in the file; and he's magically "resolved" to do something. We have no information about what he supposedly did before the detention; nor about how his current statements reconcile with what was insufficient to warrant continued detention.</p>
<p>He's implicitly admitting that he failed -- when he <em>had</em> the chance -- to confront the guards at Guantanamo; and there is no record of him having confronted the "injustice" while in US hands which should have, if they were real, "justified" his <em>continued detention</em>, not release. He has no credibility with the supposed audience he (supposedly) hopes to motivate. The more reasonable conclusion is that the intended audience is not anyone in the Moslem world, but the people reviewing the intelligence files and assessments about this information: Members of Congress, Senior Administration Officials, and those one-step beyond the immediate intelligence analysis.&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Part III: Judgments</u></strong></p>
<p>We judge the following:&nbsp;</p>
<p>- The analysts commenting on the tape are looking for reasons to <em>explain-away</em> a contradiction, not, as they should, <em>use</em> the contradiction to examine the authenticity of the video. This contradiction is important and the explanation provided is not adequate.</p>
<p>- The President and Vice President are being misled about the information related to this prisoner's original activity, detention activity, basis for release, and the prisoner's monitoring during the Saudi rehabilitation program</p>
<p>- The supposed post-rehabilitation statements are not designed to motivate Moslems to resist, but the statements&nbsp;are designed for a western audience</p>
<p>- The translation and original comments are not from an Arabic speaker, but comments from someone in the public affairs community attempting to spin a threat+ - The prisoner's comments are adverse to their interests: They implicitly argued that they did not struggle, when they were under US control, to justify their continued detention</p>
<p>- The timing of the release is consistent with the problems DIA has with its statements on recidivism</p>
<p>- The information is consistent not with a change in foreign opposition, but the new framing from Mr. Blunt. The video does not explain how the prisoner changed their focus from a geographic region in either Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iraq, to a new focus in Saudi Arabia or Israel.</p>
<p>-&nbsp;The explanations for the name change are not adequate, and have not explained why the prisoner did not use the same name during detention as he now discloses</p>
<p>- The US government has not adequately explained the why the photographs of this prisoner should be given attention using the same methods which cannot explain why images of "Osama bin Ladin" have inexplicably changed</p>
<p>- The video is designed to raise doubts about the policies in the US and Saudi Arabia related to prisoner release+ - The disclosed statements about what the prisoner is saying are not consistent with the pre-release behavior warranting (a) release from US detention; and (b) successful release from the Saudi rehabilitation program.&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Part IV: Conclusions</u></strong>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The video is a forgery. The speed of the video disclosure, translation, and analysis suggests the video production company and the "intelligence analysts" are one in the same.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The video is black propaganda. The video is evidence that there are personnel hoping to mislead the United States and US President on the current threat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The video is designed to undermine support for the US President's decision to close Guantanamo. The United States intelligence analysts and intelligence policy makers have not adequately explained how people who were released because of lack of evidence were not detected during pre-release reviews in the US or at the monitoring program in Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The video is intended for a western audience. This video is not a reasonable basis to believe that Moslems will be motivated to spread their attacks in Saudi Arabia. This threat existed before this video was released. &nbsp;</p>
<p>The video was originally conceived in a non-Arabic production house. The references to Israel are not designed to communicate new information, but to add credibility to what appears to be a fabricated video.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The video is part of a non-Arabic sales strategy timed with the US government budgeting cycle, just prior to the release of the President's budget and Committees' spring budget markups. The video is designed to expand the current "two wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan; to lay the foundation for the (still mismanaged) global confrontation against terrorism. Someone appears to view their defense appropriations are at risk with the financial bailout. Once the President finds who really created this video, their funding line should be substantially reduced, and transferred to a competing appropriation that will support justifiable policy.</p>
<p><strong><u>Part V: Recommendations</u></strong>:</p>
<p>We encourage the President to seek through the National Security Council other views on this issue:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>- What method was independently used to authenticate this video</p>
<p>- Who are the specific analysts who provided the information about the "reasons" for the change in name</p>
<p>- What study was there of the lighting of the video to establish what technical background the personnel creating this video had</p>
<p>- What comparison did the White House staff immediately adjacent to the President do of the images taken of the prisoner at Guantanamo; and a comparison with the now disclosed images in the video</p>
<p>- Why are the same analysts from the intelligence community -- who cannot admit that the "images of bin Ladin" have mysteriously changed -- taken seriously on tracing images between this prisoner's detention and the images now disclosed?</p>
<p>- Who has discussed whether the US might have placed within the prisoner pool undercover American agents designed to "penetrate" an illusory cell? </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">- What is the explanation for why the "r" and "b" were never included within the prisoners' file; why the prisoner files do not show other disparities between what the prisoner said and their "desired" name; and how does this relate to the NSA targeting protocols used during monitoring of Arabic speakers?</p>
<p>- When was the prisoner's son born; and how does this birth, if it occurred, relate to the disparity between the (a) name used at Guantanamo; (b) other names used; (c) changes or alterations in the Guantanamo files; and (c) the final name now used</p>
<p>- Who did a review of the prisoner's file at Guantanamo?</p>
<p>- Is there a reasonable relationship between what the prisoner supposedly did prior to original capture (supposedly warranting detention); with (a) what the guards at Guantanamo documented; (b) the subsequent files on the prisoner's concerns; (c) the criteria to review the risks of recidivism; and (d) what the Saudis concluded was appropriate for this prisoner; and (e) what the prisoner is now doing.</p>
<p>- Does anyone see that there are far too many hurdles for this Prisoner to have walked through, not get detected, yet he's asking us to believe that he should be taken seriously as part of the "fight" against Saudis; yet, he's not demonstrated -- during detention -- that he was actively confronting his captors or those in charge of the rehabilitation program?</p>
<p>- Does anyone see that this prisoner has too many convenient factors: Just enough to get detained; not enough to have continued detention; was able to slip through his handlers in Said Arabia, but now he's suddenly upset and going to do something about it. This defies reason. We should have seen something long ago, especially something that should match his original capture. Yet, we don't. Conveniently under the radar, then within 24 hours, we have a translation of a video. Far too convenient, especially for someone that had passed through many gates, and was "not of sufficient concern" to warrant continued detention.&nbsp;</p></blockquote>]]>
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</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Bailout Priority: Food Supply, Farmers Not Banks</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/bailout-priority-food-supply-f.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.253493</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-24T22:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-24T22:36:52Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The bailout appears poorly managed because there&apos;s little understanding why banks -- as a supplier of capital -- are getting priority; but the real priority -- food -- seems to have been lost in the shuffle. The time to debate...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/president-obama-delivers-your-weekly-address/">bailout</a> appears poorly managed because there's little understanding why banks -- as a supplier of <em>capital</em> -- are getting priority; but the real priority -- food -- seems to have been lost in the shuffle. The time to debate <a href="http://recovery.gov/">this issue</a> is now, not after the bill has been passed.</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p><a href="http://recovery.gov/">Not ready</a>: "Check back <strong><em><u>after</u></em></strong> the <u><em><strong>passage</strong></em></u> of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to see how and where your tax dollars are spent." [Emphasis added]</p></blockquote>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>One problem is the appearance the US leadership is throwing money at a poorly defined problem. This needs to change.</p>
<p>We don't need to throw money at more consumers or pet projects. Once the money is spent, there will be no additioanl money to sustain the real requirements to sustain a recovery: A method to sustain <em>operating cashflows</em>. Falling operating cashflows isn't relevant when the existing cash levels far exceed the debts <em>and</em> the debt repayment obligations. The current approach focuses on throwing water on the fire, not in ensuring we construct the house in the right place.</p>
<p><strong>T</strong>he President&nbsp;focuses on whether we are or are not <em>monitoring</em> an <strong>incorrect</strong> list of priorities:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/president-obama-delivers-your-weekly-address/">President Obama</a>: "I know that some are skeptical about the size and scale of this recovery plan. I understand that skepticism, which is why this recovery plan must and will include unprecedented measures that will allow the American people to hold my Administration accountable for these results."</p></blockquote>
<p>Let the banks and those who gambled go into bankruptcy. The real concern&nbsp;should not be with&nbsp;those who faciliated the gambling, but those who <em>provide</em> the most important national resource: <em>Food</em>. If the banks "cannot fail," then there should be good reasons -- not excuses -- for creating the current priority list. There <em>is</em> a priority list, right?</p>
<p><strong>O</strong>ne&nbsp;error is to punish borrowers who have assets, cash, or securities which <em>can</em> service loans. The current approach <em>appears</em> to take a broad brush to all borrowers, regardless their fundamentals: The ability to service loans, even in the worst conditions. Those who <em>can</em> service loans should not be punished by reducing their access to capital or loans.</p>
<p>Farmers borrow money from any <em>supplier</em> of capital. The issue isn't whether the farmers have a problem -- they don't, because they have a product they can sell to service the loans. The question is whether the US leadership will, as they should, let the banks -- which are insolvent or have lost in the gambling -- go by the wayside because they cannot be trusted to responsiblty&nbsp;<em>supply</em> capital.</p>
<p><em>Capital Supply Problem Overshadowing Higher Solvent Capital Demand</em></p>
<p>Who cares about the suppliers of <em>capital</em>. The issue is whether the most important <em>users</em> of capital -- the farmers, producing food -- can continue with the most important job: Sustaining the food supply. </p>
<p>Why aren't we creating a lending system that <em>will</em> ensure the highest priority -- the food supply -- is getting the highest priority in accessing capital? Let the gamblers <em>argue</em> they should have a higher priority for food.</p>
<p>We need to focus on the real priorities for capital access -- not the supply of capital, but supporting those who have the most important and sustainable demand for capital: Food production. The answer isn't to increase the ability for people to access capital; but to ensure the <u>prioritized</u>&nbsp;<em>demand for capital</em> is given the support it needs.</p>
<p>We need a debate on <em>which</em> demands for capital should be given the greatest-to-least priority. Then we can discuss whether the US government should or should not support those requirements.</p>]]>
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</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Congress Should Promulgate Similar Legislative Ethics Standards As President Obama</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/wh-website-incorporates-text-f.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.252783</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-21T15:34:08Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-23T02:50:48Z</updated>
   
   <summary>WH Website Incorporates Text From My Obama Congress should note closely the White House website changes. Changes from one of them involves legislation: A promise to host for five (5) days a public comment period before the President signs a...</summary>
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      <![CDATA[<p><em>WH Website Incorporates Text From My Obama</em></p>
<p>Congress should note closely the White House website changes. Changes from one of them involves legislation: A promise to host for five (5) days a public comment period <em>before</em> the President signs a bill.</p>
<p>These ethics-oversight changes should be matched by similar changes&nbsp;in Congress and <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2008/12/gao-list-for-obama.php">GAO</a>.&nbsp; Real change means giving the public the opportunity to comment <em>before</em> Congress debates the final version of the bill, before the Congress sends the bill to the President.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how closely the <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/">MyObama issues</a>&nbsp;match the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/">White House agenda</a>.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;">
<p><em></em><strong>Table Cross-Indexing MyObama to White House</strong></p>
<p align="center"><em>[Work in Progress]</em></p>
<ul>
<li>Removed: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/faith/">Faith</a>, incorporated under "Additional"</li></ul>
<p>Civil rights: <a href="http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/civil_rights/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/">WH</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Defense: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/">WH</a></p>
<p>Disabilities: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/disabilities/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/disabilities/">WH</a></p>
<p>Economy:&nbsp;<a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/economy/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/economy/">WH</a></p>
<p>Education: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/education/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/education/">WH</a></p>
<p>Energy &amp; Environment: <a href="http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment/">WH</a></p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;">
<p><em>Deleted</em>: Provide short-term relief to American families facing pain at the pump</p>
<p><em>Deleted</em>: Enact a Windfall Profits Tax to Provide a $1,000 Emergency Energy Rebate to American Families.</p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">Ethics: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/ethics/">WH</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p dir="ltr">Faith: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/faith/">MO</a> WH [Deleted, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/additional/">moved</a>]</p>
<p dir="ltr">Family: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/family/">MO</a>&nbsp;<a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/family/">WH</a></p>
<p dir="ltr">Fiscal: <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/fiscal/">MO</a> <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/fiscal/">WH</a><br /></p><p dir="ltr">Foreign Policy <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Healthcare <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Homeland Security <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Immigration <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Iraq <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Poverty <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Rural Service <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Seniors and Social Security <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Taxes <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Technology <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Urban Policy <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Veterans <br /></p><p dir="ltr">Women Additional<br /></p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">&nbsp;</p>
<p dir="ltr">President Obama's website at the White House included <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/ethics/">one thing</a> which caught our eye:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;">
<p>President Obama will not sign any non-emergency bill without giving the American public an opportunity to review and comment on the White House website for five days.</p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">These words match those at the <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/">MyObama</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/ethics/">This text</a> was added as a <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/">third bullet item</a>:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;">
<p><strong>End the Practice of Writing Legislation Behind Closed Doors: </strong>President Obama will restore the American people's trust in their government by making government more open and transparent. <strong>Obama will work to reform congressional rules to require all legislative sessions, including committee mark-ups and conference committees, to be conducted in public.</strong> By making these practices public, the American people will be able to hold their leaders accountable for wasteful spending and lawmakers won't be able to slip favors for lobbyists into bills at the last minute.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/ethics/">This text</a>&nbsp;was added to the <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/">section</a>, "Free the Executive Branch from Special Interest Influence"&nbsp;related to <a href="http://www.usoge.gov/">OGE</a>, ethics <a href="http://www.usoge.gov/laws_regs/regulations/5cfr2635.aspx">regulations</a> and OGE <a href="http://www.usoge.gov/ethics_guidance/opinons/opinions.aspx">opinions</a> [<strong><u>emphasis</u></strong> added]</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Enforce Executive Branch Ethics: </strong>The Obama-Biden administration will give the Office of Governmental Ethics strong enforcement authority with the ability to make binding regulations, and it will work with <strong>inspectors general</strong> in all the federal agencies to enforce ethics rules, minimize waste and ensure federal officials are not using their offices for personal gain. The OGE will also be the <u><strong>clearinghouse of all public records</strong></u> relevant to ethics in the Executive Branch and <u><strong>place this information on its website</strong></u>. Finally, the OGE will promulgate rules and procedures to record all oral and in-person "lobbying contacts" between registered lobbyists and political appointees and <strong><u>make those records available to the public in a searchable computerized database</u></strong>. </li></ul>
<p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/ethics/">This</a> is new:</p>
<blockquote>
<h4>Spend Taxpayer Money Wisely</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Performance Team and Chief Performance Officer:</strong> Barack Obama and Joe Biden will create a focused team within the White House that will work with agency leaders and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve results and outcomes for federal government programs while eliminating waste and inefficiency. This unit, a SWAT team, will be composed of top-performing and highly-trained government professionals and be headed by a new Chief Performance Officer (CPO) who will report directly to the president. The CPO will work with federal agencies to set tough performance targets and hold managers responsible for progress. The president will meet regularly with cabinet officers to review the progress their agencies are making toward meeting performance improvement targets. 
</li><li><strong>Streamline Government Procurement: </strong>Barack Obama will implement the GAO's recommendations to reduce erroneous federal payments, reduce procurement costs with purchase cards, and implement better management of surplus federal property. These initiatives will save $4.5 billion a year. 
</li><li><strong>Protect Whistleblowers:</strong> Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in government is an existing government employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak out. <strong><u>Such acts of courage and patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled.</u></strong> We need to empower federal employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance. Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of authority in government. Obama will ensure that federal agencies expedite the process for reviewing whistleblower claims and whistleblowers have full access to courts and due process. 
</li><li><strong>Line-by-Line Review of Spending:</strong> Barack Obama and Joe Biden will conduct an exhaustive line-by-line review of the federal budget, work to eliminate government programs that are not performing, and demand that new initiatives be selected on the basis of their merits -- not through a political process that rewards lobbyists and campaign donors. 
</li><li><strong>Slash Earmarks</strong>: Earmarks grew from $7.8 billion in 1994 to $29 billion in 2006. Barack Obama is committed to returning earmarks to less than $7.8 billion a year, the level they were at before 1994. 
</li><li><strong>Shed Sunlight on Corporate Tax Loopholes: </strong>The tax code is riddled with corporate loopholes and preferential regulations that benefit a handful of companies at the expense of the rest of the business community as well as ordinary families. Some large companies have managed to secure tax breaks or hide their profits in overseas tax havens to avoid paying any American corporate taxes at all. Obama and Biden will require any tax bill considered by Congress to include a Corporate Tax Impact Statement that would disclose which industries or specific companies would be expected to benefit from the new tax breaks.</li></ul></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Chief Justice Misplaced &quot;Faithfully&quot; During Oath of Office</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/presidents-oath-of-office-does.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.252707</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-20T19:11:28Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-22T23:47:00Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Should President Re-Swear His Oath of Office?President&apos;s Oath of Office at Inauguration Does Not Match ConstitutionThe Chief Justice and President appeared to be in a small power struggle. There was a small platform for the Chief Justice. The President-elect joked...</summary>
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      <![CDATA[<i>Should President Re-Swear His Oath of Office?</i><br /><br />President's Oath of Office at Inauguration Does Not Match Constitution<br /><br />The Chief Justice and President appeared to be in a small power struggle. There was a small platform for the Chief Justice. The President-elect joked about the platform for the Chief Justice.<br /><br />This compares the Constitutional Oath of Office with what the Chief Justice recited:<br /> ]]>
      <![CDATA["Faithfully" was misplaced:<br /><blockquote><br />Constitution:<br /><br />"I do solemnly swear <strike>(or affirm)</strike> that I will <b>faithfully</b> execute the Office
of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."<br /><br />Recited Oath:<br /><br />"I Barak Hussein Obama do solemnly swear that I will [ . . .] execute the Office of President of the United States <b>faithfully</b>, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. So help me God."<br /></blockquote><br /><b>H</b>ere is the interchange between the President-elect and Chief Justice during the oath of office:<br /><br /><br /><blockquote><u>Senator Obama</u>: That's for you [referring to the platform placed for Chief Justice]<br /><br />[Cheers]<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: Are you prepared to take the oath, Senator?<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: I am.<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: I Barak Hussein Obama. . <br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>; I Barak. . .<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>:&nbsp; do solemly swear<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: I Barak Hussein Obama do solemly swear <br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: That I will [ . . .] execute the office of  President to the United States <b>faithfully</b><br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: That I will execute [pause] <br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: the off-&nbsp; <b>faithfully</b> the Pres- the office President of the United States<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: the office of President the United States <b>faithfully</b><br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>; And will to the best of my ability<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>; And will to the best of my ability<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: Preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: Preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: So help you god?<br /><br /><u>Senator Obama</u>: So help me god.<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: Congratulations, Mr. President. <br /><br /><u>President Obama</u>: [inaudible]<br /><br /><u>Chief Justice</u>: . . . all best wishes.<br /><br /></blockquote><font style="font-size: 1.25em;"><b>F</b></font>ollow-up: The 20th Amendment says Bush's Term ended at noon; and Obama's term started when Bush's term ended, at noon:<br /><br /><blockquote>1. The terms of the President and Vice President <b>shall end at noon on the
20th day of January</b>, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on
the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if
this article had not been ratified; and <b>the terms of their successors shall
then begin</b>.<br /><br /><br /></blockquote>Article II:<br /><br /><blockquote><p><b>Before he enter</b> on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following
Oath or Affirmation:</p><p>"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office
of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."</p></blockquote>

]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Delivered Inaugural Address Different Than Pre-Released Transcript</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/testing/2009/01/early-transcript-final-speech.php" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/testing//2102.252651</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-20T17:13:56Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-20T19:11:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>President Obama&apos;s delivered speech is different than this transcript [still not visible, 1:54 EST]:There are several key words which will help you determine whether the information you&apos;re reading is: (1) a pre-release of the inaugural address, which was embargoed until...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>testing</name>
      
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      <![CDATA[President Obama's <a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27721638/vp/28738177#28738177">delivered speech</a> is different than this <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/read_the_inaugural_address/">transcript</a> [still not visible, 1:54 EST]:<br /><em><br /></em>There are several key words which will help you determine whether the information you're reading is: <br /><br /><blockquote>(1) a <i>pre-release</i> of the inaugural address, which was embargoed until the President delivered his remarks; or <br />(2) a <i>real</i> transcript of the the delivered inaugural address.<br /></blockquote><br /><u>Check of inaugural address<em> </em>transcripts</u>: The President <i>reversed two words</i> during his inaugural address, saying "honesty and hard work", but the inaugural address <i>transcript</i> said, "hard work and honesty." The President also deleted or added "the" in several places; and started to say words not in the original draft. [C<i>heers, applauses</i>] and hesitations [ ] included<br /><br /><u>Follow-up</u>: Which version of the transcript does the White House <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/read_the_inaugural_address/">publish</a>: The original <i>transcript</i>, or the <i>delivered</i> speech?<br /><br />]]>
      <![CDATA[The [<i>added comments</i>] are noted.<br /><br />[<i>Thank you, thank you</i>]<br /><br />My fellow citizens:<br /><br />I stand here today [ . . . ] humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors. I thank President Bush for his service to our nation, [ . . .<i>applause</i>] as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition.<br /><br />Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath. The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the oath is taken [admist gathering clouds and raging storms]. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.<br /><br />So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans.<br /><br />[<i>Comment</i>: Previous phase, when spoken, did not flow from the previous. It was read as a phrase, not spoken as an idea.]<br /><br />That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age. Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly; our schools fail too many; and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.<br /><br />These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable but no less profound is a sapping of confidence across our land - a nagging fear that America's decline is inevitable, <strike>and</strike> that the next generation must lower its sights.<br /><br />[<u>Comment</u>: Last sentence, "and" not audible nor apparently spoken.]<br /><br />[Apparently spoken: . . . "nagging fear that America' decline is inevitable . . that the<br />next generation must lower its sights."]<br /><br />Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real. They are serious and they are many. They will not [partially said "make," recovered] be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this, America - they will be met.<br /><br />[<u>Delivered</u>: "They will not [partially said "<i>make</i>," recovered] be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this, America - they will be met."]<br /><br />On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.<br /><br />On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn out dogmas, that for far too long have strangled our politics.<br /><br />We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.<br /><br />[ <i>Applause</i> ]<br /><br />In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted - for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things - some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.<br /><br />For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life.<br /><br />For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.<br /><br />For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn.<br /><br />Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction.<br /><br />This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions - that time has surely passed. Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.<br /><br />[<i>Applause</i>]<br /><br />For everywhere we look, there is work to be done. The state of the economy calls for action, bold and swift, and we will act - not only to create new jobs, but to lay a new foundation for growth. We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together. We will restore science to its rightful place, and wield technology's wonders to raise health care's quality and lower its cost. We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age. All this we can do. And all this we will do.<br /><br />Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions - who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short. For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage.<br /><br />What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them - that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works - whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account - to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day - because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.<br /><br />Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control - <b><strike>and that a</strike> [ <i>the</i> ]</b> nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. <br /><br /><u>Comment</u>: [Not audible, "and that a," "the nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. "<br /><br />The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our Gross Domestic Product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on our ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart - not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.<br /><br />[<i>Applause</i>]<br /><br />As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. <br /><br />[<i>Applause</i>]<br /><br />Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake. <br /><br />[<i>Applause</i>]<br /><br />And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.<br /><br />[<i>Applause</i>]<br /><br />Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with [<i>the</i>] sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.<br /><br />We are the keepers of this legacy. Guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort - even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.<br /><br />[ <i>Cheers. applause</i> ]<br /><br />For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus - and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.<br /><br />To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. <br /><br />[ <i>To those</i> . . .] <br /><br />[Interrupted, applause ]<br /><br />To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.<br /><br />[C<i>heers</i> ]<br /><br />To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to [<i>the</i>] suffering outside our borders; nor can we [ <u>Comment</u>: President started to say a word that started with , "<b>s. . .</b>" ] consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.<br /><br />As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us <b>[<strike>today</strike>]</b>, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment - a moment that will define a generation - it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.<br /><br />For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies. It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break, the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours. It is the firefighter's courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent's willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.<br /><br />Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends <br /><br />[<u>Comment</u>: President <i>reversed</i> the clause, and said, "honesty and hard work" ]<br /><br />- <strike>hard work and honesty</strike> [<i>honesty and hard work</i>], courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism - these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility - a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.<br /><br />This is the price and the promise of citizenship.<br /><br />This is the source of our confidence - the knowledge that God calls on us to <b>[ ] </b>shape an uncertain destiny.<br /><br />This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed - why men and<b> [ ]</b> women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.<br /><br />[C<i>heers, applause</i> ]<br /><br />So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America's birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:<br /><br />[<u>Neil Armstrong moment</u>: Not audible, or President did not say "the" before future; note, added text "[it]' part of the original transcript. Does not <i>appear</i> President mouthed the word, "the":]<br /><br />"Let it be told to <strike>the</strike> future world...that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive...that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet [it]."<br /><br />America. In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.<br /><br />Added: ["<i>Thank you. And God bless you. And God Bless the United States of America."</i>]<br />]]>
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