The National Archives recently released 9-11 Commission documents. One document was a summary of a visit to Northern Command reviewing the DoD role in domestic security.

The author of the visit report (report, memo) discussed DoD's role in domestic law enforcement.  A close reading of the memo suggests some DoD parsing. There are growing suspicions DoD plays more than an advisory role in domestic law enforcement (LE).

One lesson of the FISA violations suggests Members of Congress agreed to turn a blind eye to other illegal DoD activity re Posse Comitatus: Using combat forces against civilians in a law enforcement capacity. This is an assault on the established order.

This discussion may help illustrate what some of the still-classified DOJ OLC documents might look like.

Curiously, it appears the author included within his memo copies of text extracted from the DoD briefings. The apparent boilerplate DoD language assures us DoD will not violate the Posse Comitatus Act, unless Congress authorizes that activity.

However, we heard the same promises lies from President Bush re warrantless electronic surveillance, before the invasion of Iraq, and re habeas.

The parsing within the DoD information and visit report demands close scrutiny. Here, the author implicitly assumes Congress is involved with the domestic use of the US military. However, parsing the words suggests something else: "Indirect" DoD involvement does not necessarily mean Congress must approve the DoD activity:

Possible Boilerplate Information From DoD, Likely Consistent with Still-Secret DOJ OLC Memoranda

Visit report: Unless authorized by an act of Congress (or by the Constitution) JTF -CS will not engage in direct law enforcement activities (Posse Comitatus Act - PCA). Direct LE activities include arrest of suspected criminals, search and seizure of evidence, and investigation of criminal activities.

Recall the secret Congressional-Executive agreement to sidestep the FISA court, and bypass the established order. Initially, the court did not review the inter-branch decision to bypass the agreed-to-FISA procedures.  The system of checks and balances failed until outside pressure embarrassed the US government.

Despite assurances to the contrary, the US government knowingly violates the rights of American civilians. Law enforcement and DoD hopes to find, in the wake of the illegal activity, information it can retroactively say it had that would have prospectively have justified the intrusion.

The NSA "investigative lead" process works the same way: NSA, a DoD-component combat support arm, stumbles across information it illegally acquires; then feeds this to law enforcement, which uses that information to subsequently interrogate, harass, or target a civilian.

Congress is complicit. Congress, despite the illegal activity, has yet to conduct an adequate, comprehensive review of these assaults on the established order. It is a subsequent problem when the US national leadership are reluctant and unwilling to timely review this illegal activity. There is a solution.

This lesson applies to the 9-11 investigation memo. Specifically, this language within the 9-11 note creates "exceptions," as did the secret FISA agreements. However, as with the FISA violations, the memo implicitly suggests there are no provisions to ensure judicial review a legislative-executive decision to conduct domestic DoD operations if they jointly agree -- outside judicial review -- that the DoD operation meets specific criteria:

Likely DOJ OLC Classified Memo: Dubious Exceptions Without Judicial Review

DoJ OLC has a habit of pretending that the courts do not have a role. However, close examination shows the exceptions have been perverted, breaching the established order.

Visit report: However, in very limited circumstances, the Congress has specifically authorized DOD active-duty personnel to engage in direct LE  activities. For instance, Congress has created a specific exception (18 U.S.C. -831) to PCA by authorizing DOD active-duty personnel to arrest persons, and to search for and seize  evidence related to violations of federal criminal law prohibiting the possession, transfer, or use of nuclear materials and weapons.

The memo suggests something other than co-equal branches of government. In this perversion of the Constitution, the Court is expressly denied authority to review a legislative-executive agreement that specific DoD operations are lawful, within special exceptions, and cannot be reviewed by the courts.

Posse Comitatus Act Immunity?

Strange, we went down this path with the FISA violations, raising the absurd prospect that Congress might (someday) pass immunity legislation for DoD-connected contractors supporting domestic military operations against American citizens which violate the Posse Comitatus Act.

Congress agreed to attack the established order, then, like a drunken sailor, handed out immunity dance-cards. So much for the established order. We must discuss methods to deny Congress the discretion to secretly agree to Legislative-Executive plans which attack the established order, and, in this case, bypass the third branch.  These solutions will be packaged as a new established order.

This quote from the memo focuses narrowly on what this specific Northern Command unit may be doing. However, the denial is incomplete. The memo and the implicit DoD disclosure is silent on which other units may have been assigned supporting or indirect-direct missions, "other than" those mentioned:

DOJ OLC Likely Concluded Language "Opens" Door For DoD LE Role

This language appears similar to the DOJ OLC-like arguments which "open" the door to breaches of the established order:

Visit report: It is not entirely clear which DOD assets actually perform such activities, or whether JTF-CS personnel have ever been enlisted to conduct such operations. JTF-CS public statements are that they "currently, have not been assigned any missions other than CBRNE response." 

[Note -- CBRNE: "Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive"]

The author's speculation of DoD involvement within the exceptions deserve review, especially in light of the Member of Congress-Presidential agreement to breach the agreed-to FISA requirements:

Door "Open" To Classified DoD Activity Breaching Posse Comitatus

Note the similarity to FISA violation exceptions:

Visit report: I suspect (on mere speculation) that they have been called upon to consult/advise on the conduct of classified operations under the exception above.

However, the distinction between respond and prevent [emphasis added], leaves open the possibilty units -- other than these -- are involved:

DoD Does Not Adequately Close The Suspicion

Note the parsing:

Visit report: When I asked about supporting such operations (that are preventive in nature) MGEN Grizzile and his staff were rather adamant that they are called upon to "respond," not "prevent."

It remains unclear what operations have been agreed to; and what process, if any, Congress plans to use to review their complicity with the DoD violations of Comitatus. Congress has been reluctant to openly review their complicity with the FISA violations and other breaches of the established order. Although they should provide leadership to preserve the estabilshed order of judicial ovesight of DoD domestic operations against civlians, Congress is not likely to independently call for self-flagellation.

Hunting For The Right Question

Here is some follow up for DoD and Members of Congress and their staff, who rarely seem to be given adequate guidance on which questions they should be asking:

A. Which units were assigned to these combat-related activities which violate Posse Comitatus?

B. Which DoD component could be "indirectly" called to prevent any lawful activity?

C. Which DoD component has been called to prevent any lawful activity?

D. Does DoD view "travel along the open roads" as an exception to the warrant requirement when (electronic) monitoring, detaining, searching, seizing, surveilling, interrogating or harassing American citizens?

E. Has Congress, by inaction, not adequately reviewed the DoD role in using resources to conduct electronic surveillance of American citizens while they travel on the open roads?

F. Does DoD and the Congress view cell phone communications between traveling vehicles as different than personal electronic communications between private citizens in their own homes?

G. Which marked or unmarked vehicles have been fitted with side-mounted infrared radar (FLIR) which cannot be legally used to look into houses without a warrant, but "could be (illegally?) without a warrant" to look at non-houses (vehicles, vehicle passengers)?

Magna Charta

Let's put aside whether the US Constitution prohbitis the activity, creates an exception, or is "inadequate". We argue, if the US Congress and President say the "established order" in the US Constitution is irrelevant, then we must fall back to the Magna Carta: What does it say about the implicit DoD activity?

We conclude the requirements within the Great Charter would challenge the DoD domestic role, and create a requirement to investigate this activity. However, this US government appears to have not only ignored the US Constitution, but also these requirements within the Magna Charta:

Magna Carta On Free Travel

This shows the standard DOJ OLC likely ignored, and Congress concurred, when "legalizing" secret US combat operations against civilians:

Magna Carta, clause 42. It shall be lawful in future for anyone (excepting always those imprisoned or outlawed in accordance with the law of the kingdom, and natives of any country at war with us, and merchants, who shall be treated as if above provided) to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public policy- reserving always the allegiance due to us.

If Congress will not review this activity, nor preserve the established order, there is a legal basis for American citizens to take action: Through the grand jury process. Here within the great charter is the legal basis for a grand jury to review the alleged DoD domestic activity which violates Posse Comitatus:

Magna Carta On Timely Investigations To Questionable Activity

Magna Carta. clause 48. All evil customs connected with forests and warrens, foresters and warreners, sheriffs and their officers, river banks and their wardens, shall immediately be inquired into in each county by twelve sworn knights of the same county chosen by the honest men of the same county, and shall, within forty days of the said inquest, be utterly abolished, so as never to be restored, provided always that we previously have intimation thereof, or our justiciar, if we should not be in England.

There is a declaration in the Magna Carta that the legal requirements are binding on all, which Members of Congress and the Executive Branch appear to have ignored:

Magna Carta On Kingdom-Wide Legal Enforcement

The applicability of the established order applies not to a geographic region, but to a realm of power: The Kingdom. Today, we call this "The State."

Magna Carta, clause 60. Moreover, all these aforesaid customs and liberties, the observances of which we have granted in our kingdom as far as pertains to us towards our men, shall be observed by all of our kingdom, as well clergy as laymen, as far as pertains to them towards their men.

US Government Actions Circumvent Judicial Review

The requirements within the Magna Charta require a review of the 9-11-connected memo, especially when the wording leaves open the option to violate the US Constitution, the warrant requirement, and federal law prohibiting DoD assets in a domestic law enforcement capacity.

We've seen the US Congress turn a blind eye to habeas violations. There was no express finding that the US had been invaded nor was there an insurrection. Yet, the DOJ OLC memos and the 9-11 visit report implicitly suggest that even absent a specific declaration of Congress, the President and DoD may infer within Congressional AUMF "authorization" to conduct operations within specific exceptions.

However, this conclusion appears to have been made with the intent not to subject this decision to judicial review, and likely prompt claims of "national security" to shield the agreement from public review.

It appears the claims of "national security" and "executive privilege" are not to shield classified information, but to thwart public knowledge needed to start the FOIA process, and trigger initial review of the questioned documents, even in secret. This possible DoD activity appears to be a joint legislative-executive process to, once again, circumvent the third branch.

Questions

Evaluating Adequacy of Congressional Supervision

A reading of the Magna Carta in light of above prompts questions about the adequacy of Congressional oversight; and what methods are required to oversee Congress. One problem is the Congress does not timely respond to demands for Congressional accountability; but secretly agrees to hide the agreements which assault the established order.

H. When did Members of Congress plan, as they did not do with the FISA violations, to discuss their reasons for secretly agreeing to breach the US Constitution, and not conduct timely oversight of the DoD's ongoing domestic law enforcement operations?

I. As with the FISA violations, which contractors, military, para-military or combat units have been secretly assigned the duty of "preventing" -- not reacting to -- incidents using methods which may or may not be lawful?

From the Great Charter:

Magna Carta On Timely Justice

This shows justice in an established order must open to all without delay:

Magna Carta, clause 40: To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.

Questions

J. When did Members of Congress first learn DoD-connected law enforcement personnel  (DoD components, contractors) were, among other things:

- Conducting domestic intelligence operations outside the permitted exceptions;

- Lying to the public about their activity;

- Misleading the court about their indirect and direct involvement with stops, detention, and searches of American civilians;

- Using misrepresentations to target American civilians for administrative, non-judicial punishments;

- Hiding their connection with DoD during interrogation and surveillance of American civilians; and

- Actively attempting to prevent lawful activity unrelated to CBNRE?

AUMF

It appears the DoD operations rely on still secret DOJ OLC memos. As with the justification for FISA violations, it appears the President and Congress used the AUMF to defy the established order, bypass the courts, and "approve" DoD domestic operations using dubious exceptions to the judicial review process, statute, and Constitution.

Questions

Exceptions To Posse Comitatus Absent Judicial Review

K. What legal authority, as with the FISA violations, did DoD "rely" to conduct the above operations which violate posse comitatus?

L. How long have Members of Congress known, as with the FISA violations, the AUMF after 9-11 and re Iraq, was used by DoD and the President to 'authorize" DoD's domestic role in law enforcement?

M. Why did Congress agree to attack the established order and not permit judicial review of the Congressional-Executive agreement to bypass the courts on Posse Comitatus violations?

DoD Role in Civilian Administrative Punishment

Geneva imposes on the US, as a signatory to the laws of war, a legal obligation to ensure civilians are not subject to military law. There are two methods to impose justice: One through the legal process involving the courts; and a second, falling under the administrative process, which excludes the courts.

The concern is the 9-11 Commission Memo implicitly suggests that there are exceptions. My implication, this means DoD, acting outside the Judicial process, could work to use non-judicial procedures to impose consequences on civilians.

It remains unclear whether this possible DoD support for non-judicial punishment would violate the Geneva Convention protects afforded to American civilians. Members of the armed forces are afforded special protections to ensure justice. However, it would not be surprising to learn Congress has turned a blind eye to DoD efforts to bypass the Geneva protections afforded to civlians in an international conflict, and administratively punish civilians for illusory offenses without adequate judicial review by the third branch.

It is irrelevant Congress and the Executive believe DoD should have discretion to conduct domestic law enforcement operations without judicial review. The Magna Charta does not permit this non-judicial punishment, but requires judicial involvement with evidence and legal procedings:

Select Magna Carta Clauses On Legal Procedure

These show judicial provisions Members of Congress and DOJ OLC likely agreed would be explained away, in defiance of the established order, and secretly replaced with DoD administrative, non-judicial punishment in breach of Posse Comitatus:

Magna Carta, clause 38. No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put anyone to his "law", without credible witnesses brought for this purposes.

Magna Carta, clause 39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

However, "lawful judgment" presupposes that the issues are in court. Yet, classified or administrative hearings do not meet this legal standard. Under the Congressional-Executive agreement, DoD combat operations could indirectly support non-judicial proceedings.

The implications are stunning. American citizens could be administratively punished, denied a reasonable chance to present evidence, and not afforded a right to appeal a reckless administrative decision linked with illegal, domestic DoD operations.

Members of Congress still have to account for the assault against the established order in agreeing to unlawful FISA procedures, and their plan to bypass the third branch. We shouldn't have to threaten to hold our breath to get an answer. The Members of Congress took an oath. There's that ringing reminder of "change" still ignored from 2006.

Unenforceable Secrecy Agreements

It's useful to apply the FISA-violation analogy further. The question isn't narrowly what the Congress and Executive agreed in bypassing the courts, but what subsequent agreements they imposed to suppress evidence of the original unlawful attack on the established order.

In turn, this lesson of the FISA violations applies to the DoD operations re Posse Comitatus and their possible involvement with administrative punishments. Not only is the process flawed, but the process could be used to thwart public knowledge of that flawed, illegal administrative punishment.

Indeed, on accusation alone, DoD components could issue administrative orders with threats of arrest without a legally enforceable reason to impose that administrative punishment. Yet, without access to the secret information, the American civilians would not know which DoD personnel to subpoena to review their illegal activity in depositions.

The question is whether DoD is using an NSL-like process which bypasses the courts. It took many years for the courts to learn of and review of the NSL. Under the above nexus, it's possible the courts still have no inclination what the Congress and Executive have agreed by way of Posse Comitatus.

Confronting Member of Congress Complicity

The lessons of the FISA violations are applicable. Members of Congress with the Executive ignored the established order. Until proven innocent, the public should adversely reasonably assume Members of Congress have agreed to similar exceptions to Comitatus; and have secretly agreed to remain silent about this illegal activity.

Questions

N. Does the secrecy agreement about the Posse Comitatus violations mean witnesses before Congress could mislead the Congress in open testimony to keep secret the agreement to bypass the courts re Comitatus actions?

O. Have members of Congress, as it appears with the FISA violations, secretly agreed to be bound to secrecy agreements, not afforded access to counsel, and are subject to arrest if they disclose the DoD operations which violate Posse Comitatus and bypass the courts?

P. What is the plan of the Congress, in the wake of the FISA violations, for Members of Congress to expressly certify they are not bound to any secrecy agreement to keep silent abaout similar Congressional-Executive agreements to bypass the courts re Comitatus?

Possible DoD Support of Non-Judicial Sanctions Against American Citizens

DoD could be acting outside what the Great Charter would permit. There appears to be a new system of accusatory justice, based on secret, unreviewable evidence and false claims. Disturbingly, these secret DoD operations do not appear to be reviewable by a court of law; nor are they designed to ever be reviewed.

It remains unclear what else the Congress and Executive have secretly agreed.

The DoD operations would, in theory, create a method by which American civilian "targets" could be, on false accusation, selectively harassed, with the goal of thwarting detection of, reporting, or public commentary about the illegal Congressional-Executive agreement:

Possible DoD Support for Administrative Harassment

There are a range of possible DoD operations which could target American civilians, fall within the above exceptions, and bypass the courts. Some of these tactics could include:

- Using false statements by DoD contractors, civilians, or other US government personnel;

- Compelling American citizens during illegal detentions and interrogations to provide dubious information, under threat of arrest for "non cooperation";

- Relying on "secret investigations" known only to a select few;

- Using unsubstantiated claims and information to make material decisions about employment, access to capital, housing, travel, and other  conditions of a capital market

DoD components could, on accusation alone, pervert the system, target American citizens not because of a bonafide threat, but because DoD and others wanted to thwart detection of the domestic illegal activity.

Questions on Possible DoD Support For Administrative Harassment

Here are some discussion questions for TPM readers and the public to review; and consider whether the current Congressional staffs are or are not likely conducting oversight to adequately, publicly answer:

Q. How many DoD components use, generate, rely on, or transfer intelligence related to American civilians that is unrelated to any bonafide law enforcement activity?

R. What percentage of the information or law enforcement activity must the DoD actions and information have to meet the exception standards?

S. Could DoD, in theory, classify 5% of its information as "related" to a "permitted exception" and fall within the permitted exceptions; what about the 95% of the information that falls outside the permitted exception?

Conclusion

The 9-11 Commission investigation trip report includes speculation about a DoD domestic law enforcement role. The responses from Northern Command are not adequate. Other DoD components could be within the "permitted" exceptions, and this conclusion is consistent with what is likely within the still-secret DOJ OLC memos.

Opportunity, Demonstrated Conduct

There is nothing obvious suggesting the DoD's domestic law enforcement role after 9-11 has been adequately reviewed in public, especially given the refusal to declassify the DOJ OLC memo (dated 10/23/01) on warrantless DoD activity against American citizens.

Even if the United States Congress were to argue the US Constitution or capital system needs reform, they cannot argue there is a legal vacuum. The Magna Charta created legal obligations which would aggressively, timely review these legal matters.

One cannot argue the Constitution is inapplicable -- as a pretext to ignore illegal activity --  and also ignore the Magna Carta. This Congress, in defiance of its oath, has failed to preserve the established order, and taken us back to the pre-Magna Carta days.

Indeed, the lessons of the FISA violations are instructive. Members of Congress in secret agreed to activity which breached the established order. There is a reasonable basis to conclude that DoD components may have been involved with preventive measures, outside the permitted exceptions, yet Members of Congress know about but have refused to prevent this illegal DoD domestic law enforcement activity.

Opening Door To Debate A New Established Order

We have a financial crisis and some have questioned which economic system should replace the failed model. We have a "war on terror" and some view this Constitution as outdated and quaint.

The American national leadership appears to view the established order as discretionary. However, pre-emptive military domestic law enforcement role and action against civilians during wartime would not be permitted under the Great Charter.

Those who have an obligation to preserve the established order must preserve that order; otherwise, we must discuss a new established order.

Congress appears reluctant to review its complicity with FISA violations. To turn down the heat and corral its allies within the telecom community, the Congress handed out immunity cards. These promises of immunity have (surprise, surprise) not been subjected (yet) to judicial review.

The public should assume, as with FISA violations, Congress will thwart the inquiry into DoD violations of Posse Comitatus; and suppress information about Congressional-Executive agreements to bypass the courts. However, without a public review of these issues, the public must discuss a new established order that will ensure breaches of the established order are timely enforced.

The US government has an obligation to lead a review. Otherwise, they're sending the message they do not take the established order or the Magna Carta seriously. What established order do they support? Not one We the People agreed, established, or replaced.

It remains unclear which established order the Congress selectively hopes to enforce, ignore, marginalize, or explain away.

Our obligation, regardless the cooperation confusion rebellion of Congress against the established order, must be to discuss the remedies within the framework of a new established order.  The same was done before Runnymeade in 1215.

Members of Congress can be induced to agree to a new established order, outside the amendment process. The question is when We the People will be ready to annul this Constitution and replace it, as permitted, with a new established order.

Government is bound to the Amendment process; however, We the People have the recognized power reserved in the 10th Amendment to annul the established order and replace it through a ceremony, without following the Amendment process.

Reserved Power To People: The Power To Annul

The Amendment process applies to the government, not to We the People. The People have the option to annul the established order:

Federalist 78: Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.

The "sentiment" that the Constitution, FISA, Geneva, or Posse Comitatus are "quaint" are irrelevant. Until there is a new established order, Members of Congress cannot lawfully breach the existing order with secret agreements sidestepping the courts, FISA requirements, Geneva Conventions, or restrictions against using combat forces against civilians.

Congress needs to lead to investigate this illegal activity. However, without a decision to confront these assaults against the established order, We the People are more inclined to establish a new order to ensure these illegal agreements do not thwart the established order.

We cannot go back. We must go forward and establish a new order which shall prevent this abuse of power and similar breaches of the established order.

Responses To Comments

We the People Retain The Power of Nullification

The apologists for inaction would have some believe there is "no precedent" for nullification. That is misdirection. All powers not delegated to the government are reserved to the People. The apologists for inaction and silence cannot point to anything which We the People agreed to "not retain" the power of nullification.  We never delegated the power of nullification to the US government; by implication, through the 10th Amendment, we retain that power.

The apologists for inaction claim there is no precedent for "nullification." If that is true, why did the Framers in Federalist 78 expressly mention this option? You're asking us to believe the Framers were concerned about something which is impossible. They mentioned it because they intended to remind future generations of what is possible. Indeed, there are other retained, undelegated powers which are not expressly mentioned, ready to be used when government is oppressive and the established order fails.

Whether this Constitution or any other document has or hasn't been nullified is irrelevant: We retain the power of nullification, and can use it when the US government officials defy the esablished order, and refuse to remedy the defects contributing to their breach.

Precedent For First Use of Retained, Not-Yet-Used Power

The established order of the Magna Carta is based on nullifying what was before it; and imposing a new established order upon those who were a threat to civility, reason, and prudence.

Indeed, there was no "precedent" for the American Revolution: There was no America, there was no legal body which could point to a precedent: It was merely Jefferson's appeal to the rights of man when government proves to be unresponsive. A "lack of precedent for the American Revolution" did not mean there could be no effort to replace the established order, but required it.

Precedent has little relationship to legal power We the People retain, but have not yet used. It defies reason to suggest there is an exhaustive list of retained powers which are both not yet used, but have a precedent for their use.

Even when Congress does not assert power, it does not mean the power goes away.  Similarly, when We the People do not assert our power of nullification, it does not mean the nullification power evaporates.

Here, despite a legal obligation to defend the Constitution, US government officials refused to assert their power. Their inaction is malfeasance; our inaction is conditional deference. But that deference cannot be expected to endure when the US government officials refuse to embrace the need for investigation or reform; but absurdly assert nothing can change. Yes, it can. Change has arrived.

US Government Powerless To Prevent Nullification

The apologists would ask that we believe despite a known problem, and US government refusal to remedy the problem with the established order, that we should remain loyal to what breaches the established order; but not discuss much less contemplate a solution.

Who is going to stop the American public, seeing this reckless abuse of power and handed a new established order that will remedy these defects, from nullifying what has failed; and, as the Framers discussed, enacting a new order? The apologists for inaction accept there is a problem, but they offer no solution other than, "We can't do that."

It is an absurd notion, in the wake of the self-evident abuses and failure of the established order, or anyone to claim they are defending what has failed; but will not embrace what would succeed. These government officials are defending an established order that they can exploit. The defects must be remedied not defended.

The US government officials have an inferior, weak position. They claim to defend that which is indefensible; but they offer not reasonable position to remain loyal to an established order they will not exhaustively defend, even against their peers. Those government officials who breach the established order lose their authority to compel our loyalty to what they recklessly abuse; and they cannot compel us to shirk what might succeed.

Self-Evident Problem Without Leadership

The apologists, before agreeing their is a problem with the established order, want a solution. Yet, they offer not reason to avoid the threat of nullification, and do not propose an option, only excuses for what has failed: Passing more rules which US government officials and legal counsel expressly "reserve" the right to violate in secret.

The apologists are free to outline a plan to work within the established order, yet do not change the established order to prevent breaches of the same. That path was the FISA, and this US government thought it fitting to secretly agree to ignore the established order. 

Lawfully Confronting Joint Legislative-Executive Assault On Established Order

US government officials have no lawful authority or power to breach the established order.

Their "leadership" is to defy the established order; our leadership must be to create a more robust established order which detects, thwarts, and timely punishes similar breaches in their infancy, not many years after they become the entrenched, unacceptable status quo.

Nullification Remains On the Table

Who is demanding unquestioned loyalty to an established order which permits its own destruction; and contains no mechanisms to ensure the government officials do not secretly agree to breach the established order? Until some embrace this question and are willing to debate it, we will not get far in ensuring this abuse of power ends.

The abuse will continue when the debate removes any lawful option from the table. Nullification is on the table, especially when a new order could dilute and redelegate power, and create mechanisms which make impossible these secret agreements to defy the established order.

Discuss a New Established Order

We must discuss what new established order will deprive them of the discretion to secretly agree to breach the established order. We cannot be compelled to remain loyal to what fails as an excuse to not image what might succeed.

The issue before isn't narrowly how to "make new rules" (which get ignored); but what will deprive the government of the discretion to secretly agree to breach the established order. There is a problem which FISA was designed to address; but the US government officials agreed, in secret, to ignore. This isn't merely a legal issue, but one requiring debate: what new order is required to ensure this breach is impossible.

We must remedy any effort to thwart preservation of the established order. We must remove the obstacles to preservation of the established order through investigations, prosecution, or impeachment.

We must know why the leadership refused to investigate, prosecute, or impeach to preserve the established order, and eliminate the factors thwarting the assertion of these powers to preserve the established order. Our solutions cannot be rules like FISA which are ignored; but must be mechanism which make the breach of the established order impossible.

Those who say these solutions are impossible have given up before they consider solutions. You are part of the problem and shall be lawfully confronted for your reckless defense of what is irresponsible tyranny; and your refusal to make way for responsible order.

Our job is to realize the potential of the Founders: Established order.