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Withdrawing US Combat Forces From Afghanistan
Charting A Way Forward in Afghanistan
American presence makes the Afghans more determined to unite and fight, acting as a catalyst for additional US combat troops in Afghanistan. This is one ignored lesson of Vietnam.
The US should militarily withdraw, then work with foreign powers to selectively implement a coherent strategy in Afghanistan.
Background: This press briefing touches on the Afghan policy review; and the letter to Iran.
Consider the experience off the Somali coast: World powers, not the US acting alone, deployed military force to confront the common threat of piracy. The same approach must be considered when confronting forces of instability in Afghanistan.
Linking Strategy To Economic Objectives
Afghanistan should not be viewed narrowly through the lens of counter-terrorism, but whether the United States will work with Afghans and regional allies to create stable economic conditions. The goal should not be to fight instability nor contain or mitigate terrorism.
One error is to frame the discussion narrowly in terms of military power and combat forces. A more persuasive argument is to focus on the economic benefits of the the proposed options and strategy: A shared, world goal is to create stable economic conditions.
Instability Relates, In Part, To Afghan Decisions
One reason the US has a problem in Afghanistan is the US, by it's presence, is removing an excuse the local war lords have for fighting eachother. For the foreseeable future, the Afghans are going to fight whether the US is or is not in Afghanistan. The US presence is a catalyst to blame the US for what the Afghans love to do: Fight.
The US should not use military force to force the Afghans not to use force. That strategy defies reason: The Afghans view this approach as arrogant of the West. The Western approach asserts, in the mind of the Afghan warlord, that the US and NATO can do thing which native Afghans cannot. This warlord calculus should not leave DoD war planners confused why increased US troop presence in Afghanistan backfires.
New Excuses To Ignore Lessons of Vietnam, Iraq
One factor contributing to "progress" in Iraq is the prospect of a US departure. This prospect is lost once the US increases US combat troops in Afghanistan. Iraq can hardly be called a model of what works when US combat forces surge. Iraq is a mess. Iraqis want to leave. The error is for the US to throw caution to the wind, and do the same in Afghanistan.
The question is whether the Afghans, after the US departs, will continue fighting eachother. The US presence clouds getting an answer. A decision to increase US combat forces -- without addressing the Afghan's love of fighting -- means we're repeating the errors of Iraq.
Prospect of Instability Should Not Thwart Decisive Presidential Leadership
One question is whether the Afghans, who are fighting eachother, will, after the US forces leave, be an adequate check on threats to international stability.
That question is one for the international community to jointly discuss when developing a coherent strategy, not for the US to unilaterally decide and resolve with troop deployments.
Increasing US Combat Forces In Afghanistan Continues A Flawed Strategy
After 9-11, the United States chose the military option, identified a specific group, and legitimized that group. That option has failed. Doing more of that by way of increasing US combat forces in Afghanistan does not signal the US understands what is motivating the Afghans to fight: They are warlords, and that is their job.
However, one option after 9-11 was for the US to not identify a specific person or group to target; deny the opposition the opportunity to create a martyr; and not directly conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, but to quietly target selected threats in concert with the world.
Indeed, one error after 9-11 was to distract the focus on Afghanistan by going into Iraq; but this does not mean that now that we are leaving Iraq, that we should now refocus American military power in Afghanistan. Imagine how determined the war lords might have been had the US focused all the deployed troops in Afghanistan. We're going down that path now that we're "refocusing" after the "diversion of Iraq."
Building off the experience of the Russians, the US and NATO could have declined to en masse (to attempt to) take over Afghanistan, but worked with the world leadership and regional powers to target specific threats, and not increase Afghan opposition to the NATO campaign.
It has been seven long years in Afghanistan without a decisive result. The US largely ignored the strategic lessons of the Russian experience in Afghanistan. The US should not compound the tragedy in Afghanistan by ignoring the American lessons in Iraq.
One error is to do more of what is causing the United States a problem: Deploying American troops in the middle of motivated fighters who (a) love to fight themselves; and (b) will put aside their differences to challenge a foreign power. Additional US combat forces in Afghanistan, on the back of a failure to address the warlord concerns, lowers the chances for US success.
One lesson of the Middle East shows us that determined people will find an excuse to fight. This President says that path can change if we start to change, as we are doing in sending George Mitchell to the Middle East.
The US is not militarily deployed in Isreal. The US is hard pressed to explain why, without American combat power on the ground in the Middle East, the US is more determined to achieve a military strategy in Afghanistan using ground forces.
Without US combat forces on the ground in the middle east, the US President is assured of a promise of change. Indeed, more combat forces are not reasonably the necessary condition for diplomacy to start in Afghanistan. The US does not have to have combat power on the ground in Afghanistan before we can discuss a strategy. We argue the presence of US combat power in Afghanistan polarizes the situation, and increases the chances the same, flawed strategy will expand.
Withdrawing from Afghanistan does not mean the US does not retain the option to use select military force. The US can work with regional allies to conduct joint operations, especially when the US signals it is willing to change, learn from history, and implement a workable strategy.
The US departure does not mean the US will never return. In the interim, a US departure will clear the smoke, and force regional powers and the Afghans to decide what they would like to do to be part of the economic stabilization. The lesson from Iraq: The US cannot unilaterally impose on others what they "should" have an an interest. They will resist, as Americans have done to FISA violations.
A US withdrawal takes the US out of the driver seat, recognizes the US made an error after 9-11, and puts the responsibility on the regional powers to request or not request US assistance. As with Iraq, if the Afghans are not willing to put down their arms against the United States, it is not the job of the US to continue fighting those who are more determined to fight.
Rather than transitioning forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, the US should completely withdraw all combat forces from Afghanistan, and let the Afghans continue their fighting. Once the Afghans realize that the US provided some stability, some Afghans might be willing to work more closely with allied powers. Maybe.
Using American Power To Stabilize Promising Economic Markets
A US withdrawal and allow the world leadership to focus its energies on creating stable world economic conditions. The question is whether Afghans want to contribute to the economic stability and capture market share; or whether they would rather fight themselves over ageless disputes and enjoy continued economic stagnation. There are more Americans who care about American economic prosperity and progress than there are Afghans who want war, peace, prosperity, or conflict.
Change means doing the unexpected, withdrawing from Afghanistan, and changing our relationship with Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, and India. American combat power, planning capability, and leadership should be applied to where it will better service world economic interests: In creating stability in promising economic markets in Africa.
Regional Powers Have Responsibilites
If the Afghans want to fight each other after the US departs, the US will be able to monitor whether they are or are not selectively fighting some targets, but turning a blind eye to threats to international stability. If the Afghans cannot put aside their differences, and will not exercise self-governance, then there is no reason the US President should exhaust scarce US treasure to do what Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia refuse to do: Ensure a bordering country is not a threat to their national security.
A US departure will put the responsibility on the regional powers to step up to the plate, make some decisions, and remind the regional powers that the US is open to change, especially in admitting it has made a chaotic situation worse. The US presence in Afghanistan have removed the excuse for the war lords to fight. Perhaps this internal struggle might be the needed check on instability threatening non-Afghans.
Once the US departs, the regional allies will have to decide whether they will step up to the plate. Indeed, it may not be desirable for Russia to use combat forces in Afghanistan, but with enough change, the Russians will have to decide whether they are serious about never engaging in Afghanistan using combat forces; or whether the US and Russia should cooperate now to avoid possible instability along the Russian-Afghanistan border.
American Views of Combat
Blunt expressly stated there were three wars: In Iraq, Afghanistan, and against terrorism. Blunt's testimony before the Senate intelligence committee signals the US looks at Afghanistan as a separate war than the confrontation with international terrorists. The US should, by implication, not link a change in policy in Iraq with Afghanistan.
The task force is part of the planning process which will influence how the US proceeds with her allies on Afghanistan:
One question is whether the Afghan tribal-competition will act as a check on international instability. Putting aside the question of whether there is or is not a link between Afghanistan, bin Ladin, and 9-11, the issue is whether Afghanistan is more of a threat to the United States than to her bordering neighbors.
Some might argue the United States withdrawal could precipitate the very instability along the Afghan-Pakistan border which the US cannot afford, which would be overshadowed by the increased cooperation between the US, Iran, and Russia. Once the US realigns its strategic power relationship with Russia and Iran, Pakistan cannot point to the "war on terror" and "instability in Afghanistan" as leverage to thwart US action in Pakistan.
Rather, the US withdrawal will unmask the dynamics, and help understand how much the Pakistan-Indian confrontation is fueling instability in Afghanistan. Once this relationship is understood, the UN Security council can impose appropriate leverage on Pakistan and India to bring stability to Afghanistan.
One error is for the US to introduce more US combat troops on one hand, while seeking international support for "soft power". The two strategies are at cross-purposes. More US combat power will further polarize the situation in Afghanistan, and lower the prospects "soft" power to have new inroads.
The President said:
The people of Central Asia have seen one brutal side of American power, and an appropriate change of direction in Iraq. The US should admit that it has made a mistaken in Afghanistan and withdraw. This does not mean the US will allow the forces of instability to go unchecked. The US reserves the right to use military power against imminent threats.
Implementation
To achieve this goal would require some coordination with Iran, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics just north of Afghanistan. One approach would be for US combat forces to jointly train with these nation's combat forces using former Eastern European combat equipment; and physically co-locate US troops in Russia and Iran; and invite Iranian and Russian combat forces to conduct joint military exercises in the United States using Eastern European combat equipment.
The United States, rather than increasing US military actions and troops in Afghanistan, should re-stage those troops in Iran, Russia, and former Russian republics with the express intention of:
Under this plan, the Russian and Iranians would not have unfettered access to US technology, would narrowly use and train with non-US equiprement, and could be closely monitored as US forces in Russia and Iran would. Russia has ruled out Russian troops for Afghanistan; but this does not mean that the Russia would never consider hosting US troops in Russia if the Russians were granted similar access to the United States.
The above addresses some issues with Russia and Iran, and build off recent diplomatic openings. Russia has decided not to deploy missiles in Kalingrad because President Obama signaled there was room for adjustment on Missle Defense.
The question is less what the Iranians and Americans do or do not have in common, but the US and Iran are talking. President Obama signaled to the Iranians that the US will not continue the policy of "non talking". In response, the Iranian President indicated a willingness to talk, but preconditioned on the US distancing itself from a blind support of Isreal and for apologizing for US mistreatment of Iran.
Policy Recommendations
The US President has an economic crisis on his hands. He should work with the international community to focus on the economic agenda. Putting "more attention" on Afghanistan will create friction between the needed allies in creating stable economic conditions.
The US President should develop a timetable in Afghanistan for the US forces to be withdrawn, and redeployed with Russian and Iranian government concurrence, to non-Afghan military bases in the region.
The US should work with the Chinese and Afghans to ensure they are part of the discussion, and are fully involved with the change in direction. The US cannot afford to talk about change, but do more of what has failed.
The US should remove combat forces to help clear some of the smoke over the Pakistan-Indian proxy war in Afghanistan. If India and Pakistan want a solution to their border question, that dispute cannot be allowed to bleed into the already murky waters of Afghanistan.
Other Comments
The United States, as it is doing in Iraq, should similarly withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan. The President planned to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to adjust combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates signals the US plans to increase US combat forces in Afghanistan.
We still need a clear explanation of what relationship, if any, any forces in Afghanistan had with the placement of explosives in the WTC. As with Iraq, where there is no relationship between the use of US-NATO power and the supposed forces behind 9-11, the more emoldened the opposition will be in putting aside their differences and joining forces to oppose the increased US combat forces in Afghanistan.
Some might suggest that Afghanistan is "more linked" with 9-11 than Iraq; so it makes sense to change course in Iraq, but continue the fight in Afghanistan. This shows a lack of understanding of what does apply: The lessons of Iraq, and the risk of increasing the presence of US combat forces in Afghanistan, further strengthening the Afghan resolve to unite and drive out the US and NATO forces.
The United States cannot argue, by reducing combat forces in Iraq, this will allow the US to address Afghanistan. There is no relationship between (a) the allocation of resources on the ground in Iraq; and (b) the US government's decision to focus or not focus on Afghanistan. The two are independent. Rather, the US government can focus on both, one, or neither regardless the troop levels in Iraq. Whether there are or are not enough resources is a different question.
A better way to frame the issues with Afghanistan is to focus on whether the US should free US troops from Iraq, and transition them to Afghanistan. However, this calculus is flawed and creates more of a problem.
Imbalanced Argument On Priorities, Resources
One argument is the US cannot focus on Afghanistan because of the distraction of Iraq. This would imply the US, because it is focused on an economic crisis, cannot afford the distraction of combat operations in Afghanistan. However, if the US leadership argues "it can do both," the question is why it is putting any effort in Afghanistan while the US economy is not getting all the attention of the US government. Americans are being asked to sacrifice. Then the Afghans should not enjoy a superior position to demand US government attention "not good enough" for the American public.
American Treasury To Preserve Some Russian Interests
If the US will remains in Afghanistan, Russia does not need to use her treasury to address the situation in Afghanistan. Once Russia sees the US is serious in leaving Afghanistan, the Russians might see the prospect of instability along her border to reconsider whether Russia is or is not serious about never contributing to a solution.
Any US military action along the Russian souther border in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan must consider Russian involvement to ensure Russians are confident the military forces are aimed at instability to the south in Afghanistan, and do not, as national missile defense did, threaten Russia from one of her former allies.
Exploring Joint US-Iranian Joint Military Confidence Building Measures
Iran was willing to work with the US after 9-11 because it had a common threat in Afghanistan. There is no reason the US, by withdrawing from Afghanistan, could not help the Iranians return to their position in the wake of 9-11. The US and Iran might disagree over Israel, but this does not mean that Iran and the US cannot discuss common security concerns along the Iranian-Afghan border.
Prospect of Strengthening Chinese Military Involvement With Anti-Piracy Off Somalia
China has an interest in regional stability. She is one of the permanent members of the Security Council. If the US with her allies works to remove US forces from Afghanistan, the UN can focus more on common economic problems; and then, as the situation changes in Afghanistan, agree to implement a coherent international solution.
However, the US, by remaining in Afghanistan, is clouding the picture on what the problem is, and whether other powers should or should not step up to the plate. If the situation deteriorates, and the instability from Afghanistan further spreads into former Russian republics to the north, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, or China, then the President will have the resources to provide assistance should those regional powers desire joint action.
One of the issues driving the problems for the US in Afghanistan is the Indian goal of creating some instability along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The US troops deployment in Iran and Russia would reduce the leverage Pakistan has with India in using the US troop presence in Afghanistan in its calculus with India.
There may be regional agreements the US has with current warlords, but once the US increases combat operations, the question is whether these current relations with select warlords will strengthen, or whether the increased US combat operations will encourage the warlords to side with eachother against the US. It cannot be argued that increasing US combat operations in any country seven years after starting those operations will be viewed as a change, but more of what hasn't worked. The presence of US combat troops in Afghanistan communicates the US doesn't understand the lessons of the Russians in Afghanistan.
American presence makes the Afghans more determined to unite and fight, acting as a catalyst for additional US combat troops in Afghanistan. This is one ignored lesson of Vietnam.
The US should militarily withdraw, then work with foreign powers to selectively implement a coherent strategy in Afghanistan.
Background: This press briefing touches on the Afghan policy review; and the letter to Iran.
Consider the experience off the Somali coast: World powers, not the US acting alone, deployed military force to confront the common threat of piracy. The same approach must be considered when confronting forces of instability in Afghanistan.
Linking Strategy To Economic Objectives
Afghanistan should not be viewed narrowly through the lens of counter-terrorism, but whether the United States will work with Afghans and regional allies to create stable economic conditions. The goal should not be to fight instability nor contain or mitigate terrorism.
One error is to frame the discussion narrowly in terms of military power and combat forces. A more persuasive argument is to focus on the economic benefits of the the proposed options and strategy: A shared, world goal is to create stable economic conditions.
Instability Relates, In Part, To Afghan Decisions
One reason the US has a problem in Afghanistan is the US, by it's presence, is removing an excuse the local war lords have for fighting eachother. For the foreseeable future, the Afghans are going to fight whether the US is or is not in Afghanistan. The US presence is a catalyst to blame the US for what the Afghans love to do: Fight.
The US should not use military force to force the Afghans not to use force. That strategy defies reason: The Afghans view this approach as arrogant of the West. The Western approach asserts, in the mind of the Afghan warlord, that the US and NATO can do thing which native Afghans cannot. This warlord calculus should not leave DoD war planners confused why increased US troop presence in Afghanistan backfires.
New Excuses To Ignore Lessons of Vietnam, Iraq
One factor contributing to "progress" in Iraq is the prospect of a US departure. This prospect is lost once the US increases US combat troops in Afghanistan. Iraq can hardly be called a model of what works when US combat forces surge. Iraq is a mess. Iraqis want to leave. The error is for the US to throw caution to the wind, and do the same in Afghanistan.
The question is whether the Afghans, after the US departs, will continue fighting eachother. The US presence clouds getting an answer. A decision to increase US combat forces -- without addressing the Afghan's love of fighting -- means we're repeating the errors of Iraq.
Prospect of Instability Should Not Thwart Decisive Presidential Leadership
One question is whether the Afghans, who are fighting eachother, will, after the US forces leave, be an adequate check on threats to international stability.
That question is one for the international community to jointly discuss when developing a coherent strategy, not for the US to unilaterally decide and resolve with troop deployments.
Increasing US Combat Forces In Afghanistan Continues A Flawed Strategy
After 9-11, the United States chose the military option, identified a specific group, and legitimized that group. That option has failed. Doing more of that by way of increasing US combat forces in Afghanistan does not signal the US understands what is motivating the Afghans to fight: They are warlords, and that is their job.
However, one option after 9-11 was for the US to not identify a specific person or group to target; deny the opposition the opportunity to create a martyr; and not directly conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, but to quietly target selected threats in concert with the world.
Indeed, one error after 9-11 was to distract the focus on Afghanistan by going into Iraq; but this does not mean that now that we are leaving Iraq, that we should now refocus American military power in Afghanistan. Imagine how determined the war lords might have been had the US focused all the deployed troops in Afghanistan. We're going down that path now that we're "refocusing" after the "diversion of Iraq."
Building off the experience of the Russians, the US and NATO could have declined to en masse (to attempt to) take over Afghanistan, but worked with the world leadership and regional powers to target specific threats, and not increase Afghan opposition to the NATO campaign.
It has been seven long years in Afghanistan without a decisive result. The US largely ignored the strategic lessons of the Russian experience in Afghanistan. The US should not compound the tragedy in Afghanistan by ignoring the American lessons in Iraq.
One error is to do more of what is causing the United States a problem: Deploying American troops in the middle of motivated fighters who (a) love to fight themselves; and (b) will put aside their differences to challenge a foreign power. Additional US combat forces in Afghanistan, on the back of a failure to address the warlord concerns, lowers the chances for US success.
QuestionsAmerican Contradictions Between Afghanistan and the Middle East
- What Presidential directives have been issued to consider the strategy of withdrawing all American combat troops from Afghanistan?
- Why are the arguments -- against US combat troops in Iraq -- being treated differently re Afghanistan?
- How much is 9-11 overshadowing a coherent analysis of whether the Afghan war lords will increase their opposition to the US after increasing US combat troops?
- What views has the President considered related to a realignment of American power in Afghanistan re Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and China?
- What are the President's reasons for not discussing joint military operations with the Iranians and Russians; or deploying US combat troops in Russia or Iran in exchange for heightened security guarantees for both countries?
- Would the Russians support joint Russian-NATO military activity in the countries immediately north of Afghanistan: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgystan; and using these counties as future staging points for non-Russian forces into Afghanistan?
One lesson of the Middle East shows us that determined people will find an excuse to fight. This President says that path can change if we start to change, as we are doing in sending George Mitchell to the Middle East.
The US is not militarily deployed in Isreal. The US is hard pressed to explain why, without American combat power on the ground in the Middle East, the US is more determined to achieve a military strategy in Afghanistan using ground forces.
Without US combat forces on the ground in the middle east, the US President is assured of a promise of change. Indeed, more combat forces are not reasonably the necessary condition for diplomacy to start in Afghanistan. The US does not have to have combat power on the ground in Afghanistan before we can discuss a strategy. We argue the presence of US combat power in Afghanistan polarizes the situation, and increases the chances the same, flawed strategy will expand.
Withdrawing from Afghanistan does not mean the US does not retain the option to use select military force. The US can work with regional allies to conduct joint operations, especially when the US signals it is willing to change, learn from history, and implement a workable strategy.
The US departure does not mean the US will never return. In the interim, a US departure will clear the smoke, and force regional powers and the Afghans to decide what they would like to do to be part of the economic stabilization. The lesson from Iraq: The US cannot unilaterally impose on others what they "should" have an an interest. They will resist, as Americans have done to FISA violations.
A US withdrawal takes the US out of the driver seat, recognizes the US made an error after 9-11, and puts the responsibility on the regional powers to request or not request US assistance. As with Iraq, if the Afghans are not willing to put down their arms against the United States, it is not the job of the US to continue fighting those who are more determined to fight.
Rather than transitioning forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, the US should completely withdraw all combat forces from Afghanistan, and let the Afghans continue their fighting. Once the Afghans realize that the US provided some stability, some Afghans might be willing to work more closely with allied powers. Maybe.
Using American Power To Stabilize Promising Economic Markets
A US withdrawal and allow the world leadership to focus its energies on creating stable world economic conditions. The question is whether Afghans want to contribute to the economic stability and capture market share; or whether they would rather fight themselves over ageless disputes and enjoy continued economic stagnation. There are more Americans who care about American economic prosperity and progress than there are Afghans who want war, peace, prosperity, or conflict.
Change means doing the unexpected, withdrawing from Afghanistan, and changing our relationship with Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, and India. American combat power, planning capability, and leadership should be applied to where it will better service world economic interests: In creating stability in promising economic markets in Africa.
Regional Powers Have Responsibilites
If the Afghans want to fight each other after the US departs, the US will be able to monitor whether they are or are not selectively fighting some targets, but turning a blind eye to threats to international stability. If the Afghans cannot put aside their differences, and will not exercise self-governance, then there is no reason the US President should exhaust scarce US treasure to do what Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia refuse to do: Ensure a bordering country is not a threat to their national security.
A US departure will put the responsibility on the regional powers to step up to the plate, make some decisions, and remind the regional powers that the US is open to change, especially in admitting it has made a chaotic situation worse. The US presence in Afghanistan have removed the excuse for the war lords to fight. Perhaps this internal struggle might be the needed check on instability threatening non-Afghans.
Once the US departs, the regional allies will have to decide whether they will step up to the plate. Indeed, it may not be desirable for Russia to use combat forces in Afghanistan, but with enough change, the Russians will have to decide whether they are serious about never engaging in Afghanistan using combat forces; or whether the US and Russia should cooperate now to avoid possible instability along the Russian-Afghanistan border.
American Views of Combat
Blunt expressly stated there were three wars: In Iraq, Afghanistan, and against terrorism. Blunt's testimony before the Senate intelligence committee signals the US looks at Afghanistan as a separate war than the confrontation with international terrorists. The US should, by implication, not link a change in policy in Iraq with Afghanistan.
The task force is part of the planning process which will influence how the US proceeds with her allies on Afghanistan:
Executive Order: The mission of the Special Task Force shall be to conduct a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.Some might argue the above plan presupposes that a withdrawal from Afghanistan cannot, with certainty, reduce some of the tension driving warlord fighting. However, the US withdrawal from Iraq assumes, in part, that a US withdrawal will remove one catalyst for Iraqi militancy. Afghans appear less likely than Iraqis to put down their arms regardless whether the US President increases or decrease US combat. It cannot be argued that increasing US combat operations in Afghanistan will remove the incentive for the warlords to set aside their differences and oppose the US.
One question is whether the Afghan tribal-competition will act as a check on international instability. Putting aside the question of whether there is or is not a link between Afghanistan, bin Ladin, and 9-11, the issue is whether Afghanistan is more of a threat to the United States than to her bordering neighbors.
Some might argue the United States withdrawal could precipitate the very instability along the Afghan-Pakistan border which the US cannot afford, which would be overshadowed by the increased cooperation between the US, Iran, and Russia. Once the US realigns its strategic power relationship with Russia and Iran, Pakistan cannot point to the "war on terror" and "instability in Afghanistan" as leverage to thwart US action in Pakistan.
Rather, the US withdrawal will unmask the dynamics, and help understand how much the Pakistan-Indian confrontation is fueling instability in Afghanistan. Once this relationship is understood, the UN Security council can impose appropriate leverage on Pakistan and India to bring stability to Afghanistan.
One error is for the US to introduce more US combat troops on one hand, while seeking international support for "soft power". The two strategies are at cross-purposes. More US combat power will further polarize the situation in Afghanistan, and lower the prospects "soft" power to have new inroads.
The President said:
"My job is to communicate to the American people that the Muslim world is filled with extraordinary people who simply want to live their lives and see their children live better lives," President Obama told Al Arabiya. "My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy."The US should put this principle into play by emphasizing the economic benefits of regional cooperation, and remove US combat forces to force the regional allies to step up to the plate on their national security interests. This strategy should be discussed with regional powers, and not unilaterally decided. This is a NATO operation in Afghanistan. NATO, not just the US, should be leading the way to open the door for a regional realignment.
The people of Central Asia have seen one brutal side of American power, and an appropriate change of direction in Iraq. The US should admit that it has made a mistaken in Afghanistan and withdraw. This does not mean the US will allow the forces of instability to go unchecked. The US reserves the right to use military power against imminent threats.
Implementation
To achieve this goal would require some coordination with Iran, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics just north of Afghanistan. One approach would be for US combat forces to jointly train with these nation's combat forces using former Eastern European combat equipment; and physically co-locate US troops in Russia and Iran; and invite Iranian and Russian combat forces to conduct joint military exercises in the United States using Eastern European combat equipment.
The United States, rather than increasing US military actions and troops in Afghanistan, should re-stage those troops in Iran, Russia, and former Russian republics with the express intention of:
- Using those forces to only attack terrorism targets in Afghanistan;Understandably, the US will be concerned with the prospect of inviting Russian and Iranian combat forces into the United States. Any resistance in the US to host Russian or Iranian combat troops should remind Americans why Afghans do not enjoy the presence of US combat troops, put aside their regional differences, and continue attacking American forces.
- Remove the local catalyst in Afghanistan of attacking US combat forces;
Force the Afghans to decide whether they would rather fight themselves or the local sources of instability;
- Retaining the option to, with UN Security Council authorization, attack targets in Afghanistan related to emerging terrorism targets;
- Create a new basis for the Indians and Pakistanis to interact along their joint border; and
- Creating confidence building measures between the US and Iran and Russia.
Under this plan, the Russian and Iranians would not have unfettered access to US technology, would narrowly use and train with non-US equiprement, and could be closely monitored as US forces in Russia and Iran would. Russia has ruled out Russian troops for Afghanistan; but this does not mean that the Russia would never consider hosting US troops in Russia if the Russians were granted similar access to the United States.
The above addresses some issues with Russia and Iran, and build off recent diplomatic openings. Russia has decided not to deploy missiles in Kalingrad because President Obama signaled there was room for adjustment on Missle Defense.
The question is less what the Iranians and Americans do or do not have in common, but the US and Iran are talking. President Obama signaled to the Iranians that the US will not continue the policy of "non talking". In response, the Iranian President indicated a willingness to talk, but preconditioned on the US distancing itself from a blind support of Isreal and for apologizing for US mistreatment of Iran.
Policy Recommendations
The US President has an economic crisis on his hands. He should work with the international community to focus on the economic agenda. Putting "more attention" on Afghanistan will create friction between the needed allies in creating stable economic conditions.
The US President should develop a timetable in Afghanistan for the US forces to be withdrawn, and redeployed with Russian and Iranian government concurrence, to non-Afghan military bases in the region.
The US should work with the Chinese and Afghans to ensure they are part of the discussion, and are fully involved with the change in direction. The US cannot afford to talk about change, but do more of what has failed.
The US should remove combat forces to help clear some of the smoke over the Pakistan-Indian proxy war in Afghanistan. If India and Pakistan want a solution to their border question, that dispute cannot be allowed to bleed into the already murky waters of Afghanistan.
Other Comments
The United States, as it is doing in Iraq, should similarly withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan. The President planned to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to adjust combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates signals the US plans to increase US combat forces in Afghanistan.
We still need a clear explanation of what relationship, if any, any forces in Afghanistan had with the placement of explosives in the WTC. As with Iraq, where there is no relationship between the use of US-NATO power and the supposed forces behind 9-11, the more emoldened the opposition will be in putting aside their differences and joining forces to oppose the increased US combat forces in Afghanistan.
Some might suggest that Afghanistan is "more linked" with 9-11 than Iraq; so it makes sense to change course in Iraq, but continue the fight in Afghanistan. This shows a lack of understanding of what does apply: The lessons of Iraq, and the risk of increasing the presence of US combat forces in Afghanistan, further strengthening the Afghan resolve to unite and drive out the US and NATO forces.
The United States cannot argue, by reducing combat forces in Iraq, this will allow the US to address Afghanistan. There is no relationship between (a) the allocation of resources on the ground in Iraq; and (b) the US government's decision to focus or not focus on Afghanistan. The two are independent. Rather, the US government can focus on both, one, or neither regardless the troop levels in Iraq. Whether there are or are not enough resources is a different question.
A better way to frame the issues with Afghanistan is to focus on whether the US should free US troops from Iraq, and transition them to Afghanistan. However, this calculus is flawed and creates more of a problem.
Imbalanced Argument On Priorities, Resources
One argument is the US cannot focus on Afghanistan because of the distraction of Iraq. This would imply the US, because it is focused on an economic crisis, cannot afford the distraction of combat operations in Afghanistan. However, if the US leadership argues "it can do both," the question is why it is putting any effort in Afghanistan while the US economy is not getting all the attention of the US government. Americans are being asked to sacrifice. Then the Afghans should not enjoy a superior position to demand US government attention "not good enough" for the American public.
American Treasury To Preserve Some Russian Interests
If the US will remains in Afghanistan, Russia does not need to use her treasury to address the situation in Afghanistan. Once Russia sees the US is serious in leaving Afghanistan, the Russians might see the prospect of instability along her border to reconsider whether Russia is or is not serious about never contributing to a solution.
Any US military action along the Russian souther border in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan must consider Russian involvement to ensure Russians are confident the military forces are aimed at instability to the south in Afghanistan, and do not, as national missile defense did, threaten Russia from one of her former allies.
Exploring Joint US-Iranian Joint Military Confidence Building Measures
Iran was willing to work with the US after 9-11 because it had a common threat in Afghanistan. There is no reason the US, by withdrawing from Afghanistan, could not help the Iranians return to their position in the wake of 9-11. The US and Iran might disagree over Israel, but this does not mean that Iran and the US cannot discuss common security concerns along the Iranian-Afghan border.
Prospect of Strengthening Chinese Military Involvement With Anti-Piracy Off Somalia
China has an interest in regional stability. She is one of the permanent members of the Security Council. If the US with her allies works to remove US forces from Afghanistan, the UN can focus more on common economic problems; and then, as the situation changes in Afghanistan, agree to implement a coherent international solution.
However, the US, by remaining in Afghanistan, is clouding the picture on what the problem is, and whether other powers should or should not step up to the plate. If the situation deteriorates, and the instability from Afghanistan further spreads into former Russian republics to the north, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, or China, then the President will have the resources to provide assistance should those regional powers desire joint action.
One of the issues driving the problems for the US in Afghanistan is the Indian goal of creating some instability along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The US troops deployment in Iran and Russia would reduce the leverage Pakistan has with India in using the US troop presence in Afghanistan in its calculus with India.
There may be regional agreements the US has with current warlords, but once the US increases combat operations, the question is whether these current relations with select warlords will strengthen, or whether the increased US combat operations will encourage the warlords to side with eachother against the US. It cannot be argued that increasing US combat operations in any country seven years after starting those operations will be viewed as a change, but more of what hasn't worked. The presence of US combat troops in Afghanistan communicates the US doesn't understand the lessons of the Russians in Afghanistan.
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testing ,
Your post is thoughtful and provactive . We need to remember that the Iranian's nearly went to war with the Afghan Taliban a year or two before 9-11 . In fact the Iranian intelligence community provided hard targets in talibanland for the first western strikes against al Qi'ada in response to 9-11. I would also add that we could consider letting Turkey take the lead in a possible Nato push to include the Russians, Iranians , and even the Indians in some kind of regional solution - The regional solution framework must also include work to support the moderate Pakistan government .
Why not also offer specific carrot and sticks -tell the Afghani warlords we would buy all the poppy produce at above market value if that would advance civil society in Paktia .
And finally we need to get tough -by regional means -on the ISSI - there are elements in the Pakistani intel structure that did support the Mumbai terrorist attacks ..
January 30, 2009 5:10 AM | Reply | Permalink