We review a NYT article discussing a newly released video from someone claiming to have been released from Guantanamo.

We discuss the basis for our conclusions, and provide recommendation for the National Security Council in light of these objectives and this agenda. We assume you've read this testimony and his written responses. This information may be useful for the principals listed here.

Background: The information relates to the failed DIA effort to link formerly detained Guantanamo prisoners to alleged post-release terrorism.

The video and NYT reporting raises questions warranting follow-up.

The NYT reported two individuals were in a video. The NYT reports there is a belief that one of the men disclosed a number matching a prisoner number at Guantanamo. 

The media has reported there is a discrepancy in the name, suggesting the name change has something to do with a different spelling, pronunciation. 

Contrasting the "Two Versions" of "the Name"

The name repoted in the video: Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi

The name associated with the Guantanamo prisoner number: Mohamed Atiq Awayd al-Harbi, 333 

Explanation disclosed in the NYT report:

"The difference in names is partly due to the common Arab practice of referring to men by their kunya, an honorific, in this case Abu Hareth, derived from the name of his first son. The name Al Harbi is a tribal designation." 

1. Photo Comparison

Argument: The video is evidence. Arguably, under Geneva, the photographs taken of the "prisoner 333" are releasable to the public because they are no longer a prisoner of war. The public needs to see a certified copy of the photographs taken of the prisoner's face while in captivity. Then the public can independently compare the images the US government certifies were taken of the POW with the still images from the newly released video. 

2. Names

The names do not match exactly. al-Harbi and al-Awfi in spelling or sound. The former has a distinct "r", while the latter does not include the hard r or b sounds of the former.

The US government needs to explain why - for many years in captivity - the POW agreed to be called by the wrong name, with the mismatching sound. This difference has implications for: Tracing the names of the supposed people behind the 9-11 attacks; and the NSA monitoring done using similar linguistics. Different audible sounds mean two different pronunciations of different words are getting matched as if they are the same. This is flawed.

3. Reference to Son 

The NYT report, in part, attributes some of the change in name to a "son's name. We need to know when the son was born; the timing of the birth relative to the prisoner's timelines at Guantanamo. We also need to have independent confirmation that there is a son by this name; and there is a reasonable relationship between the supposed son and the name provided within the video. We also need an explanation why the name of the son, not the prisoner's father or other relative, was incorporated into the name.

The public needs to understand when both names were first loaded into the NSA monitoring systems; and whether the primary focus of the monitoring was foreign intelligence; or whether there was a different objective.

he disclosure of the video, names, and different spellings create a discrete point-certain when documents would co-jointly contain both names. We need to know when the Pentagon first learned of the first name; and what comparison was done with the different spellings. 

5. Speed of Disclosure

Normally, when the US government gathers intelligence, it does not quickly disclose information. The timing of the disclosure is suspect. DIA recently released discredited information suggesting more than a handful of former POWs had returned to the fight. 

The NYT report does not cite, as it should, the source of the information; nor the basis to conclude that the person in the video does or does not match the person who was photographed at Guantanamo. We haven no information about the source of the information related to who did the analysis of the name change; nor whether the explanation, even if true, stands scrutiny by competing analysts.

We have no information about the following:

- How the video was acquired

- What method, if any, was used to authenticate the video: That it correctly depicted persons

- What method, if any, was  used to establish the location the video was taken 

Part II: Detailed Comments

Article: ROBERT F. WORTH. 2 Ex-Detainees in Qaeda Video. New York Times, Sunday, January 25, 2009

This conclusion is too fantastic to believe:

NYT: "Two former Guantanamo Bay detainees now appear to have joined Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch, which released a video on Friday showing them both and identifying them by their names and Guantanamo detainee numbers."  

The basis to conclude that the person released was the same person in the video; or that the information about the leadership reasonably matches the information within the video.

It is possible that someone learned of a possible change in leadership, and assigned thatinformation to a former POW. The lack of information about the sourcing, method toauthenticate, and the basis for the conclusions raises doubts about the credibility of theconclusions, the claims, or the implied relationship between Guantanamo, the video, and actions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 

Mr. Blunt in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee referred to a third war: One in Iraq; a second in Afghanistan; and a third, not in a geographic region as is the case with the first two, but a fight against terrorism. Notice this video is not linking Guantanamo to Pakistan or Osama bin Ladin; nor with names in Iraq. This video appears to be a new construct: Consistent with the "third" war, beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. The timing of the video, the relationship with Blunt's disclosures, and the convoluted-unsourced explanation about the name change raises additional doubts about the authenticity of the information.

This is a dubious assertion:

NYT: American counterterrorism officials have already confirmed that Said Ali al-Shihri, 35, who was released from the American prison camp at Guantanamo in November 2007, is now the deputy leader of Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch.

We have no information to understand the basis for the suspicion+ He is suspected of playing a role in a deadly attack on the American Embassy in the Yemeni capital, Sana, in September.  

We have no information about how "counter terrorism officials" (whoever they are)"confirmed" that the person released matches the person in the video. If this confirmationis real, then there should be photographic evidence supporting this assertion. However,we have seen that the images of "Osama bin Ladin" do not match, raising doubts about why we should believe similar assertions about whether people in one location are the same in other locations. They may be, but "confirmed" intelligence reports have defied reason on tracing whether the video images of "Osama bin Ladin" were of the same person.  Adding to the problem is the failure of the FBI to link bin Ladin to the 9-11 attacks. Yet, this quickly, the intelligence community has done what the FBI could not do: Link al Queda to a struggle which the FBI has not been able to do re 9-11.

We would like more open discussion about this apparent contradiction:

What reasons did the US give for conducting combat operations in Afghanistan if, as the FBI says, there is no link between bin Ladin and the 9-11 attacks? Are there reasons still valid in support of Mr. Blunt's assertion that the "second" war is in Afghanistan. If bin Ladin, as the FBI concludes, has no relationship with 9-11, then who or what are the US really fighting in Afghanistan: Merely the people who took up arms because they had no direct connection to 9-11?

This gives us clues about the speed of the video release, and fantastic ability of the world community to translate, dissect, and reach conclusions: A skill the US intelligence community has not well demonstrated 

NYT: In the video released Friday,  

We have no adequate information to justify belief that the person in the video was, in fact, the same person detained:

NYT: Mr. Shihri sits alongside a man identified as Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi, who appears with a script at the bottom of the screen giving his Guantanamo identification number, 333. That number corresponds to a man known in Pentagon documents as Mohamed Atiq Awayd al-Harbi, who was also released to Saudi Arabia in November 2007.

This explanation is not satisfactory:

NYT: The difference in names is partly due to the common Arab practice of referring to men by their kunya, an honorific, in this case Abu Hareth, derived from the name of his first son. The name Al Harbi is a tribal designation.

We need more information about why the distinct "r" sounds are explained away. Also, the NYT says that the "difference" in names is "partly" due to some factors. This suggests that there were other factors which analysts have concluded, but not agreed. Please disclose publicly the other reasons provided for the difference; and let the public discuss whether these reasons stand scrutiny, or attempt to -- as it appears -- start with the (incorrect) assumption that the tape is valid, and attempt to create an explanation accounting for an error (possibly) proving the tape is a forgery.

This information shows the prisoners were not engaged in "jihad" during their detention:

NYT: Both men passed through a Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists after their release from Guantanamo. That program has been seen as a model, and the Saudi government had previously said that none of its graduates had returned to terrorism.  

The NYT report refers to a "rehabilitation" program. Whether this program was or was not successful is less important than discussing what measures, if any, the US will take to "rehabilitate" the current Guantanamo prisoners. Let's suppose, for the sake of conversation, that these prisoners were not rehabilitated. We would hope the President review these prisoners, and outline a "rehabilitation" plan for the current prisoners; and discuss what will be done -- before more prisoners are released after Guantanamo supposedly shuts down in 2010 -- to apply the lessons of this apparent failure, and ensure there is no problem once the prisoners are released. 

We also do not have enough information about the prisoners' case files, what evidence the US government had, and why they were released. Indeed, if they were being "rehabilitated" there should be some matching information in the US and Saudi files about what the persons were supposedly doing. However, there is no reference in the original information indicating what the now-released-prisoners were supposedly doing warranting their capture. This diversion was, in part, the basis to conclude the DIA disclosures were invalid.

We need to hear more about this supposed prisoner held at Guantanamo; what information the US had in the file (if any); and whether there is a logical link between: (a) what the prisoner supposedly was doing before capture; (b) what the Prisoner disclosed during detention; (c) what the video supposedly says the prisoner is now doing; and (d) what the Saudis learned during the rehabilitation program.

It defies reason to believe the US had enough information to detain this person; but not enough to continue detention; but the prisoner is now doing things that are of concern; yet the Saudis were convinced that he was not a threat. The preceding statement would ask that this person can magically change their outward appearance to justify detention, but that the US could not find this information, and the US despite control of the prisoner could not establish additional information during detention to justify the original decision to detain; yet, that the Saudis were fooled during a period of close monitoring.  

We doubt there is a reasonable link between the activity the prisoner was supposedly doing before capture and what he now says he is going to do. He didn't have enough to warrant continued detention; but enough to warrant capture; but the Saudis missed it; and yet, out of the blue, despite observations, he's now in a senior position of leadership despite the US and Saudis not linking his pre-detention conduct with activity that would warrant detention, nor with risk factors that would raise doubts about his prospects of success during the "rehabilitation." This defies reason.  

This assertion smacks of disingenuous "concern" about Israel; and fails to explain why the prisoner is "warning" anyone about a program that failed to detect him:

In the video released Friday, Mr. Awfi warns fellow prisoners about the Saudi program and threatens attacks against Saudi Arabia. He also speaks angrily about the Israeli attacks on Hamas in Gaza.

In light of Blunt's comments about the "third war", what is unusual is that the US has a video of someone no longer referencing US actions in either Iraq or Afghanistan; but is conveniently moving the focus from Iraq and Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia and Israel. This, again, fits too conveniently in the "third war".

We have no information about the "warning" about the program in Saudi Arabia:

Did the "former prisoner" hope to warn people in Saudi Arabia only; or a message to the entire world: What specific "warning" did the prisoner hope to provide -- that the "rehabilitation" program as ineffective? Then no "warning" is needed. If the program was defective, as the intelligence community would have us believe, then the "former prisoner" should have done the opposite: Publicly stated that the program was effective to mislead the government officials, ensure they with a program that "allowed someone like him" to get released; but privately planned to do the opposite and continue attacks.

This language has yet to be authenticated as original Arabic speech:

NYT: Mr. Shihri also speaks in the video, saying "by God, our imprisonment only increased our perseverance in the principles for which we went out, did jihad for, and were imprisoned for."  

We doubt the validity of the statement at the end. "Our imprisonment only increased our perseverance" is a phrase that is too concise, and does not sound as through it is a valid translation of a similar notion of "jihad" from the Moslem world. We would like to know more about the source of the translation; and how the translation squares with other mis-translations on similar concepts, but from a different country: Iran. 

Indeed, if the US detention system was true, then we should have had some evidence the prisoner -- before being released from Guantanamo -- should have documented some evidence that the prisoner was persevering. The prisoner should have put that "perseverance" into action while being detained. Yet, we're asked to believe he did nothing while in detention; did not resist to a level warranting his continued detention; fooled the Saudis during the "rehabilitation"; but can only satisfy himself by disclosing his "concern" in a video. That defies reason.

Someone who was genuinely "resolved" to confront injustice, would have engaged in activity during detention that would have warranted their continued detention. Yet, we're asked to believe this prisoner's file had no information warranting continued detention; there was nothing about his pre-detention activity in the file; and he's magically "resolved" to do something. We have no information about what he supposedly did before the detention; nor about how his current statements reconcile with what was insufficient to warrant continued detention.

He's implicitly admitting that he failed -- when he had the chance -- to confront the guards at Guantanamo; and there is no record of him having confronted the "injustice" while in US hands which should have, if they were real, "justified" his continued detention, not release. He has no credibility with the supposed audience he (supposedly) hopes to motivate. The more reasonable conclusion is that the intended audience is not anyone in the Moslem world, but the people reviewing the intelligence files and assessments about this information: Members of Congress, Senior Administration Officials, and those one-step beyond the immediate intelligence analysis. 

Part III: Judgments

We judge the following: 

- The analysts commenting on the tape are looking for reasons to explain-away a contradiction, not, as they should, use the contradiction to examine the authenticity of the video. This contradiction is important and the explanation provided is not adequate.

- The President and Vice President are being misled about the information related to this prisoner's original activity, detention activity, basis for release, and the prisoner's monitoring during the Saudi rehabilitation program

- The supposed post-rehabilitation statements are not designed to motivate Moslems to resist, but the statements are designed for a western audience

- The translation and original comments are not from an Arabic speaker, but comments from someone in the public affairs community attempting to spin a threat+ - The prisoner's comments are adverse to their interests: They implicitly argued that they did not struggle, when they were under US control, to justify their continued detention

- The timing of the release is consistent with the problems DIA has with its statements on recidivism

- The information is consistent not with a change in foreign opposition, but the new framing from Mr. Blunt. The video does not explain how the prisoner changed their focus from a geographic region in either Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iraq, to a new focus in Saudi Arabia or Israel.

- The explanations for the name change are not adequate, and have not explained why the prisoner did not use the same name during detention as he now discloses

- The US government has not adequately explained the why the photographs of this prisoner should be given attention using the same methods which cannot explain why images of "Osama bin Ladin" have inexplicably changed

- The video is designed to raise doubts about the policies in the US and Saudi Arabia related to prisoner release+ - The disclosed statements about what the prisoner is saying are not consistent with the pre-release behavior warranting (a) release from US detention; and (b) successful release from the Saudi rehabilitation program. 

Part IV: Conclusions 

The video is a forgery. The speed of the video disclosure, translation, and analysis suggests the video production company and the "intelligence analysts" are one in the same. 

The video is black propaganda. The video is evidence that there are personnel hoping to mislead the United States and US President on the current threat. 

The video is designed to undermine support for the US President's decision to close Guantanamo. The United States intelligence analysts and intelligence policy makers have not adequately explained how people who were released because of lack of evidence were not detected during pre-release reviews in the US or at the monitoring program in Saudi Arabia.

The video is intended for a western audience. This video is not a reasonable basis to believe that Moslems will be motivated to spread their attacks in Saudi Arabia. This threat existed before this video was released.  

The video was originally conceived in a non-Arabic production house. The references to Israel are not designed to communicate new information, but to add credibility to what appears to be a fabricated video. 

The video is part of a non-Arabic sales strategy timed with the US government budgeting cycle, just prior to the release of the President's budget and Committees' spring budget markups. The video is designed to expand the current "two wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan; to lay the foundation for the (still mismanaged) global confrontation against terrorism. Someone appears to view their defense appropriations are at risk with the financial bailout. Once the President finds who really created this video, their funding line should be substantially reduced, and transferred to a competing appropriation that will support justifiable policy.

Part V: Recommendations:

We encourage the President to seek through the National Security Council other views on this issue:

- What method was independently used to authenticate this video

- Who are the specific analysts who provided the information about the "reasons" for the change in name

- What study was there of the lighting of the video to establish what technical background the personnel creating this video had

- What comparison did the White House staff immediately adjacent to the President do of the images taken of the prisoner at Guantanamo; and a comparison with the now disclosed images in the video

- Why are the same analysts from the intelligence community -- who cannot admit that the "images of bin Ladin" have mysteriously changed -- taken seriously on tracing images between this prisoner's detention and the images now disclosed?

- Who has discussed whether the US might have placed within the prisoner pool undercover American agents designed to "penetrate" an illusory cell?

- What is the explanation for why the "r" and "b" were never included within the prisoners' file; why the prisoner files do not show other disparities between what the prisoner said and their "desired" name; and how does this relate to the NSA targeting protocols used during monitoring of Arabic speakers?

- When was the prisoner's son born; and how does this birth, if it occurred, relate to the disparity between the (a) name used at Guantanamo; (b) other names used; (c) changes or alterations in the Guantanamo files; and (c) the final name now used

- Who did a review of the prisoner's file at Guantanamo?

- Is there a reasonable relationship between what the prisoner supposedly did prior to original capture (supposedly warranting detention); with (a) what the guards at Guantanamo documented; (b) the subsequent files on the prisoner's concerns; (c) the criteria to review the risks of recidivism; and (d) what the Saudis concluded was appropriate for this prisoner; and (e) what the prisoner is now doing.

- Does anyone see that there are far too many hurdles for this Prisoner to have walked through, not get detected, yet he's asking us to believe that he should be taken seriously as part of the "fight" against Saudis; yet, he's not demonstrated -- during detention -- that he was actively confronting his captors or those in charge of the rehabilitation program?

- Does anyone see that this prisoner has too many convenient factors: Just enough to get detained; not enough to have continued detention; was able to slip through his handlers in Said Arabia, but now he's suddenly upset and going to do something about it. This defies reason. We should have seen something long ago, especially something that should match his original capture. Yet, we don't. Conveniently under the radar, then within 24 hours, we have a translation of a video. Far too convenient, especially for someone that had passed through many gates, and was "not of sufficient concern" to warrant continued detention.