Contrary to public statements, the US and Isreal are planning on more talks with Hamas. The goal of the Israeli operation in Gaza against Hamas is different than what we've being led to publicly believe.

We discuss the basis for this conclusion, and the real problems facing Israel at the jump.

Israel's Limited Military Goals Against Hamas: Preparing For Future Negotiations With Hamas

Israel's military campaign is not designed to be a decisive military victory over Hamas, but create a more favorable negotiation platform. Israel plans to negotiate again with Hamas, and recognizes that Hamas is not going to go away. The aim of the military action is to bolster public support for the plan to undermine Hamas' perceived negotiation advantages. The military operation is expected to backfire in the long-run and Hamas is expected to gain support within Israel, not just the Palestinian community.

Pyrrhic Victory: Publicly, Israel is focusing on military objectives; behind the scenes she is leveraging herself to exploit hope for changes in Hamas' negotiation position. Israel is fighting over relative advantages in one area; but ignoring the looming advantage Hamas will enjoy that will put Israel in a weakened negotiating position. Hamas can reasonably point to the Israeli action and argue to the public that Israel, not Hamas, has abandoned core principles; and that this Israeli abandonment is out of weakness. Israel's actions are perceived as inconsistent, and that she has changed the concerns with the core principles because of Hamas' relative position. That in no way communicates to anyone that Hamas is on the edge of collapse; but that Israel knows Hamas is a force to be reckoned with, even after the current military campaign ends and Israel is challenged to explain why it has abandoned these principles at the next round of talks with Hamas.

Israeli Political Strategy Objectives: Israel's government is making the decision to attack Hamas to, among other things:

- Change Israeli moods on defense spending
- Create a favorable discussion environment for future decisions
- Maintain support for Israeli decision not to continue with current principles or this agreement
- Distract attention from the failure to extend the current agreement
- Distract attention from the problem of failed linkage between Israeli military action/spending and Hamas reactions/relative strengths.

Limited Israeli Goals Show Hamas Expected To Endure: Israel's goal is to bolter public support, increase its perceived negotiating position, and weaken Hamas' military and attached negotiation position: Israel hopes to send the signal that there are more relative advantages for Israel than Hamas (which is not valid); and that the options have increased, thereby generating public support for the Israel government negotiating position. However, had there been a genuine belief that Hamas was not a factor, then Israel's government would not have made a decision - before the Israeli election -- to attack Hamas. Israel should have waited, leaving Hamas with less support, especially in the wake of Israeli self-evident restraint (which did not happen).

Israeli Election Objectives Factored Into White House, DoD Support: The Israel public has to be convinced of something that is understandable: Now, the Israeli government's actions are not consistent with principles Hamas and Israel previously agreed.

Hamas Relative Public Advantage: Hamas has more support than the Israeli military force can undermine. Israel has failed to adequately approach military operations and negotiations with an eye toward swaying Palestinians to a reasonable Israeli position.

Education process: The goal of the operation is to spread information about Israeli options, policies, capabilities -- When the Israelis lost to Hamas, the Israelis lost a relative advantage they had in refusing to respond to some of the Hamas concerns in the current agreement.

Israeli Political Risks: Hamas appears to view the Israeli position as fleeting; and that given time, the Israeli government's support will fracture at the edges, then collapse toward the center. It is harmful to Israel when Israel is perceived to be using military force that exceeds what is reasonable, or what the law provides. Not all political issues are linked with the principles and key concerns Israel has with Hamas.

Dilution of Domestic Israeli Support: The question is whether internal forces within Israel will see the Israel government has abandoned reasonable principles and its actions against Hamas and the Palestinians warrant a different approach. The question is how this sense within Israel will undermine the principles within the existing government and embolden other forces in Israel who view the most recent agreement as an opportunity for dialog, discussion, and shared interchange on key principles.

Negotiation Strategy: The question is what each side wants to acquire as consideration; it may have an effective
military capability, but if the capability is seen as -- and is -- ineffectual, then their negotiating position changes based on the perceived changes of relative advantages.

Political Link To Israeli Negotiation Goals: Public perceptions have been factored into how the Israelis are developing the negotiating position; and what the Israelis hope to present as favorable or unfavorable options to the Israeli public before agreeing to terms with Hamas. Israel's problem is that it taking the fight to Hamas, Israel is signaling that it's not committed to any points of negotiation, which will be seen by some as an inflexible and unreasonable Israeli position vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

Israel Use of Force Underestimates Stronger Support for Hamas In Long-Run: Throwing more money at Israel for combat operations, has no affect on whether Hamas  does or does not have a perceived advantage at the negotiating table. The problem is that Israel has too quickly moved to exploit a short-term military recover after her losses against Hamas, but has not solidified a gain to destroy the Hamas advantage at the negotiating table. It is  expected that Israel's use of force will likely exceed what Israel originally planned, but require such military force to backfire, and strengthen supports for Hamas in the long-run.

Preparing For Future Discussions With Hamas: The question is less what will happen in the current combat situation in Gaza, but whether Israel and Hamas have plans going forward that will achieve agreeable terms. Israel wants to change the basis for the negotiations, remove many of the Hamas' current options, and change how Hamas attempts to use its relative advantages during the next phase of negotiations. Israel is signaling not that it genuinely wants to -- nor believes -- it can destroy Hamas; but that Israel is required to use military force to remove the current advantages Hamas has in negotiations.

Timing To Dilute Hamas' Stronger Negotiating Position: Israel viewed the situation less stable because without Hamas' fear, the Hamas had no incentive to agree to be bound to any timelines, numbers, or specifics.

Diluting Hamas Negotiation Leverage: Israel would like to change what Hamas has by way of options; and what Hamas will intend to have. However, this is where the current Israeli thinking is flawed: By using ineffective and excessive military force, Hamas will have a reasonable basis to demand more options; and the net support for Hamas will fuel greater intention to acquire more, not less, options relative to Israel. Again, this is a sign that Israel's use of force is not out of strength, but because of limited options to counter act what Israel views as Hamas' relative advantages at the negotiating table.

Attacking Hamas' Negotiation Advantages: Israel hopes to eliminate Hamas' options on the negotiating table. Publicly, they're saying they want to eliminate Hamas. Israel knows this is impossible. The question is whether Israel can credibly include within the Hamas position the aggregate support from Hamas-linked fighters or foreign forces. The Israelis would like to widen the net to include broader forces to justify their increased security requirements, which Hamas does not agree.

Creating options for Israeli leadership, link to Israeli election: Israel is taking action now because it wants to present favorable political options to future political leaders in Israel. Israel would rather not be bound by anything that will bind Israeli leadership to unfavorable terms; but open the door to less constraints within the negotiations. Israeli elections were factored into the decisions:
- Timing of agreement within policy and objectives, events
- Speed of resolution of agreement

Israel Unwilling To Commit To Continued Compliance With Agreed To Principles: In turn, Israel would have to do something it does not or cannot quickly do to maintain balance within the current framework and principles with Hamas. Beyond simple numbers, Israel cannot explain why -- despite its military capability -- Hamas has not given up. Putting more Israel dollars into offensive military weapons and using them is not destroying Hamas or their will to fight on behalf of the Palestinians.

Fundamental Inequity of Israeli Position: The question is whether Israel is or is not asking Hamas to change its current position; and constraining Hamas to not do what Israel reserves the right to do. The question for public discussion is: - What principles of agreement were at play with the current discussion;

- Why are these principles no longer ones Israel is willing to start a subsequent negotiation
- Which principles does Israel hope to retract by using relative force to undermine
some of the advantages Israel believed Hamas had during the negotiations
- which principles, if accepted or rejected for the original agreement, would
result in a backlash if Israel continued along that discussion track
- Are the Israeli changes reasonable relative to those original agreed to principles?

Inconsistent Israeli Stance on Principles: Israel is not willing to consistently recognize a principle it once agreed to with Hamas. If Hamas isn't denied key principles, then Israel fears this action will reward Hamas. The Israeli government is doing things that, they hope, will be easy to explain to the Israeli people; and bolster Israeli public support
in the election.- Is Israel willing to pay a price in any area in exchange for Hamas willing to agree to a different principle?

Hamas Refuse To Predictably React To Israel: Israel's problem is that it may have the right to do something, but it does not have an opponent that will respect the (limited) options Israel current has. Israel cannot effectively threaten Hamas with nuclear weapons because Hamas is not simply located in a building, but it is an idea spanning many continents. Rather than attempt to increase technology or rely on greater US forces, Israel is using military force to dilute the relative advantage Israel perceives Hamas has at the negotiating table. Israel cannot explain why it did not share her concerns with the Egyptians who brokered the current agreement which expired; nor  why she did not lay out her concerns consistent with security concerns of Hamas. Israel is acting out of fear, not of genuine respect for Hamas; and this refusal to discuss the negotiating points openly is a sign of desperation, one that Hamas knows is on the side of Hamas.

Israel Hopes To Remove Hamas' Relative Negotiation Advantages: There is something about the current agreement which Israel knows Hamas has a genuine concern; and that Hamas, to remedy this defect, could reasonably do something Israel does not want. Rather than keep this option on the table, or permit Hamas to appeal to a principle that would open this option, Israel hoped to remove the basis for Hamas relying on this key principle, which Israel previously agreed. Israel is taking military action because it knows all other options cannot credibly sway public opinion or remove the inherent negotiation advantages Israel recognizes and incorporated into the original agreement brokered by Egypt.

Relative Benefits For Hamas Delayed Reaction: Israel has factored into the discussion the Hamas view of what Israel will abandon. Israel knows that Hamas will conclude Israel wants an advantage in this area. The question is whether Hamas will take the bait, and react in the way Israel wants: Excessive force against Israel. This is not likely to happen given the Palestinian history of injustice; any Hamas attack would be seen as a moral victory for the Palestinians.

Limited Effect of Israeli Military:  Israel's military capability is seen as ineffectual in destroying Hamas, or the support the Palestinians have for Hamas because of their success in achieving an agreement with Israel

Reckless Show of Force: One goal of the Israel action is to show Hamas that Israel is willing to do something. The problem is that the Israel action is not convincing; and the expected advantage in negotiations is not getting achieved. Israel hopes to create leverage, but it is doing the opposite. The prospect of future Israeli action is not intimidating Hamas, nor destroying the Palestinian hope. It is doing the opposite: Increasing the sense of injustice and emboldening Hamas and the Palestinians.

Israeli Reacting: Israel did not believe Hamas was taking Israel seriously because Hamas had, in effect, learned about the Israeli weaknesses, giving Hamas more options, especially given their perceived legitimacy through the elections.

Appearance of Desperate Israeli Action: Israel is perceived to have exploited one forum to gain an unreasonable advantage over Hamas, at the expense of abandoning principles of interest to Israel and Hamas.

Timing Because of Israeli Weaknesses: Israel attacked at the end of the case-fire timeline because Israel felt she had to respond. This is a sign of Israeli weakness, not strength. They're gambling that they're going to perform better; and that the net Hamas support will be in sufficient to bring the problem home to Israel, nor further undermine the Israeli position.

Israel Seen As Reacting Out of Weakness, Desperation: Israel's military confrontation shows Israel is weak, at a disadvantage, and that Hamas must be taken seriously. Israel knows it will have to use excessive -- and illegal -- force to achieve the advertised goals of fully destroying Hamas. This is impossible, especially when Hamas can point to the Israeli excessive force and re-constitute itself after Israel ends the current campaign. Israel knows that Hamas believes that time is on the side of Hamas, not Israel.

Hamas Sees Tentative Israeli Military Approach: Part of the decisions relate to how well Israeli forces operate, and whether they are or are not able to perform. This will affect the Israeli negotiations: Those Israeli forces that are seen as better performing will be forces that Israel can better position against Hamas in exchange for increased security requirements. This has less to do with the current peace proposal, but with the longer negotiation objectives the Israelis have. Regardless the Israeli military position, Hamas is not going to disappear; it will re-emerge even if Israel has to exhaust its resources. Time is on the side of Hamas, especially given the wider Middle East support for Hamas relative to Israel.

Contradictions Within Israeli Strategy Against Hamas In Gaza: This situation is an effort to bolter Israeli public support for increased defense spending despite the agreements with Hamas. The two do not reconcile. Israel agreed to terms; but now wants to spend more money fighting what Israel previously found common ground. The problem for the current Israeli government is to explain why it felt it had to move on the basis of a political timeline, not one that would move along genuine Israeli national security objectives.

Unconvincing Israeli, US Statements on Israel: It does not appear the Israeli's use of force is consistent with the original principles it agreed to; nor does the Israeli use of force adequately justify Israeli government retraction of those original principles agreed to with Hamas.

Disingenuous Israeli Public Statements: The question is to what extent Israel is deceiving itself to justify military action:

-          How much of the relative advantage Hamas has -- prompting Israeli military action  to destroy those advantages for future negotiations -- will become more of a problem in the wake of expected increased public support for Hamas

Transparency of Israeli Bluster: If Israel was genuinely in the fight with Hamas to achieve decisive military results, Israel cannot explain why it is taking a phased approach. Israel would be silent about its options, and not testing the waters. This shows Israeli tentativeness.

Challenge To Distract Israeli Public From Contradiction: It cannot be argued that public opinion did not support a previous agreement with Hamas. The question is whether the Israeli government will be able to explain why it is no longer able to sustain public support for the principles and subsequent agreements with Hamas. The public in Israel can reasonably question why the Israeli government does not believe it can begin -- now, without military operations -- another round of discussions with Hamas to expand security agreements.

Tilting Public Perceptions On Defense Issues: There is little question that the Israeli actions have factored into its campaign the public polls and upcoming election. This action is designed to adjust public perceptions before the election to more favorably expand Israeli perceived options relative to Hamas. The Israeli military campaign hopes to affect Israeli public perceptions on government support, the scope of taxation, and amount of necessary military spending.

Continuing Israel Problem After Attacks Against Hamas In Gaza: Israel will not have exclusive control of the relative military advantages it may have; and Hamas shows that even Israel can miscalculate, incorrectly believing it has a military advantage when it does not. The military is a tool of strategy. Israel appears to be letting a flawed strategy drive a military misadventure.