The evidence isn't there, but this hasn't stopped Indian accusations.

India is reported to be concerned that Pakistan played a large role in the recent attacks. However, there's more to the story than what's in the NYT.

Rather than sit on the sidelines and accept the Indian status quo, America could exercise leadership to encourage the Pakistanis and Indians to focus on a common enemy at sea.

Part I: Indian Interests In Blaming Pakistan

The evidence does not support official Pakistani-government involvement in the attacks in India. At best, it appears the Indian leadership and hotel managers knew more (not much) about what was going on than the Pakistani government.

India is being disingenuous when it says it opposes terrorism. India indirectly supports some anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani-Afghan border. This is, in part, an effort to keep Pakistan off guard along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

There's another side to the same coin.

Indian Objectives Of Accusing Pakistan

When India first announced its "concerns" that Pakistan was involved with the attacks in India, Pakistan said it would shift troops from the Afghan border regions.

This Pakistani-force movement would respond to the Pakistani-anticipated Indian troop movements, and bolster anti-terrorism efforts inside Pakistan's.  Also, this shift would remove some Pakistani pressure from the Indian-backed forces near Afghanistan.

Given Pakistan's (likely) non-involvement, they're probably just as concerned with terrorism as the Indians. It doesn't  make sense for Pakistan to spend energy chasing ghosts eluding the mighty Americans since 2001, while there's a real threat (possibly) lurking inside Pakistan.

India has several overlapping interests. The goal is to dilute Pakistan's power relative to India's regional interests:

1. Forcing Pakistan to move forces from Indian allies near Afghanistan;
2. Taking pressure off Indian-backed forces,
3. Forcing Pakistan to appear to choose to move forces away from terrorism
4. Forcing Pakistan to move troops to the Indian-Pakistan border;
5. Creating a distraction from the Indian domestic security situation
6. Finding a convenient scapegoat.

Part II: India Falling Into US Trap After 9-11

The quandary for the US relates to 9-11: India, unlike the US (in part) did after 9-11, is not pointing fingers based on the supposed nationality of the attackers, but which nation supposedly supported the attacks.

Afghanistan didn't support 9-11, but the US is bogged down in a nation.

The United States ignored the nationality of the people supposedly behind the hijackings; refused to showcase the Saudi-connection, but attacked Afghanistan.

The United States had a hasty response to 9-11, a bungled deployment, Congressional rubber stamping, and a mismanaged war. Quite an illusion of progress, despite no real progress.

Why are the Indian accusations, this quickly, being taken more seriously despite the "lack of evidence" linking bin Ladin to 9-11?  They're providing a response, not leadership.

Here, India must appear to be doing something because it has nothing it can really do. It has no new targets. It has a familiar border rival: Pakistan. Rumfeld did the same with bin Ladin and Hussein.

If there are new terrorist plots, India isn't openly talking about them. India's choice has been to apply the the American example after the 9-11 attacks. Perhaps they'll do better than a stop-light system to provide (useless) warnings to the civilians.

The US cannot credibly demand India ignore what the US did after 9-11 -- take time, carefully review the evidence. The US Congress still refuses to review the evidence of who placed the explosives inside WTC; and refuses to review the President's illegal activity since 2001.

Nor can Washington credibly demand Pakistan "cooperate" with an investigation into an event they (apparently) had nothing to do with. These demands sounds more like more White House "demands" on Saddam Hussein: Meet a standard, or suffer "the consequences."

It would be a shame for the United States to heed the Indian example, but make more excuses to solve the wrong problem. Perhaps, because of frustration with Afghanistan and the Taliban, the US is looking for an excuse to distance itself from Pakistan as a precursor for more US-led military efforts inside Pakistan.

Part III: Supporting A Sustainable Indian Security Plan

The right approach is to take the high road, develop a comprehensive plan, and help India develops a sustainable plan going forward for national security and economnic development.

The international community must support India in developing an audit plan to monitor it's economic-security responses to these attacks.

The error is to repeat the bungling contract efforts of the United States, and throw money at a problem without adequate audits, oversight, regulation and enforcement. Hopefully, the Indians can apply the lessons the AG-nominee learned:

Holder, via TPMM: "National security concerns are not defined only by the challenges created by terrorists abroad, but also by criminals in our midst, whether they be criminals located on the street or in a boardroom."

It will be interesting to watch how quickly the world reviews, supports, or challenges the Indian conclusions about the attacks; and compare the speed of her policy responses to the United States.

Hopefully someone can glean the lessons of America's hasty response to 9-11. It will be interesting to see how quickly the Indians pass their version of the "Patriot Act," and when the Indian judicial system to reviews it's legality.

The United States must show the world it has learned from the abuses since 2001, and provide wise counsel to the Indians: If the Indians move too quickly, they may do more to inspire people to join anti-government efforts, and, in the long run, fail to fully mobilize the entire Indian nation in the right, sustainable direction.

The worst thing for India to do would be to mobilize the nation, but ignore domestic, criminal threats in government and the financial district. Terrorism cannot be an excuse for quick, hasty movement; nor rubber stamp business contracts.

To prevail over unconventional forces, those forces must be confronted along all fronts without sacrificing national values. The trap the terrorists hope to create is to force India to respond militarily, overreach, and leave India with egg on her face.

India seems poised to take the bait, as the US did after 9-11. Despite the US frustration with poor progress along the Afghan-Pakistan border, the United States should not use this situation to as a pretext to undermine Pakistan nor violate her sovereignty.

Part IV: Regional Cooperation To Confront Common Enemy

India is putting her regional interests before credible solutions, as the US did after 9-11. Unless we see strong leadership, India is on a course of self-alienation, just as the political opposition desires. India appears to be falling in the same trap the US finds itself.

The US put aside its differences with Russia before and during WWII to confront the Nazis. The same must be done when confronting the threats to shipping.

It remains to be seen whether Secretary of State Clinton (?) has the leadership to guide India and Pakistan to rise above their regional interests and apply the lessons from the bungled response to 9-11.

Somali Pirates

It would be appropriate for the Pakistanis and Indians to agree that one of the common problems has been the abuse of naval shipping to spread instability.

Time for the world leaders to put aside their regional interests and differences, and join in supporting a comprehensive world approach, as was not done in Iraq.  Pakistan's NAVY patrols not only her 650 mile border on the Arabian Gulf, but protects her shipping.

Working With Iran

It would be appropriate for the current Administration to put aside its difference with Iran, and encourage Russia and China to view this incident as a regional problem warranting a solution, as should be done with the Somali Pirates.

If the US could put aside its differences with Iran, this would free-up (some) US naval resources (from the Gulf) to join with the Indians and Pakistanis to confront the pirate problem off the African coast. Yes, the Russians and Chinese should be fully involved, especially since the Russia proved Venezuela is within their span of military influence.

Egypt is taking action to protect the Red Sea. By de-escalating the military confrontation with Iran, Iran would be free to deploy (some) of her naval vessels to assist the Egyptians and confront the Somali pirates.

When Iranian military vessel depart the Persian Gulf to participate, the US should move an appropriate number to confront the pirates. This will ensure the US is not moving forces on an Iranian promise; and show the world we're serious about solving the most important, imminent problem: The impact to commercial goods through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Otherwise, the ships will have to take a longer route around the horn of Africa.

Comments on the Comments

This comment doesn't adequately capture the points above:

Oh-Really: "That the western intelligence agencies or President-elect Obama thinks Pakistan is the epicenter of religious fanatic terrorism has nothing to do with what India thinks."

First, the point was made (several) times: There's no evidence linking Pakistan to the attacks.

Second, there's no claim (here) that the US view of Pakistan's (non) relationship to this attack has anything to do with India's interests in diluting Pakistani power. The two subjects are unrelated to this discussion.

Third, India's claims about Pakistan's involvement have nothing to do with facts, but with their (misguided) national interests. This is the trap the US fell into after 9-11.

Are the Bush and Obama Administrations primed to treat Pakistan like Iraq, and looking for an excuse to unleash American power? Possibly.

This response does not seem compelling, and does not adequately share what we might "see" if we took this action. As a nit, one does not "stick" their head out of the darkness, but "pull".

Oh-really: "The Pakistanis like this writer, need to stick their head out of the darkness and see the light."

The right action is for the Indians to show by example what the US refused to do after 9-11.

This comment does not appear to adequately distinguish between (a) a TPMM-comment about India-Pakistan with (b) the Administration policy:

Diachronic: "The incredible hypocrisy of Americans re pakistan is evident in the above comment."

The hypocrisy of the American policy toward Pakistan is noted, and related to this topic on TPMM -- the Indian interests in pointing the finger at Pakistan; and what the United States should or should not do about the Indian response.

The question is whether the US will confront the situation on the ground based on a consistent policy toward India and Pakistan based on facts; or whether regional interests will carry more or less favor depending on the shifting political winds.