I believe there is a tendency, even among the learned, to overestimate the consequences of an American withdrawl from Iraq. In much the same way that many Americans were deluded in thinking invading Iraq and removing Saddam would be "easy", it is also easy to be overly pessimistic envisioning the aftermath of American withdrawl. The imagination tends to stick on the most fearsome possibilities, while reality tends toward a much more mundane outcome. Removing American troops from the fray would at least diminish the number of focal points for violence by one.

One great fallacy of the imagination that exaggerates one's sense of dread over withdrawl is the belief that the presence of American forces makes a big difference in what's going on in Iraq. Yes, of course American troops have an effect, but in terms of the larger picture of how the Iraqi political struggle irons itself out, American military forces have almost nothing to contribute. American troops act as both a cushion and a catalyst in the in the Iraqi political brew, but they are not a real factor in the outcome. They merely postpone the eventual resolution of divisions between interested Iraqi and regional players.

If we recognize that American military forces can do little to influence the political process that will eventually bring some measure of stability to Iraq, acknowledging that the troops mostly confuse and complicate the issues, it is at least plausible that a measured withdrawl would in fact alleviate one of the major impediments to progress.

Another delusion of American power is that we tend to underemphasize the death and destruction in Iraq when it is carried out by our troops, we see it as part of the mission, but when we envision the civil violence that is likey to follow our withdrawl it seems much more vicious and unnecessary. I would wager that to the Iraqis the violence seems pretty much equally depressing no matter who does it. We wish our troops could be there to tamp it down, we optimistically imagine that they could, but the reality is more complicated. It's important to recognize that from an Iraqi perspective it is hard to know whether American troops cause more death and destruction than they prevent, and that fact neutralizes American efforts to influence Iraq's eventual political resolutions.

The key point here is that America has almost no meaningful control over the outcomes in Iraq. Our every effort is met with stalemate and confusion, not simply because our leaders are incompetent, which they are, but also because it is a rather simple matter to frustrate American aims in Iraq, no matter how noble, and there is enough political energy among various Iraqi interest groups to continue to frustrate American efforts as long as we're there. Whatever minor influence we may exert, it is vastly outweighed by the costs of bringing it to bear and the unintended negative consequences of our efforts.

If American policymakers in Iraq were to recognize the futility of our efforts there and try to reorganize our activities based on our true strengths (not on the illusion of military power or the ego needs of a flailing president), based on the limited power we do have to make a positive difference in Iraq and the Middle East, withdrawl would be the first step. Yes there would be trouble and it would look bad, but withdrawl alone among options is a step toward eventual resolution. If there's nothing we can do, we need to stand back and let the real players make their moves. We can hope Iraqis are already tired of violence and once they are left alone they will find other means to settle their differences. We can hope that by example, America has shown the Iraqis the futility of war. It's at least as plausible as the flowers and candy scenario, in fact it's way more plausible.

There is a possibility that the Iraq conflict will descend into a nightmarish regional conflagration. But now that we've unleashed the demon in Iraq, now as we see our power to bottle up that demon diminished to the point of irrelvancy, we need to fall back to a position where our actions do make a difference, if indeed there is such a place. Unfortunately, we have backed ourselves into a corner where no matter what happens in Iraq and in the region, we have little power to influence events. We long ago exhausted our potential by leading with our biggest punch, the military cudgel, and we find our adversaries are still standing, in fact thriving.

Finally, our strategic failure in Iraq was entirely forseeable long before American bombs began falling on Baghdad. It is not a failure of military strategy we are witnessing but a failure of intelligence, both the strategic kind and the mental kind. By failing to understand the complications of military intervention into the sectarian powderkeg of Iraq, by failing to plan for any but the most improbably rosy scenarios, President Bush and his ever-shrinking army of supporters have one by one eliminated every chance to wake up from the nightmare of their own imaginations.