The Proper Historical Analogy is China under the Warlords
Iraq is starting to bear a striking resemblance to China under the warlords.
I begin with some observations on the impact of the surge:
I do not believe that we have ever needed to wait for GEN Petraeus' report.
1) To the degree there has been diminished violence, this is at the expense of the longer term potential for stability in Iraq. We arm Sunni tribals, they attack Al Qaeda first and supporters of the (Shia) central government (including us)second.
2) Not even the shape of a possible political settlement has surfaced. That is, the opaque and rambling discussions among Iraqis in the IZ seems to be part and parcel of the interminable quarreling among Iraqi exiles pre-invasion. This smells like a primitive fight for power among warlords. Not a statesman in the bunch. This is why it is laughable to be debating whether or not to replace Al Maliki - our Army is more dedicated to the idea of Iraq than the Iraqis.
3) As the British pull out, we will need to re-assign or introduce additional troops to protect our supply lines. The surge will end with us more stretched than ever. The discussion of continuing the surge may be moot.
4) I'd assert that there has been little if any progress training Iraqi police. We are left with a rump security force of trained Iraqi soldiers that are poorly motivated to fight for Iraq-the-idea.
5) The current emphasis on empowering localities is only guaranteed to further fracture the Iraqi polity. City states, warlordism, etc.
Now the outcomes:
1) a Mao Zedong/Kemal Ataturk type emerges, kills and otherwise intimidates his opponents, tosses out the foreigners and proceeds to re-ignite Iraqi nationalism. This, it seems to me, is the best if quite unlikely case. It is necessarily anti-foreigner, regardless of any ties to foreign support.
2) Iraq remains under the warlords indefinitely, a failed state and a breeding ground for all sorts of extremism. We live in the Bund (sorry, "enduring bases"), intervening when we feel it is necessary, and treat the "government" of Iraq as a convenient fiction, and exploit the country as needed or desired. This state of affairs is a further analogy to China under the warlords.
The two outcomes are not mutually exclusive. We could have #2 first followed by #1. In the case of China, that would suggest a long period of failed state - a generation or so - followed by #1.
Notice that our intervention going forward is basically irrelevant to the political dynamic. I'd say this is important. The fact that we tout this as a good thing (democracy, whatever) flies in the face of the result. Next time President Bush touts Iraqi self-determination, take a hard look at the state of Iraq and ask yourself whether he means it.
Not sure how this fits with your analogy here (which to me is not entirely clear... the analogy, I mean - not clear enough to agree or disagree).. but today's New York Times adds info re the surge (=since Feb):
August 24, 2007 8:59 AM | Reply | Permalink
China had an empire that fell apart under external pressure. Sun Yat Sen was the idealist that led the charge into the bright democratic future, but he didn't have the power to make it stick. Everyone wanted a piece of the action - regional candidates, military people, Communists, Kuomintang. China was the scene of a long competition for power, circa 1920-1946.
Iraq will end up the same way, although the contest for power may be resolved sooner. Players include Muslim clergy, especially on the Shia side, the ubiquitous regional actors (Sunni tribes, the Kurds), ethnic and religious leaders. Some players are strictly regional (Anbar sheiks), some are national and even international (Shia alliance).
We are relevant only when we choose a team; otherwise, we are in everyone's way. I wish I understood which team we support - I gather the incumbent, the current Iraqi government, is no longer in favor.
August 24, 2007 12:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not sure if your analogy necessarily adds up, especially in reference to Mao Zedong (who didn't take power until 1200 years after Qin consolidated power in China).
First, there was really no external influence during the warlord period, as opposed to what we have with the US and Iraq. Qin didn't have England (for example) selling them advanced weaponry.
Second, the attitude of warlords were much different. There was almost a gentlemanly agreement on engagement. Although the Chinese were masters of subterfuge and deception, the point of that subterfuge was to minimize the loss of life. This is in direct opposition to the current insurgency, with their seeming desire for terror and ethnic cleansing.
Third, Chinese warlords adhered to the teachings of Sun Tzu and Confucious; Iraqi insurgents use a bastardized version of Islam. The two teachings couldn't be furthest from each other with regards to piety, etiquitte, and tactics.
In my opinion, your analogy would work better using the American influence on feudal Japan, and the Emperor's crusade against the samurai.
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August 24, 2007 2:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
I won't argue your point although my recent reading does suggest China in the period ~1920-1930 is a good analogy to the state of Iraq today.
Maybe the more important point is that WWII, Vietnam, etc, are all very much off the mark if what we seek is a description of the state of affairs from the Iraqi point of view as opposed to the American point of view.
The Iraqis see chaos, and the biggest political question in every Iraqi's mind is allegiance; get that wrong, and you won't survive.
August 25, 2007 4:29 AM | Reply | Permalink