From what I could tell in my recent visit, security progress in Iraq, to the degree there is any, is due to a single development: Sunni tribals taking arms against Al Qaeda, with our help.

To me, this is only indirectly related to the surge. That is, we could have armed the tribals at any point in time, and some commentators, notably Patrick Lang, have long suggested working with the tribes. The surge of American troops may have had some impact on waverers, but even this is doubtful.

It seems to me that the focus on having the Sunni tribals get rid of AQ suggests we could operate with fewer, not more, troops. The tribal fighters become our proxies, the Afghan model.

To the degree more troops are needed, the core function that couldn't be performed by Iraqi elements is the destruction of Shia militias. We haven't really begun this yet, and my supposition is that we may never take this mission - the Shia militias are, in effect, the security forces of the government.

I'd suggest we watch closely to see if there is any movement to engage the Mahdi Army directly. To date, I believe we have been happy with what is in effect an armed truce.

If these extra troops are deployed to target Sunni militias, then eventually this imbalance will simply exacerbate the political problems ("reconciliation") in Iraq.

Iraq is starting to bear a striking resemblance to China under the warlords.

I begin with some observations on the impact of the surge:

I do not believe that we have ever needed to wait for GEN Petraeus' report.

1) To the degree there has been diminished violence, this is at the expense of the longer term potential for stability in Iraq. We arm Sunni tribals, they attack Al Qaeda first and supporters of the (Shia) central government (including us)second.

2) Not even the shape of a possible political settlement has surfaced. That is, the opaque and rambling discussions among Iraqis in the IZ seems to be part and parcel of the interminable quarreling among Iraqi exiles pre-invasion. This smells like a primitive fight for power among warlords. Not a statesman in the bunch. This is why it is laughable to be debating whether or not to replace Al Maliki - our Army is more dedicated to the idea of Iraq than the Iraqis.

3) As the British pull out, we will need to re-assign or introduce additional troops to protect our supply lines. The surge will end with us more stretched than ever. The discussion of continuing the surge may be moot.

4) I'd assert that there has been little if any progress training Iraqi police. We are left with a rump security force of trained Iraqi soldiers that are poorly motivated to fight for Iraq-the-idea.

5) The current emphasis on empowering localities is only guaranteed to further fracture the Iraqi polity. City states, warlordism, etc.

Now the outcomes:

1) a Mao Zedong/Kemal Ataturk type emerges, kills and otherwise intimidates his opponents, tosses out the foreigners and proceeds to re-ignite Iraqi nationalism. This, it seems to me, is the best if quite unlikely case. It is necessarily anti-foreigner, regardless of any ties to foreign support.

2) Iraq remains under the warlords indefinitely, a failed state and a breeding ground for all sorts of extremism. We live in the Bund (sorry, "enduring bases"), intervening when we feel it is necessary, and treat the "government" of Iraq as a convenient fiction, and exploit the country as needed or desired. This state of affairs is a further analogy to China under the warlords.

The two outcomes are not mutually exclusive. We could have #2 first followed by #1. In the case of China, that would suggest a long period of failed state - a generation or so - followed by #1.

Notice that our intervention going forward is basically irrelevant to the political dynamic. I'd say this is important. The fact that we tout this as a good thing (democracy, whatever) flies in the face of the result. Next time President Bush touts Iraqi self-determination, take a hard look at the state of Iraq and ask yourself whether he means it.