Iraq Eyewitness
I just returned from Iraq for the second time this year. I live with and work with soldiers - I am not there as an observer or a VIP. Things have changed.
Violence in some provinces is down significantly. I attribute this to the arming of Sunni tribal auxiliaries. Many tribals seem to have decided that Al Qaeda is more of a threat to their well being than the US. I would like to make three points on this strategy:
-- the fact that violence is down significantly gives the lie to the notion that anti-Coalition violence is due to Jihadis, foreign or domestic. In my opinion, violence is down because locals that were killing us before have taken our money and weapons to deal with a threat TO THEM that is both more serious and more manageable - Jihadis who kill people if their beards are too short and who disrupt traditional power structures (shaiks and tribes).
-- We are now arming both sides of the sectarian conflict, and that will come back to haunt us. Anbar is totally Sunni, so giving weapons to Sunni shaiks to deal with AQ doesn't affect the Sunni/Shia balance of forces in contested areas. Giving those same weapons to Sunni shaiks in areas of sectarian conflict does alter the balance of power. We should expect a bloody anti-American reaction from the Shia. We should also expect the sectarian conflict to grow in scope and violence once the "near enemy" of AQ has been eliminated.
-- Soldiers do not like giving weapons to people that they know were shooting at them the previous month and that are likely to shoot at them again once they have regained control of their territory. The people we are arming do not like us. This is quite demoralizing - the soldiers have to worry about their Iraqi "friends" as well as their many enemies.
Now to some more general observations.
It seems to me that indirect fire (mortars, rockets, etc) attacks on our bases are up significantly. As these harrassing attacks are essentially random, it is hard to worry about them, but the sense of danger for people on FOBs (forward operating bases) is up significantly. In the case of the Green Zone (IZ), I personally wouldn't live there unless quartered in a bunker and working in a bomb proof area. Yes, it is that bad.
I was struck by the truly crappy living conditions for many of our soldiers. These have gotten much worse as we have moved them out to smaller bases and patrol posts. It is 110+ degrees in Iraq. It is extremely dusty and sandy. It is a very unpleasant place. Why, 4 years into an occupation, do our soldiers have to live in such horrendous conditions? I visited several FOBS where the soldiers live in tents in the desert. This just should not be, in my opinion.
Finally, I am enraged at the lack of recognition of the effort being made by contractors to support our troops in the field. This is truly invisible sacrifice. We tend to want to think that because contractors are paid, it is venality that puts them in the war zone. We tend to think that because Halliburton and KBR are making pots of money that somehow all their employees are motivated by obscene profit.
I am here to tell you that this is untrue. Sure, they make better money, but they work long hours in very difficult and dangerous conditions to make that money. Over 1000 contractors have died in Iraq. They do not do this just for the money - they are ex-soldiers for the most part, helping their buddies stay alive.
What enrages me is that this effort, in starkest contrast to that of the troops, is consistently denigrated or unreported. Denigration: somehow every contractor is an immoral war profiteer. Under-reported: more than 1000 dead and presumably thousands more casualties. I truly believe that the country ought to thank those folks for their service. This is not inconsistent with despising KBR or Halliburton - love the team, hate the coach.
Great post, SLE. You've brought up many issues that I'm hearing, too. My son recently wrote to friends and family about joining forces with their newfound "friends" that were the "enemy" last month. It reinforces the reality that we're not engaged in a "global war on terror" but refereeing an endless sectarian power struggle between tribal clans, where "the enemy of my enemy is a friend of mine -- today."
My fear is that as soon as we begin redeploying OUT of Iraq and reducing our presence there -- and we will -- these same "friends" will decide to take a few hits to our backsides just for good measure.
And I applaud your courage to address the stain of profiteering that Halliburton has brought to ALL its employees, contractors and sub-contractors. I know that many were recruited from the ranks of our military and only switched horses because they were tired of getting shot at for minimum wage -- and worse yet, getting killed and leaving their families on welfare. AND they were tired of being issued substandard equipment -- like body armour. The mission is the same for MANY of these private contractors; they just have more in the way of tangible support and compensation.
The image problems these guys face, though, are more difficult to reverse, because the name Halliburton conjures up the contemptible sneering face of Dick Cheney.
That being said, however, there have also been reports of some questionable disciplinary problems within the private sector. Is this true?
Yep.
Morgan
With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plea; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.
-- William Lloyd Garrison (1805 - 1879)
July 25, 2007 11:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
A similar dilemma faces us who are uncomfortable with reliance on private security forces as the one of how to criticize force policy without being accused of not supporting soldiers. We must be able to criticize the pretense that there are only so many US soldiers when they are increased by an unreported number of contractors. We have to be able to question the policy implications of armed personnel not covered by UCMJ. And we have to wonder why we need so many private soldiers in this particular war, unlike the previous ones.
Of course most of the private employees are good people. Most people in general are good people. What is bad is policy.
July 25, 2007 11:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
Giving arms to the Sunnis who have been killing Americans to fight a minuscule al Qaeda presence (Professor Juan Cole estimates 1200 people) is just another example of the US 'divide and conquer' strategy. It can't be interpreted any other way.
The latest news is that Ambassador Crocker has an agreement with Iran to contain the Sunni occupation resistance which will of course get Saudi Arabia's attention. Sunni Saudi Arabia furnishes a majority of the foreign fighters in Iraq, which hasn't been many but may increase if the Saudis perceive an increasing Iranian influence in Iraq..
The US goal in Iraq, as it has been for generations in Palestine, is to prolong the turmoil and thus prolong a crisis atmosphere which will require continued US military spending and, in the case of Iraq, a continued US presence. In other words when you say "We should also expect the sectarian conflict to grow in scope and violence" this is obviously the US goal.
Incidentally, I believe that the US military was complicit in the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing which kicked the Sunni/Shia conflict into a whole higher level, but that's another subject.
July 25, 2007 11:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
I hear the comments on the policy that requires us to "field" a force of contractors as support and security personnel to sustain the war. It is, in fact, outrageous and I believe symptomatic of a political calculus that says dead contractors aren't shown on the nightly news, dead soldiers are. There is also the light Army high-tooth-to-tail legacy of Rumsfeld, who I believe missed the importance of a presence mission, including occupation missions.
Private security forces make me uncomfortable, but it is important that we understand their missions. There are two: personal security for nabobs and convoy security. I assume personal security is uncontroversial - bodyguards are usually a private function anyway.
The convoy security job is (very) dangerous and results in frequent engagements. This is where I become uncomfortable - if the job has a high probability of resulting in multiple combat engagements, then to me that is a military job. Having said that, the Blackwater types who perform this mission are really putting their lives on the line - no backup. I'd make them subject to something very similar to, if not identical to, the UCMJ. Our legal and regulatory processes just haven't caught up.
Things have improved in that regard - theater commanders have a lot more control over civilians in their sector, and I was told that I was subject to the UCMJ, don't know if it is true or not.
I am hesitant to attribute any sort of underlying covert policy objective to this war. I think the "keep them in turmoil" objective is plausible, as is "keep Israel safe" as is "control the oil". These may have been unstated/understated objectives. I think it far more likely that this war was the result of an irrational impulse to punish, fear and political convenience. Then on a post-facto basis we have a whole set of justifications that are simply there to obscure the initial irrationality. These are what are now being debated, irrationally of course. Shame on the administration, and shame on us.
I am amazed at the depth of ignorance on Iraq that is on constant display by American officials and the media. It is as if they are too busy to read a few books - there are lots of good ones. DOD has one that is the single best condensed volume I have read on Iraq. There are many good books on Islam, I like just about anything Karen Armstrong writes.
I noticed this phenomenon also with Bosnia. I often think that it is just really, really convenient to be ignorant. It permits relentless over-simplification and distortion without any real downside. Blind people speaking to other blind people, all holding their hands over their eyes.
Finally, I don't give any particular weight to my view of the war - it doesn't seem to me that it is terribly relevant. It is probably clear that I am not a big fan, but that isn't really worth a blog.
July 25, 2007 12:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent information and your insight is riveting. As for whether your views are worthy of a blog, I'll buttress my opinion that they are indeed worthy with your own words:
I won't apologize for the officials nor the media, but I will say that too many of us here at the bottom of the food chain are too busy trying to keep up with this rat race most must call "life."
Keep blogging.
We need people like you to inform us just as children need teachers in the classroom.
Thank you for taking the time. I, for one, greatly appreciate it!
Morgan
With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plea; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.
-- William Lloyd Garrison (1805 - 1879)
July 25, 2007 2:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
Morgan:
I didn't notice any particular disciplinary problems among the contractors. I am sure there are problems - a no-booze policy is an invitation to bootleg, especially when the population in question has a lot of money. It is a fact, though, that a commander at just about any level can just order a contractor out of theater.
It is a very difficult, austere environment. Discipline problems ought to be expected. Most contractors are unarmed (yes really!), so for the most part discipline issues will be of the venial sort as opposed to the mortal.
July 25, 2007 12:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, it is understandable, given the conditions there. My concerns are that this "private army" could morph into something more sinister without strong congressional oversight and control. Given this administration’s obsession for secrecy and autonomy, I feel my worries are justified.
Do you agree?
Morgan
With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plea; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.
-- William Lloyd Garrison (1805 - 1879)
July 25, 2007 2:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Morgan, well, yes. I think that convoy security in a war zone is a job for our armed forces. However, there are private convoys running around, I'd say most of them are private.
It is a weird situation, we have Army convoys, with Army security, and private/semi-private convoys by people like KBR that are essentially on their own. They need security, so if the Army will not/cannot supply...
July 25, 2007 4:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Just a follow up: these contractors are forbidden to engage in offensive combat operations. This means they don't kick down doors, arrest people, etc. They are only to defend themselves and the convoy. The questionable situations come about in the same way they do for the military: when a vehicle approaches and doesn't heed escalation of force (a sequence of warnings of increasing threat), when do you pull the trigger?
July 25, 2007 4:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you, I'm getting a better picture of what exactly these private security forces are actually doing. There isn't much (any?) media coverage of what their role is and how they execute it. Hence, my ignorance.
Perhaps you can help me understand something else.
Knowing that many are recruited from the military ranks themselves or are recent discharges, my imagination, albeit vivid at times, is that under a high level of stress or duress, "engaging the enemy" would be a trained response in an incident. Is it possible that these could be construed as "covert actions" due to lack of government oversight?
Is there already in place government or military oversight in the way of reporting such incidents involving private contractors to some kind of coalition authority?
Since our government doesn't seem to be tracking Iraqi civilian deaths, it isn't too difficult to conclude -- even wrongly -- that no agency on the part of our government is collecting incident reports involving private contractors, either.
Yet, to the Iraqi people, they're ALL Americans who are operating in their country. Doesn't this create a diplomatic -- if not moral -- challenge for our government and military?
Morgan
With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plea; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.
-- William Lloyd Garrison (1805 - 1879)
July 25, 2007 6:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Morgan:
Yet, to the Iraqi people, they're ALL Americans who are operating in their country. Doesn't this create a diplomatic -- if not moral -- challenge for our government and military?
Well, yes, in my mind, it does create a dilemma. I do think controls on armed contractors have increased, but you point to a more fundamental issue. If contractors are armed, there will be incidents of deadly force between contractors and local nationals, and these are combat incidents whether the actor is civilian or military.
The issue, in my mind, is not so much civilian/military but the lack of transparency. If the policy on armed contractors was surfaced early, debated, and appropriate legislation were in place, then it could be said fairly that we as a country approved of the use of armed contractors in this sort of role and put in place the needed regulation.
That didn't happen, and we have been playing catch-up. There are reasons for this, ally bad: 1) convenience: why make policy if you think it isn't required?, 2) ideology: corporations fill a need and shouldn't be subject to regulation, 3) efficiency: regulation constrains flexibility
A civilian must have official approval to be armed. This approval is requested by a local commander, reviewed by higher echelon, and my understanding is that the Iraqi government itself issues the permit. So there is a degree of regulation, but none of these procedures has been debated or discussed at a national level.
Myself, I didn't feel my job required a weapon and I do not feel that the limited training I might receive would be sufficient for anything other than being able to defend myself as a last resort. Having said that, circumstances change rapidly, and I will tell you that when you are in a camp where all the soldiers are armed, presumably because the threat is that high, not having a weapon is uncomfortable.
It is not a normal situation for Americans in Iraq. It is a war zone, and all foreigners are targets. There are plenty of people that will kill you on sight. There are choices that must be made that in my mind are much more difficult. I would never even consider carrying a weapon here; I would in Iraq.
July 26, 2007 4:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
The two jobs security contractors do were handled by US forces in WW II, Vietnam, and Korea, and mostly in Gulf I (I think). I'd prefer that---if there is engagement it should be all of us, so to speak, acting. It should not be just business. Maybe US forces should offer what Blackwater pays as combat bonus. Not, however, to the generals; incentives aren't needed.
It's not mercenaries that bother me---the Swiss were reliable, as were the Hessians (usually), and they were subject to normal command structure.
July 25, 2007 11:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, I think that is right. It should not just be business, and I do believe that the two security functions were performed by military personnel in the past.
As you say, the fundamental issue is transparency and regulation.
I have heard that Blackwater, as an example, has recruiting standards that have varied over time. There is a big difference between recruiting ex-soldiers with long experience in combat formations and recruiting... others. This is the sort of thing that could usefully be regulated by a government.
There is an important question: what is the writ of the US government? After all, my armed personnel are not operating in the US, may not be contracted to the government, and often aren't American. I don't have any answers there.
July 26, 2007 4:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
Let's make it simple. They're either under the jurisdiction of the United States as the de facto occupier, and that's the end of the discussion.
Or they're under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi government, or whoever claims to be representing it at the moment.
One or the other. Does that help?
July 26, 2007 8:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Valdron, it kind of helps. I assume that ultimate jurisdiction is actually with the Iraqis, but this only begs the question as to whether the US has a legal role, and, if so, what is that role? Is this determined bilaterally or unilaterally?
July 26, 2007 6:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'd also like to make the point that conditions for private armed contractors and soldiers are quite different.
Soldiers have backup - attack aviation, quick reaction forces, etc. - that civilians do not have. Soldiers have equipment - vehicles and weapons - that contractors do not have. Many soldiers wouldn't do the convoy security job under civilian conditions - too dangerous.
I met some pretty hardened British ex-soldiers who had done convoy security as contractors for years in Iraq. They were on their way out. I asked whether it was for R&R; they shook their heads in unison and said: "no, we're leaving, it is too dangerous".
My point is that we shouldn't equate the job of a soldier with the function and conditions of a private contractor. There are significant differences, for better and worse. Contractors are paid more, generally, although the difference may not be as large as supposed in some cases. Soldiers have the comfort of operating within the structure of a large armed force that supplies support.
July 26, 2007 4:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
SLE: This is a great discussion and I appreciate you enlightening us on an issue that needs to be aired -- especially if our goernment is planning to "occupy" Iraq through 2009. I must leave town for a week and I would like to resume it when I return.
Howard? Tom? Glenn? Deanie? Suse? Tricia? Anyone else? Love to see you weigh in here, too. I'm sure you have questions and insights. And unlike the senate, we have a very cooperative "witness" in SLE.
Until then, everyone stay safe.
Morgan
With reasonable men I will reason; with humane men I will plea; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.
-- William Lloyd Garrison (1805 - 1879)
July 26, 2007 12:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
SLE's raising the issue of outsourcing security touches on a deep issue. Do we want effectiveness at expense of shared sacrifice? I hated the draft when I was a target, and the volunteers are a better-trained force, but I don't think draftees are guaranteed to be poor soldiers. If they underwent the extent of training now employed, they would be a very disciplined and effective force, I think. We have continued to learn about training since WW II and Vietnam.
Precisely because a draft would be unpopular it would ask the deep question---is force just a tool or is it a grave action that should involve the whole country? If the Army consisted mostly of draftees, can you imagine us being in Iraq?
July 26, 2007 12:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
Precisely because a draft would be unpopular it would ask the deep question---is force just a tool or is it a grave action that should involve the whole country? Tom Wright
I think the shared sacrifice issue is one that enrages many soldiers; their view is increasingly that they are a "sacrifice population". A draft, in my mind, wouldn't work. Our soldiers now spend a year just training for Iraq, after all their basic training, MOS (military occupational specialty) training, etc. To me, the desired amount of training is inconsistent with a politically sustainable (if there is such a thing) draft.
Having said this, it would be very easy to create shared sacrifice. Vote monies on soldiers' welfare issues and vote taxes to pay for this. A President that talks about full engagement by everyone and suggests volunteer work that would be important - at the VA, etc. Leadership that attends funerals and other memorials, and encourages public expressions of grief (and rage) over soldier deaths. Posters, etc reminding people we are at war, depicting our enemies and our friends. We do have friends, and shouldn't, in my mind, minimize their contributions. I worked with Estonian and Macedonian soldiers who put their lives on the line every day. Excellent, tough soldiers much appreciated by our own.
The difficulty with this sort of mobilization: things are not so clear cut. Who is the enemy? Politically, just plastering UBL around town doesn't... focus on Iraq. In fact, it would tend to remind people that UBL isn't in Iraq, and never was in Iraq. Plastering the face of lesser lights of AQ in Mesopotamia on the wall would tend to result in the identification of all Muslims, at least all Arab Muslims, as the enemy. Putting up Moqtada as the poster boy would create confusion - how many different sorts of enemies do we have, and where was Moqtada in 2001? (Answer: he was nowhere, although the al Sadr family had/has a lot of prestige).
July 27, 2007 6:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
The paradox at the heart of this---if the effort involved more people it wouldn't have happened in the first place.
July 27, 2007 8:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree absolutely, especially if we're talking people from upper income strata...
July 27, 2007 2:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
To me, the desired amount of training is inconsistent with a politically sustainable (if there is such a thing) draft.
Speaking of a draft, as I have a few times in the past, I’d like to point out the following.
To say that instituting a draft would get the American public much more involved in questioning the “rightness or wrongness” of the current or future wars, and that that would be a good thing, is not the same thing as saying that a draft is desirable or would produce as good of an army as the one we entered Iraq with. It is not necessarily to offer a viable option but is just to point out a truth about the American public.
Having a draft would cause a very much higher percentage of the public to pay attention and form an opinion and would also push many who are now complacent to act on that opinion.
To quibble a bit about the effectiveness of a drafted soldier, I would say that if the country had a nucleus of highly trained career soldiers it would then be possible to expand the ranks greatly by filling them in with draftees that had maybe ten months training. That would leave those draftees a year to contribute to the war effort. The army thus formed might not be quite as effective on a man by man basis but would almost certainly be better than one made up of soldiers on their second, third, or fourth combat tour.
As to a draft being politically sustainable I would say that IF we were in a war that the American public considered vital to win, one that we considered posed an existential threat to our democracy and way of life, and it could be seen that we needed much more cannon fodder, our government would impose the draft in a heartbeat and the public would support it.
Having said this, it would be very easy to create shared sacrifice.
My cynical opinion of this is that while the soldiers would appreciate it if the public shared in the sacrifice for the war the result of that sharing would be that the public would have been more overwhelmingly against the war even sooner. The hawks and chicken hawks try to keep all the sacrifice on the soldiers for that very reason. They want war.
In the case of the Green Zone (IZ), I personally wouldn't live there unless quartered in a bunker and working in a bomb proof area. Yes, it is that bad.
I an curious as to what sort of area you did stay in and what sort of security/protection you had that you felt was better than in the Green Zone.
I appreciate your first hand perspective and hope you keep contributing.
July 27, 2007 11:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
Very nice comments, and I do agree with the comments on the draft and shared sacrifice. The pressure would be overwhelming to leave if we actually knew those soldiers on the evening news, or identified with them in ways that didn't permit a channel flip.
Security on a FOB is simple. Rockets and mortars (indirect fire) are essentially random, harrassing attacks. I am not saying the bad guys don't try to aim, but the weapons are pretty crude and they don't have time to register properly.
Given that, a FOB is more secure if
(1) It is large, so that people and living areas are dispersed.
(2) Defense mechanisms - JLENS, CRAM, etc - are set up and used
(3) You shoot back asap and disrupt the attackers aggressively.
The Green Zone is small, has the defensive measures in place, but you cannot use (will not use) artillery in the city, and that is usually the fastest way to respond.
The Green Zone also is "dialed in" - there are security leaks as part of the security is Iraqi.
The Green Zone is an especially lucrative target - high value relative to mortaring a FOB where you know the response will be rapid and lethal, and the likelihood of getting headlines is low.
I stayed in a pod most everywhere, occasionally a tent. Pods are thin-walled trailers, like a mobile home. Usually there are blast barriers - T-walls, HESCO barriers or sandbags on the sides of the pod, but nothing overhead. A direct hit would be devastating, but the blast barriers provide a degree of protection from nearby impacts.
None of this matters much when you are outside - nobody wears armor unless required. Too damn hot and heavy.
Most indirect simply doesn't hit anything, but that is luck of the draw. People were killed and wounded from it on the FOBs I was on while I was there, just not very many relative to IEDs and SAF (small arms fire) outside the FOB.
July 27, 2007 3:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
SLE:
Always interesting to hear from people who have been in-country. For those who have questions about what laws apply and that sort of thing, you may find some of the info at blackwaterblogger.com to be helpful. If not, it might at least be amusing. Cheers,
July 27, 2007 10:58 PM | Reply | Permalink