From what I could tell in my recent visit, security progress in Iraq, to the degree there is any, is due to a single development: Sunni tribals taking arms against Al Qaeda, with our help.

To me, this is only indirectly related to the surge. That is, we could have armed the tribals at any point in time, and some commentators, notably Patrick Lang, have long suggested working with the tribes. The surge of American troops may have had some impact on waverers, but even this is doubtful.

It seems to me that the focus on having the Sunni tribals get rid of AQ suggests we could operate with fewer, not more, troops. The tribal fighters become our proxies, the Afghan model.

To the degree more troops are needed, the core function that couldn't be performed by Iraqi elements is the destruction of Shia militias. We haven't really begun this yet, and my supposition is that we may never take this mission - the Shia militias are, in effect, the security forces of the government.

I'd suggest we watch closely to see if there is any movement to engage the Mahdi Army directly. To date, I believe we have been happy with what is in effect an armed truce.

If these extra troops are deployed to target Sunni militias, then eventually this imbalance will simply exacerbate the political problems ("reconciliation") in Iraq.

Iraq is starting to bear a striking resemblance to China under the warlords.

I begin with some observations on the impact of the surge:

I do not believe that we have ever needed to wait for GEN Petraeus' report.

1) To the degree there has been diminished violence, this is at the expense of the longer term potential for stability in Iraq. We arm Sunni tribals, they attack Al Qaeda first and supporters of the (Shia) central government (including us)second.

2) Not even the shape of a possible political settlement has surfaced. That is, the opaque and rambling discussions among Iraqis in the IZ seems to be part and parcel of the interminable quarreling among Iraqi exiles pre-invasion. This smells like a primitive fight for power among warlords. Not a statesman in the bunch. This is why it is laughable to be debating whether or not to replace Al Maliki - our Army is more dedicated to the idea of Iraq than the Iraqis.

3) As the British pull out, we will need to re-assign or introduce additional troops to protect our supply lines. The surge will end with us more stretched than ever. The discussion of continuing the surge may be moot.

4) I'd assert that there has been little if any progress training Iraqi police. We are left with a rump security force of trained Iraqi soldiers that are poorly motivated to fight for Iraq-the-idea.

5) The current emphasis on empowering localities is only guaranteed to further fracture the Iraqi polity. City states, warlordism, etc.

Now the outcomes:

1) a Mao Zedong/Kemal Ataturk type emerges, kills and otherwise intimidates his opponents, tosses out the foreigners and proceeds to re-ignite Iraqi nationalism. This, it seems to me, is the best if quite unlikely case. It is necessarily anti-foreigner, regardless of any ties to foreign support.

2) Iraq remains under the warlords indefinitely, a failed state and a breeding ground for all sorts of extremism. We live in the Bund (sorry, "enduring bases"), intervening when we feel it is necessary, and treat the "government" of Iraq as a convenient fiction, and exploit the country as needed or desired. This state of affairs is a further analogy to China under the warlords.

The two outcomes are not mutually exclusive. We could have #2 first followed by #1. In the case of China, that would suggest a long period of failed state - a generation or so - followed by #1.

Notice that our intervention going forward is basically irrelevant to the political dynamic. I'd say this is important. The fact that we tout this as a good thing (democracy, whatever) flies in the face of the result. Next time President Bush touts Iraqi self-determination, take a hard look at the state of Iraq and ask yourself whether he means it.

We need to take stock of our national interest, and proceed accordingly.

1) Immediately start a national effort to obtain energy independence. I see raising CAFE standards, promoting nuclear power, promoting alternative fuels, etc. All of it, right now.

2) Tell the Iraqis we will begin pulling out our combat troops by December. Rather than using deadlines, fixed residual troop levels, etc. tell the Iraqis the end state will be determined jointly as we proceed, but that the intent is to disengage from combat operations no later than the end of 2008. Our military presence in the area would be primarily naval, possibly with some ground combat forces in Kuwait, and a Marine force afloat.

3) Go to the UN and tell the UN that we are leaving Iraq but that we will fund a reconstruction effort in Iraq to the tune of XX billion a year, some of this funneled through UN agencies, if the UN engages as we leave.

4) Convene a regional conference to try to get a regional consensus on measures to support Iraq. Invite everyone. Indicate that money will be made available to assist Iraqi refugees, money that can even go to Syria contingent on constructive participation in Iraqi stabilization/peace efforts.

5) At the Iraqis' request, a residual troop presence for training and/or SF to help suppress AQ types would be possible.

6) Engage Iran, without preconditions. We would address Iranian security concerns, they would address our concerns about Iranian support for armed non-state actors in the region.

7) Engage Saudi Arabia. Tell the House of Saud that the propagation of anti-Christian, anti-Western values are a strategic threat to our country and that if continued will result in a riposte. Tell Saudi Arabia that the export of young military age males for jihad will not be tolerated - they might as well be exporting weapons. Name specific individuals engaged in these practices and demand that they be suppressed. Tell the Saudis that the new relationship must be predicated on mutual respect and tolerance, and if they aren't capable of that our relationship cannot be friendly.

Iraq has ceased to be a country. The Sunnis have left the "government", which couldn't agree on anything important anyway, and couldn't govern.

Don't let the term "failed state" scare you anymore: we're there. Ordinary Iraqis cannot agree on anything that matters and Iraq is incapable of governing itself.

The respite for our forces obtained by arming local militias is almost certain to be temporary.  There is no respite for ordinary Iraqis, in spite of what is being said now.  Think about it:  one hate killing in the US makes national news for a week.  In Iraq, we're talking about a decrease from many 10's to a few 10's a day.  In fact, by arming local power centers over the objections of the central government, it can be fairly said that we are simply hastening or validating (take your pick) the disintegration of Iraq-the-country.  

The policy wonks don't get it:  facts must dictate policy, and the relevant facts in Iraq change.  Anyone who is providing the same policy prescription now that they touted in 2003, or for that matter 2006, is doing the country a disservice. 

 Some facts:

-- A Viceroy didn't work

-- Democracy (elections) didn't work

-- A focus on training the Iraqi security forces didn't work

-- Nothing economic has worked

Maybe someone out there smarter than me understands why we think 160,000 of our soldiers can change this dysfunction, because I sure don't understand it. 

Our country really has to think about this at a more serious level. There are a lot of complaints about the proposed Saudi arms deal, but nobody is pointing out that a far, far more serious issue is the ocean of money we send the Saudis and other folks for oil.

We are the strategic armorer of the jihadis.

Do you suppose for one second that Saudi Arabia and Iran would have the prestige they have in the Middle East if it didn't have the means to arm, train and fund myriad Hezbollahs, Hamas and other rejectionist organizations, and crazy people in Pakistan?

I am not too worried about the Saudis having JDAMs. I am very, very worried about giving people that don't like us trillions of dollars.

The war in Iraq couldn't be fought without contractors. Contractors keep the infrastructure and equipment running. Contractors keep the troops fed and the vehicles fueled. Contractors operate logistics convoys.

Contractors die.

In fact, according to a report in the NYT, contractors die a lot:

At least 146 contract workers were killed in Iraq in the first three months of the year, by far the highest number for any quarter since the war began in March 2003, according to the Labor Department, which processes death and injury claims for those working as United States government contractors in Iraq.

That brings the total number of contractors killed in Iraq to at least 917, along with more than 12,000 wounded in battle or injured on the job, according to government figures and dozens of interviews.  Broder and Risen, New York Times, 19 May

 I believe that this is an under estimate.

These contractors may profit from their work, but that is different from war profiteering.  The folks on the ground are actually risking their lives.  All of the American contractors I met had a common goal:  to help our soldiers.  It isn't all about money.

Rather than applauding our fellow citizens who are willing to do nasty, dangerous work in support of our troops, the country and our leadership are generally either silent or hostile (Blackwater, Halliburton, etc etc).   I can tell you it feels really shitty to come back to dismissive talk about how much money I must be making, as if that were the point.  In my case, I had all the money I needed before, and have somewhat more now; it wasn't about money.  

There are plenty of people who wouldn't go for any price, and for good reason:  you can very easily die. 

There are real people over there really risking their lives to help our troops, and this should be applauded.  

I just returned from Iraq for the second time this year. I live with and work with soldiers - I am not there as an observer or a VIP. Things have changed.

Violence in some provinces is down significantly. I attribute this to the arming of Sunni tribal auxiliaries. Many tribals seem to have decided that Al Qaeda is more of a threat to their well being than the US. I would like to make three points on this strategy:

-- the fact that violence is down significantly gives the lie to the notion that anti-Coalition violence is due to Jihadis, foreign or domestic. In my opinion, violence is down because locals that were killing us before have taken our money and weapons to deal with a threat TO THEM that is both more serious and more manageable - Jihadis who kill people if their beards are too short and who disrupt traditional power structures (shaiks and tribes).

-- We are now arming both sides of the sectarian conflict, and that will come back to haunt us. Anbar is totally Sunni, so giving weapons to Sunni shaiks to deal with AQ doesn't affect the Sunni/Shia balance of forces in contested areas. Giving those same weapons to Sunni shaiks in areas of sectarian conflict does alter the balance of power. We should expect a bloody anti-American reaction from the Shia. We should also expect the sectarian conflict to grow in scope and violence once the "near enemy" of AQ has been eliminated.

-- Soldiers do not like giving weapons to people that they know were shooting at them the previous month and that are likely to shoot at them again once they have regained control of their territory. The people we are arming do not like us. This is quite demoralizing - the soldiers have to worry about their Iraqi "friends" as well as their many enemies.

Now to some more general observations.

It seems to me that indirect fire (mortars, rockets, etc) attacks on our bases are up significantly. As these harrassing attacks are essentially random, it is hard to worry about them, but the sense of danger for people on FOBs (forward operating bases) is up significantly. In the case of the Green Zone (IZ), I personally wouldn't live there unless quartered in a bunker and working in a bomb proof area. Yes, it is that bad.

I was struck by the truly crappy living conditions for many of our soldiers. These have gotten much worse as we have moved them out to smaller bases and patrol posts. It is 110+ degrees in Iraq. It is extremely dusty and sandy. It is a very unpleasant place. Why, 4 years into an occupation, do our soldiers have to live in such horrendous conditions? I visited several FOBS where the soldiers live in tents in the desert. This just should not be, in my opinion.

Finally, I am enraged at the lack of recognition of the effort being made by contractors to support our troops in the field. This is truly invisible sacrifice. We tend to want to think that because contractors are paid, it is venality that puts them in the war zone. We tend to think that because Halliburton and KBR are making pots of money that somehow all their employees are motivated by obscene profit.

I am here to tell you that this is untrue. Sure, they make better money, but they work long hours in very difficult and dangerous conditions to make that money. Over 1000 contractors have died in Iraq. They do not do this just for the money - they are ex-soldiers for the most part, helping their buddies stay alive.

What enrages me is that this effort, in starkest contrast to that of the troops, is consistently denigrated or unreported. Denigration: somehow every contractor is an immoral war profiteer. Under-reported: more than 1000 dead and presumably thousands more casualties. I truly believe that the country ought to thank those folks for their service. This is not inconsistent with despising KBR or Halliburton - love the team, hate the coach.