shdejong's Blog

France Adopts a Multilateral Defence Policy

2008-06-25T08:37:58Z

The 2008 White Paper sets the tone for the next decade of French defense policy. Although France's "loss of independence" is controversial, many welcome the progress towards synchronization of the French, European, and transatlantic security and defense strategies.

The French White Paper on defense and national security presented by President Sarkozy on June 17 provides the country with a new military and security strategy intended to modernize and rationalize the French approach to defense, security, and foreign policy.

Despite undergoing revision in 1994, France's military strategy was still organized as a response to the challenges of the Cold War. In an attempt to address the threats of this century and adapt to a new international order, France is now moving away from its distinctive independent course. There is no plan, however, to relinquish control of the nuclear deterrent or the command of armed forces.

The new policy includes plans for a reduction of defense personnel, a restructuring of the defense estate, and an improvement of coordination. The focus is on national defense and intelligence activities. Yet from a foreign policy perspective, the paper's most important provisions concern the reintegration of France into NATO 's military command structure and the furthering of European defense policy and cooperation.

The commentaries and analyses listed below discuss the military, diplomatic and financial implications of the French White Paper and shed light on some of the controversies that have arisen. The opinions are drawn from a selection of French, American, British, and German sources.

Le Monde: La defense entre recentrage et alignement

In a critical assessment of the French White Paper, Louis Gautier argues that despite providing for more coherence in practice, other aspects of the Paper, such as the articles concerning NATO reintegration and European integration, are merely products of political maneuver.

Instead of offering guidelines for future decisions, the White Paper reflects the President's present position. He consistently influenced and disrupted the commission with his public announcements regarding NATO, dissuasion, Afghanistan, Africa and the French approach to terrorism.
Yet the White Paper does provide for a more coherent policy. When compared to the earlier approach of which the scope was too broad, the new strategy will enable concentration on major issues, a better screening of priorities, and a focus on strategic interests.
Although European defense should be prioritized, the articles dealing with this dimension of French defense policy do not do justice to European ambitions in this field.
In contrast, due to its symbolic significance, France's much less important intention to reintegrate NATO has been paid a great deal of attention. In fact, this move does not even present any concrete interest for either party at this stage.
As a matter of fact, rejoining NATO may be counterproductive since this move bears heavy meaning for those in Moscow and Beijing who still perceive NATO as the West's spearhead. From this perspective, the White Paper merely appears as a tool for Sarkozy to zealously attempt transatlantic alignment.

The New York Times: In defense policy, France turns to US and Europe

This editorial welcomes France's adoption of a more modern, effective, and outward looking defense strategy which should allow for increased collaboration.

The White Paper outlines a plan for a smaller, more efficient, and increasingly cost-effective French army. France will be better equipped to address new threats.
The outcome of the new strategy should enable France and the EU to act alone and be taken more seriously on the international stage. France should therefore adopt a less bilateral approach and intensify cooperation with the EU, NATO, and regional organizations even if it maintains its independent nuclear program on the side.
The fact that Sarkozy wanted progress and rapprochement within NATO to run parallel to progress within EU was initially a problem for the US. The last few months have shown the EU and NATO are best complementing rather than competing with one another.

Financial Times: Knowledge holds the key to French defence

For Francois Heisbourg, France's downsizing of field operations in favour of intelligence activities presents advantages both for France's approach to new threats and its cooperation with partners.

While prevention is meant to enable a more cost-effective defense and security policy, increased focus on intelligence is intended to turn France into a valuable asset for international partners.
The setting of new priorities does not mean nuclear deterrence is going to end. In the words of Sir Michael Howard: "the nuclear dragon may be sleeping, but it is certainly not dead."

Time: Sarkozy makes eyes at NATO

Leo Cendrowicz interprets the French White Paper as a strategy to strengthen EU defense and an attempt to substantially reduce French defense expenses.

Sarkozy's move to reintegrate NATO is merely strategic since it will allow France to capitalize on its transatlantic approach and "find stronger backing for EU defense projects among NATO's European members."
At the same time however, this decision has been met with the French public's opposition - a vehement group of army generals in particular, are argueing that France will be weakened by the reduction of its armed forces.
He quotes Daniel Korski who argues that the establishment is not prepared to admit the real reason for renouncing so-called independence: France's inability to shoulder alone any longer the financial burden of an independent defense policy.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Eine neue Verteidigungsdoktrin

France's new White Paper will enable France to cut military costs and modernize its army. Progress on the European front is promising in theory but could prove disappointing in practice.

France's new defense and security strategy will enable the country to meet the new challenges of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Since the White Paper does not provide for an increase in military budget, the new approach is an attempt to effect the simultaneous modernization and rationalization of the army.
Having secured US approval for progress on the level of European defense, France has agreed to reintegrate the NATO command structure. Regarding European defense, however, progress needs to be made at the level of implementation because the concept remains much more impressive on paper than in reality.

This press round-up was prepared by members of the Atlantic Community editorial team.

Is France Becoming More American?

2008-06-24T13:11:19Z

PRO:

Pro-American Rhetoric
Braving the current of French popular opinion, Sarkozy acknowledges that France has little to gain from systematically opposing the United States. A pro-American approach enables France to voice its visions of the international order. The shift was made explicit as early as May 6, 2007 on the evening of his electoral victory: “I want to reach out to our American friends to tell them they can count on our friendship […] I want to tell them that France will always be on their side when they need her …” Sarkozy’s visit to the United States in November 2007 gave the president the opportunity to express his admiration for the US and emerge as the new central partner for Washington in Europe after Blair’s departure. His advisory and parliamentary staff has contributed to the political rapprochement. His foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, is famously transatlanticist. The president’s major foreign policy advisor, Jean David Levitte, spent the last years working on calming the transatlantic storm in his capacity as French ambassador to Washington and has successfully helped the president rebuild strong transatlantic relations.

Geostrategic Conversion
Rapprochement of the two nations has been facilitated by Sarkozy and Kouchner’s support of the United States’ tough line regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This contrasts with other European leaders’ positions as well as Chirac’s earlier cautious approach to conflicts and tensions in the Greater Middle East. Sarkozy additionally shares Washington’s serious take on security threats to Israel and its critical posture towards Russia and China, especially with regard to their human rights records and their perceived unfair and imbalanced trade policies.

Military Rapprochement
Sarkozy has agreed to increase France’s contribution to the war effort in Afghanistan by adding 1500 to 1700 to the existing French contingent of 1600, sending combat troops to the East, and providing military arsenal. Yet the main new element of French military cooperation with the United States is Sarkozy’s commitment to reintegrating France into NATO’s military wing. He announced this bold step at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in early April. In exchange for rejoining, Sarkozy is likely to demand France be granted control of a key NATO command.

CON:

Sarkozy the “Old European”
One element of continued French “Anti-Americanism” is Sarkozy’s alignment with the policies of “Old Europe.” At the NATO Summit in Bucharest, he sided with Germany, Britain, and Spain in their opposition to Bush’s plan to offer MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia which revealed the limits of his support to Washington. He does not ignore that “Old Europe” remains tied together by common geostrategic challenges and interests that can conflict with America’s international objectives. The breach between the Bush administration and “Old Europe” is particularly evident regarding climate change. The war in Iraq also remains a thorn in the relationship between France and the United States since Chirac’s applauded rejection of military involvement in 2003. In addition, Sarkozy holds Washington responsible for the weakness of the dollar and blames the US for not acting to combat the crisis efficiently enough, thereby harming French foreign trade.

A Split Commitment: NATO-ESDP
Despite Sarkozy’s praise of NATO, it can be argued that he merely views the Alliance as a tool to strengthen France’s military capacity and global involvement. By endorsing full membership of NATO, he may be hoping to restrict it to a role which leaves room for the development of a parallel and counterbalancing European Security and Defense Policy. This is why Sarkozy demanded US endorsement of the ESDP in exchange for France rejoining the military structures of NATO. A few days before the Bucharest Summit, Sarkozy paid a short visit to the UK to secure Gordon Brown’s endorsement of the ESDP. Committing to NATO proved necessary to negotiate with the Americans and the British since both fear that the ESDP could become a rival to NATO if France did not rejoin.

French Unilateralism
Sarkozy's unilateral foreign policy has hindered transatlantic progress within the last year and antagonized both his European and international partners. Among other things, Sarkozy acted in Darfur before the international community could decide on a common strategy; he carried out nuclear agreements with states such as the United Arab Emirates without involving the US; and finally, he welcomed the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi in Paris although the dictator’s credentials are still highly questionable. On the European level too, many of Sarkozy’s initiatives have been unilateral. These include the proposal of a mini-treaty instead of the European Constitution in September 2006, the re-discussion of the Turkish question, and the forcing of the Mediterranean Union. In the light of Sarkozy’s prioritization of national interests, these elements of his foreign policy seem less dictated by the intention to revive transatlantic relations or the promotion of multilateralism than by the aim of restoring France’s great power status.