So we're not, as Copleston supposes, stuck with Kant's conclusion.

To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word will. Every true act of his will is also at once and inevitably a movement of his body; he cannot actually will the act without at the same time being aware that it appears as movement of the body. The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely different ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for the understanding.

So the body has two sides to it: the noumenal side and the phenomenal side. The noumenal side is to the body as matter and movement are to the world. The phenomenal side is to the body as form is to the world.

We could even look at this as akin to the right-brain/left-brain distinction. In fact, Bohm talks about synching-up the right and left brain. In the same way, Freud and Jung would use Schopenhauer's concept of the synched-up noumena and phenomena to describe the psychological process of the synched-up consciousness and unconsciousness.

I hope I've started to unpack this coherently.

I'm with you against Dawkins. He's a total reactionary cloaked as "scientist".

I think that there are several different Schopenhauers. The actual one is rarely heard from anymore. But his actual system allows for -- and, even if he didn't recognize it, calls for -- the Divine. I tried to link to my description of this, but it won't link. It was in the comments on this post of yours.

I think you are wrong in regards to Schopenhauer's way of looking at the microcosmic level. The notion of "wholeness" that Bohm uses descends from Schopenhauer's philosophy.

If someone constructs the most powerful baseball bat in history, their inability to hit a fast ball does not mean that the bat is flawed.

His notion of will was nothing like personality or ego -- as it is understandably mistaken. Magee, in the interview, makes the case that energy would have been a better word than will.

Regardless, Schopenhauer's notion of will can be replaced by any all-encompassing concept. You favor flux. I'd agree: that's probably the healthiest concept. Bohm thought it was unfragmented movement -- similar to what you're saying.

For the purposes of physics, we could replace will with hidden variable.

My over-arching point is not that Schopenhauer is right. I don't think that he is entirely right. But I do think that his systemic way of perceiving the world is right. He may misinterpret what he sees in that world, but the way of looking is what I'm trying to advocate. And, most to the point, that way of looking was used by Einstein and Bohm.

Everything happens exactly as it happens for an exactly sufficient reason.

Except existence in itself. That is, as I read Schopenhauer, the only thing necessarily beyond the principle of sufficient reason. In Kantian language: that principle applies to all the phenomena, not the noumena. Schopenhauer's central insight was merely to show that Kant over-reached himself by assuming that the noumenal world could be considered a multiplicity. And exactly for the reason you say: our categories only apply to our representation of it.

The ding an sich isn't local but it isn't non-local, either, and no phenomenal characteristic can be assigned to it one way or the other, neither for Kant or Schopenhauer.

I agree that a phenomenal character could not be assigned to it by Kant. But, Schopenhauer's system allows room for a phenomenal character. The ding an sich is local and non-local. For Schopenhauer, the body -- the immediate object -- is the direct manifestation of the ding an sich. The body is phenomenal. So, whether Kant allows for a phenomenal character of the ding an sich or not, Schopenhauer definitely allows for it. To me, that's the ultimate synthesis -- to bring the ding an sich into the world we perceive. No coincidence that Freud and Jung use this move to describe synching-up the unconscious mind with the conscious mind.

And what about complex double binds involving both sides, step-parents, grand-parents, etc? Are there triple and quadruple binds? Or does Bateson limit the concept to double binds?

I think that what it's designed to reference does have something to do with you. I understand your concern: if 'god' just refers to all that is, then what's so special about that?

I think though that 'god' refers to more than just all that is. I think it refers to all that is and the sense in which every point in space and time contain all that is. To me, that has everything do with you.

You definitely assimilate Bohm's ideas into your bones. I don't think you can understand it without your marrow being saturated by it.

Yeah, I think this is connected to quantum leaps. Kant's concept thing-in-itself allows us to explain quantum leaps -- how the cosmos moves as a whole.

I've never read Bateson, but I will now. Thank you.

Brother Pierre is a character of the Highest Self.