Bread, circuses and executive pay
The foxes guarding our much-raided chickens have handed us a gamy egg in exchange for stealing the coop.
I guess I should be real impressed the Obama administration has drawn a line in the sand and told seven banks they couldn't pay their executives kings' ransoms out of the bailout kitty. It's an emotional issue, after all. Why should already-rich, overpaid crooks who got us in the meltdown jam profit with taxpayer money? As current affair, it's like episodic TV and freeway driving: There are good guys, bad guys, dumb folk and bang-up excitement. Maybe even a little blood and some broken glass.
Meanwhile, though, efforts to plug up the crumbling dike that is the derivatives market with safe-and-sane regulations are fading away slowly under cover of the bankers' salary smokescreen.
There's been a big push by Democrats in Congress, reform advocates and the Obama administration to bring federal regulation to these deals. At the very least, advocates wants these contracts to go through clearinghouses or be traded on exchanges in order to make their terms public.
...But there are exemptions. In an effort to protect companies like airlines and manufacturers that use derivatives to hedge against things like price fluctuations and currency exchange rates, these so-called end-users would not be required to make public the terms of their contracts. Rather, they would continue to operate in the dark.
But (Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin) Peterson on Wednesday amended the bill to extend the exemption to big banks and financial institutions, as long as their contracts were with these end-users... Peterson's amendment "fatally weakens the bill," said Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of America. [Source: HuffPo]
Since Peterson is a committee chair in the Hope and Change Congress, you may have guessed already that he's a Democrat, and evidently one of many who didn't get the Blackberry tweek about that big push by the party to re-regulate.
Regulation was dropped from derivatives late in the Clinton era, when this relatively new "financial instrument" began picking up steam as an upper-level investment money-maker. From the same hothouse that gave us the oily, treacherous "junk bonds" in the '80s, derivatives are basically side-bets on how investments will perform, or not perform, as the case may be.
Here's what I would do to game the set-up: If I had an investment that was a mediocre performer, I'd bet on it doing badly, sell it off at its premium price - pocketing the sale price and my side-bet that it would take a sell-off hit. That kind of gaming almost crashed Wall Street itself in 1910, so our bright forebears outlawed "bucket shop" wagering... until the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Today, the dice-roll is a little more sophisticated - a lay bet that a stock will lose is paid off with a "credit swap", a form of insurance not called such because, of course, insurance is regulated. Because such swaps are unregulated, nobody has bothered to actually fund the "policy", and over the past eight years, all this gaming tore a hole in worldwide investment markets estimated to be in the trillions of dollars.
Since the other shoe hasn't fallen on all this debt, banks are sitting on their earnings and starving small businesses that live on short-term loans. Nevertheless, the investment industry wants the wide-open, crapshoot system back, and our Congress is more than willing to do just that:
Representative Barney Frank's central role in drafting new regulations for the US financial industry has dramatically boosted his power as a political fund-raiser, helping him increase campaign contributions by almost a third more than at this point in the last election cycle.
As chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Frank was a major player in the $700 billion Wall Street rescue package last year, and is now the point person working on legislation proposed by the Obama administration to prevent another economic crisis like the one that plunged the nation into a recession.
Frank's place in the thick of economic policy making has made him the focal point for a variety of executives, unions, advocacy groups, and individual supporters who have poured $1.2 million into his campaign account since January. That is 32 percent more than the $907,000 he raised during the same three quarters of his 2007-2008 reelection campaign.
Hmm. Could that 'splain why he's been such a laggard in tightening up regulation of derivatives markets? He's even been lauded on conservative blogs for this "pragmatic approach" to regulation.
On the West Coast, in the '90s, the Russian mob had a pragmatic approach to gasoline it sold to convenience stores - by mixing the fuel with water!
Frank is a perennial favorite of what passes for the progressive media these days, taking his slobbery hound-dog Baahs-tin persona to the mike stand every time we need a no-nonsense, urban perspective. Wonderful! It's like watching William Bendix gargle with hippie jug wine.
The "regulations" bill made it out of committee this week, so we'll see. Timothy Geithner seems to like it. That's never a good sign.
















Excellent post, Curt, as always.
It is scary to look at all this within the context of the political reality that there really has been an "economic coup de'tat" as was most recently discussed by Marci Kaptur on Bill Moyers' Journal. The problem here goes way beyond your basic campaign finance pay-to-play bribery that allows corporations and the wealthy to exert undue influence over the politicians. No, the financial industry owns this government. They have their hands directly on the levers of government (see Paulson, Geithner, Bernanke, etc.) and the White House and Congress defer to them on all matters regarding the financial industry.
Imagine, for example, Geithner determining that Goldman Sachs needs to be broken up because it is Too Big To Fail - a very plausible recommendation. How would he explain that to his friends and colleagues back at the clubhouse, eh? It ain't happening, regardless of the impact that might have on our ability to forestall the socialization of the next financial crisis.
October 23, 2009 3:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
derivatives used to be regulated pretty simply: courts wouldn't enforce the contract. you bet and they don't pay up? you're screwed! so people only made legitimate "bets" -- ie, when it wasn't terribly risky and only when they really needed to hedge their risks.
rec'd
October 23, 2009 3:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
Too many times I see that word pragmatic, like it is an excuse.
Kind of like saying, well boys will be boys.
I DON'T WANT A PRAGMATIC APPROACH. I WANT THE THIEVERY TO STOP RIGHT NOW.
Nice Post Curt, as usual.
October 23, 2009 4:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Gretchen Morgenson at the NY Times has a piece about the end-user exceptions.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/business/economy/18gret.html?_r=1&dbk
Is the recent flurry of FBI investigations into bank fraud another bone to throw the little people? I think it was Marci Kaptur who said that you can tell how serious Justice is about doing anything meaningful: there are few investigators and little money assigned to the problem, and that personnel and resources should be increased many, many, times over.
October 24, 2009 9:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Isn't this concern with (overemphasis on?) credit default swaps a case of closing the barn door after the horses have departed?
The problem with CDSs arises when writers misprice them -- AIGFP being the poster-boy example. Even then, the problem is limited* to the failure of the particular company that wrote them which learns to its chagrin that CDSs can be "weapons of mass destruction." I greatly suspect CDS writers have learned their lesson; once bitten twice shy.
The important issue, it seems to me, is how to prevent regulated companies such as AIG (insurance) and Citigroup (FDIC insured) from turning themselves into hedge funds. I don't see that regulating derivatives gets us to the nub of the problem.
* CDSs do have a deleterious effect on bankruptcy workouts in which bondholders may refuse to take a haircut to save the company because they hold CDSs which will pay off if the company is liquidated.
October 24, 2009 10:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
But if we don't regulate derivatives in our recovery, won't we restock fresh horses in another doorless barn? The set-up, for too long, has been this: "We're responsible bankers, we can regulate ourselves, trust us." We can't. We know that now. And maybe it's time to rethink the very concept of hedge funds; what began 60 years ago as a good idea to insulate investors from market tumult has become a leech, a vampire that rewards a few at the price of combusting the market.
October 24, 2009 1:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
. . . combusting the market.
It is not clear to me that derivatives -- and that includes CDSs -- precipitated or had any significant role in last Fall's "crisis" -- that is, the claimed inability of certain large banks to rollover their very short-term debt, a liquidity problem.
Remember that AIG's solvency was never tested. No one ever asked the company to make good on its CDS contracts. All there ever was was a threat that the rating agencies were about to downgrade AIG's rating "forcing" the company to come up with additional collateral in favor of its CDS counterparties.
Paulson and Bernanke used that threat to generate a TWAWKI is ending hair-on-fire panic in order to enable them to pump money into illiquid (insolvent?) banks via an AIG bailout. They used the CDSs AIGFP wrote as the pipeline -- nothing more.
We should be demanding legislation to ensure regulators can put TBTF financial institutions into receivership together with standard bankruptcy rights. Once derivative speculators and "bucket shop" proprietors understand that they risk not getting paid, derivatives will no longer be a problem.
October 24, 2009 2:55 PM | Reply | Permalink