Let's Re-Regulate the Financial Sector?
The Obama administration has released their Financial Regulatory Reform Plan. The various political and pundit responses are being broadcast. I could not get past the introduction without choking over the the misdirection of poli-speak. I guess my hopes are for plain speaking and accountability. I do not see either reflected in this document.
Below is the introduction to the report - just the introduction because it forms the framework and tone for the rest of the plan.
Over the past two years we have faced the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. Americans across the nation are struggling with unemployment, failing businesses, falling home prices, and declining savings. These challenges have forced the government to take extraordinary measures to revive our financial system so that people can access loans to buy a car or home, pay for a child's education, or finance a business.
While the first two sentences are accurate, the conclusion is questionable. The problem for most in the United States is not getting loans, but what is happening to the loans that they already have. Credit card rates jumping through the roof, mortgage loans resetting, the popping of the housing bubble devaluing homes below the loan levels.
The roots of this crisis go back decades. Years without a serious economic recession bred complacency among financial intermediaries and investors. Financial challenges such as the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and the Asian Financial Crisis had minimal impact on economic growth in the U.S., which bred exaggerated expectations about the resilience of our financial markets and firms. Rising asset prices, particularly in housing, hid weak credit underwriting standards and masked the growing leverage throughout the system.
While the roots of the current crisis does go back decades, there have been crashes that should have caused caution - such as the crash of 2000 and the long "jobless recovery." What this indicated was that financiers were gaining, but the American people were not. A recovery that does not include the people is not a "recovery," it is profit-making.
I do not believe that the "exaggerated expectations" were about "resilience" but about the ability to accrue excess value indefinitely.
Rising home values signalled a housing bubble, and all honest economists knew that. It did not "mask" the growing leverage in the system, it depended on the growing leverage in the system
At some of our most sophisticated financial firms, risk management systems did not keep pace with the complexity of new financial products. The lack of transparency and standards in markets for securitized loans helped to weaken underwriting standards. Market discipline broke down as investors relied excessively on credit rating agencies. Compensation practices throughout the financial services industry rewarded short-term profits at the expense of long-term value.
It is clear at this point, that risk management systems were not trying to keep pace, but rewriting their risk calculations to facilitate the process of limitless profit-taking.
While "lack of transparency" was (and is) a problem, it was no accident. The negligence was deliberate and systematic. Saying that "market discipline broke down" assumes that the market could ever discipline itself. It is clear, and has been clear since the early 1900s that the market has no discipline. Given the opportunity to act in an unfettered manner, it will follow the greatest opportunities for profit.
Households saw significant increases in access to credit, but those gains were overshadowed by pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving many Americans with obligations that they did not understand and could not afford.
Households saw significant increases in access to credit as wages fell further short of the ability to increase consumption. The people took on massive debt to support a system that was extracting greater and greater profit with the facilitation of federal deregulation. There were not just "failures in consumer protection," but passage of legislation that removed those protections.
While this crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the government could have done more to prevent many of these problems from growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial system. Gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of financial firms presented challenges to our government's ability to monitor, prevent, or address risks as they built up in the system. No regulator saw its job as protecting the economy and financial system as a whole. Existing approaches to bank holding company regulation focused on protecting the subsidiary bank, not on comprehensive regulation of the whole firm. Investment banks were permitted to opt for a different regime under a different regulator, and in doing so, escaped adequate constraints on leverage. Other firms, such as AIG, owned insured depositories, but escaped the strictures of serious holding company regulation because the depositories that they owned were technically not "banks" under relevant law.
This is a disgusting soft-peddling of the realities of this situation. Legislation was passed that allowed financial related industries to merge and expand in unprecedented ways. The boundaries between types of financial institutions were removed. Controls and oversight were weakened or removed. The Federal Reserve under Greenspan, and a series of representatives in Washington, took a "hands off" approach to the financial sector - purportedly under the theory that markets could regulate themselves better than government could regulate. It was the ultimate test of laissez faire, and it failed.
This collapse was facilitated. It was not a "failure." If one gets a car, removes the brakes and the steering wheel, and hops up the engine, it is not a "design flaw" when the car crashes - it is sabotage.
We must act now to restore confidence in the integrity of our financial system. The lasting economic damage to ordinary families and businesses is a constant reminder of the urgent need to act to reform our financial regulatory system and put our economy on track to a sustainable recovery. We must build a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.
One has to ask "Restore whose confidence"? And one has to ask "What integrity"? There was not been integrity in the financial sector forever. Whatever "integrity" there has been is in keeping the financial sector in check and honest. Whose confidence do we wish to build? Is it the confidence of the populace that they will not be bilked, exploited, and stolen from? Or is it the confidence of "investors" that they will return to a market that will get them high gains? Is the plan to restore the failed system yet reduce the amount of profit taking, or is it to build an economy that works for the people? All signs point to the former.
Institutions that were too big to fail are now fewer, but even larger. Institutions were bailed out (and continue to be bailed out) while the people are totally neglected. Why have people in Detroit lost their homes while those same homes are sold in blocks to investors for as little as $8000 a piece? If financial institutions are going to take that kind of loss, then why not refinance to the existing owner at that same valuation? Why remove the mark-to-market valuation on banks so their books look better, and then let them steal people's homes and sell them for a song.
What is happening here is a massive and direct transfer of wealth. It is being facilitated and subsidized by those same officials who are "stabilizing" the market.
The basic premises of this plan are troublesome to me. There is an assumption that everything was working fine and then some unfortunate things happened. There is an assumption that "things just changed too fast" for regulations to keep up. We all know that this is not the case. We all know that there were deliberate actions and decisions which brought us, and our economy, to this collapse. Many would argue that simply patching up the system that failed is not adequate. In fact, that such an attempt will result in a duplication of the collapse we are still in.
Mr. Obama, welcome to the "no mud sticks if you don't throw it" world of corporate owned Washington D.C.
















This was a conspiracy, going back decades. We used to have state usury statutes.
You would get a loan at 8 %, there were similar limits on mortgages...
One big goddamanable conspiracy. (refuses to bless himself) repubs sitting in closed forums
deciding the fate of the country)
June 18, 2009 7:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
A conspiracy indeed, and the charge led by the republicans-cum-neocons, but they are not alone any longer. Corporatism and special interests are major players - and not just in the Republican camp. This is not to say there is no difference between the two parties, because in my opinion there certainly are. However, they are both dancing and bowing to the same pipers - and those pipers are not the people of the United States.
June 18, 2009 7:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Obama has to blame people for it, even if it's not true it's part of the rhetoric. He's going to introduce sweeping changes and that means there must have been major problems.
I'd like Aunt Sam to weigh in as well because of her resume I think her comments and insight here will be valuable.
I don't buy the "deregulation" point. There were lots of problems and contributors. But I try to boil it down to the main contributor - everybody got drunk on real estate. Consumers got over-levered as did the investment banks. Nobody modeled a significant drop in property values in their "downside cases" and they got burned. But as long as their were buyers for this mortgage paper who were too lazy to do their own credit work and relied on rating agencies to rubber stamp things, then it all seemed like safe investments.
All the blame on "de-regulation" of the Graham-Leach Act in the late 90's and the "relaxation" of the net capital rules in 2004 is nonsense to me.
The investment banks have been highly leveraged for years and if none of that "de-regulation" had happened, we'd still be in this mess. Lehman and Bear would still have gone hog wild selling mortgage backed debt. Investment banks and commercial banks had been selling mortgage backed debt, subprime debt, derivatives, etc long before the Graham-Leach Act was passed. Did that act let Citi get too big? Maybe but size isn't what caused Citi to make a lot of dumb moves.
In the late 90's the investment banks were roughly leveraged 30-to-1. Why didn't we have a catastrophe then? Because their assets were a lot better quality than the mortgage assets they owned in 2007 that they thought were high quality and turned out to be junk.
The 2004 net capital rules did not undo any leverage restrictions. Those actions tried to add some regulation to the investment banks which prior to then had not existed. The investment banks had no capital requirements at the holding company level, so it was impossible to relax them or "de-regulate" them.
The 12-to-1 leverage ratio that people claim was suspended or relaxed is just not an accurate statement. The 12-to-1 restriction was not changed as part of the 2004 amendment. But more importantly, well before 2004, the 12-to-1 ratio calculation's definition of indebtedness did not even include things like obligations that are fully collateralized by a liquid proprietary security. Therefore, securities financing transactions were not even included in a broker-dealer's aggregate indebtednes for purposes of calculation the 12-to-1 requirement. This was true prior to 2004. This means the calculation wouldn't prohibit the investment banks from taking on a ton of assets through financing transactions. We all know that substantial portions of the investment banks balance sheets were comprised of these types of financing transactions.
And furthermore, even if the 12-to-1 test had been loosened, it didn't matter because the big brokers had a choice between two tests and never chose the 12-to-1 test. Rather they chose the minimum net capital of no less than 2% of customer debits. The investment banks have been using this latter test since the 1970's.
Finally, these net capital rules only applied to the broker-dealer subsidiaries and not to the parent holding company entities. Many of the investment banks risky activities such as OTC derivatives and the warehousing of real estate loans all happened outside of the broker-dealer subsidiaries.
So my point is that there was a lot of regulation but it wasn't very effective regulation. And nothing happened in 2004 with the net capital rules that really "deregulated" anything. But some reporter at the NYTimes or some other paper needs to write stories that sell, and then all of a sudden everybody grabs on to it.
June 18, 2009 10:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ask and it shall be given. Aunt Sam speaks in the next comment down.
June 19, 2009 12:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
Rowan - I made my comment after the one written by Aunt Sam. I appreciate her points. I was curious as to her opinion of the MSM's two favorite whipping posts as the "cause" of the crisis - Graham/Leach/Bliley Act in 1999 and the SEC's amendment to its net capital rules in 2004 were evidence of "de-regulation".
In my opinion (and I also work in the financial services industry but not as high up as AS) neither of these events "de-regulated" anything. They were both poor attempts at changing the existing regulation but neither one really allowed Lehman, Bear, et al to lever themselves up 30-to-1 and securitize a bunch of crappy real estate loans. They had the ability to do that for a long time.
June 19, 2009 6:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Definitely not a purely republican problem here, DD. Both parties have been in on the scam since at least the 1980s.
June 19, 2009 5:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
Rowan,
As someone who was in top management of a financial organization in the '80s and experienced (if not was victim of) the changes that evolved in the financial regulatory oversight - I can attest to the validity of, 'While this crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the government could have done more to prevent many of these problems from growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial system. Gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of financial firms presented challenges to our government's ability to monitor, prevent, or address risks as they built up in the system....'
And yes, it is true that, 'We all know that there were deliberate actions and decisions which brought us, and our economy, to this collapse.'
However, I have no issue with the manner in which this document was worded as it is simply the preface to the plan and not the arena for the litany of specific (Or the preface would be 1000 pages at least) actions/inactions of individuals or governing bodies.
The bottom line is that the failures were those of both our legislative/oversight branches of government and the boards of these institutions. Obama is attempting to begin delivery of what he believes to be the start of rebuilding our financial systems.
He didn't make the mess, he's trying to clean it up.
June 18, 2009 9:08 PM | Reply | Permalink
Aunt Sam, I appreciate your experience and perspective. I also agree that Obama did not make this mess - he wasn't in the Senate long enough to be deeply involved. However, I still think that simple statements of fact for context setting are appropriate. Those simple statements of fact would have taken no more space than what was written, and it would have shown what specific problems are being addressed by the plan. IMHO.
June 18, 2009 9:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
The wording is typical of inside-the-beltway-speak, in that it presents the problem as if it fell from the sky, an act of god, totally unforeseeable. They have to do this to maintain the facade so no one notices the little guy behind the curtain who really has no clue as to what's going on, other than the financial state of his/her campaign war chest. In the end I have no doubt the use of taxpayer funds used to maintain financial solvency/liquidity of a market system heavily geared to the haves, rather than the have-nots, will indeed go down in history as the greatest transfer of wealth in the history of mankind. Thank goodness they gave the cash to the haves. Had it been the other way around we would all be, (god forbid), socialists by now. Our ideological purity is assured.
June 18, 2009 10:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Good post Rowan.
June 18, 2009 10:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Indeed, we are only socialists to save capitalists (er capitalism). The Wizard of OZ is apt, and 1984. I keep being reminded how prescient Orwell was.
June 19, 2009 12:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
co-signed
June 18, 2009 11:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you Zeno.
June 19, 2009 1:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
Off subject, Go sign Bernie's petition..... Check my blog for the link.
June 19, 2009 2:40 AM | Reply | Permalink
Rowan, I note there are over 300 uses of the word 'we' in the Regulatory Reform Plan you link, but not one name of who wrote it. Anywhere... that I could find...???
Normally a government document with no name or signatures on it is not one for which anyone wants personal responsibility. (my name was not on it, I didn't contribute to that portion, that came out of a committee, I don't know who wrote that section, a guy in the other office added that, the copy boy must have deleted or added that.. etc.)
June 19, 2009 1:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
There are no designated authors - including the copy at the Treasury website. So no personal accountability - or even committee accountability. Good point.
June 19, 2009 1:23 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for this, Rowan. I don't know quite what to think of the reform proposals. Some things are quite good, such as the controls on consumer oriented financial products and systemically important institutions. But if you look at the causes of the crisis, I'd pick out the Rating Agencies, the Fed, and corporate compensation practices as central culprits. Nothing significant is being done about the first and the last, and the Fed is being rewarded with new powers when they demonstrably refused to use the powers they already had.
Aside from the reforms, what is happening now is really quite maddening. Banks and I-banks are being recapitalized on the tax-payer dime through conduits such as AIG (closing insurance contracts at par) and apparently also BofA and Citi (buying toxic assets at inflated prices). As a result the bank stocks are back to pre-crisis price levels thanks to this subsidy which will eventually amount to somewhere north of 2 trillion dollars.
This really is the most dangerous, and not just outrageous, part of the story. There is now a huge moral hazard problem in the financial market. The government has shown a commitment not to let bankers lose money, which means the latter now have no incentive to take risk-management seriously. Hence all risk management is now incumbent on the government agencies. But two of the three main risk-management agencies - the Fed and SEC effectively work for the banks (explicitly so in the first case, through voting rights for commercial banks, and implicitly so in the second through rampant corruption or 'capture'). The one agency with some credibility - the FDIC - is having its auditing powers neutered.
This said, I'm not sure what regulatory framework would work. Ideally you claw back the past 3-4 years bonuses commensurate to the fraud committed in the various banks, to remove some of the moral hazard. But that requires a functional SEC with competent attorneys to investigate. This simply doesn't exist and and cannot simply be wished into existence. A sad state of affairs.
June 19, 2009 5:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
Just another point - the 'boring banking' model that existed for 50 years after the great depression wasn't mainly due to some magnificent government-imposed regulatory framework at all. That is a myth. It was due to the fact that banks were made to suffer severely during the depression - they saw that government was incapable/unwilling to bail them out. As a result they took risk-management very seriously. The present situation is similar to the depression in many ways, but the huge disanalogy is in the handling of the banks. Look at who has suffered and who has gained over the past year. Those who created and inflated the systemic risks through the creation and manipulation of CDS over the past few years - JPM and GS - are the victors. Mid-sized boring banks have gotten killed. Bondholders and management at the big banking conglomerates have gotten huge payouts.
The bad practices in the financial sector are probably not going to change markedly. They are self-regulated because they are too big to be efficiently regulated from the outside. And they have no incentive to self-regulate, while the government has decided not to let them shrink to a manageable size that can be regulated. Draw your own conclusiosn.
June 19, 2009 5:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
CDS is not really the reason that JPM and GS are doing well right now. They are doing well right now because neither went long subprime back in the real estate bull market. They also were more selective than Citi and others in the private equity boom - having less dollars underwritten for LBO loans that quickly went underwater.
I fully agree with you on the moral hazard part. Going forward, the banks that think they fit the administration's "profile" of too big to fail will continue to make dumb decisions because they know a bailout will come.
My post above tried to highlight that some of the "de-regulation" that the MSM reports about wasn't deregulation at all. But it does highlight how ineffective the existing regulation is.
June 19, 2009 6:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Hi Bill, yes JPM and GS are better managed, but I meant that they have been the biggest players in CDS and benefited hugely from the AIG-mediated bailout. I agree pretty much with your assessment that deregulation as such isn't to blame. It's more the reinforced sense since the early eighties that there is a government safety-net available when problems come - starting with Volcker and the Latin American crisis, the Greenspan put and now these massive subsidies.
The question to ask about the proposed reform package is whether, were these rules in place, would the crisis have been averted? The answer is clearly, No. Nobody in power saw CDS as a systemic risk factor, or saw any systemic risk at all, much less felt inclined to do something about it. Consumers and originators would have lied about mortgages, Ratings agencies would have lied about ratings, the Fed would have kept rates artificially low, Basel II would have ensured weak capital buffers, even with powers to unwind Citi in an orderly manner the administration prefered not to. New powers are useless if no one is inclined to use them.
June 19, 2009 6:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
They may have benefitted from the AIG bailout, but that was really just luck on their part. They weren't betting on the government bailing out AIG.
But Goldman is claiming that they hedged all of that AIG counterparty risk out to other institutions. But either way I completely agree with your point. All the regulation in the world would not have stopped what happened over the last couple years. People will always try to find a way around the current system.
June 19, 2009 6:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks Obey for sharing your thoughts and concerns. I agree that we are still in heavy water in all areas. Just means we can't be spectators.
June 19, 2009 9:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think this will ever be properly fixed. The entrenched political and finacial power won't allow meaningful reform to take place. There has alredy been a very public shitstorm that has had little or no effect. The kind of money thrown around by the business community pointed squarely at our lawmakers has and will continue to be a corrupting factor. And as horrible as it is there is no escaping that Obama is no less a part of this than all the rest.
Here is a list of top contributors to Obama from the last election.
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/contrib.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00009638
Here is a list for McCain.
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/contrib.php?id=N00006424&cycle2=2008&goButt2.x=9&goButt2.y=5
Please note that these weren't direct contributors but rather the sponsors of PACS that bundled the contributions.
June 19, 2009 10:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent summation. Here's what Treasury's plan should have added up to: Since deregulation was an unholy bust, we're going to re-regulate, regardless of squealing from banks and Wall Street. This plan is yet another Hope and Change disappointment - an affirmation that entrenched lobbies and wealthy sectors are re-establishing a corrupt, fixed, status-quo arrangement between government and Moneyworld.
They won. We lose.
June 19, 2009 12:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
Deregulation an unholy bust? Not really. There wasn't much de-regulation that had any impact on the credit or economic crisis. Don't believe everything you read in the paper.
June 19, 2009 11:40 PM | Reply | Permalink