According to the AIG White Paper, 5 out of AIGFP's 25 risk businesses or "books" are "almost completely wound down".  Does AIGFP have a time table for closing the balance of its active hedges and unwinding its remaining complex transactions?

Do the traders and risk managers at AIGFP have any incentive to expedite the clean-up?  Or will they continue to receive sizeable compensation for the duration of the operation, giving them a reason to proceed at a leisurely pace?

What priorities have been established for the unwinding of AIGFP's  positions?  Which books and which counterparties are being favored, and why?  What cost-benefit analysis has being conducted on alternate actions?

AIGFP is headquartered in Connecticut but operates out of London.  What government agencies or parties are specifically responsible for oversight of AIGFP's activities?  Where does the buck - pardon me, the 165 billion bucks and counting - stop?  If there are conflicting regulatory jurisdictions, nationally and internationally, is there a clear cut division of responsibility, or do the regulatory parties involved have an ad hoc committee to oversee AIGFP? 

Is the Obama administration going to make sure that the G20 meeting takes up the question of regulatory evasion by entities like AIGFP? 

Does anyone represent the interests of U.S. taxpayers on the AIG board?

Given multiple calls for AIGFP to be sheared off from AIG and separately incorporated, in order to restore the reputation and safeguard the value of the taxpayer-owned parent company, are there any impediments to immediately taking this critical step?

The single largest beneficiary of AIG largesse has been Goldman Sachs, to the tune of $12.6 Billion.  Does AIGFP have any remaining contracts with Goldman Sachs?  If not, why were these contracts favored for settlement?

Henry Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and then-Treasury Secretary, consulted in September of 2008 with regulators and bankers to determine the fate of the most wounded financial institutions.  Among those on Paulson's team was Lloyd C. Blankfein, current CEO of Goldman Sachs.  Lehman Brothers, a Goldman Sachs competitor, was allowed to fail.  AIG, with sizeable obligations to Goldman, was not.  Why isn't this appearance of blatant favoritism and egregious conflict of interest at the heart of the AIG bailout being investigated by a congressional committee, government regulatory agency or state attorney general?

Given the retrenchments required of auto workers and the term adjustments being asked of mortgage holders, why hasn't more pressure been brought to bear on AIGFP employees and counterparties?  Why hasn't bankruptcy law been amended to allow the modification of the most complex and troubling derivative contracts by a bankruptcy judge?

Why hasn't special legislation been developed to define the rights and responsibilities of government rescued companies and their employees, and to properly endow the government with the powers required to protect the interests of taxpayers and the stability of the global financial system?