Here's why Gen. David McKiernan was sacked as Afghanistan commander
Gen. David McKiernan was fired as
American commander in Afghanistan and replaced by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. This
is the first U.S. commander fired during war time since Harry Truman fired
Douglas MacArthur in the Korean War. It was so far out of the ordinary way of
treating American Generals during combat that eyebrows rose all over the place.
What the Hell happened? Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post now explains.
In mid-March, as a White House assessment of the war in Afghanistan was nearing completion, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met in a secure Pentagon room for their fortnightly video conference with Gen. David D. McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Kabul.
There was no formal agenda. McKiernan, a silver-haired former armor officer, began with a brief battlefield update. Then Gates and Mullen began asking about reconstruction and counternarcotics operations. To Mullen, they were straightforward, relevant queries, but he thought McKiernan fumbled them.
Gates and Mullen had been having doubts about McKiernan since the beginning of the year. They regarded him as too languid, too old-school and too removed from Washington. He lacked the charisma and political savvy that Gen. David H. Petraeus brought to the Iraq war.
McKiernan's answers that day were the tipping point for Mullen. Soon after, he discussed the matter with Gates, who had come to the same conclusion.
Mullen traveled to Kabul in April to confront McKiernan. The chairman hoped the commander would opt to save face and retire, but he refused. Not only had he not disobeyed orders, he believed he was doing what Gates and Mullen wanted.
You're going to have to fire me, he told Mullen.
Two weeks later, Gates did. It was the first sacking of a wartime theater commander since President Harry S. Truman dismissed Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951 for opposing his Korean War policy.
The humiliating removal of a four-star general for being too conventional reveals the ferocious intensity Gates and Mullen share over a growing war that will soon enter its ninth year. It also demonstrates their zeal to respond to President Obama's demand for rapid success in a place where foreign armies have failed for centuries.
McKiernan
is an old school American general. You don't get more hard corps old line
American than being an Armor Commander. Armor, Artillery and to a lesser
extent, tactical air (close air support), are the epitome of conventional war.
What's so old line about being an Armor General? That's a logistics war, big
army against big army. The commander who can bring the greatest numbers against
the weak point of the enemy normally wins. And what are "the greatest
numbers?"
The numbers that matter in conventional war are rounds of ammunition and tons
of ordnance. A conventional commander coordinates the firepower of more weapons
on the battlefield to greater effect than does the commander of the enemy
forces. The ultimate weapon in conventional war is a nuclear weapon. The most
important resources for the winning commander come from either the largest
economy or the greatest population. The commander's most important skills are
coordinating the use of these resources - logistics.
How do you defeat the army that posses an essentially unlimited number of
rounds of ammunition and ordinance to drop on you? The Chinese tried
overwhelming numbers of troops, which works as long as the opponent isn't losing
so badly they resort to nuclear weapons and you have enough troops. Since many
of the Chinese troops used in Korea were previously Kuo Ming Tang troops and as
such politically unreliable, they were expendable and available. But human wave
attacks were not the best solution. A few years after Korea, the Algerians
adapted Leninist guerrilla techniques and applied what is now called asymmetric
warfare against the French. You don't offer the dominating power an army for a
target. The new strategy was effective. Algeria is no longer French dominated
even though the French had both the police forces and the conventional army
with the conventional power. The asymmetric warfare technique migrated to South
Vietnam and defeated the U.S. military also.
Asymmetric warfare was a logical solution when the occupation following
American conventional invasion of Iraq was so badly screwed up by the American
conservatives from the Heritage Foundation and the Bush administration who sent
them there. The attempt to impress a foreign political ideology will always
fail with it does not match the existing culture the ideologues attempt to
impress it on. Such an effort creates a perfect ground for asymmetric warfare.
So how does it work?
Instead a conventional army, you place highly skilled and very political cadres
into the population and convince the population that the conventional forces
and police of the government are their enemy. That is done in several ways.
First, make promises that, given power, the cadre will focus on and provide for
the needs of the population. Whatever can be done to back these promises up
makes them more credible, so the cadres have humanitarian needs organizations -
with political brands. This is easier when the government has no similar humanitarian
efforts.
Second, conduct guerrilla operations against the enemy military and police that
cause them to attack the population as the source of those operations. The
extreme version of this is terrorist operations in which the attackers are
prepared to and plan to die in the attacks. The most effective of these cause a
massive counter reaction by conventional forces against the general population.
Such efforts also create martyrs who have died to benefit the population. "Collateral damage" of innocent civilians is inherently a loss on the battlefield. It
really helps the insurgents when the government is inherently corrupt, since
the population will always recognize this and act to reject it. How do you
think the Iraqi population reacted to the corruption of Blackwater and
Halliburton? Was there any doubt that these organizations represented the Bush
administration? Since the conservative American philosophy of individualism
with no government regulation encourages such corruption, the Conservative philosophy
creates its own enemies.
Afghanistan is a political war. Where is the effective conventional warfare
counter for these asymmetric techniques? Conventional warfare has only one
solution to asymmetric warfare techniques - destroy every last member of the cadre of insurgents, and if they
keep being recreated from the population (as they will be), conduct genocide on
the population. This has been the Soviet reaction in Chechnya. It hasn't worked
very well there, and with the most modern forms of journalism, works even less
well. The media has become a major theater in such wars now. That's because the
battleground is the minds of the population involved.The actual geography being fought over is now little more than a stage on which the real battle is played out for the minds of the onlookers.
LtC. John A. Nagl in his superb book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Malaya and Vietnam describes the traditional U.S. military
conventional war culture beautifully. It is a culture that permeates both the
military forces and, more important, the American political culture. You can
tell that Gen. Petraeus and Gen. Chrystal are violating it because they are
accused of being "political generals." The American culture of war
fighting looks down on "political generals", but that is the essence
of fighting an asymmetric war successfully.
In the American political culture, Americans fight wars against other armies.
When America is at peace, the military is subordinate to the political leaders,
but when America is at war, the military leaders determine how the war will be
fought. That includes the political effects, because modern wars are total wars
in which both the military and the civilians are combatants. Let's not forget
that both WW I and WW II were won in large part because the American economy
was nationalized and directed by the government planners. That's the definition
of total war. In total war, there is no essential difference between the
civilian sector and the military sector. America fights modern wars in which
scientific logic based on observable facts dominates the actions taken by both
armies and civilians. West Point was created in 1803 and run by the Army Corps
of Engineers to create an officer corps dominated by scientific thinking rather
than the traditional thinking of European armies. West Point succeeded. It has
been a major element in creating modern America.
By the way, buy a copy of colonel Nagl's book. Most intelligent and promotable
U.S. officers already have.
As a company grade officer during the Vietnam War, I read Mao's writings on how
to fight a war. His techniques were inherently political. They started with a dedicated
political cadre and worked up to a conventional army, but only as each stage
before it succeeded. Let me say it again. The stages were inherently political, not military. As one who
firmly believed in logistics and the idea that the biggest battalions win, I
was hard to convince. But I was thinking on the wrong battlefield. The
conventional war battlefield is just that - armies, trenches and ordnance. The
modern battlefield is men's minds. Thomas Kuhn would describe this as a paradigm
shift. George Lakoff would describe it as "reframing the issue." Both are
correct. But who would have thought that shifting the paradigm or reframing the
issue would determine who might win a war? But it does.
Gen. David McKiernan was not able to make the shift or reframe the issue.
That became obvious to Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen.
The
fact that McKiernan was unsuited to win that war was demonstrated by his refusal to
accept a face-saving way out of his command. Afghanistan is simply not a war suitable for an armor general who sees war as a
challenge for an engineer or logistician. It is a war for a politician.
I don't blame McKiernan. I don't trust political generals, either. I was a logistician.
That's my generation. McKiernan was one of our very best. But then, so was
General Westmoreland in Vietnam. Let's not forget that we didn't win that one,
either.
















Regarding Gen.Petraeus' 'success' in Iraq: Thomas Ricks thinks the war there is approximately half over, and its worst days may be ahead of us. His victories were certainly 'political' but likely insubstantial. (In truth, this was undoubtedly the best that could have been done, given how we had already unleashed the chaos without any provocation whatsoever.)
Can Gen. McChyrstal create the illusion of results in Afghanistan? That is what Obama seems to need.
August 18, 2009 2:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't know what it will take to win in Afghanistan. I do know, however, that someone who thinks like Westmoreland (more troops and battle of attrition * ) will fail.
I remember as a Lieutenant wondering how American military officers were dealing with the political aspects of the war in Vietnam. It seemed to be military technicians going up against Communist politicians. Since I sat the war out in Germany reading about it and was a REMF to boot, I had no combat experience. Combat experience was and remains the qualification to be taken serious. John Nagl has that qualification, and I suspect his view has a chance of succeeding.
What I am sure of is that the end result in Afghanistan will not be anything that most Americans will describe as "winning." It will have some elements that are favorable for America and a whole lot of elements that are not. We are going to reach a point that seems to be stable and get the Hell out. Whether it is, in fact, stable will depend on the Afghans themselves. It also will be based on a lot of American efforts that are for the most part not military in nature. It's a political war in a very foreign culture, after all.
As for Iraq, the only way we could have "won" there is not invade in the first place. Everything after that has been downhill. The low point may have been passed, but the best we can do is get the Hell out and try to maintain some kind of positive relations with both some of the Iraqi's and the government. Again, the end result there is not going to be the result of our military actions. The outcome is political.
I very much dislike American generals who play politics here in America. But no general who is unaware of American politics is going to get the support he needs to succeed either in Iraq or Afghanistan. And the in-country operations in both countries will be more political than logistics.
The general there is also going to have to consider the battle for the heart and mind of Thomas Ricks. The illusion of results is also going to be necessary.
As someone heavily trained in looking at maps and thinking that was the battlefield, I am not ready to tell anyone how to win a war where the battlefield is the minds of the in-country population, their government, the media (both international and American) and also the minds of the American population. The Corps of Engineers just doesn't offer that map. What I can say is that Gen. McKiernan didn't recognize the battlefield he was operating on.
*A severe oversimplification, I know. But it gets at the essence.
August 18, 2009 3:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
A very interesting analysis.
When I read the target article on the sacking of Gen. McKiernan, I have to admit that my mind was not wholly unprejudiced. I felt that the general was probably sacked for being, well, impolitic- which is, as you explain, more or less true. But I was also forced to agree that Gates and Mullen were probably right to do so. The war is political- and the body politic in question is not just the Afghan and the U.S. ones, but also, crucially, Pakistan's.
The Taliban are really the unacknowledged offspring of ours and Pakistan's. Although this is not a factor in our domestic politics, this is a huge embarrassment in Pakistan's. I hope someone somewhere- in the State Department, maybe- is able to use this embarrassing fact to our advantage. (In the world of the paradigm shift, this could happen.)
August 18, 2009 6:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent points. I think that the overreach by the Taliban into Pakistan has led to a break between the Taliban and their supporters in the Pakistani ISI. At least that is how I interpret the movement of the Pakistani military into the Swat valley.
It seems that the Pakistani middle class had the shit scared out of them as they realized that the Taliban was a loose tiger and bent on taking them over. That may have been what was necessary to break up the focus of the Pakistani military on the fear of India.
I'll be interested in seeing if the Americans, British and Indian diplomats are able to use this set of events to allay the Pakistani fears of an Indian war against Pakistan. It seems reasonable if the Brits and the Americans can guarantee Pakistan's independence from the Indian military, and if the Indian government can tame their own internal politics and allay the apparent threat to Pakistan.
The terrorist groups focused on Kashmir, of course, recognize this danger. That will be one motivation for the recent attack on Mumbai. Perhaps the threat the Kashmir-focused terrorist groups present to the Pakistani government is becoming more clear to them. Up until now it is my impression that the ISI considered those groups as effective weapons against the Indian military.
That whole thing is going to have to be worked out before we can get out of Afghanistan. Which means that both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to have central governments that can prevent terrorist groups from operating on their soil. Neither has ever had a government that strong.
But I can remember when the Sheriff of Plaquemines Parish Louisiana (south of New Orleans) was able to keep federal officers enforcing desegregation out of that Parish, too. And Galveston, TX had a well-known sea side gambling casino in violation of State law until the late 1950's. When a central government is threatened, it will go after the threats or it disappears.
In the case of Pakistan I think the threat to the middle class will be decisive. But as far as I can tell, there is no middle class in Afghanistan and there won't be until after there has been peace and stability there for a decade or more. That makes the border with Pakistan critical. It has to be closed to the Taliban.
Both Islamabad and Kabul are in the cross-hairs at the moment. They've both tried agreements with the local leaders, and they haven't worked. If the central governments can't provide the first function of any government - offering social and economic stability and peace - those governments will soon be gone. India, Britain and the U.S. all have a big stake in the outcome there, India most of all.
And of course, it's not reported but I feel certain that the Chinese government has a stake in keeping the disorganization in the Afghanistan/Pakistan/Kashmir/India area roiling. History and geography strongly suggests that.
Fun, huh? As far as I know, only the Horn of Africa centered on Somalia and possibly Yemen present a similar level of danger and political turbulence. And no one there has nukes.
August 18, 2009 5:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
"The ultimate weapon in conventional war is a nuclear weapon. The most important resources for the winning commander come from either the largest economy or the greatest population. "
The ultimate weapon in conventional war is not a nuclear weapon. The distinction between conventional war and thermo-nuclear war was made years ago, and is still intact.
And no, the most important resources don't come from the largest economy or the greatest population, they come from the percentage of resources that either country is willing to dedicate to the particular war in question. Those are theoretical, final limiting factors, not the initial or primary limiting factors.
The oversimplified idea that any country is homogenously behind any war that the leaders of the country are willing to fight is ridiculously over-simplified. It depends very largely on how much a country is willing to spend to be constantly prepared for war, at least at the onset of war, before anybody goes through any protracted gearing-up.
August 18, 2009 8:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
When making the distinction between conventional war and unconventional warfare, a nuke is just the extreme of conventional technological weaponry. It's the biggest possible ordnance. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a technological and tactical distinction within the mindset of conventional warfare.
When fighting a conventional war between two conventional armies, the advantage still goes to the side with the greatest economic advantage, an advantage that can sometimes be weakened by throwing more people into the battle. And yes, that is a theoretical limit that can be offset by properly sequencing and deploying resources against an enemy. But this is a blog, not a dissertation. In making the distinction between the conventional war mindset and that capable of dealing with unconventional war, expect some simplifications in other areas.
August 18, 2009 10:59 AM | Reply | Permalink
We have already lost Afganistan. You don't have to study Mao. Sun Tzu wrote the book on both types of war, and his credo that prolonged conflict brings certainty of defeat to the invading army is as true today as it was when he wrote it.
We had 12 months to "win" in Afganistan. Bush sacrificed any chance we may have had (and I don't think we had any chance, as it is an unwinnable geography) was squandered when resources were diverted to Iraq.
Afganistan can't be won, it's never been won by any army in the history of the world. Every country that ever tried lost for the same reason - the locals prolonged the conflict and destroyed the political will to send soldiers to die to keep it. We do not profit by our war in Afganistan. Once we are forced to leave Iraq, we'll leave Afganistan, too.
August 18, 2009 11:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think that Sun Tzu was right. Afghanistan is almost a textbook case illustrating his principle.
The fact is we did not desire to win in Afghanistan. It's downright eerie, when you think about it. Nations do not normally respond to provocations such as those launched by al Qaeda with such disinterest.
Panic, irrational strategic blunders, wild gambles, anything-But not disinterest.
This cries out for an explanation.
August 18, 2009 5:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
I thought from the beginning of the Bush/Cheney administration on 2001 that Cheney and the Neocons controlling foreign policy considered the only dangerous terrorism to be state-sponsored terrorism. In the case of Afghanistan, since there was no state, the terrorism that came from there could not possibly be a threat.
This went back to the writings of Claire Sterling from the 80's, and it was displayed by the effort to deploy Star Wars. That was an effort to control terrorism by controlling the state sponsors. Actually dealing with terrorists is too messy to handle. I attribute the bushies' disdain for actually dealing with the causes of terrorism to refusal to recognize that populations and cultures make choices that the government does not necessarily direct. Then add the Bushies' general disdain for anything "Clinton." Those factors should explain to the Bush administration disinterest in the Clinton administration focus on terrorism by al Qaeda. I think the attitude of the early Bush administration is easily explained.
Needless to say, 9/11 was a Hell of a shock to them, perhaps more than it would have been to a Democratic administration. As far as Bush and Cheney were concerned, 9/11 really came out of the blue. At the time Cheney was SecDef his assumption that only state-sponsored terrorism was really dangerous might have been reasonable. But he missed the eight years of the Clinton period and wasn't up to speed. He missed the meaning behind Oklahoma city bombing with it's easily constructed bomb as well as the threats to the Atlanta Olympics and the threat involved around Y2K. My bet is that he and the NeoCons attributed all that to what they considered the essential incompetence of the Clinton administration, not to real changes in the system of threats.
Then when 9/11 did occur, the NeoCons and Cheney attributed it to the instability of the entire Middle East. Again, this was a state-focused explanation. Going into Afghanistan was clearly a tough nut to crack, and required nation-building to boot. The NeoCons don't do nation building, remember? It's easier to go after a national armed force with our military structured and trained the way it was . (Less so now, of course.)
But the conservatives do emotionally satisfying operations that look good in preference to more rational but less satisfying operations. And we had already taken the Iraqi military down once, even if we did leave the job unfinished. (Reasonable, but not satisfying.) So what could settle the entire Middle East better than a massive demonstration of American military prowess and the willingness to use it better than to invade Iraq and finish the job that George H. W. Bush left undone? Shock and Awe is emotionally satisfying. And it's not easy to prove it WON'T work. (Sophistry, of course. It's the conservative stock in trade.)
So instead of the uncertain and difficult job of nation-building in Afghanistan, the Bushies chose the comparatively easy military invasion of Iraq as a demonstration project intending to restructure the culture of the entire Middle East. To do it they starved the difficult job needed in Afghanistan.
Anyone with a smattering of world and Middle Eastern history knows that the peoples in the Middle East have been invaded regularly since Sargon at least, and it's normally been the invaders who became Middle Eastern rather than the Middle Easterners whose culture was changed. You'll notice that Persia still exists. Updated a bit, but still identifiably there.
Ask a conservative who Darius or Sargon were, and they'll be scrambling for their Classic comic books or Conan comic books to find an answer. All the history they need comes from Adam Smith, Hayek and Ayn Rand. And their resulting ideology is perfect. If it fails it merely means that the persons implementing the conservative philosophy were insufficiently conservative, so the next person needs to be more extreme.
Is it any surprise that the conservatives in charge of Congress and the Executive Branch have given America the worst set of disasters since the Coolidge administration set up the Great Depression with most of the same economic policies that Reagan brought in with him.
August 18, 2009 6:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
You're right, even the Mongols were assimilated, and they were one group who weren't squeamish about genocide.
August 19, 2009 10:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
A conspiracy theorist who is also a science fiction fan might argue that Afganistan was our Selusa Secundis and Iraq is our Arrakis.
In other words, there was never a real desire to win in Afganistan, only to use it to train up a dedicted cadre of fantatical warriors. There was never a real desire to win in Iraq, only to maintain enough chaos and conflict to pirate its natural resources.
August 19, 2009 1:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Not farfetched at all. In fact, if less reasonable than Richard's answer to my question, it is far more satisfying emotionally (a fact which is, I think, significant).
With Guantanomo and the 'Black sites' being the dungeons of Giedi Prime, desmesne of House Halliburton..
August 19, 2009 7:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
As I recall, Bush and Cheney did not want to go into Afghanistan at all. They were forced to do so by public opinion. I wasn't surprised at the way they starved the effort for resources.
August 29, 2009 1:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
Do you also support the idea that General Petraeus brought "charisma and ploitical savvy to the Iraq war"?
And what do you think about the Generals who supported the war, but were paid by the different news organizations?
Full disclosure: I often thought that Petraeus's eye shifts and micro-expressions denoted him either lying or fudging, but I am certainly not a pro in the field.
August 18, 2009 12:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm no pro in determining what charisma is, so I can't say if he brought it to the Iraq war. When I watched him testify, I saw an ambitious man working the crowd in Congress and I inferred that he was doing it for personal gain. As I wrote earlier, I distrust political generals and Petraeus seems to be a classic of that genre. Still, that seems to be part of what is needed to succeed (however success is defined - another political process, by the way) in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
One thing that I don't think anyone will disagree with though is that Petraeus went into Iraq and actually collected information on the ground, then adjusted operations based on the information that was developed. That hadn't been done before. Until then the war was run to suit Rumsfeld's wishes. Rumsfeld knew what he expected and didn't listen to anyone else. Typical ideologue behavior.
As far as I could tell, the entire invasion of Iraq was designed to suit the politics in the U.S. and to advance the conservative ideologies. The Iraq war seems to have been conducted as a shadow play and filtered through a neutered media primarily for American public consumption, with the script written in Washington. The script writers knew how they expected the invasion to turn out and refused to listen to any objections. The last thing the Washington script writers wanted was the kind of surprise the insurgents threw at the Americans. That is in my opinion the main reason why Rumsfeld refused for so long to acknowledge we were fighting an insurgency. It didn't fit the script written by the Heritage Foundation. The politicians never acknowledged the Iraq insurgency until after the American occupation of Iraq had effectively failed.
If there was a real rational goal to the invasion, no one has yet determined what it was. All we know is what the Bush administration thought they could sell. My best bet it that the real goal was the kind of macho posturing that suits American conservatives.
The American conservatives often seem to choose emotionally satisfying solutions over rational ones that are worked out logically and based on facts. So do religious fundamentalists, by the way, which has been one reason the alliance between the conservatives and the fundamentalist worked for so long. Both groups then reject or ignore facts that appear that contradict their emotionally satisfying solutions for as long as possible. That's my best explanation why they so frequently attempt to bury or hide embarrassing facts and why they make decisions in secrecy so often.
Petraeus changed that big time, and put the operation in Iraq on a rational basis rather than the apparently emotional one the Bush administration and the conservatives used to get us stuck there. I give Petraeus credit for that. The American military has learned as an institution that the facts you bury or hide from kill soldiers and lose battles, so they tend not to do that as much. Of course, I still suspect that Petraeus is aiming to run for President.
I don't know exactly how it came about that the military took the war back from the politicians when Petreaus went in. It may have been that he was the talented man on the ground who demonstrated that he had the skills to rationally correct some of the things the politicians had screwed up so badly, because he was certainly that.
But another possibility is that the military leaders in the Pentagon waited until the American public recognized the utter failure of the Rumsfeld/Cheney/Bush conservative-run war and took back management of it from the irrational politicians when they sent Petraeus in. The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
As for the paid flacks who used their rank and connections to push the war on TV - they were used by the politicians and did not have the needed integrity not to sell out their fellow soldiers and the American public. Greed and personal ambition trumped honor and honesty. For those who were West Pointers, they certainly did not understand the meaning of the Honor Code. They were Judas goats for the corrupt conservative politicians like Rumsfeld. They led American soldiers into a trap for no reason better than personal gain. In any gathering of honorable men *, they should be shunned. All of them. I realize that is a rather mild and tepid judgment, but it's the best I have to offer for what it is worth.
* (I am unaware of any women in that group - probably an accident caused by the inability of women to rise to that rank in the profession until very recently, the absence of combat arms career routes for women and the continued general cultural bias against women warriors. The news organizations may have concluded that no woman had the necessary public credibility to act as a convincing TV spokesperson for a war. Have any women written books on the military prosecution of the war other than from the point of view of how women are effected?
It's going to be interesting to see how that changes in the future.)
August 18, 2009 5:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
I think the nature of this genus you have identified, the 'political' general, dictates, as Wendy observes, facial language indicative of lying. Politicians lie. (Full disclosure: It was Petraeus' willingness to 'consult' with the WH first, before meeting Congress, that finally drove me to write to my Congressman to investigate whether this violated the agreement Congress had drawn up for his progress report, and if it did, to impeach the President. It is inarguable that Petraeus is malleable- that is the downside of the virtue Richard points to above, that he does not have the mind set in stone that constitutes the rather Paleolithic CNS of Rumsfeld and fellows. It isn't the inevitable concomitant of a modernized brain: It may be a trait shared by all 'political generals,' who are a small, and maybe new, subset of the species).
Petraeus, in fact, reminds me of another politician- Obama.
August 18, 2009 5:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
Let me very strongly recommend John Nagle's excellent book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. He analyzes both the British military in Malaya and the American military in Vietnam from the point of view of how much each was a learning organization. His conclusion was that the British military was a learning organization and the American military was not, explaining why the British prevailed in Malaya and the Americans failed in Vietnam.
But he then uses the history and resulting culture of each military and the overall national culture each came from to explain the difference in the military outcomes. It especially interested me that both the U.S. and British military forces learned the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare in WW II, and forgot it after. But when faced with failure in Malaya, the British went back to their history of small unit wars against insurgents as an Imperial army, while in Vietnam the American forces went back to their culture of major industrial wars between large armies from the Civil War, through WW I and through the part of WW II we Americans focus on most, Europe. That culture failed in Vietnam until after Tet. By then it was too late to adapt, although the U.S. did adapt.
Then after the loss of Vietnam, the U.S. military went back to focusing on an industrialized war between the U.S. and the USSR,again completely forgetting the lessons relearned at great expense during the last part of Vietnam. Petraeus went back into Iraq after the Rumsfeld reign had totally failed and relearned the lessons of counter insurgency.
Nagl paints a very compelling picture. I haven't seen a better description of what has been happening to and with our ground forces. When I first joined the military in 1961 I was in a reserve unit with a large number of Korean War vets and we were using Korean War towed Artillery and M1 rifles. During the Vietnam war a lot of the training was in using large combat forces, artillery and airpower against the Victor Charlie (didn't work very well) and search and destroy missions. I left active duty and went back to the reserves in 1979 just as we abandoned Westmoreland's large number of troops and war of attrition strategy for one more appropriate to counterinsurgency. But as a reservist, I planned and conducted large unit field training missions based on the latest doctrine out of Fort Leavenworth, and by 1976 we were focused back on a Soviet invasion of Germany through the Fulda Gap. By the time I retired in 1986 the West Point Lieutenant Colonels I worked with had all entered active duty after Vietnam. It was back to a big army logistics oriented military force again, just what America has always been most comfortable with.
Both the Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq were big army wars against another major armed force. Panama and Grenada were big army operations also. Sort of like large scale training exercises. All of these were conducted using the large army cultural model. Somalia was, of course, considered a Clinton failure. That's notwithstanding the fact that the real failures were command failures that caused mission creep. The commanders simply did not know how to deal with the kind of war they had in Somalia. That was the same problem as the insurgency in Iraq once the initial attack was over. Rumsfeld and Bremer have a lot to answer for. (Bremer, interestingly, is not only a dedicated conservative, but he is also a very conservative Catholic who fits well into the religious fundamentalist mold.)
Big army logistics wars against another real army are totally unlike the small unit highly political counterinsurgencies we are seeing today. These counterinsurgencies require primarily police operations combined with massive Intelligence gathering, and supported by nation-building efforts. The military exists primarily as a support to all this, and should come under the control of the police and the local government. Needless to say, this is a massive culture shock to the conservatives and especially to the NeoCons.
Read Nagl's book if you want to know what is happening to America militarily. I suspect that Nagl himself and his book had a lot to do with Petraeus' strategic changes in Iraq. Last I heard he was the go-to guy for the Pentagon in counterinsurgency.
August 18, 2009 8:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
Richardxx, excellent post. Thank you.
I haven't had a chance to read Nagle but I am curious as to your thoughts on operations like this.
My understanding is that the success of Peterus in Iraq largely rested on a threefold strategy 1. an immediate show of force to staunch the bleeding (the surge), 2. separating Sunnies from Shiites (you know roadblocks and 20' concrete walls)and forcing them into their respective enclaves, and 3. bribing the leaders of the militias (see link).
From Shaun Bauer's article:
Then you hope for the best, and pray to god you don't run out of money or domestic support (in both locales), cause then you are toast.
Seems to me that this is a short term strategy that can only work if you last decades without pissing off the locals, long enough to effectively build a new social structure with an economy that generates enough jobs that motivate the people to support the status quo.
The problem I see is that without either a shared common threat, or absolution devastation, proud cultures don't really give you the time. So we really only have money.
I would like to hear your thoughts. And also I would be very interested in a post on thoughts of the possible success of a Ngl strategy in Afghanistan. What does that look like.
P.S. are you out of you're Freaking mind? :)
August 19, 2009 3:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Interesting question. And yes, of course I am out of my freaking mind. Is there any doubt? It's a lot more fun than any of the alternatives.
You're right that it seems to be a short term strategy - for us, but how long do we need to be there? My (very limited) reading of Middle Eastern history indicates that civilization and politics started there. Politics have been practiced there with great intensity for longer than just about anywhere else in the world. If there is any group of people in the world that understands how to manipulate foreigners, it's the current residents of Iraq and Persia/Iran. We aren't tricking or manipulating them, it's they who are most likely to come out ahead in the game.
Of course, as the currently resident military barbarians in Iraq, I'm not sure we even have much of an idea what it means to come out ahead there. The Iraqis are the permanent residents and our goal has to be to let go of the tar-baby, get loose and get out.
One thing I am reasonably sure of is that the strategy you describe seems to be based on a reading of the actual facts on the ground. That is a major departure from the Bush administration practice of planning everything with the primary goal of manipulating the American media and the American voting public to satisfy the strange and primitive tribal demands of the American conservative base.
I am coming to the conclusion that America is politically split between two different cultures (or two tribes according to Digby.) One is a primarily rural traditional culture based on primarily agricultural values (the conservatives) and the other is based on more modern rational urban and secular values shaped largely by industrialism. The very important German sociologist Max Weber described these groups a century ago. Among other differences, the two cultures have very different decision styles.
The conservative culture is primarily authoritarian. The decisions are more emotional than rational, often based on what feels satisfying rather than what is most rational. (Hit your enemy instead of dealing with him rationally.) The conservatives manipulated America into invading Iraq in the first place without much of a clue regarding what Iraq really is all about or what we were going to do with Iraq once we took it. As I wrote elsewhere, the conservatives seem to make decisions based on what feels good rather than on what can rationally achieve a useful goal. Our military, however, is both highly industrial in nature and extremely rationalistic. That means they make decisions based on collecting facts, analyzing them, determining a goal, and rationally calculating the most efficient way of achieving that goal. Then they start to do it, and keep measuring the success or failure to adjust to better get what is desired. (In practice it's not quite as linear and sequential as it is when laid out on paper, but those are the steps.)
Based on this model, I'd guess that the situation you described above is the result of the recognition that the invasion of Iraq was essentially purposeless, has failed on any possible useful level and has no evident future value. Our rational goal, then, has to be to get as much of our military out of there as soon as possible with a minimum of blowback.
I think you are right that we don't have much time left in Iraq. Nor do we have much influence beyond money. Withdrawing our troops removes any real power advantages, but that's going to be our best move for our own purposes. If they wanted us to stay, they'd tell us, and I haven't seen much evidence of that. Nor would I expect it. As you say, they are a proud people. We are going to have to trust them to organize their own society. Anything else is a paternalistic fantasy (something else I expect from our traditionalistic conservative culture.)
Anyway, those are my thoughts on the subject for what they are worth.
August 19, 2009 2:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
What a fulsome reply; thank you! The question you raised about what drove the Pentagon Military to reclaim the direction of the war; if you think of any more answers, we would, no doubt, all be fascinated to hear your theories. It looks like this blog will be up a full 24 hours.
It just seems to me that Someone must have been key to selling the Generals on the idea; it had been run so thoroughly by Rumsfeld and who, Cheney?
How interesting your understanding is, thanks.
August 18, 2009 5:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks. But I'm just looking for patterns that make sense. I'm throwing them up here as much to get criticism and improved patterns as anything else.
Much of the logic seems to work, but what am I missing? As that great philosopher Rumsfeld once said, I don't know what it is that I don't know.
I know it's unlikely, but is there any chance that you are my new State Senator? The one who replaced a Republican last November? I gotta ask.
August 18, 2009 8:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Gosh, no. Is her/his name Wendy Davis? I am a Coloradan with zero wish to be in government. I was a long-time activist, and got asked to run for CO state senate once, but hoo boy! Would I have been a sacrificail lamb!
August 18, 2009 9:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yep. Wendy Davis. A bit new to the Senate, and she started by sending emails out that described how she felt about her new situation. I can't say that impressed me much. I still haven't adapted real well to the female tendency to focus on feelings and relationships and talk about them. Especially in mass emails to strangers.
I've been told that I have a goal-oriented engineering mindset, something I found very accurate when I first heard it. It sort of explained why when my ex-wife and I used to have arguments about how she felt about something and got upset, and I would respond by telling her to calm down get rational and the two of us would work it out rationally, she would so often go shrieking into another room, leaving me puzzled and confused. (Not the reason for our divorce.) I have since learned to comprehend the communications problem and to laugh at it, but I'll probably never be comfortable with it.
Yes, I do identify with Dilbert a great deal. I probably ought to use a picture of Dilbert as my avatar. Except that Dilbert doesn't have an illustrious and distinguished beard as I do. ;-}
But my new Senator acquitted herself well in her first biennial Legislative session in spite of her unfortunate tendency to spew on about how she felt in mass emails, so I have forgiven her her feminine emotionality. Just defeating a conservative Republican was worth it, and boy was he shocked when he lost! Beyond that, she is quite competent as a legislator. So I can adapt. I guess.
August 18, 2009 11:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
What fascinating analysis, and from a Vietnam veteran. As an ignorant draft dodger, this really moves me.
Maybe I just skip the proper readings on this current mess. But I have not be introduced to this kind of take on the politics of this war.
I also notice new alliances taking place over there via MSM.
Thank you for this Richard. I will have to reread this of course.
August 18, 2009 5:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks. The analysis is, as you can see, quite ideocentric. I'm trying to make sense of what seems obvious to me.
It sort of surprises me that I am not getting responses that tell me I am out of my freaking mind. Instead I am getting encouragement. What more can a blogger want?
Don't overrate the Vietnam Veteran bit. I spent the time in Germany in what was in fact a peacetime army situation filled with a lot of war time veterans. I spent much of my last year in Germany working for a Major who spent much of Tet stuck on the top of a downtown Saigon hotel with an M-14 rifle for company.
I'm just a Vietnam Era Veteran, and a REMF to boot. (That's a Rear Echalon M**er F**er. I understand there is a new nickname for such people these days.) A real Vietnam Veteran spent time in country. I can't even qualify for Veterans of Foreign Wars. There is a status pecking order, you see, and I fit way down on it. All I really have to offer is some observations, some facts, and a bit of logic to tie them together.
August 18, 2009 9:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Very interesting post and follow-ups. Gobbled it up. Thanks.
Are you familiar with William Lind? I see occasional posts by him at anti.war.com. Here is an example: http://original.antiwar.com/lind/2009/06/29/going-nowhere-fast/
He is, I fear, a bit on the creepy culturally conservative side, but seems to have an honorable, patriotic interest in helping to move the US towards a non-interventionist foreign policy. He writes mostly about Fourth Generation Warfare theory and how we are always mired in fighting Second Generation, or at best, Third Generation, to our detriment.
August 18, 2009 8:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Lind article is quite interesting. One thing about it that strikes me is the evaluation of what Kelley Vlahos wrote. It seems to miss the point of what Nagl actually said.
Just consider the title of Nagle's book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. The phrase "Learning to eat soup with a knife" is a quote from T.E. Lawrence describing how extremely difficult it is to do counterinsurgency successfully. I'd starve to death trying to eat soup with a knife. That doesn't sound particularly optimistic to me.
The British did succeed in Malaya after a long time and many false starts, but not many who have taken on the challenge have actually succeeded. America's Vietnam experience or the experience in Somalia seems a lot more likely to me. Unfortunately, the result of failure appears to often be that sooner or later we have to go back and try again. Certainly Somalia suggests that. We sort of lucked out that North Vietnam was able to get control of South Vietnam. But they were the source of much of the problem. Could we coexist with a Taliban-run Afghanistan?
August 18, 2009 9:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
thanks for the interesting thread and all the time you have spent on replying to comments.
August 18, 2009 8:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
I merely follow humbly in the footsteps of the master, dickday.
Actually, no kidding. I wouldn't be writing this way if he hadn't encouraged me, and the responses are patterned on what I seem to see him doing.
[So blame him - not me - if it goes bad. That's the conservative side of me speaking, of course.]
August 18, 2009 9:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well surely that will just make dickday's day! I thank him for pushing you to share your expertise on topic.
August 19, 2009 12:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
I just want to compliment you on this fine post. It is times like this that I really despise the 24 hour rule.
August 18, 2009 10:08 PM | Reply | Permalink
yup, in all of the various past software systems here, everyone could follow a discussion like this for months if they wanted to. And without feeling of pressure that you had to comment immediately or it would be over, it could be thoughtful. In my opinion, an even more important benefit was that people who might have equal expertise on topic to Richard, who are too busy in real life to spend lots of time checking an internet forum each day, would see it being discussed when they stopped by, and jump in.
August 19, 2009 12:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
What TPM Cafe needs is another section that shows topics with ongoing discussions, no matter how old they are.
August 19, 2009 1:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
So how do we arrange such a setup?
I've long wanted a website that does exactly that - discusses ideas in an essentially seminar type format. I also have no real clue how one could put it together.
Who has the facts we need? What resources and skills are necessary? What are the pitfalls? Who would moderate it? How would subjects be selected and presented?
It would certainly resemble TPM Cafe, but I think it would extend beyond it.
Dickday, where are you?
August 19, 2009 3:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
TPM could do it.
Currently, there are two reader topic areas on the main Cafe page. One shows recent (24-hour)topics with most recommends. The other shows most recent topics.
All it needs is a third topic area, one that tracks recent comments (24-hour) rather than posting time. Posts than maintain a high level of daily comments would automatically filter to the top, much in the way topics are bumped in regular forums. A mechanism would have to be put in place to keep the owner of the post from bumping his own topics onto the list, but otherwise it wouldn't be that difficult to accomplish, maintain, or moderate.
I suggest begging Josh to have his web people add that to the Cafe page.
August 19, 2009 3:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
I think you have your conservatives mixed up, Richard. The Neocons are the Democracy promoters and nation builders, albeit really bad ones. The Conservatives are the realists that only do war if it serves America's interests. Cheney had all Neocons advising him, including Libby, Wolfowitz, Adelman, Perle and the Feckless Feith, but he's not considered a Neocon. His interests and theirs just happened to call for war with Iraq. Bush is just a flip-flopper. :-)
Like Mr. Conspiracy, I think we can stick a fork in Afghanistan. If the goal hasn't been accomplished by now after 9 years, the only way of winning it is if there are no more hearts and minds to win. The Davids in the world have figured out how to handle Goliath when Goliath comes invading with a hard to hide military. The kinetic route of trying to kill or capture every terrorist is not realistic in a country where the "opposing army" can move from cave to transnational cave with no forwarding address.
Your estimate of a decade for enough stability in Afghanistan to create a middle class is optimisic. I think Pat Lang called for a century and Jeffrey Record was muttering about the 561 years it took to get from the Magna Carta to the founding of the US. Time is on their side, not ours.
I very much enjoyed this, Richard. Haven't read Nagl yet, but I'm up on the insurgency through Steven Metz and the military through Jeffrey Record and the other experts in the SSI. I hope you post again, soon.
August 18, 2009 11:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
There are so many pieces to the Afghan war that crafting a strategy that looks like success to all concerned parties is an exercise in futility.
All the pieces have pro and con arguments. Some valid and some not. Agreement is hard to come by. The American public has a sense this war was bungled from day one. Karzai is seen as a puppet of the U.S. and has a limited ability to actually control the rugged mountainous regions or the Pakistan border. Heroin production is a huge problem. The up and down resurgence of Taliban forces is stretching U.S. resources with Afghan military forces barely in the game. Historic perspectives strongly suggest foreign intervention is not a workable solution. Localized factions operate autonomously of a central government. The populace is more loyal to these local regimes and makes it all but impossible to create a nationally unified political structure.
I see our Afghan operations as a waste of time and resources. There are just too many divergent pieces that defy establishing a strategy that might produce a politically, economically and socially rational state. I don't think it can be done.
August 19, 2009 1:46 AM | Reply | Permalink
A couple of things I don't see mentioned above is that America's tendency to militarism is supported in a big way by the MIC (Military Industrial Complex) and the so called "Intelligence Community". This community has tremendous influence and is able to lie with impunity to the president and congress as well as influence news worldwide through their contacts and controlled organizations. This Military Intelligence Community MUST keep their budgets up. They do this by manipulating news, intelligence reports and situations in other countries. They also have files on most prominent people and can blackmail them to greater or lesser extents. All this, a secret budget and at least $60 billion a year in funds that aren't audited publically are a guarantee of corruption.
August 19, 2009 1:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for this, Richard. Really useful stuff. And I share Larry's sentiments above...
August 19, 2009 8:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
It had that, for several years. It was called "Discussion Tables." The entries themselves were vetted, too, by votes of a group of "most trusted users" (trusted users got to be so by getting good ratings from the community on their comments.) Marshall decided to sack it with this most current incarnation, which happened during the primary. He said on one meta thread that he instead considered having sections for long term discussions by invitation only, but decided against it as being too cliquish or elitist.
I must admit that I do think the less thoughtful, more breaking, more emotive, churn set-up, along with the "American Idol" style competition for getting on lists, and the need for those interested to check in often, has been very successful for them in getting a larger audience, which is necessary to get big advertisers to pay the bills for the editorial side.
August 19, 2009 3:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
The most detailed, contentious (and daunting) discussions of the Afghanistan connundrums are on a COIN-centric blog hosted by Andrew Exum/Abu Muqawama. Nagl is his boss @ CNAS. Exum was recently in Afghanistan as a part of a strategy group assembled by the new guy in charge, General McChrystal:
Although the commenters are allover the map in as far as their opinions about our present courses in Afghanistan go, many of them have had relevent experience and make their arguments from that perspective. Exum offers fair warning :
I should also say, though, that, again, anyone who is a bit too confident in either their support for or criticism of the war in Afghanistan should be approached with wariness. Although my internet persona is often casually arrogant and impressed with himself, Afghanistan is a country and a conflict that rewards humility. Those who have spoken with me in person about Afghanistan know how deeply I feel that.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/afghanistan-strategy-dialogue-my-thoughts.html
August 19, 2009 5:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Definitely words to live by.
Thanks, Lally
August 19, 2009 10:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
Richard, I hope you continue to contribute and interact here. I value thoughtful analysis such as yours based on study and experience. I would value the chance to widen the conversation about our military, its useful capabilities, and our militaristic policies.
Meanwhile, I'll be in Cowtown in a few weeks and cooling off some afternoons at the VIP on White Settlement Rd. I'll tip a cold one to you. Cheers.
August 20, 2009 12:23 PM | Reply | Permalink