I am republishing this as a detailed comment on Bernard Avishai's article of June 14, "Total Settlement Freeze? No, a Border."

Anyone who regularly reads the comments to MJ. Rosenberg's numerous posts on Israel and Palestine knows that I am (or at least have become) extremely skeptical about the feasibility of the so-called two-state solution as a way to end the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. There was a time when I was not quite so skeptical, when I believed that, while no solution was perfect, the creation of two states was an achievable objective and also a reasonably fair and effective way to resolve the problem

Over the past five or six years, however, as I have read more about the conflict, listened more carefully to the arguments of both Jews and Arabs, and observed events on the ground, I have slowly but inexorably come to the conclusion not only that the two-state solution is unworkable, but--much more important--that all attempts to advocate for or negotiate a two-state solution must increasingly be judged irresponsible (if not willfully pernincious), because all they can do is distract from and delay the work required to produce a feasible solution. 

Conditions for Success

Before explaining why the two-state solution is unworkable, let me identify what would be necessary for a solution to succeed. For a solution to this conflict to be feasible, I believe it must meet two conditions:

• First, the solution must be acceptable and reasonably satisfactory to both parties. If not, no agreement will ever be signed.
• Second, the solution must be able to endure. A signed agreement is only the first step in achieving a solution. What happens after the agreement is signed is far more important. If the situation created by the agreement is unstable and unsustainable, the agreement will collapse and the conflict resume. 

Some may object to my first condition, saying that mutual agreement is not necessary because a solution can be imposed on one of the parties by the other or on both of the parties by the international community. The problem, though, with imposed solutions is that they tend to result in unstable situations post-imposition. The risk, therefore, is that by ignoring the first condition and imposing a solution, the second condition will not be met. And the second condition is really the most important, because a solution that cannot endure is not really a solution.

The Features of a Two-State Solution as Currently Conceived

So what does this mean for the two-state solution? Most supporters of the two-state solution argue that its features have been known for a long time and that the primary reason for the inability to reach agreement is merely a kind of stubbornness among the two parties or the result of poor leadership on one or both sides or in the international community. I'd argue that, in fact, the reason the two-state solution has not been agreed upon despite decades of discussion and negotiation is that:

• Its features are actually not known because the details of the solution have never been fully explored, and these details must be known before before any agreement can be had.
• If its features were known (i.e., the details were fully explored), the solution would be neither mutually desirable nor capable of producing a lasting, peaceful arrangement, and would therefore fail to be agreed upon or, if agreed upon, collapse soon after the solution was implemented.  

I might even go further and argue that the constant attempt to put off "final status negotiations" reflects a tacit understanding among negotiators that a two-state solution is impossible and that the negotiations will collapse as soon as the final status issues are raised. Two-state negotiations, in one form or another, have gone on for decades without reaching any agreement. Furthermore, whenever final status details are discussed, the negotiations become tense and, eventually, collapse. Empirically, this should be strong enough evidence to convince any rational person that there is something significantly wrong with the two-state proposal. Yet, discussions continue and the conventional wisdom remains that a two-state solution is both desirable and acheivable. 

So let's look more closely at the outlines of the supposed solution. Most say that the three basic features of the solution are:

• Borders approximating the 1967 green line
• East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state
• Compensation (but no or very limited return) for Palestinian refugees

The problem with this vision is that the first two featuers are no longer possible to implement because of Israeli settlements and the third, while possible, is likely to be agreed upon by the Palestinians only if they receive much more than they are likely to be offered.

Let's look at each of these features of the imagined two-state solution individually and explore the details more closely.

Borders

First, borders. To really understand this issue, you should review this map and also these population statistics.  If you look at the map, you'll see the geographic extent of Israeli settlement. Especially significant are the large settlement blocks near Jerusalem, near Qalqiliya, and near Hebron, but there are settlements large and small scattered throughout the West Bank. If you look at the population statistics you will also see that the number of people living in these settlements is approaching 300,000.  Returning to the 1967 borders (or even anything close to them) will require the removal of more than a quarter of a million people from hundreds of locations across the West Bank. This is simply impossible for Israel to do. Not only will the effort create something like a civil war in Israel, removing and resettling 300,000 unwilling people is a daunting and politically disasterous task, which no Israeli leader would ever agree to undertake. 

In fact, the impossibility of returning to 1967 borders is now widely accepted. This is why all proposals for two-state solutions now suggest that land will need to be swapped. The problem here is which pieces of land are to be swapped? To understand the complexity of this problem, one must know something of the geography of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. One could divide the land in of this region into four categories. Category A is the fertile land along the coastal plain, in the Jezreel Valley, around Gallilee, and parts of the northern Jordan River valley. This is the most valuable land, most suitable for growing crops. Most if it is in Israel. (In fact, one reason the Arabs reacted so badly to the original UN partition is that nearly all of this best land was given to the Jewish state.)  Category B land is also suitable for agriculture, but it's drier or more mountainous and therefore has more limited capacity. Much of this category B land is found in the western portion of the West Bank and in some areas of Israel. Category C land is near desert. This makes up much of the Eastern portion of the West Bank and much of the southern part of Israel north of the Negev desert. Finally, there is Category D land, which is true desert. This is found in the Negev and the southeastern part of the West Bank.

If one looks at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, one sees that most of the settlements are on category B land. Some smaller (in population, but not area) settlements have been built in the bit of category A land in the Jordan River valley north of the Dead Sea (land which Israel says it wants to keep as a "security zone" even after a Palestinian state is established). So most of the land swap provisions in two-state solutions require the Palestinians to relinquish category A or B land. Typically, what they get in return is category C or D land. After all, it is C and D land that is sparsely populated and hence open in Israel.  So most of the land swaps not only fragment the West Bank, they reduce the overall quality of the land in the Palestinian state.

This has significant consequences. The population of the West Bank and Gaza is about 4 million. Those 4 million need to eat. If the agricultural land is poor, growing enough food will be challenging. In most proposed versions of the two-state solution, Israel retains control of most of the water. So irrigation will be difficult for the Palestinians. And the soil is relatively poor in many places anyway. So Palestine will need to import much of its food.

This means Palestine will need to have an industrial base to generate the wealth to buy food. But Palestine now has little industry. And there is no reason to see why the West Bank and Gaza will attract much industry. Palestine is not like Singapore or Hong Kong--city states with important ports that were significant to the world trade of the British Empire and that therefore were able to develop viable economies despite a paucity of good land.  Palestine currently has no deep water port (there have been plans proposed to create a deep water port in Gaza, but that's a major undertaking); and it has none of the business and other infrastructure that a Singapore or Hong Kong had because of their historical economic importance. Palestine would be building its industrial base from the ground up, facing significant competition from richer or more established economies, and with few natural advantages to build on. The prospects--realistically--are not promising. The likely scenario for a Palestinian state is actually continued poverty for many, many years, with at best a marginal agricultural base and a weak industrial base. This doesn't bode well for the long-term stability of the Palestinian state.

Before we move on to East Jerusalem, let's return to the issue of fragmentation of the West Bank. I mentioned in passing that the settlements kept by Israel would leave the West Bank fragmented. In fact, those settlements would likely bisect the West Bank into separate northern and southern sections. And this is a "best case" scenario: some proposals would actually divide the West Bank into three or four or even five pieces.  Fragmentation creates significant challenges. Already, the problem of connecting Gaza with the West Bank is thorny. Now multiply this problem several times over. If the Palestinian state is so fragmented, Palestinians will continue to have to pass through Israeli checkpoints to move within their state. This will be a huge economic inconvenience that will discourage businesses from locating in Palestine and, maybe more significantly, will mean constant tension--and potential violence--between Palestinians and Israelis. Fragmentation makes a Palestinian state highly unstable and likely unsustainable.

To conclude the discussion of borders, we must acknowledge that the 1967 border is no longer possible and that the actual possible borders are really nothing at all like the 1967 border. Worse, the borders that actually are possible result in a fragmented and economically disadvantaged Palestinian state. This state will not be stable and is unlikely ever to be a peaceful neighbor to Israel, which means repeated Israeli blockades, incursions, or even re-occupation should such a state ever be created.   

East Jerusalem

The Israelis have been creating large Jewish neighborhoods within East Jerusalem. The populations of these neighborhoods now approach a quarter million. Furthermore, East Jerusalem is almost completely surrounded by Jewish settlments. It will be detached completely from all other parts of Palestine should a two-state solution be agreed upon. It will therefore make a very poor capital for the Palestinian state. In fact, making East Jerusalem a practical capital of the Palestinian state seems impossible without vast transfers of the Jewish population living in and around it and the dismantling of at least some of the settlements that separate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. I don't see how any of these actions will ever occur. Because of this, East Jerusalem is no longer available to be the capital of Palestine so this feature of the two-state solution is as completely unreaslistic as a state on borders approaching the 1967 borders.

Refugees

Israel insists that either no or very few refugees will be allowed to return to Israel. Already the population of the West Bank and Gaza is 4 million. Palestinian refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza (in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) could potentially increase the population by another 1 to 2 million. This creates a very crowded Palestinian state. As we explained above, there is neither an agricultural or industrial base to support this many people. The crowded, impoverished conditions of Palestine will tend to make the state unstable and will also likely result in conflicts with neighboring Israel. This kind of weak state will almost certainly need to be attacked or re-occupied at some point by Israel, which means a quick return to today's status quo.

Of course, the Palestinians are very reluctant to agree to give up what they view as their right to return to Israel for reasons of justice and emotion. But were they ever willling to compromise on this point, they would still need something in return to help avoid the kind of economic and political disaster that would result from overcrowding and poverty. No proposals for compensation that I have seen even come close to addressing this economic need. And the border problem--which further reduces the agricultural capacity of Palestine--only exacerbates the difficulties. The refugee problem--oft mentioned, but rarely seriously addressed--is a major sticking point. And if solved in the way most of the proponents of the two-state solution assume it would be solved, it will only increase the economic instability of Palestine.

Maintaining the Illusion

For all the reasons outlined above (and many others too such as, water rights, control of airspace, or the nature of the Palestinian military), a two-state solution seems completely impossible.

Two questions then arise:

• First, why do we continue to cling to the illusion that a two-state solution can be effected?
• Second, what alternatives are possible if we ever relieve ourselves of the two-state delusion?

The primary answer to the first question is that the two-state solution superficially seems like a good one and most people (including a large number of Israeli Jews and Palestinians as well as much of the international community) don't carefuly examine the details. So most people continue to accept its feasibility as fact. A second answer is that the illusion of the possibility of a two-state solution is attractive to two groups within the Jewish community. Liberal Jews in Israel and elsewhere who want to preserve a Jewish state find it emotionally attractive to think that a solution other than a bi-national state or outright ethnic cleansing is possible. On the other hand, certain conservative Israeli Jews may have come to realize that pretending to be interested in the impossible two-state solution provides useful cover for a more cynical strategy of delaying a solution indefinitely in the hopes of wearing down the Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, the supporters of a two-state solution seem to be hoping that they can garner support among the international community and use this support to obtain more from the Israelis than the Israelis would like to give them (a highly unlikely possibility). And of course, there are corrupt and/or ineffectual Palestinian politicians who depend on the West for money and power and who must publically back the two state solution to continue to be supported by their Western sponsors. So for all these reasons, the two-state delusion continues to remain attractive (or at least useful) to many minds while, in fact, being effective only at delaying and even interfering with progress toward any real solution. 

Alternatives

There are really only two alternatives to the impossible two-state solution. One is some kind of bi-national state or federation that re-integrates the two populations into one economic community. This solution would solve all the problems of borders and would make the transfer of populations unnecessary since everyone in both groups would be free to live and work where they like within the region (it negates both the refugee problem and the settler problem). Better yet, a bi-national or federated solution would allow the Palestinians to once again find jobs and work in Israel, creating economic hope for those impoverished populations and helping to create a more stable and peaceful Palestinian community.

The other alternative is removing the Palestinians to some other part of the world. This of course is generally unacceptable. However, an argument can be made that if the two-state solution is unworkable and no one will agree to a bi-national or federated solution, then ethnic cleansing is the only answer. If this is the case, one has to ask whether continuing to argue for a two-state solution is in any way defensible. All it does is delay justice (the bi-national state or federation) or prolong the suffering of the Palestinians while still condeming them to the ultimate injustice of  ethnic cleansing.

For all these reasons people who truly believe in the sanctity of human rights need to begin to challenge the two-state delusion and create a new and more realistic path toward justice and peace. I recommend some kind of bi-national state or federation. I'll leave it to others to argue for ethnic cleansing or for continuing to maintain the two-state delusion for another 60 years, while the injustice and suffering continue unabated.