According to Reuters and to Haaretz correspondent Barak Ravid, Israeli Military Intelligence Chief  Amos Yadlin announced at the weekly Israeli cabinet meeting on Sunday that "Iran has crossed the technological threshold" in its quest for nuclear arms. "Arrival at military nuclear capability is a matter of strategy," Yadlin said. "Iran is accumulating hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium at a low level and hopes to utilize the dialogue with the West in order to gain time, which is required in order to achieve the capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb."

In 1994, Israeli intelligence sources issued dire predictions that Iran would have a nuclear weapon in five to eight years.  By 1996 the estimate was down to 4 years, according to Israel's then-Prime Minister (and now President) Shimon Peres, and pressure was beginning to build for a joint US-Israeli military strike against Iran. In early 1998 the estimated time, according to Israeli "experts" until Iran possessed nuclear weapons capability was down to as few as 18 months, although a news report in December of 1998 said that Israeli intelligence and security officials had reduced their expectation of Iran's development of nuclear capability from 5-7 years to 2-3 years.  Iranians repeatedly denied wanting as well as seeking nuclear weapons and accused the US of hypocrisy for ignoring Israel's 200 nuclear weapons. 

Meanwhile, in March, 1998, International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman David Kyd confirmed that "the IAEA has not detected any suspicious nuclear activities being carried out" in Iran which violated the NPT or any other laws governing non-proliferation. The IAEA team had inspected the research center at Isfahan and the experimental reactor at the University of Tehran four times in the last year. The two reactors under construction at Bushehr were not inspected because no form of nuclear fuel has been transferred there yet. Kyd also insisted that the "IAEA [has] never detected any sort of suspicious activity in Iran."  In August, after the US House of Representatives voted to cut funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency by the exact amount of aid with which the IAEA was provding Iran for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on grounds that the Bushehr project could help Iran's nuclear weapons program, Kyd said, "This action cannot influence this agency's general policies...All the member states of this agency are satisfied with the peaceful nuclear cooperation between the agency and Iran and the agency will support any peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world."

On Sept. 28, 1999, at the annual meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, called for Israel to put its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The next day, Haaretz reported that Iran approached Israel through the United Kingdom to discuss nuclear proposals, such as not striking first, not arming missiles with nuclear warheads, and restricting long-range missiles. However,  Israel refused to respond to the proposals, in part because doing so could acknowledge the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons.

Israel's denial of its own clandestine nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1960's.

Israel had completed the development stage of its first nuclear weapon by 1966-67. CIA reports distributed in early 1967 indicated that Israel had produced all the necessary components to allow it to assemble a nuclear bomb in 6-8 weeks  According to Avner Cohen, in his 1998 book  Israel and the Bomb, Israel refused to admit to having a nuclear weapons program, insisting it was sufficient for it to assert, "it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East."

When Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Ambassador to the U.S. Yitzhak Rabin  met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in October 1968, Rusk explained the U.S. position that Israel's development of nuclear weapons would "confront us with [the] question of whether we were serious about NPT, which we are," as well as raise the question, in the context of the Cold War, of what the Soviet Union might do to provide Arab countries with access to nuclear weapons.   While Rusk and the State Dept. attempted to link the sale of U.S. F-4 Phantom jets to an agreement to sign the NPT, CIA Director Richard Helms privately briefed President Lyndon Johnson and told him that Israel's nuclear capability would preclude its signing as a non-nuclear weapon state.

 Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Warnke began a series of negotiations on Oct. 30,with then-Israeli Ambassador Yitzchak Rabin.  Although he had not provided with the CIA assessments of Israel's nuclear weapons program, Warnke suspected that Israel had the capability of producing a nuclear bomb and quite possibly had already done so.  He proposed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that linked Israel's signature on the NPT not only to the sale of the Phantoms but to the transformation of the U.S. into Israel's main arms supplier, a role that until then had been filled by France.     

As reconstructed and recounted by Avner Cohen,  Warnke met with Rabin on Nov. 12, and  attempted to clarify what Israel meant by "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area."   Rabin replied that it meant, "We would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons."

 "What do you mean by 'introduce'?" Warnke asked.

 "What is your definition of nuclear weapons?" Rabin responded.

 Warnke said the question he was asking had two parts:  the definition of what was or was not a "nuclear weapon" and the definition of what was or was not "introducing" nuclear weapons.  "If there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon-although part A may be in one room and part B may be in another room-then that is a nuclear weapon," Warnke declared.

 General Mordechai Hod, who had accompanied Rabin to his Warnke, asked whether there was any accepted usage of the word "introduction" in international law.   Warnke admitted there was not.   Rabin and Hod then focused on testing as the hallmark of any operational weapons system.  The five nuclear-weapons states had all tested nuclear weapons, and since Israel had not conducted any nuclear tests, it was abiding by its pledge not to have introduced nuclear weapons to the region.  Warnke defined "introduction" in terms of physical presence.

But  Rabin insisted that, since the purpose of nuclear weapons was to deter, their presence would have to be publicly acknowledged in order to make a case that they had been introduced, since an unacknowledged nuclear had no deterrence value.  Rabin further argued that "notoriety and pretesting" were both necessary in order to meet the Israeli definition of  "introduction."  When Warnke asked him whether, "In your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon," Rabin responded affirmatively. Warnke disagreed, but the Phantom deal went through despite the definitional disagreement.  A moratorium on discussion of Israel's nuclear program has remained in place, with "opacity" the rule in international discussion, and silence in the domestic sphere.   A moratorium on discussion of Israel's nuclear program has remained in place ever since, with "opacity" the rule in international discussions, and silence in Israel itself.

In June 2006, I asked  Cohen, "While Iran is being derided for its clandestine nuclear research, if the politics were different, couldn't that secrecy also be considered "ambiguity" or "opacity" from an Iranian point of view (a notion which Israel clearly is unwilling to admit or permit)?"

He responded, "Yes, I agree with you that it is a great irony that there is a great deal of resemblance in the mode of opacity - via secrecy, concealment, ambiguity, double talk and denial - between the way Iran is pursuing its nuclear program today and the way Israel was pursuing its own program in the 1960s.  In fact, I would not be surprised if some Iranian policy makers and nuclear technocrats have deliberately decided to try to adopt or mimic the Israeli model of nuclear opacity, IF the world would permit them to pursue that mode."

Cohen continued, "If this line of thinking is correct, it means that Iran's nuclear program would not aimed at a test of a nuclear device, nor towards declaring Iran as a nuclear-armed state. Instead, while most likely maintaining a secret weaponziation program (but without testing), Iran would continue to insist publicly on its right to enrich uranium. Over time, while remaining within the NPT, Iran would be seeking to acquire a perception and reputation (by ways of leaks, rumors, double talk, etc) that they have actually built a 'secret' nuclear arsenal or at least secretly accumulated a sufficient amount of weapons-grade fissile material."

"It may well be," Cohen had to agree, "that some Iranians have come to believe that by mimicking the Israeli model, as much as they could, they would get all the prestige and deterrence effects they need but without leaving the NPT, let alone without testing or declaring such a bomb. Let the question of the Iranian bomb remain opaque, just like Israel. This would mimic the way Shimon Peres for decades used to talk about 'deterrence by way of uncertainty.' Let the world guess. In fact, the world is already guessing now where Iran is in its nuclear pursuit. Some say that Iran is as far as five to 10 years away from producing the bomb, while others, including some mavens in Israel, are fearful that if Iran has been closely imitating Israel it may well already have the bomb. What a remarkable irony indeed."

Cohen mused, "If Iran indeed follows the Israeli model of nuclear opacity, this would put Israel in a great dilemma of its own. Should Israel call the bluff over Iranian opacity, and in doing so expose its own opacity, or should Israel prefer to acquiesce, just as the world had acquiesced over its own two generations ago?"

Thus far, Israel is responding by doing what it has done for the past 15 years:  doing everything it can subvert improved relations between the  U.S. and Iran, on the one hand, and, on the other, threatening to attack Iran to destroy its suspected weapons sites if the U.S. does not.
  
 

MI chief: Iran has crossed 'technological threshold' in quest for nukes

Military Intellience chief Amos Yadlin said Sunday at the weekly cabinet meeting that "Iran has crossed the technological threshold" in its quest for nuclear arms.

"Arrival at military nuclear capability is a matter of strategy," Yadlin said. "Iran is accumulating hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium at a low level and hopes to utilize the dialogue with the West in order to gain time, which is required in order to achieve the capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb."

Yadlin stressed that the American government's new approach of dialogue with Iran is being treated with caution in the Middle East.

"The moderate Arab states think this will come at their cost and will be used for negative purposes by Iran and Syria, who are dragging out time with the appearance of talks but are continuing to arm themselves and to support terrorism," Yadlin said. "The extremist axis hopes the U.S. will change its stance, but they suspect that it is a step that will only advance the formulation of a more efficient coalition against them."

Meanwhile, Iranian media reported on Sunday that Iran has test-fired a new air-to-surface missile, in the Islamic Republic's latest display of its military capability.

The missile test was carried out despite the offer by the administration of new U.S. President Barack Obama to engage Iran in direct talks if it "unclenches its fist".

Iran's Fars News Agency said the domestically produced missile had a range of 110 km (70 miles) and was designed for use by military aircraft against naval targets.

"Now these jet fighters have acquired a new capability in confronting threats," the semi-official news agency said. Iran's Press TV initially said a long-range missile had been tested, but later also used Fars' way of describing it.

Iran often stages war games or tests weapons to show its determination to counter any attack by foes including Israel and the United States, which accuse the Islamic Republic of seeking to develop nuclear bombs. Tehran denies the charge.

The U.S. State Department declined to comment on the Iranian press reports.

A top Iranian military commander last week said that Iranian missiles could now reach Israeli nuclear sites. Iran has often said it has missiles able to reach Israel but had not previously mentioned such specific targets.
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