Who Are We Fighting?
Remaining hawks, like Bill Kristol and Hugh Hewitt, emphasize concepts such as will and weakness in explaining their rationale for continuing to pursue democratization and mideast influence through military means. Others have written about the error of assuming our virtual omnipotence, but one aspect of this mistaken toughness paradigm deserves particular elaboration. When it comes to terrorists, it's easy enough to observe that they may on occasion be emboldened by the example of prior U.S. military engagements that had been cut short. But in the main, the very fananticism the right tirelessly points out as motivating the jihadists means they cannot be deterred, and will likely come after us wherever a good opportunity appears to present itself. This is an argument for multilateral intelligence and diplomatic work and an improved homeland security posture--neither item, of course, having received adequate concern from the Bush administration. The only rationale I can think of for the hawkish interpretation of our strategic options is the assumption that deterrable states are overwhelmingly responsible for sponsoring terrorism; but they are apparently a diminishing proportion of the total risk points in an this new era of mass media ideological dispersion.
In their view, it seems, this is not a new, but an old type of war. The spread of aggressive anti-Western sentiment and the suicidal rage of many jihadists both mitigate against hawkish traditionalism, and argue for including a war for hearts and minds in our strategic thinking, but so far the Iraq defenders' philosophy has not budged. That Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are a problem is undeniable, but they are now part of a larger picture that the traditional militaristic model does not reflect. Why aren't the hawks getting more heat for this failure of perspective, especially considering that their opinion is contradicted by many of their own talking points?




