The Hamas Conundrum
[Note: This was written as a response to Professor Todd Gitlin's post. His point, if I may paraphrase, is that even those who, like him, oppose Israel's attack on Gaza will have to come to terms with what to do about Hamas. It's a problem I don't believe has been adequately addressed by those who support Israel but oppose the war and leaves my own questions about the necessity, wisdom and morality of what is happening unanswered. Anyway, I took some time to write it, so I decided to re-print it on this side of the "cafe." I welcome your thoughts.]
Anyone opposed to this war must answer the question of how to deal with the murderous idealogues of Hamas. For those who view the creation of Israel as a crime itself, the answer is easy. Hamas, however despicable its means, is merely a byproduct of Israel's illegal policies. For those in the Israel right or wrong camp, the blame for the entire tragic enterprise falls on Hamas. For those, like me, who support Israel's right to exist and defend its citizens, but are deeply disturbed by the suffering in Gaza, there is no easy answer.
Most of the arguments I read here seek to apportion blame among the parties, and there is certainly plenty on both sides: continuing expansion of the settlements and a brutal occupation met with consistent Palestinian and Arab rejectionism (while I can agree that the Camp David deal was less than ideal, the fact remains that no Palestinian leader has ever evinced even an inclination of any compromise on the right of return, which is a nonstarter).
None of these arguments, however, apply to Hamas, which has successfully impeded the peace process at every opportunity through suicide bombings and now rocket attacks. It is often noted that Hamas thrives on the misery and hopelessness of its people, a condition they perpetuate by maintaining a constant state of war. This is just the most recent example of the leaders of Hamas demonstrating that the misery they have brought to their own people is subordinate to their movement's divine aim.
The rule of Hamas sidelines the traditional approaches to a peaceful, two-state solution. Indeed, the movement was created in opposition to the two state solution. Its founding belief is that the entire land of Palestine is occupied, that it is part of the Islamic waqf, and that all previous agreements, and all prospective agreements purporting to share it are against the will of God.
How then can Israel end the blockade of Gaza when the territory is ruled by a movement inalterably opposed to existence and committed to an armed struggle to achieve its objective, no matter the cost? How can Israel allow an implacably hostile group to consolidate its control over adjoining territory, to accumulate even more powerful weapons that will make it even more undeterrable in the future, and to launch attacks on its citizens?
The current situation illustrates the bankruptcy of the temporary truce. Hamas apparently used the lull to acquire more sophisticated weapons that are now raining down on Israeli towns. In this respect, the current operation is not just about stopping the relatively ineffectual (though still monstrous) rocket fire on Israel's South. It is about stopping more deadly rocket fire in the future, not only from Gaza, but also the West Bank. It is ultimately an existential question for Israel. Any ceasefire without provisions for controlling Gaza's borders poses an unacceptable risk.
For Israel, then, something must be done to "change the equation." Hamas thrives on a state of war, and as long as they remain in power, any of the preconditions for peace become more unlikely. As if that weren't depressing enough, Hamas is strenthened by the suffering it causes. When Hezbollah instigated similar devastation on Lebanon, somehow its leaders were hailed as "victors," whose credibility was enhanced (despite their public admission that they misjudged Israel's response). The same is widely predicted as the outcome of the current violence - increased support and legitimacy for Hamas. This is a madness I can't comprehend.
So the question I always come back to is how can Israel deal with Hamas? As someone who is disturbed by the war, but believes strongly in the state of Israel, it is the one for which I have yet to hear a reassuring answer.
I consider the Palestinian support of Hamas to be similar to Afghani support of the Taliban: the everyday Mohammad on the street is not an extremist bent on the destruction of Israel, the West, etc. They simply want relative safety and a decent quality of life. Just as the Taliban originally gained the support of Afghanis by providing protection from Mujahideen warlords, Hamas rises because Palestinians are impoverished 'unwanteds' in their own homes and Hamas provides them what no other entity seems willing or able to give.
Yes, the services come with heavy, bloody strings attached. The movements' successes lend apparent credence to the more radical, right-wing goals and some of the ideology seeps into the culture -- obviously, that doesn't help in the longterm.
How do you defeat Hamas? You can't bomb a philosophy -- just as we ourselves have learned in Iraq, the harder you try, the more you marginalize moderates and exasterbate the problem.
The only way is to give the Palestinians a viable alternative, and time to change long-held perceptions.
January 9, 2009 7:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you Demosaur for engaging the topic.
I have no firsthand knowledge of Palestinian society, but applying my armchair principles, I have no doubt that the majority of the inhabitants of Gaza are most concerned with a decent life for themselves and their families. I am also aware of the many charitable functions Hamas performs and its image (at least prior to the elections that eventually led to its arguably legitimate rise to power) as an alternative to the thoroughly corrupt Fatah.
However, I believe you underestimate the sway of the suicide cult in Palestinian society, particularly in Gaza. Last I heard, suicide attacks on Israeli civilians were enjoyed wide support and when successful were met with widespread jubilation. Though I'm not sure, I imagine the rocket attacks are greeted similarly. While it is often remarked that this is a response to the hopelessness and despair, there really is no excuse. More importantly, the militancy represented by Hamas commands a sufficient constituency to make any normal co-existence virtually impossible.
I also believe the Hamas movement must be seen in the context of both (a) the islamist movement in general and (b) Palestinian rejectionism in particular. As I mentioned, Israel has much to account for - it has its own share of missed opportunities. Most notably, the disastrous settlement endeavor stands as a hulking roadblock to any peace and continual irritant that must be removed, but that no Israeli leader has had the courage to confront. (I would say, though, given all that's gone on, that Josh Marshall's statement at the outset of this latest round that it's really all about the settlements was one of the sillier analyses I've read.) But its calls for Israel's destruction, its refusal to renounce armed struggle, its vile anti-semitic (in the Jewish sense) propaganda that justifies, even glorifies, the killing of jews, is disturbingly familiar and fits with a long tradition. Even during the Oslo process, that climate remained, and as I noted above, no Palestinian leader has ever indicated a willingness to even compromise on the right of return.
So I would take issue with your statement that "some of the ideology seeps into the culture." The ideology seems ingrained in the culture. Yes, Israel has participated in the conditions in which the ideology flourishes, but it is far from an inevitable, or rational, response. The outcome is sadly familiar - war, death, destruction. It has become a cliche among the war's supporters to point out that the rockets continued after Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza (a mistake to have done so unilaterally, but that's for another day), but the importance of this to the Israeli mindset cannot be overstated. The counter is that Israel never opened the borders, but how could Israel open itself to an entity praying for and plotting its destruction?
Of course I am in complete agreement that there is no military solution to the Hamas ideology. I too am appalled by the carnage. I am also afraid that any temporary strategic gains achieved in this war will be overwhelmed by the creation of a still more hatred and extremism. One hopes that at some point Gazans will question the leaders and the ideology that brought them to this point, or that a truly bold Israeli leader will come forward offering a real olive branch and with the necessary clout to take on its own extremists.
Finally, I agree that in the long term the best counter to Hamas is a viable alternative, the prospect of a better life alongside Israel, real progress politically and economically. There are some signs that this is beginning to happen in the West Bank, and Olmert's overtures have been somewhat encouraging. But the point I return to (after so much time I hardly remember where I started), is that it's hard to imagine any of this happening as long as Hamas is in control of Gaza.
January 10, 2009 2:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
Armchair:
I first read this in the comment thread of Professor Gitlin's bold post, and the first thing I thought was that this should be a post on its own. Nicely done AG. I wait too for an answer to the simple question you pose.
Bruce
January 9, 2009 8:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks. Going back over it I am as always somewhat disappointed. There is so much to say on this topic that I scarcely know where to start and my feelings about what is happening are so mixed.
By the way, you can call me Josh - that being my real name.
January 10, 2009 2:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree with Bslev. Good post.
I am no expert in this matter and will not pretend to be. Civilians including children are dying.
January 9, 2009 8:47 PM | Reply | Permalink
Not being an expert, or even conversant, in a subject matter never stopped me from expressing a firm, if misguided belief.
Yes, civilians and children are dying and it is a terrible thing, no matter where you are standing.
January 10, 2009 2:38 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Nicely done AG. I wait too for an answer to the simple question you pose."
Guerilla & Bruce - When I read that line, I burst out laughing. Simple question - huh!!!
I will attempt to answer that question to the best of my ability. Here are some of the assumptions I am working with.
1 - Israeli and Palestinian animosity has made it impossible for the two parties to negotiate meaningfully. These is absolutely no trust between the parties and there will be none in the intermediate future.
2 - There is an extremely unequal power relationship between the two parties. A very strong Israel backed by the omipotent USA against an extremely weak Palestine. I have been in lots of unequal negotiations (given your profession Bruce I assume the same is true of you) and those negotiations never turn out well. The temptation of the stronger party is to take advantage of the weaker one and ram thru an agreement that is not as fair or just as it should be. In addition, the weaker party can become intrangient due to fear of failure and plain lack of confidence.
3 - There is no way for Israel to abandon all the West Bank settlements. It simply is too much to give up Ariel and Ma'ale Adumim, Har Homa and other near Jerusalem settlements.
4 - Without outside intervention the two parties will never settle. The fight has been going on for almost 100 years and that is but a brief moment in time given the perspectives of each party.
5 - If Gaza and the west bank are not easily contiguous in spirit not neccessarily in fact, no enduring peace is possible with a split Palestinian populace.
6 - Hamas must be a party to the peace agreement right from the beginning. Just as with our negotiations with North Korea, we brought in 6 other parties so that NK would understand the unified nature and importance of said negotiations.
All of that as a backdrop it is important to get outside the box.
1 - Land is negotiable. If Israel gets to keep some west bank territory then Palestine can get some of Israel. Here is what I propose, in return for Israel being able to keep some major settlements on prime land sitting on top of aquifers then Israel has to give up a segment of the Negev. Gaza would expand along the egyptian border to a line just south of Magen eastward to just south of Beersheba almost to the Nevatim air base. A tunnel would then connect to the West Bank. Except for the tunnel idea this is similar to a proposal made at Taba but would include more land than just a transportation corridor.
2 - A plebecite would be held in both Israel and ALL of Palestine requiring each party to enter FINAL negotiations. A majority would have to approve of the negotiations and any subsequesnt agreement. We need buy in to the process as well as the result.
3 - The parties to the talks would include Israel (with representatives of each major political party) Hamas and Fatah, Syria, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, The Gulf States, the EU, UN and US. Negotiations would be held at some site not connected to the area or participants. Greece or Cyprus come to mind. Most importantly, the parties agree to participants at very senior levels(like Foreign ministers) and all parties agree to stay until and agreement is reached. The UNSG would be the moderator. I know it sounds like a messy negotiation but it's important to keep all the would be peace de-railers inside the tent.
4 - It's important that Israel sign a peace agreement with ALL the arab states who are the only ones who would be able to keep the Palestinians in line. The arab states would deposit $100 billion in an escrow account as would the US and EU. These funds would be used to compensate aggrieved parties if agreements are broken. For each year that funds are not used 5% would each go to Israel and Palestine.
5 - Israel will contribute $50 billion to compensate Palestinians for their losses and the Arab states would contribute $50 billion to Israel for the losses Jews suffered by arab states. These monies would be used to help kick start the economies.
I don't have time to outline all the security guarantees and other fine points of an agreement that I have been kicking around for years. Suffice it to say - we need peace. Confidence building measures absent a final deal are impossible given everything that has gone on in the past. As Yoda once said " Do, or Do Not, there is no Try.
January 9, 2009 9:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
A nice post, JD, for two reasons:
One, it recognizes that the only way to solve the problem of Hamas and the Qassams is to stop focusing on derived problems like Hamas and the Qassams and instead focus on solving the core problem, which is the continued disenfranchisement of the Palestinian people.
Two, it seeks new approaches to the solution rather than repeating the same old cliches about two-states and '67 borders . . .
January 9, 2009 10:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm glad you were amused by me JD, because as you know laughter is the best medicine, right? ;).
But you, like many, conflate two fundamentally different issues. First, there are missiles raining down on civilians. Second, there is a need for a long-term solution, which is what you focus on with your usual compelling and convincing style. But the first question, to me, is equally compelling, necessitating immediate attention, and fairly simple at the core.
January 9, 2009 10:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Bruce - I have commented in other threads that I have not come up with a significantly different alternative than what Israel is doing short term to stop the rockets. However, if I were Israel's PM, I would have done things a lot more deliberately and methodically.
First, I would have announced a date certain on which military action would be taken absent a cease fire and encouraged Egypt,Saudi Arabia, the EU, UN etc to get busy to support and encourage such a cease fire.
Second, absent a cease fire,I would have started major bombing the tunnel areas on the border with Egypt, then paused for two weeks to see if a cease fire could be negotiated. Absent that, I would bomb specific Hamas infrastructure elements and used helicopter gunships and drones to pin down Hamas operatives.
Third, I would slowly escalate military action until a cease fire was reached. Israel is enthralled with the lightening strike and the quick victory. Such actions worked against state actors in the past but I don't think work as well in fighting non-state actors like Hamas and Hezballah where the philosophy and citizens are intertwined.
Latly, Israel has to avoid short term tactics that impede long term solutions. Activities like boming the crap out of civilian infrastructure just postpones the day of peace until everything can be reasonably rebuilt. I also believe half of the current Gaza/Hamas problem can be laid at Sharon's feet. His unilateral withdrawal was not just a mistake, it was a catastrophic mistake. Instead of using the opportunity to strengthen Abbas and turning Gaza over to the Palestinian government he used the opportunity to stick a red hot iron rod into the Palestinian eyes. Sharon was never interested in true peace, he just wanted to "get rid of the Palestinian problem". That was something I heard him say at a TV press conference while in Israel.
January 10, 2009 7:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
JD:
I hate to be in the position of defending Israel's particular military actions because I don't claim to be a military expert. But what on earth makes you think that your gradual escalation approach would have resulted in anything other than gradual escalation to the point where we're at now? Your argument appears to based on this notion that Israel is enamored of the "lightning" approach, and that's why it acted this way. On what basis do you conclude that Israel has acted this way militarily on that basis? I don't know, you could be right, but I just don't understand how you come to that conclusion although perhaps you know more about military tactics than I do. Food for thought though.
Gotta get ready for tot shabbat. Some things never cease yielding pleasure, even in the midst of hell. Isn't that way shabbat was invented in the first place?
January 10, 2009 9:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
I mean "why" shabbat was invented in the first place.
January 10, 2009 9:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
Bruce - I am far from being a military expert. I never studied it formally nor was a member of any armed forces. However, here is the genesis of my comments.
First, you may be right that my methodical escalation might have ended up in the same place we are now - but there was a chance it might not. If the latter case were true, I can see the benefits of fewer deaths and less infrastrucure to repair. Why not give the parties a chance to stop short of all out war?
As far as the lightening strike goes, you know I was in Israel for the month of November. It was a pretty open secret that a war with Gaza was coming. I have two IDF nephews, one with the Golani Bridgade and one with an ordenance unit. For monthe the Golani and Givati Brigades(and some others) have been performing very heavy duty urban warfare training. Artillary shells were moved in massive amounts to near the border with Gaza. Bombs were moved from their underground storage to near the flight lines. In late October the soldiers were notified that all leaves were cancelled as of 12/15/09.
The junior officers were speculating on the war plans based on scuttlebutt they heard and pieced together from their superiors. The plan was a massive and quick bombing of all the key Hamas targets (turned out true) combined with a commando raids to snatch Haniyeh and other key Hamas operatives (not true). What I heard was a 7-10 day war was planned by the military - not including a massive invasion of Gaza but only bombing and incursions to specific targets.
Anyway - that's how I came about my conclusion. I did not mean to generate any negative emotions.
January 10, 2009 5:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
I would slowly escalate military action
So apparently would they:
Ha'aretz, Jan. 10:
I don't mean to be flippant, I realize you were talking about doing it in a whole different framework, with pauses for negotiation, etc., and you present strong ideas.
It's just that your characterization of "it's the old lightning strike thing again" doesn't sound very accurate to me this time. It doesn't look to me like a lightning strike or shock and awe or anything similar was ever intended here.
January 10, 2009 1:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
When I said your ideas sounded very strong to me, I meant it. I just read this Dec. 31 op-ed by Daoud Kuttab describing a situation that Hamas was in that fits some of your proscriptions in my mind.
Got me thinking that perhaps what the problem is is not an Israeli attachment to "lightning strike," so much as it is a desire to maintain an image that they don't need anybody else to take care of themselves? That's an understandable image to want to give off given the Holocaust history, but it's not too practical. If they had at least a few Arab allies at certain steps of the way when doing military actions, even if rarely and momentarily, wholly different end results might happen? I.E., less strengthening of Hamas as an attractive ideology, more weakening of it...one can't expect miracles, but if the long-term goal is weakening Hamas rather than reinforcing support for it....
January 10, 2009 1:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
Bruce, I don't think the two issues (Israel's need to defend its citizens and long-term resolution of the I-P conflict) are fundamentally different. In fact, I'd argue that because they are so fundamentally intertwined with each other, they are fundamentally the same problem. Hamas hasn't arisen in a vacuum. Yes, Israel needs to stop the Hamas rocket fire. But military action is (1) unlikely to actually stop the rocket fire and (2--most importantly) only exaccerbates the tensions that generate violent Palestinian resistance. In South Africa, the ANC committed many violent acts while resisting apartheid (Mandela admits that his organization was guilty of crimes against humanity). The South African government responded with harsh measures. The world branded the ANC a terrorist group. Mandela was imprisoned. But the violence ended only when the underlying problem--apartheid--was solved. Would it be conflating two problems to say that the best way for the South Africans to defend themselves against black violence was to end the systematic oppression of blacks? Would it be conflating two issues to say that the best response to Nat Turner's brutal slave rebellion was not to execute several hundred slaves but rather to end slavery? I think not. What seems artificial is not the conflating of these two issues, but the attempt to decouple them, as if the underlying injustice of the situation is somehow unrelated to the violent resistance that emerges from that injustice.
Just one other point. As someone whose ancestors owned slaves, I guess I can understand (and maybe even owe my existence to) my ancestors' efforts to defend their families against slave rebellions. And while I understand and appreciate the need for them to do what they did to protect themsleves and their children, I believe that their mistake--their crime--was to have focused on defending themselves from attacks while for so long ignoring the underlying injustice for which they were responsible and which was the spark that ignited those attacks. The decoupling of one problem from the other was immoral. Just as bad, the violence of extremists like Nat Turner (and he may have been a psychopath) was used by my ancestors to rationalize their continued repression of all blacks, who were branded as naturally violent, not fully civilized, and unready to be free. Similar things, unfortunately, are happening in Israel today. There seems to be an intense campaign right now to try to demonize the Palestinians and focus on their most extreme actions in order to rationalize the continued refusal to accomodate their need for justice. We can't deal with them. They're not ready for a state. They have a culture of death. They're corrupt. They can't renounce violence. These, I'm afraid, are all excuses for avoiding the underlying problem. Yes there are bad Palestinians and some of their actions are horrific. But to decouple Palestinian violence and the response to it from the underlying injustice that causes that violence isn't just to artificially decouple two naturally conflated problems, it is also to decouple oneself from the responsibility of ending an injustice for which one is, in large part at least, responsible.
January 10, 2009 9:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
Purple:
I read your reply quickly and I'm sorry but I don't honestly have time right now to give it a comprehensive response. I hear what you're saying and, as I've written before, I in know way think that responding militarily is a sufficient response, although I have defended its necessity. I guess you're saying that you don't get to step 2 this way and that's a point I need more time to reply to. It's understandable and sort of depends on answering the question of what you do in the meantime. And, as to the ANC, to paraphrase Lloyd Bentsen in his 1988 debate with Dan Quayle: I know the ANC, used to march for it, the ANC was a friend of mine. Purple State, Hamas is no ANC!
Bruce
January 10, 2009 9:46 AM | Reply | Permalink
It is late and I should have been in bed a long time ago. I'd like to give your excellent comment a full response, but I have a toddler to attend to.
Briefly, I have no problem nominating you for chief Middle Eastern Envoy (the "Peace Czar") in the incoming Armchair Guerrilla administration.
I agree with Bruce here, though. Your proposals speak to the long term. In the short term, there is the problem of Hamas control of Gaza, their fundamentalist, pathological, and unwavering commitment to a state of war to achieve their aim of an Islamic state over all of Palestine. Absent a solution to that, your program is stuck in the mud. Yes, Hamas must be a party to any peace agreement. However, I don't see how Hamas can.
January 10, 2009 2:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
AC - You seem to believe that Hamas is never going to change and will be impossible to deal with. I don't agree. Between 1956 and 1979 I was in Israel a lot and heard a lot of rhetoric from Egypt, Syria, Jordan etc that made my hair stand straight up. The howling mobs were a lot more scary in word and deed than what I hear from Hamas. Yet over time these arabs changed their mind. The furor with the masses generated by the "religion" of Pan-Arabism was equal to or greater than Hamas' Islam fundementalism.
Hamas has stated that if the Palestinian people in a plebecite approve a specific peace agreement with Israel they will honor it. Why not see if that is true? If Hamas breaks such a peace agreement, Israel is no worse off - they can still bomb the crap out of Gaza like they are doing now. Simply put, in the next 50 or 1000 years, I simply do not see Hamas/Palestinians having the military capability to seriously threaten the viability of Israel. What is Israel afraid of after a peace agreement that they are not afraid of now?
January 10, 2009 8:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
Look, first things first. How about agreeing to an immediate ceasefire? They haven't even gotten that far yet!
January 9, 2009 11:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Some interesting points here. I'll just quote it - no time to editorialize (thankfully). http://theamericanscene.com/2009/01/06/-what-happens-then-
"If I had to predict, I’d say the invasion will be a mixed success in tactical terms, with Israel successfully liquidating a number of Hamas leaders and much physical infrastructure. Whether the Qassams stop falling entirely or not, Hamas will be operationally weakened for some time. I would not bet on Hamas losing control of the territory – and Israel had better hope Hamas does not lose control, lest she find Somalia on her doorstep. Nor would I bet on Kadima’s political gambit working; it didn’t work for Labor in 1996, after all. As for the more extravagant rationales being floated – this will strengthen Fatah in the West Bank? Or will strike a blow against Iranian prestige? Or is actually a dry run for an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities – the less said the better. The tangible achievements from this war, and the great loss of life among the Palestinians may, at best, be a short respite from Qassam fire.
Was there an alternative course of action? I suppose there must have been, but I don’t see a plausible one. The Israeli government could not simply ignore the continued rocket attacks. Nor would a tit-for-tat response accomplish anything – indeed, it would make the government look even weaker than ignoring the problem entirely. While on its own terms, the war seems rather pointless, it fits into the larger Israeli strategy of the past fifteen years. It’s just that the strategy in question is neither inspiring nor particularly complicated.
Since 1993, Israel has been staging a fighting retreat from the bulk of the territories won in 1967. Rabin understood that the effort he led to crush the first Intifadeh had failed, strategically; that there was no plausible military path to retaining the territories; and that the territories had become a strategic liability for Israel. He didn’t trust Arafat for an instant, but he still embraced Oslo, as the fig-leaf for a retreat to more defensible lines. The retreat stalled out with Rabin’s assassination and Netanyahu’s election, but Netanyahu could not actually escape the logic that Rabin followed. Indeed, he tried to force a conclusive division of the territories by daring Arafat to declare a state unilaterally (something Arafat and his successors have pointedly declined to do), and so he grudgingly signed the Wye accords. With Barak in office came a new effort to force a conclusive division of the territories, this time by diplomatic means. After the failure at Taba came the Second Intifadeh, to which Sharon responded with Operation Defensive Shield, which was his cover for a decisive retreat from Gaza. The current violence is intended to provide cover for the reelection of a center-left coalition that will stage a unilateral withdrawal from much of the West Bank.
That’s what the war is about, strategically: providing Israel’s government with domestic and international cover for the next phase of unilateral retreat from its post-1967 positions to more defensible ones.
Not terribly inspiring, nor terribly complicated, is it?
Are there alternatives to this depressing spectacle? Well, Israel can’t defeat Hamas militarily. Israel could obliterate the Palestinian people of Gaza physically – they have that power – but (thankfully) they will not do that. Israel could absorb the people of Gaza into its body politic at the price of becoming a bi-national state or a unitary Arab-dominated state, a price I find it very hard imagining the Israelis being willing to pay. Short of either of these solutions, there is no way for Israel to impose its will on the territories; contra Max Boot, Israel does not have the ability to impose a peace at gunpoint, impeded only by interfering outsiders (and, by the way, regardless of what one might think of taking Putin’s Russia as a model, who says the Second Chechen War is over?).
By the same token, Hamas cannot defeat Israel. The fundamental asymmetry between Israel/Palestine and France/Algeria is that while Algeria was a _département of France (or, rather, four départements) Algeria was not France, while Israel and Palestine are the same place by two names, and the Israelis have no intention of leaving their home. (It may be objected that the Boers had no intention of leaving their home either, and have not. The fundamental asymmetry between Israel/Palestine and the Boer Republic/Bantustans is that it was not plausible to envision a Boer Republic living alongside and on equal terms with a black South African Republic but, while that is not the reality, I believe it is entirely plausible to imagine Israel living on such terms with a neighboring Arab state, whether that state was a Palestinian national state or not.)
It would be nice, given these facts, to think that an outside party – such as ourselves – could convince the parties to the dispute to see reason and agree to a plausible political settlement – particularly since we all know what such a settlement would have to look like (a Palestinian state including the Arab parts of east Jerusalem and a presence in the Old City, and a grant of Israeli territory near Gaza plus monetary compensation in exchange for those settlement blocs that would be annexed to Israel). It would be nice, but I don’t think it is correct. Trust between the two sides is at an absolute zero. The Palestinian side is in no position to enforce any agreement it might agree to, having no functional institutions of any kind, and the only plausible route to the development of such institutions is in the context of violent struggle against Israel and against rival Palestinian factions (which, indeed, is how Hamas came to power in Gaza). Besides, America has absolutely no credibility with the Palestinians at this point, and the purchase price for such credibility would be exhorbitant in terms of our credibility with other allies (and not just Israel). Israel, meanwhile, is fully aware of the incapacities of the Palestinian leadership; even those who expect nothing of this war – and that’s a broad swathe of the Israeli political spectrum – expect even less from dialogue. (Note that even Meretz supported the war in its first few days.) And while America could certainly punish Israel in various ways, I don’t see how we would plausibly convince Israel to do something she feels is genuinely threatening to her national interest, nor how we would overcome the substantial domestic obstacles in Israel to achieving peace, given that these obstacles arise in large part from the structure of their political system.
Indeed, the last time America was truly in a position to try to wrestle the various parties into a final peace settlement was in Bush Sr.‘s term, at the Madrid talks, and that was a unique moment in history: right after America’s victory in the Gulf War, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, before the rise of resistence to American unipolarity, to say nothing of al Qaeda, a period of unprecedented American diplomatic clout. Even Giant Obama is unlikely to restore us to such a position in the near term."
January 10, 2009 2:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
The first thing Israel has to do, chronologically or logically, is to either 1) give Hamas a way to save face and amend its charter, or 2) take its extermination program to its logical extreme.
Naturally, I'd advocate for door #1. Naturally, it seems Israel chooses #2 piecemeal.
January 10, 2009 5:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
"... Hamas a way to save face and amend its charter"
eds - If true, does Likud have to amend it's political platform to allow a Palestinian state? These kind of pre-conditions are ridiculous. If Hamas signs off on a peace agreement with Israel they have recognized Israel in every meaning of the word.
January 10, 2009 10:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
Don't be ridiculous. Read what I wrote, as I wrote it.
But I'm not against Likud changing its platform.
January 10, 2009 6:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here's my immediate, short term solution:
Israel should negotiate a gaza cease fire with Fatah / Palestinian Authority, including
letting the PA (with Israel) open/monitor the gaza border crossings. This will necessitate PA forces re-entering the gaza strip and taking over
police operations. Benefits: 1) Hamas would not be included in negotiations and would be kind of irrelevant, 2) fatah/ PA would be seen as fully responsible for ending the Israeli siege and actually achieving what Hamas will have failed to do. This will allow Israel to withdraw without giving Hamas a win. Fatah, is the wild card, but
currently will have complete access to all of gaza to re-establish itself until israel leaves.
There are limitations... for instance, Fatah will have to actually stand up to Hamas... but given the current context, they may be more willing to do so, and the palestinian public might be more willing for them to do so, and hamas might be less willing to fight fatah, if it means keeping Israel out. Fatah already seems to be more willing to oppose hamas in the west bank.
It seems like this may be the idea that france is presenting... but I think, either way, in principle, this could be an amazing solution.
It may fail, but either way, israel will be no worse off than the status quo. This is the first really positive outcome that I'm envisioning, on the short term. Fatah has a tremendous amount to
gain. Israel has a tremendous amount to gain. And the Arab world, has a tremendous amount to gain because this solution will not benefit
Iran. Hamas loses despite all of its demands actually being met.
What do you think?
January 10, 2009 11:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
Israel should propose the following armistice to Abbas . It will withdraw its troops ,suspend the air attack announcing that when any single missile is fired from Gaza the bombardment will resume the following day.
If Abbas agrees , an announcement should be made.In whatever way the parties decide.
Paranthetically, Sharon's unilateral Gaza withdrawal can now be seen to have been a missed opportunity. A unilateral Israel armistice would be another.
When there is another missile attack, as there will be, Israel should do exactly what it had announced. Resume. Then again discuss with Abbas
and it he agrees have him again announce a suspension. If he doesn't agree, continue bombing.
The bombing campaign was an appropriate way to deal with the missiles. Not an appropriate way to try to create any more complicated an agreement than simply no missiles =s no bombing.
The profound question of how to cause the Palestinians and the Israelis to live in peace should not be entangled with the immediate objective of stopping the killing. Quite likely they never will. Four hundred years after the Battle of the Boyne Irish Catholics were fire bombing Birmingham pubs and London office towers. Precisely why should we expect the Palestinians to differ? But the IDF can't bomb Gaza for 400 years so they should stop now.
January 10, 2009 12:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Wow. Really good comments all. Better than anything I've seen on the other side of the page. Thanks to everyone who contributed. I am humbled.
January 10, 2009 6:15 PM | Reply | Permalink