Both factions have signed the accord to end the political standoff in Honduras.  We only have sketchy information so far, but La Prensa has published a tentative list of points - thanks to Greg Weeks for the translation:

1- La creación de un gobierno de unidad y reconciliación nacional.

The creation of a national reconciliation and unity government.

2- Rechazo a la amnistía delitos políticos, y demoratoria de acciones procesos penales.

Rejection of an amnesty for political crimes, and delay for penal processes.

3- Renunciar a una convocatoria a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente o a reformar la Constitución en los artículos constitucionales irreformables.

Reject the convocation of a National Constitutional Assembly or reform of the unreformable constitutional articles.

4. Reconocer y apoyar las elecciones generales y el traspaso de Gobierno.

Recognize and support the general elections and the transfer of Government.

5- La transferencia de autoridad sobre las Fuerzas Armadas al Tribunal Supremo Electoral.

Transfer of authority over the Armed Forces to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

6- La creación de una comisión de verificación para hacer cumplir los puntos del acuerdo.

Creation of a commission of verification to ensure compliance with the points of the accord.

7- La formación de una comisión de la verdad para investigar los sucesos antes, durante y después del 28 de junio de 2009.

The formation of a truth commission to investigate the events before, during, and after June 28, 2009.

8- Solicitar a la comunidad internacional la normalización de las relaciones internacionales con nuestro país.

Request from the international community normalization of international relations with our country.

9. Apoyar una propuesta que permite un voto en el Congreso Nacional con una previa opinión de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para retrotraer todo el Poder Ejecutivo previo al 28 de junio.

Support the proposal that permits a vote in the National Congress with previous judgment from the Supreme Court to make the Executive Power retroactive to before June 28.

Point 9 means that the Supreme Court and the Congress must agree to the accord.  As I understand it, since the Supreme Court has already ruled that it would not accept Zelaya's restitution, the SC will now only decide if Congress can ratify the accord.  What are the chances of the Honduran congress agreeing to reinstate Zelaya?  I think it is good, perhaps over 50%.  According the the election polls, National Party candidate Pepe Lobos is leading Liberal Party candidate Elvin Santos by a significant margin.  While the Liberal Party is the majority party in Congress, the National Party is a significant minority.  If congress rejects reinstating Zelaya, the accord fails, and the election will not be recognized by the international community, including (maybe) the US.  Additionally, Zelaya is also supported by a minority of Liberal Party congress members - 25 or 30.  That doesn't leave that many votes to reject the accord.  We shall see - the vote could take place today.

Point 2 is interesting, since both factions could face legal procedings in the future.  I think Zelaya agreed to this because he is confident that the charges against him won't stand up to litigation.  But this issue will be clearer when the final accord documents are released.

Finally, the "people" don't benefit all that well by this accord, since their interest in for a new constitution is thwarted. But note that Juan Barahona, a leader from the Resistance Front, was originally part of Zelaya's negotiation team, but withdrew two weeks ago when the issue of the stopping actions for a constituent assembly was put on the table.  As the Resistance Front explained, Barahona's withdrawal was specifically aimed at keeping the constitutional assembly open for the Resistance Front, and it was not an indication of the Front's not supporting Zelaya. 

I like a good mystery - especially the ones that you can follow clues and form suspicions and decided whether or not the butler did it.  There's a good one going on right now on the Washington/Honduras axis - and all indications are that the butler may confess later this week.

First off, the negotiations between the Zelaya faction and Michelleti faction once again failed at the end of last week.  Charges of intransigents  have been flowing both directions, but opinion on this outside Honduras points to Michelleti, who refuses to consider the reinstatement of Zalaya.  Michelleti's last offers brought in numerous conditions that were far beyond the scope of the San José Accord, and were rejected on that basis.

Last Sunday, however, President Zelaya releases a very upbeat message that an agreement would soon be reached on settling the country's political crises.

    "I cannot give details of how this will be achieved, but Honduras cannot remain in this situation," Zelaya told the local broadcasting station Radio Globo.

That cast the mystery for me: what had happened between the doom and gloom of Friday's announcement that 14 days of negotiations had failed?

My guess is the story in yesterday's NYT: U.S. Sending Envoys to Try to End Crisis in Honduras.

This will be the first time since the coup that the Obama administration has taken a leading role in pressuring the leaders of the de facto government to restore democratic order in Honduras. The stepped-up pressure comes after months of apparently fruitless talks about whether Mr. Zelaya will be returned to power.

That strikes me as significent.  Remember, the position of the Obama Administration has been until now to support the OAS role in resolving the crisis, beyond the visa sanctions (which, incidentally, culminated with the suspension of visas for over 600 Hondurans who are associated with the coup d'etat) .  Now we have some direct intervention.

The new effort began on Friday, officials said, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made calls to both Mr. Zelaya and the head of the de facto government, Roberto Micheletti.

In those calls, officials said, Mrs. Clinton told the two leaders that there was "increasing frustration" in the United States and Latin America over the deteriorating situation in Honduras, the hemisphere's third-poorest country. She reserved her toughest comments for Mr. Micheletti, officials said, because the United States believes he has been "the most difficult."

"During the call, he spent a lot of time talking about the past," a State Department official said. "She wanted to talk about the future."

Among other things, Mr. Micheletti has refused to accept any political deal that would allow Mr. Zelaya to return to power. He has demanded that the international community declare Mr. Zelaya's ouster a legal transition of power. And, with the help of lobbyists in Washington, he has tried to pressure the United States to agree to recognize the outcome of presidential elections scheduled for next month.

Most Latin American countries have said that they would not recognize the elections unless Mr. Zelaya, who is holed up in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa, is first restored to power. The United States has threatened to do the same.

A senior administration official said Mrs. Clinton spoke to Mr. Micheletti on Friday for more than half an hour.

"The purpose was to remind him there were two pathways to the elections," the official said, "one where Honduras goes by itself and the other where it goes with broad support from the international community."

My sneaking suspicion is that this is the source of Zelaya's upbeat optimism that the crisis will be settled this week.  However, Zelaya's "certainty" must derive from his conversation with Secretary Clinton - namely she gave him information about the leverage the U.S. negotiation team will use in Tegucigalpa this week.  The team leader is Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Shannon - whose confirmation as United States Ambassador to Brazil has been blocked in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Jim Demento, er, Demint.