For those not familiar with the famous Milgram experiment, you owe it to yourself to look into it. It demonstrated that most Americans were willing to follow orders beyond a point that basic human decency would seem to preclude. A surprising 65 percent of participants showed no limits to how far they would go while following orders, while only 2.5 percent (i.e., 1 out of the 40 participants) refused to administer a shock that was marked as being dangerous. If you think we've evolved much, check out this episode of "What would you do?"
So, given that most of us would follow orders beyond what we find decent, how can we be too harsh on those who are given such orders and then follow them? Well, for starters, accepting such an excuse makes it even less likely that people would question such orders in the future, whereas making examples of those who did not question such orders makes it more likely people will question such orders in the future. But, is that fair? I think not.
So, what should we do? Here's where I feel murky, so bear with me. For one thing, I think making as many people aware of the Milgram experiment as possible as a form of inoculation is a beginning. Of course, it has to be done in the right context so as not to be seen as excusing such behavior. Secondly, I think we can follow the German example somewhat where great collective shame is heaped onto our heads for allowing it.
What else can we do? How much should we worry about fairness if it prevents future atrocities?
]]>But far from saying that by nature all men are equal, they held that on the contrary men, like beasts, are naturally unequal, and what is natural is for every man to get what he can by any means. Law, morality, fair play, everything that the Greek summed up in the notion of "justice," is a conventional artificial obstacle that a clever man will circumvent-and be a better man, a more excellent, "virtuous" man, for doing it. "Injustice is virtue."It is easier to understand this philosophy by knowing the history of Greek philosophy up to this point: several iterations of philosophers had attempt to separate the natural from the conventional, working from the basis that the natural is equivalent to the virtuous (similar arguments today can be heard from certain corners of the homophobic world), but up until Thrasymachus' radical re-analysis of what is natural, most philosophers held that what we would consider virtuous was, in fact, natural. One supposes that they were trying to rationally justify virtue without appealing to metaphysics. (Plato's great-uncle Critias explained the Greek pantheon of gods as an invention by wise men to keep the masses from breaking the laws necessary for social order, but I'll save a more indepth look into this interesting philosopher for another post.)