But I was trying to say that Baker brings up a lot of narratives that don't meld together into an integrated description of a crime (or crimes). He often points out conflicting possible motivations for an act.
Baker's account cannot replace every other account because it is not comprehensively coherent and he admits this is the case. But he provides enough evidence to show that much of what is commonly understood to have happened is an incomplete account replete with conflicts of interest. His model puts all those conflicts of interest in the worst possible light. Cops operate in that fashion; imagining the crime while being very curious about the associates of the suspect.
I guess the distance between curiosity and paranoid certainty is what at question here.

It got me thinking about the truck I drove when I was young.
The highway was strewn with the parts that it flung.

But the ride lead to adventure
in the search for a wench here

And the rest is best left up to Jung.

What Nixon called the "the Bay of Pigs thing" becomes the ultimate description of a legacy of failure. Baker does a good job of showing how that legacy is unbroken since at least the fifties.
Baker also does a good job of putting to rest the notion that Poppy was somehow a paleo-conservative usurped by a neo-conservative cabal in his administration.

We have until now presupposed that we can determine the likelihood of the occurrence of an outcome only through objective reasoning. We can weigh the facts which suggest the occurrence of the outcome against the facts which deny it. But this is not the only way in which a judgment of the likelihood of an outcome can be established. The objective judgment can be replaced by a subjectively conditioned judgment. There is within us an inclination to believe, on the one hand, in the occurrence of the accustomed and known and, on the other hand, in the new, strange and wonderful. We are inclined to hold the occurrence of what we wish or fear for as a certainty. Such a subjective inclination to believe in the certainty of something can turn what objectively seemed as impossible into something possible; it can turn our awareness of the probability of something into an awareness of the improbability of something and vice versa.

In the context of Baker suggesting that certain people willed for certain outcomes, both of these categories come into play constantly. Since Baker often can't be sure which is happening when, the cumulative effect of the all interactions he describes is not a coherent argument that an act (or many acts)of will correspond to what really occurred. What the argument does achieve is show how the accepted explanations are no better than his.

Take the account of de Mohrenschildt committing suicide when he was in the midst of answering questions about his involvement with Oswald. Baker can't prove the model he has crafted to explain the death. But any cop has to start building a model when they ask questions like:
Who benefited from this death? Who were his associates? If he was murdered, what was the M.O.?

But this "power" could be looked at as whatever the market has to offer or actually can't offer. The question that you so righteously put forward was whether any of the people trying to influence a larger group of people were nothing more than pawns in the game of selling what we have already agreed to buy.

I was trying to say no, there are lots of people who wish to say something entirely different and they work for you and me everyday.

I was also saying that the demand for the bottom dollar to an absolute truth has its own problems.

Please tell me if this doesn't help.

But your question about dependence upon other people's narratives reminds me that the idea of what is real cuts a lot of different ways. So I would like to lay out two completely non-complimentary points of view without pretending that they eventually meet up to make a comprehensive point of view.

The first is that there are a lot of people in government who signed up for the purpose of serving the public and that their motivation and work has given them a ground to stand upon concerning the matter of what is actually happening versus whatever political message might be crafted in their name. Their work is a "balance of power" element that isn't exactly underlined in the Constitution.

The second point is that the alienation pointed out in your question whether we can trust any narratives in a world of self-interested narratives becomes a philosophical matter. In this regard, maybe our standard of skepticism is too trusting.
Jean Baudrillard talks a lot about how the demand for the absolute real that we all can experience is itself a narrative subject to manipulation. In this vein, he says something that at first glance would seem at odds with your questions:

The absolute rule is to give back more than you were given. Never less, always more. The absolute rule of thought is to give back the world as was given to us - unintelligible. And, if possible, to render it a little more unintelligible.

In the most famous passage so far of his tenure as Chief Justice, Roberts wrote, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Roberts’s opinion drew an incredulous dissent from Stevens, who said that the Chief Justice’s words reminded him of “Anatole France’s observation” that the “majestic equality” of the law forbade “rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” For dozens of years, the Court had drawn a clear distinction between laws that kept black students out of white schools (which were forbidden) and laws that directed black and white students to study together (which were allowed); Roberts’s decision sought to eliminate that distinction and, more generally, called into question whether any race-conscious actions by government were still constitutional. “It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision,” Stevens concluded.