My e-mail box has seen a great many messages in the past week calling for protest of the upcoming Middle East peace conference at Annapolis, MD. These have provided more evidence of how well the extreme right and left actually get along quite well despite disliking each other so intensely.

Americans for A Safe Israel is bringing its demonstrators to Annapolis. They essentially object to any settlement of the conflict that is not tantamount to a complete surrender on the part of the Palestinians and Arab states. They will be joined by the starkly Orwellian-named Shalom International, a Christian group that opposes any withdrawal by Israel from the Occupied Territories on religious grounds.

While no left-wing groups have, as of yet, announced any intention of physically protesting the conference, messages of protest from various small groups have been circulating. Most of these have been based on the point that the "Bush agenda" is being forwarded at the conference and therefore it should be opposed out of hand. Typically, alternatives are not presented nor, from my experience, even thought about for a moment.

Two liberal Jewish groups, Americans for Peace Now and Ameinu, have also announced that they plan to demonstrate in support of the conference.

In truth, this is much ado about nothing. The agenda for the conference has yet to be set, but the past few months have seen the Americans, Israelis and the Palestinian Authority all working overtime to tamp down expectations of this conference. And with good reason.

Before getting into that point, it needs to be stated that a conference of this type is not a negative development. There simply is no alternative to bringing the US, Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab League and the international community together to discuss the issues. The mere fact of such an event is a step in the right direction, although there can be some very negative fallout from it.

Unfortunately, the lessons of the two Camp David summits (the one that succeeded in 1978 and the one that failed in 2000) have been entirely ignored in this gathering. Even the modest goal of this conference, which is simply to restart negotiations on a final peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, needs to be pursued under certain conditions. One of the key features that distinguished the Carter summit in 1978 from the Clinton version in 2000 was the position of the various leaders attending in terms of their own terms of office.

Jimmy Carter, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat were all secure leaders whose terms in office still had a lot of future to them. Despite passionate and politically significant opposition to their actions, all three leaders had strong bases of support both among the populace and in key political arenas in their respective countries. By contrast, the 2000 attendees were all on shaky ground. Bill Clinton was nearing the end of his presidency and desperately wanted a Mideast peace accord to overshadow what appeared to be his legacy of oral sex and impeachment. Ehud Barak's coalition was falling apart amid sundry scandals and Hezbollah's claim of victory and rise in stature in the wake of the withdrawal from Lebanon. And Yasir Arafat's popularity was at an all-time low after the Oslo process had seen unprecedented settlement expansion and his administration was marked by autocracy, human rights abuses and corruption.

All the Camp David II leaders were desperate to redeem their reputations, but their needs diverged. Clinton needed a stable agreement. Barak needed to find a deal that allowed most of the settlers to stay in place, did not permit any return of refugees nor burdened Israel heavily in their compensation and did not diminish Jewish control over Jerusalem. Arafat desperately needed to show he was capable of standing up to the Americans and Israelis. These were obviously incompatible goals.

A similar situation takes hold now. George Bush's presidency lies in ruins on the sands of Iraq. Ehud Olmert is facing a stream of scandals and the humiliating setback in Lebanon last summer has already been blamed on him. The upcoming release of the second Winograd report is said to put the blame squarely on Olmert's shoulders for that war's failures and he also bears the brunt of the botched withdrawal from Gaza and the constant flow of qassam rockets being fired at Israeli towns from there. The Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas is the most different from his predecessor, but this only worsens the situation. Abbas has presided over a split that might be a death blow to the Palestinian national movement while achieving virtually nothing for residents of the West Bank. Unlike Arafat, he has very little respect among Palestinians and virtually no ability to persuade his people to accept painful compromises.

Both Olmert and Abbas are being confronted not only with strong opposition from their typical political opponents, Likud and Hamas respectively, but are also being opposed by members of their own governing coalitions. Various PA officials, including Fatah members, have not only expressed a lack of confidence in the conference, but some have even said that Abbas must make no concessions at the conference. Meanwhile, Olmert is daily attacked by right-wingers, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, but faces a much more daunting opponent in his own defense minister. Ehud Barak, attempting to position himself for a challenge to regain the Prime Minister's office for himself, has consistently undermined Olmert and the conference. Barak goes even further, though. There is virtual unanimity that the best outcome of this conference will be the restarting of serious final status negotiations. It is "the day after" that really matters, and Barak is moving to quickly start the diminishment of electricity to Gaza on December 2, a move which will clearly stir the pot and make any follow-up negotiations much harder. Thus, Barak hopes to prove Olmert a failure and set himself up as the only "moderate" alternative to Netanyahu.

All of this speaks to the need to ripen conditions before the conference rather than convene it in haste. The gestures provided by both Olmert (granting some limited amnesty to Fatah fighters, freeing several hundred Palestinian prisoners and announcing a freeze on settlement construction and the dismantling of illegal outposts, although this last has thus far been no more than words and one outpost removal) and Abbas (the increased security presence in Nablus aimed at proving to Israel that the PA can maintain security)have done little to raise confidence on the respective other sides. Syria has received no indication that it's claims would be given serious attention and is therefore declining its invitation to attend the conference (although it did cancel a parallel opposition conference). There is every reason why virtually everyone, left, right and center, expects nothing from this conference.

It need not be this way. It has always been the case that the nature of the conflict, the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, buttressed by Israel's (largely correct, though somewhat decontextualized) view that the Palestinian issue is intertwined with its conflicts with more credible enemies in the larger Middle East as well as domestic constraints on both Israeli and Palestinian leaders limit the maneuvering ability of both parties. Strong leaders have shown themselves capable of pushing past some of these issues, but these have often been in service of obstructing, rather than promoting comprehensive settlements (this was true of both Yasir Arafat and Ariel Sharon, for example). The only thing that can bridge this gap is strong American intervention, using both carrot and stick. This has, in the past produced some significant shifts and motion, such as the Camp David I accord, the Madrid conference and recognition of the PLO. Many of these have been mixed blessings themselves, but none of them could have happened without American intervention. In fact, without strong American use of both carrot and stick, there is little chance any progress will be made, now or ever.

The current administration has proven completely inept on the few occasions it has even deigned to attempt diplomacy, in this or any arena. It is loathe to employ the carrot and its use of the stick is akin to a bull in a china shop. Still, for the next 14 months, this is what we have. And I disagree with those who believe this an insincere effort on Condoleezza Rice's part; I grant that there is every reason to mistrust her, and that she has no real support from the Bush-Cheney White House, but her actions seem to indicate that she has realized, far too late, what must be done and is trying, within the limits imposed on her by her bosses, to do it.

Until the United States exerts real pressure on Israel to take down all the outposts and completely freeze settlement construction, while simultaneously both enhancing quality of life for Palestinian in all of the Occupied Territories and finding the correct balance of engagement and pressure to help the Abbas-Fayyad government stop the attacks on Israel from Gaza and establish a modicum of security on the chaotic territories, progress will be elusive and fleeting. Conditions must be improved so that both the Israeli and Palestinian publics have both hope for the future and a reason to endorse the sorts of compromises that the masses on both sides currently oppose. It is inconceivable that the Bush Administration could do this, even if it wanted to, which it obviously does not. But some of the building blocks for such a future can be laid at Annapolis and in the year that follows. This should be supported, not opposed, by all who care about either the Israelis or Palestinians, or both. And in the interim, it is crucial that those with a desire for resolution of this conflict and a realistic approach to it come together to create significant political pressure to make it happen. Recent events, such as the Ackerman-Boustany bill in Congress, show that when there is sufficient political pressure applied, even the vaunted and exaggerated "Israel Lobby" embodied in AIPAC will follow the political winds. But only if people more sensible than those in that organization make it happen.

When negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians begin to gather steam or, as is the case now, seem to be re-starting, emotions on both sides are stirred by the question of Israel’s “right to exist,” particularly its right, or lack of same, to exist as a Jewish state.

That such a debate would raise passions to a boiling point on both sides is self-evident. For Israelis, the question goes to the very legitimacy of their state and to the history of the Zionist movement. More, it implies a question of whether it is morally justifiable to seek to destroy Israel by any means necessary.

For Palestinians, the question has two layers: one, acknowledging and recognizing that Zionism succeeded in establishing the Jewish state. The second layer implies a demand that Palestinians acknowledge that their dispossession was justified and legitimate. Most, though far from all, Palestinians can accept the first layer. But search as hard as you might and it is unlikely you’ll find more Palestinians than you can count with your fingers that can accept the second.

Such a vexing question is not asked about other countries. The “right” of the United States to exist was not questioned before, during or after the Americans and their colonial predecessors nearly wiped out the native population. The right of Lebanon, a country sliced out of Greater Syria with an arbitrary pen stroke on a map, or of Jordan, a country split apart from the rest of the British Mandate over Palestine, to exist is not similarly questioned. But Israel’s is. By the same token, those countries do not ask for their “right to exist” to be acknowledged, merely that their sovereignty be recognized and respected. But Israel does ask this.

Countries do not exist by right. They exist by fiat, a recognition of sovereignty, defensive capabilities, and the power, derived either from the populace or the military, to maintain the structure and government of that country. But the debate over Israel’s right to exist persists for two reasons: Israel’s insistence that other countries, particularly the Arabs and especially the Palestinians, acknowledge this right and the constant rhetorical attempts by Israel’s opponents to de-legitimize the state’s existence. Both of these are pointless exercises that serve only to fuel the conflict and make rational discussion that much more difficult.

Israel’s “right to exist” and even to exist as a Jewish state was sanctioned by the United Nations in their partition plan of 1947 and expressed in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. While GA resolutions do not have the weight in international law that Security Council resolutions do, this is still much more international acknowledgment than most countries have. UNGA 181 speaks specifically of a “Jewish state” repeatedly.

More than that, though, Israeli diplomat Abba Eban put it best: “Nobody does Israel any service by proclaiming its ‘right to exist.’ Israel’s right to exist, like that of the United States, Saudi Arabia and 152 other states, is axiomatic and unreserved. Israel’s legitimacy is not suspended in midair awaiting acknowledgement….There is certainly no other state, big or small, young or old, that would consider mere recognition of its ‘right to exist’ a favor, or a negotiable concession.” (New York Times, November 18, 1981).

Eban was right. Israel’s insistence that its right to exist be recognized in fact undermines the very goal that insistence seeks to achieve. This is a different matter from recognizing Israel’s sovereignty, a diplomatic formality that is very important for international relations. That is what Israel needs, not recognition of its “right” to exist. And Israel can best achieve that end by ending its dispute with the Palestinians and finally demarcating clear borders so that Israel is a clearly defined entity in the international arena. Put simply, Israel needs its sovereignty recognized in the same manner as sovereignty is recognized for most of the rest of the world’s states.

The PLO recognized that sovereignty in 1988. Jordan and Egypt recognized that sovereignty with their respective peace treaties with Israel, and other countries in the Arab and larger Muslim world have also recognized it. The Arab League peace proposal offers that recognition from the rest of the Arab states. But by adding in the need for Palestinians in particular to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, Israel goes well beyond a request for recognition and asks Palestinians to agree that their dispossession was justified.

The father of Revisionist Zionism, which spawned the Herut party, the key party of the Likud coalition, Ze’ev Jabotinsky was a man of racist views, yet he saw better than his contemporaries the realities of the Palestinian Arabs’ position. In his signature essay, “The Iron Wall”, he wrote: “…consider all the precedents with which they are acquainted, and see whether there is one solitary instance of any colonisation being carried on with the consent of the native population. There is no such precedent…As long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of getting rid of us, they will refuse to give up this hope in return for either kind words or for bread and butter, because they are not a rabble, but a living people. And when a living people yields in matters of such a vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can make no breach in the iron wall.”

The situation today is no different than when Jabotinsky wrote those words in 1923, at least not in this regard. Most Palestinians realize that Zionism has succeeded and a Jewish state established. Most Palestinians realize this is an established and irreversible fact of history. They can accept these facts. But to ask Palestinians to accept that the Zionists and later the Israeli state had the right to take the land they once lived on is an unrealistic demand and one that no people could possibly accept.

By the same token, rhetoric aimed at making the case that Israel has no right to exist must also be eliminated. It is not necessary to engage in “chicken or the egg” debating as to whether that rhetoric spawns Israel’s demand or the Israeli’s repeatedly stated need for this acknowledgment inspires such rhetoric. Both need to stop if sufficiently cool heads are ever to prevail in this conflict. In this, it is not only Israel and the Palestinians, but Israel and the rest of Middle East, including Iran in particular, that is at issue. Israel must accommodate itself to the reality that, while its existence may be accepted at some point, the manner of its birth will always be disapproved of. The Arab states, as well as Iran, must recognize that Israel is a fact and that it has the same entitlement to sovereignty and security as any other country.

In my experience of dealing with peoples of all these groups, the overwhelming majority are willing to accept these conditions. It is only the constant rekindling of the pointless debate over legitimacy and the “right to exist” that radicalizes the discussion. This happens because of the deep-seated insecurities of both Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli political scientist Professor Menachem Klein puts it quite elegantly: “…admitting that Israeli forces committed war crimes in 1948, or that central organs of the government played a role in turning many Palestinians into refugees, meant admitting that Israel had been founded on an injustice. Such an admission, many Israelis feared, would void their country’s moral foundation and legitimacy…When Israel is reassured that its darkest nightmares will not come to pass, the hour will come for Israel to apologize for its role in the refugee problem….

“The PLO had a similar difficulty. Palestinian society as a whole was reluctant to admit to war crimes that its forces committed during its national liberation struggle, and to apologize for the terror that its organizations used and still use against Israelis and foreigners….They also fear that admitting to war crimes and terror will invalidate recognition of their right to self-determination. When the Palestinians are ensured of sovereignty over the territories Israel conquered in 1967, and when they are certain that their confession will not be exploited by Israel to undermine their country, the Palestinians will be able to apologize.” (Klein, A Possible Peace Between Israel And Palestine: An Insider’s Account of the Geneva Initiative, 2007, pp. 59-60)

Klein describes here how both sides need to establish a certain moral purity or, in their respective views, risk undermining the legitimacy of their national claims. But the very attempt is absurd. Notwithstanding the fact that most Israelis and most Palestinians are good and ethical people, people do terrible things in war. Israelis and Palestinians, Israel and Arab countries, and Zionists and Arab nationalists have been at each other’s throats for over a century. It is not humanly possible to fight for any length of time, much less a century, and not commit terrible crimes. No army, guerrilla group, militia or police force can make such a claim anywhere in history. The fact that terrible crimes were committed does not de-legitimize either Israeli sovereignty nor Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

It’s high time the discussion moved past pointless debates such as Israel’s “right to exist.” It’s time to deal with realities, and they are simply these: Israel exists and will continue to exist as a Jewish state for the foreseeable future and Palestinians have a right to self-determination in a viable state of their own, their experience of the past 60 years having entitled them to a good deal of aid and support from not only Israel, but also the Arab world and the larger international community in establishing that state in a sustainable manner. Should Israelis and Palestinians mutually decide (inconceivable as this is) on some other structure, such as one state or a federated system, that is their right and no one else’s to determine. From there, people of good will and conscience, in and out of government, can work within Israel and Palestine to address other needs within each society, such as healing the sectarian rifts among the Palestinians or working to ensure equality for Israel’s non-Jewish citizens.

If those basic facts of life cannot be accepted as axiomatic, then there really is no point in discussing anything else.