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Tough Guy.
Barack Obama's inherited two wars, one of which is now the second longest war in American history. Now he's faced with trying to end them without proving to the hawks that Democrats, (and he in particular), are soft on defense. Obama recently signaled a hawkish front which will be hard to contradict later, when he described the war in Afghanistan as a "war of necessity".
The Afghan presidential election was conducted on August 23 and things look pretty dismal from where I'm sitting. First off the incumbent, Hamid Karzai was hand picked by the US before coming to office in the previous election in 2004 and suffers from the image of being a puppet in the eyes of our enemies on the ground, as well as most objective thinkers around the globe. He had two Vice Presidential candidates, (as did the other candidates), as perhaps the Afghan parliament assumes a high probability of issues arising from succession due to catastrophic circumstances. Karzai replaced his second VP nominee with a Tajik former warlord blamed by human rights groups for mass civilian deaths during the Afghan Civil War. The same candidate is alleged to be heavily involved in drug traffiking according to CIA reports dating from 2002.
Forty one candidates registered prior to the election. According to human rights groups, at least 70 candidates with links to "illegal armed groups" were on the ballot list in the election.
Al Qaeda called upon Afghanis to boycott the elections, as well as vowing to prevent those who want to vote from participating in the elections. Later Al Qaeda vowed to cut the ink stained finger from any Afghani they caught participating in the American sponsored elections. This man had his nose and ear cut off for casting a vote last week.
Fifteen of the candidates for president have declared the election results invalid, alleging fraud as well as improper procedures.
Meanwhile, Taliban insurgents recently gained control over parts of two northern Afghan provinces, threatening to disrupt NATO's new supply route from Central Asia and expand the war that had for the most part been confined to Afghanistan's southern half. Taliban forces are estimated to control as much as a third of the country and threaten as much as half now after eight years of war. All of which begs the question of why the US and NATO were sponsoring elections at a time and in a country where we don't exert the control necessary to ensure free and fair elections in the first place. Some dog and pony shows just aren't worth the trouble regardless of the public relations benefit of being able to tell the world that you've conducted two elections in the country you occupy. But not to worry sports fans, because our on the ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal said that that "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable. McChrystal suggests that success is achievable by not so much killing Taliban insurgents as by making ordinary Afghans feel secure, and by so doing, isolating the insurgents. I'll grant this strategy is a vast improvement over the US strategy of winning a 'war of attrition' in Vietnam, where we stacked the enemy's bodies up against our own losses, and theoretically, whoever had the smaller pile of bones won. I'm just wondering how you make people feel secure when enemy combatants are effectively able to control or influence as much as half of the country while threatening participants in scheduled elections with physical violence after 8 years of military occupation by the US? Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Afghan forces may have to be increased beyond the planned level of 230,000 personnel to make headway. And I like chocolate ice cream and beer.
What I would like to know is how Gen. McChrystal, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and President Obama envision "success" that is achievable in Afghanistan. What does it look like? Using my own powers of observation, based on what I know of our involvement in this part of the world for well over 25 years, with a brief abandonment by us following the Soviet evacuation, is that it looks pretty much the way it does now, only we've got our very own dog in the fight now. So we'll be feeding that dog for a long, long time in order to maintain the facade of American victory, while the real business of the Afghanis, Pashtuns, Tajiks, warlords, and Taliban continues pretty much as it has been. Deals will be made, alliances struck, opium will be grown and exported, and you won't be able to tell the players without a program. Meanwhile the strategists in the government will be weighing the advantages of having a foothold, if you can call it that, in a part of the world that borders Iran and Pakistan. I suppose it's closeness to all those untapped oil fields to the north will play a role in their grand strategies as well. Ahh... for love of the Great Game.
All this to secure a country that has been home to occupying forces for centuries. From the Mongols, to the Mughals of northern India, to the Safavids of Iran, to Britain, to Russia, (and back and forth between these two invading forces for 80 years or so, then some autocratic rule by Shahs who served their own purposes and not their subjects, then some switching between a coup d'etat and it's Communist allies, who eventually supplanted the coup, and facilitated the Russian occupation in 1978, to now the US's turn to govern a people who have lived without effective government for centuries. These people were born and bred to live under and fight occupying forces. Now the US, the greatest superpower the world has ever seen, finds itself in the position of escalating an 8 year old war in a country that if not impossible to hold, is seemingly more expensive to control than it is worth. These military strategists have obviously never studied Vizzini. No 'West Bank' style settlements are going to supplant the fiercely independent people who inhabit these rugged mountains, and any 'peacekeeping' force will find itself faced with continuing attacks should they maintain a presence there. Those who advocate continued US presence in Afghanistan do so as a preventive measure against a resurgence of the Taliban and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
On some level, I'm thinking back to the late 1940s when Ho Chi Minh petitioned President Truman repeatedly for recognition of his provisional government organized after the August Revolution and was repeatedly rebuffed. In the end, we ended up waging war against his rag tag team of revolutionaries which were by then backed by another of our famous communist adversaries, China. What loss of life and great national wealth might have been saved had someone in power had the chutzpah to meet with Ho back then and open a dialogue? My question now, is whether anyone in power has thought of opening a dialogue with Taliban forces that control that other third of Afghanistan? Would they be agreeable to assuring a lock out of terrorist forces from their territories in exchange for a promise of an ordered, but timely withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan? There undoubtedly a myriad of permutations of solutions to the conflict that we're conducting in Afghanistan that don't involve the loss of life. Is anybody out there asking these questions and exploring those permutations? Is opening a dialogue with our 'enemies' just plain un-American? Would we rather fight than talk? If we're not considering all options, what do we hope to gain beyond such assurances, with the right to inspect, should we continue the military gambit under NATO or Afghan forces? What is that difference in outcome worth in the cost of human lives and national wealth?
Meanwhile we've got General McChrystal reporting that this war is winnable, which brings to mind another military strategist, a certain General Westmoreland who advised LBJ on the conduct of the so called 'War of Attrition' in Vietnam, and reaped the 58,228 body bags that returned home to US shores, where they were greeted by their grief stricken widows, children, mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, and friends. All of whom had to ask at some point what it was all about. An idea? Anyone who can't think of a better idea that's not worth dying for isn't really trying. We elect politicians to make hard, and smart decisions. Just because a military commander tells us that a war is winnable, does not mean we should base our foreign policy upon that advice. I'd be interested if any military leader would ever admit a war is not winnable by the country with more weapons of mass destruction than the rest of the countries on earth. All you need is the resolve to see it through as Westmoreland advised Congress in 1967 to 19 interruptions of applause by the wind-up patriots in Congress.
Will Afghanistan be to Obama what Vietnam was to LBJ?
What's it going to be President Obama? Are you a tough guy?
The Afghan presidential election was conducted on August 23 and things look pretty dismal from where I'm sitting. First off the incumbent, Hamid Karzai was hand picked by the US before coming to office in the previous election in 2004 and suffers from the image of being a puppet in the eyes of our enemies on the ground, as well as most objective thinkers around the globe. He had two Vice Presidential candidates, (as did the other candidates), as perhaps the Afghan parliament assumes a high probability of issues arising from succession due to catastrophic circumstances. Karzai replaced his second VP nominee with a Tajik former warlord blamed by human rights groups for mass civilian deaths during the Afghan Civil War. The same candidate is alleged to be heavily involved in drug traffiking according to CIA reports dating from 2002.
Forty one candidates registered prior to the election. According to human rights groups, at least 70 candidates with links to "illegal armed groups" were on the ballot list in the election.
While the electoral law disallowed candidates with links to "illegal armed groups", and the Karzai-appointed Independent Election Commission had barred 56 other candidates that it identified as being commanders or members of illegal militias, many of the bigger warlords, including current parliamentarians and provincial council members elected in 2004 and 2005, simply bypassed this by registering their militias as private security companies or by having the right political connections
Al Qaeda called upon Afghanis to boycott the elections, as well as vowing to prevent those who want to vote from participating in the elections. Later Al Qaeda vowed to cut the ink stained finger from any Afghani they caught participating in the American sponsored elections. This man had his nose and ear cut off for casting a vote last week.
Fifteen of the candidates for president have declared the election results invalid, alleging fraud as well as improper procedures.
Meanwhile, Taliban insurgents recently gained control over parts of two northern Afghan provinces, threatening to disrupt NATO's new supply route from Central Asia and expand the war that had for the most part been confined to Afghanistan's southern half. Taliban forces are estimated to control as much as a third of the country and threaten as much as half now after eight years of war. All of which begs the question of why the US and NATO were sponsoring elections at a time and in a country where we don't exert the control necessary to ensure free and fair elections in the first place. Some dog and pony shows just aren't worth the trouble regardless of the public relations benefit of being able to tell the world that you've conducted two elections in the country you occupy. But not to worry sports fans, because our on the ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal said that that "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable. McChrystal suggests that success is achievable by not so much killing Taliban insurgents as by making ordinary Afghans feel secure, and by so doing, isolating the insurgents. I'll grant this strategy is a vast improvement over the US strategy of winning a 'war of attrition' in Vietnam, where we stacked the enemy's bodies up against our own losses, and theoretically, whoever had the smaller pile of bones won. I'm just wondering how you make people feel secure when enemy combatants are effectively able to control or influence as much as half of the country while threatening participants in scheduled elections with physical violence after 8 years of military occupation by the US? Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Afghan forces may have to be increased beyond the planned level of 230,000 personnel to make headway. And I like chocolate ice cream and beer.
What I would like to know is how Gen. McChrystal, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and President Obama envision "success" that is achievable in Afghanistan. What does it look like? Using my own powers of observation, based on what I know of our involvement in this part of the world for well over 25 years, with a brief abandonment by us following the Soviet evacuation, is that it looks pretty much the way it does now, only we've got our very own dog in the fight now. So we'll be feeding that dog for a long, long time in order to maintain the facade of American victory, while the real business of the Afghanis, Pashtuns, Tajiks, warlords, and Taliban continues pretty much as it has been. Deals will be made, alliances struck, opium will be grown and exported, and you won't be able to tell the players without a program. Meanwhile the strategists in the government will be weighing the advantages of having a foothold, if you can call it that, in a part of the world that borders Iran and Pakistan. I suppose it's closeness to all those untapped oil fields to the north will play a role in their grand strategies as well. Ahh... for love of the Great Game.
All this to secure a country that has been home to occupying forces for centuries. From the Mongols, to the Mughals of northern India, to the Safavids of Iran, to Britain, to Russia, (and back and forth between these two invading forces for 80 years or so, then some autocratic rule by Shahs who served their own purposes and not their subjects, then some switching between a coup d'etat and it's Communist allies, who eventually supplanted the coup, and facilitated the Russian occupation in 1978, to now the US's turn to govern a people who have lived without effective government for centuries. These people were born and bred to live under and fight occupying forces. Now the US, the greatest superpower the world has ever seen, finds itself in the position of escalating an 8 year old war in a country that if not impossible to hold, is seemingly more expensive to control than it is worth. These military strategists have obviously never studied Vizzini. No 'West Bank' style settlements are going to supplant the fiercely independent people who inhabit these rugged mountains, and any 'peacekeeping' force will find itself faced with continuing attacks should they maintain a presence there. Those who advocate continued US presence in Afghanistan do so as a preventive measure against a resurgence of the Taliban and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
On some level, I'm thinking back to the late 1940s when Ho Chi Minh petitioned President Truman repeatedly for recognition of his provisional government organized after the August Revolution and was repeatedly rebuffed. In the end, we ended up waging war against his rag tag team of revolutionaries which were by then backed by another of our famous communist adversaries, China. What loss of life and great national wealth might have been saved had someone in power had the chutzpah to meet with Ho back then and open a dialogue? My question now, is whether anyone in power has thought of opening a dialogue with Taliban forces that control that other third of Afghanistan? Would they be agreeable to assuring a lock out of terrorist forces from their territories in exchange for a promise of an ordered, but timely withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan? There undoubtedly a myriad of permutations of solutions to the conflict that we're conducting in Afghanistan that don't involve the loss of life. Is anybody out there asking these questions and exploring those permutations? Is opening a dialogue with our 'enemies' just plain un-American? Would we rather fight than talk? If we're not considering all options, what do we hope to gain beyond such assurances, with the right to inspect, should we continue the military gambit under NATO or Afghan forces? What is that difference in outcome worth in the cost of human lives and national wealth?
Meanwhile we've got General McChrystal reporting that this war is winnable, which brings to mind another military strategist, a certain General Westmoreland who advised LBJ on the conduct of the so called 'War of Attrition' in Vietnam, and reaped the 58,228 body bags that returned home to US shores, where they were greeted by their grief stricken widows, children, mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, and friends. All of whom had to ask at some point what it was all about. An idea? Anyone who can't think of a better idea that's not worth dying for isn't really trying. We elect politicians to make hard, and smart decisions. Just because a military commander tells us that a war is winnable, does not mean we should base our foreign policy upon that advice. I'd be interested if any military leader would ever admit a war is not winnable by the country with more weapons of mass destruction than the rest of the countries on earth. All you need is the resolve to see it through as Westmoreland advised Congress in 1967 to 19 interruptions of applause by the wind-up patriots in Congress.
Will Afghanistan be to Obama what Vietnam was to LBJ?
What's it going to be President Obama? Are you a tough guy?
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You know I am guilty of turning a blind eye to these damn wars.
If McCAin were in office, I would be raising holy hell.
Yes, the dog days of August and health care seem to stay on as issues....silly talk shows called Sunday news........
Miguel, you are waking me up.
Thank you.
August 31, 2009 8:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for delivering some factual data on this issue.
Re your query about someone willing to talk with Taliban, I believe that Obama and others have recently stated they would, but of course with specific agenda and boundaries in place.
I've read that in some areas the Taliban has been weakened considerably, yet in others they appear to be stronger.
I can certainly understand and recognize the potential for this to be another Viet Nam, but I think it's too early to project.
Excellent post and you definitely expanded my knowledge about the election.
Rec'd.
August 31, 2009 8:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you Miguelitho2o, great post with some good history and references (excellent timing too).
What I want to know is what does it look like in Pakistan? What is the game plan for the region? Does obama know something about those nukes that makes this an 'indispensable war", cuase I could maybe buy that. But unless we have a holistic nation building plan for the whole region I don't see what we are doing there but falling into Osama's long term strategy.
It seems to me that Pakistan's (and Afghanistan's) problems require an coherent international strategy far beyond that which our military can provide. What is it?
We need a multi-pronged plan which force is only one part of. Somehow you have to get the natives to both economically modernize and desire to help us. With Afghanistan perhaps you can start by turning the opium farmers into painkiller farmers (sorta like what happened with turkey), but something has to give in Pakistan- Civil society has to be strengthened, jobs have to be plentiful, women need to get the right to vote. Quit the nonsense with India.
Frankly, I don't know enough to know if any of that is even attainable, The Vietnam parallel might be much more apt, certainly their history does not offer much hope, but I want to hear someone present some plans that at least address the intrinsic problems of the region. Otherwise we are just collecting war stories and body bags.
August 31, 2009 11:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for bringing up the issue(s) with Pakistan. I don't know what Obama 'knows' about that country, but I hope we have the sense not to advance on false information as we have done in Iraq. As a friend of mine, (aveteran of the Vietnam war), is fond of saying, "Don't underestimate the stupidity of the military and 'intelligence' communities. I know this blog paints a simplistic picture, but I do think sometimes we have to resort to simplicity. My question as to what the difference is between a military win and a diplomatic win in Afghanistan are sincere. What do we hope to achieve, that can't be more easily accomplished through talks? I'm not so much interested in a "nation building plan" for the region, so much as defining what our specific goals are in Afghanistan. We're never going to get anyone who knows anything to reveal regional strategies anyway, as that kind of queers the deal. If they can't define the strategy in Afghanistan clearly, then the hopes of them defining a regional strategy are all but lost. Modernization of the region would go a long way toward bringing about mutually desirable goals. With the warlord gestalt of the players, both A-stan, and P-stan, I'm not sure how realistic that is, and as such, to me a strategy of containment is probably as effective as one of nation building. Then begin the incentives to bring these countries into the world community. Until then, as you say, we're just collecting war stories and body bags. Thanks for your comment Sal.
August 31, 2009 11:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here's a link I've always found to be very good:
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/
September 1, 2009 12:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Bookmarked, and thanks neo. I learned more in the 'Pakistan: Quo Vadis' article than I've ever known about some of the power relationships between principles of any country.
September 1, 2009 12:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
And don't forget the archives on this site. There are some old papers there that indicate that bin Laden's most lethal threat isn't from the US, Pakistan, the War on Terra - but from Pakistan's Shia muslim community which Usama betrayed some years ago which led to several Shia deaths. Why they were never utilized by the CIA or Joint Command to get Usama is beyond me. These guys are the best shot to bring him down.
Also embedded in the archives at SAAG is a lot of information about Pak and Af being Narco States, which means there's an international arms merchant on every street corner. Man, it's a mess.
September 1, 2009 12:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks Neoboho. I've got some reading to do.
September 1, 2009 12:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
I guess I seem the conflict and Pakistan's devolution as integrally linked.
Containment would have been the preferred option, but we are there and we don't appear to be leaving. I understand your call for clear metrics or leave, but what could they possibly be? We take this moutain and declare victory? we dredge up Osama's body and then go home? I am all for that as I don't think we are in a winnable scenario, but since we seem to be committed how about a realistic plan?
I don't really agree that we won't get anyone to reveal a regional strategy. In fact without a clearly enunciated international one I don't think we can succeed at all. I do however agree that you will not get anyone to clearly state an individual battle plan. For example here is an interesting hypothetical analysis:
I can understand this reasoning, and maybe this is underlying subterfuge. However without corresponding soft power and economic incentives it will fail. In Iraq we have make a sheik program with an economically literal country that has oil. They might be able to finagle something amongst the locals that can fiance long term rebuild. Or at the very least buy them off. I am doubtful but it is possible. What is there in Afghanistan? Why would anyone care? Or are we simply going to bribe them? Then why more trips at all since no one will believe us?
But going back to the big picture. If we leave and the Taliban takes over and continues to launch sorties into Pakistan, further contributing to that countries descent into military rule how is that a victory? It is very clear that Pakistan is rapidly becoming a failed state with nukes. What do we do about that? Should we leave and hope for the best? Contain? How? What happens when Mumbai happens with nukes? What does India do (and its 120 million muslims)? What happens if those nukes make it to Iraq? Israel? NY? Do we have a responsibility
I admit that I am inclined to agree that we are destined to lose and I also I don't know enough to really make a case one way or the other. But Pakistan scares me. I hate body bags and I hate this situation.
p.s. I hate HATE Bush. Fucking idiot. Jesus it was his dad that gave the Pakistanis nukes too. God damn that family. WORST PRESIDENT EVER
September 1, 2009 3:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
That's an interesting link. One thing that I'm not sure I believe is the assertion that the Taliban has no motivation to compromise. Perhaps they are all ideologues willing to continue a conflict that ultimately they are destined to suffer great casualties as well as financial loss, but at some point there must be a realpolitik that takes hold. Again, I keep coming back to asking what we gain by going down this road and how is that different from working a deal to forgo harboring terrorists, with some form of verification? I think the money and effort we spend in Afghanistan would be better spent in Pakistan. The models suggested in the article never resolve whether the Taliban can be defeated or co-opted through negotiation, which is more or less the point I was trying to make in this post. If that's the case, some kind of accomodation must be reached, and we can pursue that after expending lives and ammunition or not. Makes sense to me to attempt it sooner rather than later. I can only hope that the concluding line, "As such, generals tend to not get their way", is accurate in this case.
September 1, 2009 4:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
at some point Realpolitik has to take hold
That is the author's point of the thinking behind the so called surge strategy, if they believe we will up and leave then they have zero incentive. They just wait us out, so we have to convince them. This was the thinking behind the surge and they are trying to export that strategy to Afghanistan. This thinking may be at play with the change in tone from Gates and Obama recently (Now it's the 'Indispensable war'). From your times link:
Okay. How. What is the timeline? If we are using the surge tactics then what is the equivalent to the Sunnai awaking? And lets stop fooling ourselve. Afgahnistan is a region, one with a porous and amorphous border. It is foolish to pretend that it can be looked at in isolation.
So what I really want to know is if we are trying this universal counterinsurgency strategy then how do you handle this:
(from my earlier link)
Frankly, absent an international coordinated approach towards the region and particularly Pakistan, I fully agree with this. Why would the Taliban negotiate? So how do we defeat them in Pakistan? The same techniques can be used but it must come from the Pakistani's themselves. That takes time and a lot of economic incentives.
So what are we doing? I would at least like someone to credibly explain what a realistic outcome of our pursuit of the policy McChrystal lays out would be
Yes but that means Pakistan too, if not any metric we come up with will be fatally flawed. So we should cut our losses now and turn to full-fledged containment of the region.
Anyway great post, Thanks.
September 1, 2009 12:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for your contributions Sal. I don't pretend to have the answers to these issues but wanted to start a discussion particularly as to the validity of Obama's assertion that our involvement in Afghanistan is a war of necessity. As you and others have thoughtfully pointed out, the crux of the issue is Pakistan. I am interested in examining our whole strategy formulated under Bush for fighting terror and particularly the effectiveness of that strategy in A-stan. One thing I'm pretty sure of is that it will be hard to compete as far as motivations for an analog to the 'Sunnai awakening' as long as there is the volume of narco-dollars floating around the region.
September 1, 2009 1:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Metric for success in Afghanistan?
No metric. We can only lose or leave.
It's the same story in Iraq, though no one admits it. (We're leaving, having won absolutely nothing there, since there was nothing to win.)
Nothing to win in Afghanistan, lots to lose.
September 1, 2009 4:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
That's pretty much my assessment. The only question is how much we are prepared to lose in terms of human life and national wealth before we actually embrace that idea. Beyond the question of losing or leaving, is the one I posed in the blog, which is to define what we gain by staying.
September 1, 2009 5:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
p.s. I hate HATE Bush. Fucking idiot. Jesus it was his dad that gave the Pakistanis nukes too. God damn that family. WORST PRESIDENT EVER
Sal, what's the story with Bush 41 and the nukes in Pakistan? For some reason, I always thought it was the Reagan administration that more or less just looked away during the Soviet invasion of A-stan, as the Pakistanis developed them. Not so?
September 1, 2009 5:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yeah its soooooooooo. ha
September 1, 2009 6:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sorry seashell. I missed this.
Frankly, I will have to source that better. My understanding is similar to yours however I have read somewhere that Bush41 allowed the China/Pakistan cooperation to accelerate and that some in the state department thought that a MAD (mutually assured destruction) with India would a positive development (and Pakistan was our ally against Soviets) This was from a while ago and it very well might have been a conspiracy thing that linked Bush41 to his CIA-China Ambassador to Pakistan. I shouldn't have attributed that to him (although I am certain he was involved at some point).
It was just a quick rant at the lack of Strategy from W.
September 1, 2009 8:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
Is Dan k around?
August 31, 2009 11:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yep. Still reading.
August 31, 2009 11:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
A second question:
I find that one even more scary.September 1, 2009 7:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
My guess is that the outcome will be quite similar to the Soviet experience although the Taliban will not have another 'superpower' supplying them with military hardware as the Soviets did, (with the US sending a steady supply of Stinger missiles and other hardware to the 'rebels'). That lack of state sponsorship is the only saving grace for our troops, though perhaps Pakistan or Iran could eventually fulfill that role to some degree given enough mangled US foreign policy. I think they will be quite capable of keeping up a steady stream of small arms harassing fire as well as guerrilla bombing operations in spite of the lack of a major state sponsor.
September 1, 2009 11:17 AM | Reply | Permalink
and then taking it into the future--the American Empire begins to fray around the edges, as did the USSR --Texas secedes, so does Alaska--hmmmm I still have a 48 star flag around here someplace.
September 1, 2009 6:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Can MN join Canada - universal healthcare, no war and solvent banks. What's not to like?
September 1, 2009 6:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
Me too, amike.
The US supply lines in the region are stretched and vulnerable so Russia " helpfully" gives us access across their land and no doubt they got something they wanted in return.
To me, that begs the question: Is their intention to help us win and get out or just to loan us a shovel to dig in deeper with so that we ultimately suffer their fate?
Maybe we should look at history and follow the tactics of the last country that successfully occupied Afghanistan.
September 1, 2009 11:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think the problem is that it makes the US look weak if we have to negotiate with the Taliban. As a result we lose credibility in future and possibly more important confrontations and negotiations. As you point out, the Taliban are well suited to wage a war of attrition and they have the home court advantage. It's too bad Bush II was able to avoid serving in Vietnam. Had he done so, he might have learned all of this, stayed out of Iraq, concentrated on getting OBL dead or alive, and gotten out of Afghanistan once that objective was accomplished. Or at least not gotten us embroiled in Iraq, which would provide us with more options in Afghanistan now...
Thoughtful, informative post, Miguelito.
September 1, 2009 7:44 AM | Reply | Permalink
At some point the parallels will fail to hold up but as I recall it, looking weak, and losing credibility played a significant role in our inability to bring the Paris Peace Talks with the Vietnamese to a 'successful' conclusion as well. Then I remember the scene of the helicopter evacuation of the US embassy in Saigon, and have to ask myself what was the net gain, politically, militarily, or in terms of world credibility between such an end and what we would have achieved had we just walked away in '68. While I don't see us having to evacuate as the Taliban closes in on Kabul, I can see a long occupation with little to show for it, and an eventual ceding of the field to the Afghans when a balance will be struck between the various factions as easily or perhaps more easily than it can occur with US involvement.
I would at least like someone to credibly explain what a realistic outcome of our pursuit of the policy McChrystal lays out would be.
September 1, 2009 11:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
Personally, I think there's some merit to the economic development model - but I think it would have to be orchestrated at the magnitude of the Marshall Plan to have a lasting impact. How old is opium cultivation in the Pashtun homeland (Pakistan and Afghanistan)? My guess is that it goes back to the Brits and the East India Company's enormous profits selling opium in China. So let's see, the Dutch India Company was shipping opium from India to Java in 1670, and in 20 years opium represented a third of the cargo shipping out of Jakarta to the rest of the world. It was a wonder commodity - the more you exported, the greater the demand grew due to popularity and addiction. By 1750 the Brits had become the opium kings, turning opium traffic from a luxury item to a bulk commodity. But I don't want to get distracted.
We're talking about a political economy that is over 350 years old - in other words, a way of life. The only change when opium production was outlawed is that it became an ex-officio political political economy, but it was so critical to the individual growers that it thrives to this day.
What this means, in my view, is that the tribal areas are ungovernable. Why should a Pashtun farmer grow cabbage instead? He would earn about 10% of what he would earn from a crop of poppies, and his family would starve. Any international aid that comes towards agricultural development in Afghanistan will come under the agribusiness model, and the farmer will be left out, replaced by oil-guzzling tractors and combines, and the crop will have to be exported to make the whole operation profitable. The real fecundity of this would be the production of more Taliban.
And let's not forget that the Taliban represent a minority of Pashtuns and other ethnic groups. The Taliban are not "a people" any more than Jehova Witnesses are "a people."
Let's also not forget that the foreigners who comprised al Qaeda have been among the Pashtuns long enough to intermarry and now are just about all family.
Anyway, I think the base mechanism for the situation is opium. Pakistan upped the ante as it embraced technology by becoming the major processing center for cooking opium into heroin. So of course the Pakistani ISI was imbricated with the Taliban, bin Laden, and generally the Pashtun tribes.
September 1, 2009 1:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Interesting analysis neo. I wonder what even a 'Marshall Plan on steroids' for the region would look like? How would you ever compete effectively in making the economic transition when there is a cash crop with the rate of return that opium growing and heroin processing provide. I've often wondered if it would make sense in that area to just purchase the product directly, rather than spend the money we do on the war on drugs, or does that just translate to the growers doubling the output as they try to fulfill their old clients orders as well as the new.
September 1, 2009 1:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, I thought of direct purchase also. Then the crop could all be burned. The Taliban, btw, did suppress opium production on religious ground...but they didn't destroy the opium - they stockpiled it. As soon as the Taliban were rooted out of their position of power, the stockpiles hit the market and there was a flush of cheap heroin in the markets - the Stans, Russia, Europe and I think a small amount reached North America. Tragic consequences too, especially in the Stans. People are so poor that they couldn't afford heroin until the market glut, and now there is a serious addiction problem all over Central Asia. The market just got larger - damn, it's so insidious.
I think a good collective project would be to determine who benefits from opium/heroin production. I think it's a five thousand armed octupus reaching into all levels of the world's economy, and benefactors range from the farmers, the cooks, mules, the terrorists, the CIA, corrupt leaders and politicians, bankers, arms traders, money launders, organized crime cartels, and so on. (I recall reading that the Bush family made a lot of bucks from opium back in the day).
September 1, 2009 1:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Interesting sidebar on the effect of the Taliban's stockpile hitting the markets in EurAsia, which I was not aware of. I'd buy the book that chronicles that 5000 armed octopus. It might be like the demimonde of drugs version of The Prize.
September 1, 2009 5:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Look this ain't rocket science. There is a simple solution- we make it legal and then buy it all up for medicine. We did it in the 70's in Turkey.
Check out this paper.
http://www.poppyformedicine.net/documents/Political_History_Poppy_Licensing_Turkey_May_2006
Bonus: Everybody loves painkillers.
Double Bonus: Death Panels!!!
September 1, 2009 2:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Let's do the math. In 06, the estimated harvest in Afghanistan was 6,100 metric tons, or 6,100,000 kilos of dry opium. What a farmer earns per kilo varies between $200 and $100, so at $150 the price tag for a buyout would be around 1 billion per year.
So it takes around 10 kilos of opium to make a kilo of heroin. In Europe, reported prices vary widely between $69K in Austria to $29k in Switzerland (I'm sure the numbers are very dynamic) so let's just settle for an average price of $40K. So the $1500 dollars an Afghan farmer earns from 10 kilos of dry opium turns into $40K bucks by the time dope dealers in London buy a kilo. Let's see, that's about a 27x mark-up, and I think my numbers are very conservative. My point is that a buy-out program would really upset the guys who are on the mark-up profits programs, from mules to labs to smugglers to dealers. And you can bet with the kind of profits that are involved quite a few movers and shakers of the world economy would be pissed too, and likely to stop the program at its start.
That's the irony - the Taliban were quite effective is stopping poppy cultivation, and when they were toppled it was business as usual, and had the blessings of the USA.
September 1, 2009 3:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
So? 1 billion is a pittance, even 27 is doable (see my "make a sheik" link above). Buy it up- create a whole legal industry out of it.
Besides it doesn't really serve our (or the world's) interests to have those middlemen making that money anyway. Let them compete with our cash while we legitimize the farmers and clap down the borders.
September 1, 2009 5:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
I admire your idealism Sal. Your assumption is that our legislators would legislate in the electorate's best interest, when all those elements of the 'Homeland security', DEA, Customs, et al, infrastructure so comfortably ensconced in place depend on a nonfluctuating status quo of actors, good and bad, fulfilling the promise of their individual economic roles in the 'War on Drugs'. It wouldn't be that different from what we're seeing in the healthcare reform 'debate', with the exception that the bad actors would effectively write the legislation without attracting as much attention as the healthcare industry is in the present 'debate'.
September 1, 2009 7:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Wow, I don't get called an idealist very often.
I don't think full legalization is neccessary, and I don't think eliminating Afghan opium would have that large an effect on our domestic law enforcement agencies. It mostly gets bought in Europe. I also don't think we even have to legislate this. We could start off by largely running it through the executive branch, however to be truly effective it would be good for some international cooperation. I would suspect that the Europeans would be on board.
I am only proposing to follow a model that we have already successfully used. That is make legal farmers out of the opium growers and then give their product to the pharmaceuticals to make low cost painkillers.
September 1, 2009 8:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think it's a bad plan, Saladin, I just don't think it would work. But let's play along with it. The first thing that would happen is that the next tier up from the farmers begin blowing the market place up, and murdering farmers who cooperate with the buy out. After all, it's that second tier that contains the actual terrorists and the war lords and their gangs who are profiting from delivering the goods to the labs in Pakistan. I've read that the lab segment of the trade is responsible for 1/3 of Pakistan's GDP, so it means that the Pakistan military would be providing cover for the guys blowing up market places etc. I'm just speculating, it just seems that there's a good chance of creating more violence and political instability with an attempt to do a buy-out plan than the plan itself is capable of lessening.
September 2, 2009 12:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree that it would have to be done in cooperation with an international economic plan for the region (see my earlier comments). I am under no illusion that it would be a general panacea for the region. But frankly if they started targeting markets- great we defend em. That's a lot easier then hunting fleas in the mountains, and we would be defending the populace's money supply so they would support us.
Yes the Pakistan issue is there, but it is there no matter what. If it is as corrupt as you say then we have lost. I don't know if I disagree with that, but here I am just floating strategies that might actually have a chance.
September 2, 2009 1:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
Well now, this sure is taking your lemons and making lemonade. How about trading poppies for medical care and equipment? I'll bet they could use some decent health care in Afghanistan.
September 1, 2009 3:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
There have been reports that the villages are willing to expell the Taliban. When they were brought schools and amenities, they no longer found it preferable to harboring people that drew the attention of the air-droids, if you will. It's really quite Stalinist, but there are no large communities in Afgahnistan so having a small presence that gets to know them can enable us to know who's new and ferret out the Taliban warriors. If the local wariors see their families treated well, they do eventually ask, and I'm fighting these people why?
Maybe healthcare will eventually generate the same effect....HA!
September 1, 2009 11:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
What does that look like? I imagine the continued expulsion of the Taliban from local villages would require a continual police presence in those villages, so if such is not the case, the Taliban vacates an area and as soon as the military presence vacates in turn, the Taliban returns. I don't think the Taliban will just fade away as the hearts and minds of Afghan villagers are won over either by US or Afghan police/troops. They seem to be the one organized power, and a significant one at that, in Afghanistan. As such, I believe our policy should be directed towards reaching a mutually acceptable outcome with them if at all possible, as well as laying off the 'air-droid' attacks on innocent locals, (could be a big component of winning those hearts and minds).
September 1, 2009 11:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
No, it's not like that. The Taliban did not leave and we entered behind them. The situation was that the villagers themselves ousted the Taliban. The villagers told them to leave.
The reason was characterized as a decision by the village to reject the Taliban. We usually see the villagers simply trying to eek out their existence while battles are fought all around them. Many will shelter a Muslim brother because of their shared faith and/or ethnicity, as is customary. Now, from what I gathered, they are making the decision to ignore that custom.
Afghanistan is kind of like Vietnam in this respect. The guy whose your friend in the morning wants to cut your throat at night, or is giving aid and comfort to that guy. Villagers in Vietnam sheltered VietCong while smiling at US troops during the day. I guess what it really comes down to is that we may be winning their hearts and minds. I saw it as a sign of that, and if we have, or when we do, then when we leave, they have their own stake in the future and have no desire to abdicate their autonomy to the Taliban. But I guess it comes down to whether we can change the way things are being done in a truly meaningful way.
September 1, 2009 4:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
But you know, it might have been just pure propaganda. There's the villages getting all freindly to the US and we'll make their lives better, and then there's the news that the Presidential candidates are all warlords and/or have their own little drug cartel.
September 1, 2009 4:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here you strike at something at the core of my motivation for writing this blog GZ. We are so easily manipulated to believing that the Taliban is a monolithic evil cabal, and it may be true, but given the distortions from political sources/governments and the simple parroting of those talking points and sound bites by the media, I'm no longer ready to subscribe to that channel. My advice to the State Dept. as well as the Dept. of Defense is to bring in some negotiators who weren't raised in the squirrel cage of government beaurocracy. Someone who can at least imagine different paradigms than the official current standard paradign, (OCSP), and thus perhaps stand a chance of being able to plot a successful course out of the mess we find ourselves in in Afghnistan.
September 1, 2009 5:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, one thing that has bothered me recently has less to do with the politicians then it has to do with the government and its bureaucracy. Although we change the Congress and President, the bureaucrats are pretty much all the same except for the heads and a few rungs down. Other then that, it's the same. I'm sure the same is true with the military, although these days it's more profitable to leave the military and go work in the private sector for the military, which does no service for our country. Those contractors are the ultimate in self-service.
September 2, 2009 1:00 AM | Reply | Permalink
Would they be agreeable to assuring a lock out of terrorist forces from their territories in exchange for a promise of an ordered, but timely withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan?
I wonder what these "terrorist forces" really amount to, and what it really means to lock them out. If some Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda-like jihadists want to plot an attack on New York or Los Angeles, does it rally matter whether they do the plotting in a "safe haven" in Afghanistan, or instead do it in Yemen or Mogadishu or Madrid or London or Newark?
Michael Cohen at Democracy Arsenal recently discussed a piece by Josh Foust. Foust said one of the two main strategic goals for the mission in Afghanistan is:
A basic minimal stability in Afghanistan, such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground for international attacks, whether against neighboring countries or the United States and Europe;
Cohen, in a generally skeptical response, nevertheless agreed that the above was "a compelling rationale for the US mission".
But is it? What kinds of Al Qaeda or Taliban attacks are they imagining could be staged in Afghanistan, and in what would the staging consist? What kinds of staging could possibly take place in Afghanistan that could not just easily take place in any number of other countries which are closer to the likely locations of the attacks? And what level of "minimal stability" could we possibly achieve in Afghanistan that would put any serious dent in the ability of jihadists to store up dynamite, C4, triggers, wires, bullets or bomb vests in a single room in some safe house somewhere in the country? What Cohen and Foust are imagining is maximum security, not minimal stability, and obviously there is nothing we can do to turn the very large, wild and geographically challenging country of Afghanistan into an American maximum security facility.
Why in the world would anyone "stage" a suicide bombing, car bombing or assault rifle attack intended for a city in Iraq, Africa, Europe, or North America in Afghanistan? And if they couldn't stage it there, would that really matter?
People seem to be easily dazzled in this debate by various pieces of poorly understood and dubiously applicable language: "safe havens", "training bases", "staging grounds". Terrorists don't need expansive training bases to do the minimal training they need to do. They don't need to go to terrorist "boot camp". They don't need to learn to drill, march and salute. They don't need to maintain a network of headquarters to manage logistically and tactically involved operations. They don't need to hide and protect tanks or battle cruisers or field artillery. They don't even need Evil Masterminds in mountain lairs. Militant jihadism is mostly a do-it-yourself job. To the extent it relies on pre-existing expertise and weapons running networks, that expertise and networking is scattered all over the world and isn't permanently "staged" anywhere.
I'm appalled that eight years after the 9/11 attacks, people still don't understand what terrorism is, what can be done to prevent it, and what can't be done. We're still getting these anachronistically conventional and inapplicable military concepts applied to asymmetric warfare.
This war is not really about Al Qaeda and "safe havens". That's for popular consumption. It is about the Taliban for the sake of the Taliban. There are realists in Washington who don't like the Taliban because they interfere with our ability to project power and control vassals in a strategically important part of the world. There are liberals in Washington who don't like the Taliban because they are reactionary Salafist Muslims who make women where burkhas and do other illiberal things. And as always, there are all sorts of people in Washington who just don't think we can afford to be seen losing a war once we have started fighting it and have invested our reputation in it.
September 1, 2009 12:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Makes complete sense to me.
September 1, 2009 1:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Very well said Dan. There is an inertia to these policies that builds over time. Once you start down the road after these 'evil masterminds' with a policy that is effectively designed around fighting a conventional military conflict, trying to turn about or even change course becomes bogged down in the assumptions laid down when that policy was originated. There's too much invested in 'proving' the evil masterminds are truly evil, and they are locked into demonstrating that the US is in fact the 'Great Satan'. So you need some people thinking these things through who can change out of the lockstep of the ideological perspective that dominated when Bush conceived his so-called-war-on-terrot, (SCWOT or 'squat' if you prefer), and get a fix on what is really happening, without considering, or at least placing on the backburner, the political implications for the television viewing audience. Of course any change in the design or execution of our policy regarding the SCWOT will be exploited for political purposes by the players, and the people will be treated to another public debate about on par with that of the teabaggers while money and lives are squandered to prove a policy conceived in error from the start.
September 1, 2009 1:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, yes very nice but what about Pakistan?
What elegantly written sophomoric crap.
In regards to your overall thought of Taliban Terrorism attacks vis a vis the west, sure fine. However- There are nukes in Pakistan, and at least 3 confirmed raids on those facilities have been attempted. Sure so far so good. But it is of real concern and one your argument does not even address. In fact you dismiss it out of hand in favor of superfluous colorful descriptions of "dynamite, C4, triggers, wires," and "Evil Masterminds in mountain lairs." Jesus lay off the bond movies and pick up a map.
I can't speak for Cohen or Foust, but I disagree with your characterization. I think that what is probably going on her is that the Obama/Gates/Clinton team has determined that we are stuck in the region in order to maintain a minimal stability for Pakistan. This 'new' strategy is just the latest shade of lipstick for that pig.
Why don't you go back to your whining. You're much better at it then thoughtful comprehensive analysis.
=)
September 1, 2009 1:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
You are right that I didn't address Pakistan, Saladin. Most of the post was focused on Afghanistan. And my post was only focused on the terrorism dimension of the conflict. For some time now we have been told that the war in Afghanistan has to do with the prevention of Al Qaeda "safe havens" or "staging grounds", and my aim was just to express skepticism about that purported aim, given that there are apparently a number of people out there - including Foust and Cohen - who take it seriously.
My understanding is that the main tools of terrorism are such things as dynamite, C4, triggers, bomb vests and wires - James Bondish or not. I would also add money and a few human beings here and there. And insofar as this is what terrorist plots are composed of, it seems somewhat ridiculous to me to think that the way to detect, counter and interdict such attacks against Americans and American interests is to try to close down their "staging grounds" in far-off territories. There are no such staging grounds. Nor will there ever be any end of little "safe havens" that are perfectly safe enough for some motley crew of terrorists to use it to plan their assaults. It doesn't matter if Afghanistan is run by Hamid Karzai, Mullah Omar or Winston Churchill - as if anyone could actually "run" that country and thoroughly surveil and police all its territory in the way that would be required to achieve the fantastic levels of security our policy-makers apparently dream of.
And it wouldn't matter. We could spend billions of dollars turning Afghanistan into a giant prison with a panopticonic system of camaras watching everything, so that terrorists could find no "safe haven" there, and yet the people who are inclined to engage in terrorism would just go somewhere else. Terrorism doesn't depend on territory.
As for the "evil mastermind" part of my post, my ironical point was that terrorism does not depend much on any such masterminds, or on the legends created about them by both their supporters and our own government, and so the picture painted for Americans of terrorists directed by "terror masters" in lairs or safe havens in Afpak is really irrelevant to the nature of whatever terrorist threats actually exist. Terrorism does depend on a network of individuals who can hook up willing perpetrators with the money, transportation and weapons they need. But such networks are distributed around the world, and don't depend on the holding of permanent territory. The fight against such networks takes other, more clandestine, forms. And whether Osama Bin Laden is now alive or dead matters little from a strategic point of view.
So again, my conclusion was that the main government selling point delivered to the US public on behalf the war against the Taliban, that it is a part of the war against Al Qaeda and terrorism, is bogus. The war has other motives.
Now all this said, it seems like you actually don;t disagree with me about this stuff, since you think the point of the war in Afghanistan really has more to do with stability in Pakistan than any concern with Al Qaeda safe havens or staging grounds.
And keeping the government of Pakistan, along with its nuclear weapons, out of the hands of militant jihadists is certainly a very important goal, as is the more limited purpose of simply keeping the government stable enough that the potential theft or use of these weapons doesn't become a pressing issue.
September 1, 2009 4:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Pretty righteous words that sure make you feel good, but to make such a blanket pronouncement without a mention of Pakistan is, frankly, Sophomoric. But I see that you are repositioning your comment as merely a statement on the selling of the war, so I will withdraw my insult.
Look we don't disagree substantively re Terrorism vis-a-vis the west, or the tools of the trade (although please revisit Neoboho and Miguelito's back and forth above to consider the 'money' element of terrorism, or for that matter 'the networks of people to transport goods' element).
However, we don't agree on the staging grounds argument. I do believe that the Taliban can strike Pakistan from Afganistan. I believe this simply because they do it now.
In fact I think it has always been the long term goal of Osama. You get yourself a nuclear armed state and you have something to reckon with. I can't prove that but if that were the game I was playing it would have been my ultimate strategic goal too. Do you really think that Afghanistan does not destabilize Pakistan? Really?
To me Pakistan (and it's nukes, and India) are really the crux of the matter and any discussion of the Afghanistan strategy that ignores that falls short.
September 1, 2009 6:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Interesting supposition regarding Osama's ultimate goal here Sal. In the end Pakistan is for the radical Islamic terrorists, the jewel in the crown of Muslim states for this reason alone. What I don't understand is the advantage 'attacking Pakistan from Afghanistan' provides the radical Islamist's. It seems to me that their best hope is to penetrate Pakistans ISI/government by infiltration/recruitment rather than attacking. Those assaults seem to just drive a wedge between them and the nationalistic instincts of the Pakistanis.
September 1, 2009 8:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
Maybe, but my thoughts are twofold:
1. You use whatever techniques that work. Use militias, use insiders, use bribery. Try everything something might stick.
2. Fear. Why do the Iranians have a civilian Basji force to compliment the conservative police? Why do we have terror alerts? Push the country conservative.
In regards to the nationalism argument. The Pakistanis have a much larger issue with India then they do the Afghans. That is if you believe that there really is such a thing as an Afghan- which I am not convinced. I really don't think that Nationalism has much hold there- or for that matter in the hills of Pakistan. That's one reason why I don't buy the easy Vietnam parallel. There is no Uncle Ho here.
September 1, 2009 8:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
You've given me a lot to think about in this discussion. I think the common ground between Pakistan and Afghanistan is what makes me question the value of Afghanistan to Islamic terrorists as a staging ground for assaults on Pakistan. It's an interesting argument, but there are so many ways such a strategy to drive a country to the right like that could backfire against the conspirators, that I wonder as to it's long term value.
I didn't want to hang my arguments as an analog to Vietnam, although there are enough parallels with regard to presidential politics, I thought it worth connecting the dots in that regard. Again, thanks for participating. I think I learned a lot from the discussion with you, and the others who joined in.
September 1, 2009 8:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks Miguelito2o, but it was your excellent post that got everyone going. I just wish I was as good a writer as you and the others around here. I want to be clear that I don't think you are hanging everything on the Vietnam analogy. I also think we agree a hell of lot more then disagree.
If Pakistan falls it will be because the country desolves into a state of chaos. If we leave all that narco money and stumble out foolishly I don't see how that would be good for the regional security- and unlike Israel, Iraq, North Korea, or Iran I am actually worried about the pakistani nukes. Stories like this do not make me sleep well.
That said, I share with you a sense that it is probably a lost cause and that our presence very likely is causing more harm then good. I just don't know enough to know what I really think yet.
I certainly wish we were not there.
September 1, 2009 9:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is a whole other blog, but I'm a fan of total nuclear disarmament. If the US ever stepped up to that plate, I believe we could negotiate a worldwide nuclear disarmament, but those who choose to interpret or misinterpret Clausewitz's theories of war and politics seem to dominate the discussion. Perhaps that leads back to TPMgary's observations above.
September 1, 2009 10:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
Now who's the Idealist?
But another day...=)
September 1, 2009 10:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
:)
September 1, 2009 10:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
What kinds of staging could possibly take place in Afghanistan that could not just easily take place in any number of other countries which are closer to the likely locations of the attacks?
Headline:Marines occupy Hamburg
"Startled residents of Hamburg awoke this morning to find tanks stationed at strategic intersections as part of the new American strategy intended to deny Al Quaeda access to the base from which they staged the 9/11 attack.
'we won't let them plot and plan in German or Arabic, declared the CIA station chief for Germany who spoke on the condition of anonymity'"
September 1, 2009 5:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Better call Tank Girl.
September 1, 2009 8:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
Like others, I find this post interesting and provocative, particularly because it embraces the complexity of the issue and does not dogmatize.
Also, as mentioned, the Obama Administration has spoken of reaching accomodations with "moderate" Taliban. It appears that the Taliban comprises a small hard core of ideological fanatics, and a much larger contingent of various tribal factions who go along, but are willing to switch sides at a moment's notice. Unlike Vietnam insurgents, the Taliban are much more often loathed and feared by most Afghans than admired, and so the usual strengths of insurgency among a native population is missing in most areas.
One statement you make, Miguelito, is I believe a misrepresentation of McChrystal's position. I don't believe he has used the word "winnable" to define success. Again, unlike Vietnam, the Administration's goals are not to reverse a nationalist movement, nor to defeat an enemy in the conventional sense, but rather to establish a sufficient balance of power among competing factions to prevent the kind of takeover that transpired prior to 9/11. I think, or at least I hope, that this is seen as requiring major efforts to replace NATO forces with indigenous players. I believe, in fact, that "success" or "failure" will be decided by our ability to restore the kind of balance among conflicting forces and warlords that has been typical of Afghanistan in many past eras. It's not guaranteed, but there is no major national external player trying to sabotage the effort, so it may succeed. Failure would be very unfortunate, because Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and Pakistan has nuclear weapons.
September 1, 2009 1:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
My concern is how accurate that description of the Taliban in fact is, ("the Taliban comprises a small hard core of ideological fanatics, and a much larger contingent of various tribal factions who go along"). What are their stated goals in regard to the occupation of Afghanistan? I've seen so much set up as a media dog and pony show during the past eight years, that I'm not sure I wholly trust the way the Taliban has been portrayed. Perhaps they do have a core of bogeymen, but is there a complete inflexibility wherein they will forever spurn diplomacy in order to reach an accommodation? I think much of Bush's strategy upon invading Afghanistan as a precursor to his Iraq strategy. That is he puts the dominant political party on the run from the start, without trying to co-opt them into a new paradigm.
Regarding the establishment of "a sufficient balance of power among competing factions to prevent the kind of takeover that transpired prior to 9/11", I agree this is the best outcome we can expect. Which makes me think of those years following the Soviet occupation, when our foreign policy was so blind as to essentially abandon financial aid to this country once the threat of communism had left the arena. It was that lack of attention that set the stage for the rise of the Taliban. That lack of attention seems to be a direct result of our policymakers wearing their own particular hue of ideological blinders. I don't have the answers, but would caution all Americans, and particularly those in power to look at these issues from outside the box of the accepted paradigm, which is about all I hoped to accomplish with this blog. It has been a good conversation. Thanks for commenting Fred. I've got to get some work done now, but will check back in a bit later.
September 1, 2009 1:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
What is known about where the Taliban get their weapons? Why does it take so long to "train" and Afghan army capable of defeating the Taliban, or at least holding them in permanent check, if that army is backed by the US Congress and Department of Defense? If nothing else, the US certainly has plenty of powerful weapons to give them.
My guess is that in the Afghan context of routine side-switching, these forces are considered so unreliable, in terms of loyalty, that any weapons delivered into their hands would quickly find their way into enemy hands, or else just pawned for cash on the black market. "Training" is thus a broad, somewhat euphemistic term that indicates finding a bunch of reliable guys who are actually committed to defending the government.
September 1, 2009 4:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
September 1, 2009 5:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
Remember the hundreds of thousands of weapons that went missing in Iraq?
September 1, 2009 7:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sounds to me like you make a good case for the U.S. getting out of Afghanistan ASAP.
September 1, 2009 3:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't have a scholarly opinion on the subject. It just seems to me that war is very profitable to many and instability in the Middle East is a primary objective for some. When you dig deeper, past the shallow religious and political ideologies, past those who claim to champion democracy and the spread of freedom, past the faux patriotic rallying cry of "America doesn't lose, America wins and we will not leave until we win" what is it that is really driving everything?
Historically, the U.S. has paid and armed different factions to fight as proxies in the Middle East. And this still goes on.
What's not talked about much is who is paying the U.S. to fight as its proxy?
Are we even in control of our own destiny in the region?
Or have we squandered our treasure so much that we are now someone else's pawn in the big game?
September 1, 2009 7:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
You raise some very interesting subtextual points to the debate my friend.
September 1, 2009 8:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sure were the pawn. India/Pakistan and China/Ugyer Muslims and Russia/Chechen militants
who would be armed and supported by Rebel groups financed by Afghanistan.
Should we care if these other foreign countries are faced with trouble on their homefronts?
If these countries had to finance their own defense, would they buy our BONDS?
September 1, 2009 8:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Again, you have presented a very good article, I very much look forward to your next work.
Your title had me thinking about our Relationship with the Afghani people.
Hey Tough guy
Whats it gonna be boy?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0ns8t9iQck
Afghani’s wondering if the relationship is for real
@ 6:11 minutes in
Whats it gonna be boy?
Come on
I can wait all night
Whats it gonna be boy yes or no?
Whats it gonna be boy yes or no?
will you love me forever.
September 1, 2009 8:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
Good on ya Resistance! That's a happy note to end this blog on as it slides off the page. Here's one of my favorite tough guy songs... Mr. Tough.
September 1, 2009 8:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here are some interesting numbers: The annual GDP of Afghanistan is $9.358B and the cost of conducting the war in Afghanistan to date is around $225B. Spread over roughly 8 years that averages about $28B/year or approximately three times the whole country's GDP/YEAR. With a population of 27 million, that equates to $1037/person/year. The per capita income in the country was at $800/year in 2008. My guess is that we would have been able to control at least as much of this 250,000 square mile plot of land as we do now after 8 years, and WITHOUT all the deaths had we just bought these people out. It would be like coming to the United States, and saying rather than invading your country, we're going to give each and every one of your citizens, children, babies, and infirm $47,000, (average US per capita income), for eight years if you'll just give up those terrorists. I don't get it.
September 2, 2009 3:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
Want to thank miguelito for the roundup and have a couple of minor points to share.
1) I have always been very sympathetic to the argument that the Taliban are not Al Qaeda and vice versa and everything that goes along with that argument.
However, when I read things like this, and I do see them often enough:
September 3, 2009 5:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
dang, the quote box should have ended with the url, sorry for not previewing properly.
Would like to add that on that trust thing and Obama, I always find it helpful go deeply into what the allies are saying. Just that we have real allies in such a war or occupation or peacekeeping or whatever you want to call it, should allay some fears from the getgo (we were notably lacking allies in Iraq and Vietnam; the few in the former were not exactly self-confident wonders.) Then if you compare what they are saying and their reasons for staying or wanting to get out or questioning their involvment or strongly continuing to support it, you get a better sense of whether your own leader's judgment is decent.
September 3, 2009 5:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
I hate it as much when I fail to hit the 'reply to' button as much as you probably do when you forget to end 'blockquotes' in their proper position. ;)
September 3, 2009 3:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
You make a good point here as to the evolving aspects of the Taliban and how that plays with the radical Islamic fundamentalists. The situation is indeed complex AA. I don't mean to underestimate the presence of bad actors in the Taliban. The fragmentation of the country is, as you say, to our advantage in that there is a counterbalance that can potentially be levered into position to offset what could be the likely (re)domination of the country by the Taliban. On some level it looks to me like that outcome of a rogue state, (operationally if not literally), of "Pashtunistan' is likely and to my thinking, perhaps the best outcome we can hope for. As to whether the balkinization of the area would further deteriorate the economic or social problems of the remainder of Afghanstan or Pakistan is not so certain to me. On some level it might improve the probability of containment by the surrounding countries/areas.
September 3, 2009 3:42 PM | Reply | Permalink