Getting A Grip On Reality Over Iran's Nuclear Program
Pity the conservative thinker and reader haunted by the specter of a nuclear Iran. How would you feel if you got halfway through your day and someone punched a big hole in your already tenuous grasp on reality?
Vice President Cheney tried so hard to play his role of Big Daddy within the Big Daddy Party and protect the kids from facts that they were too young to deal with. But the intelligence community won, and finally we have professionals telling us what some of us knew: Iran's nuclear weapons program has long been more of a virtual threat, a diplomatic tool to keep its head above water in a complicated diplomatic ocean.
But don't worry, surrogates for the genius of our unitary vice president are already coming to the rescue. Check out some of the things they're saying.
The main line of response against the news from the US intelligence community that Iran's nuclear weapon program is not fearful boils down to one word: Iraq. We overestimated on Iraq, therefore, we're probably underestimating on Iran. Check out Gabriel Schoenfeld at Commentary:
...the latest NIE is not a rock-solid judgment, and as we have already seen in a number of other dramatic instances, even the intelligence community's rock-solid judgments might not be solid at all.
To further the idea that consistency is the hobgoblin of the little minds, another junior blogger echoes this principle:
From overestimating the threat, we're going in the polar opposite direction, and being wrong in underestimating the situation is just as dangerous - if not more so.
But it won't stop there. I guarantee you. Look at this conclusion taken from the NIE itself about why Iran stopped pursuing its nuclear weapon program:
Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.
In no time at all, watch for wags on the right to declare that Iran's decision to drop its nuclear program in late 2003 is proof that we should have invaded Iraq. By implementing the Bush Doctrine, and demonstrating that the US will take military action against proliferating boogeymen, they'll say we made Iran back down. Except that we didn't really know it until now.
Bottom line: It's time to let the adults take over on foreign policy again, and not the gawky teenagers who never stopped being pissed off about the hippies marching on their college campuses.
For half a decade now, Iran has been standing outside the room, waiting to make a deal with us. Iran is enriching uranium...yeah, so is Germany, and Japan is separating plutonium. We'd rather take aggressive diplomatic measures to put Iran in that category than to force them to feel like India, Pakistan, and Israel did in their decisions to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.
Four words, President Bush: Let's make a deal.





It's ironic that Japan is separating plutonium, which is superior to uranium for a miniaturized bomb. No, I don't think they are making one.
It does fascinate me how much to-do is being made about Iranian uranium enrichment, and nothing about their plutonium work, which is not as far along. There's more than meets the eye here, as one generates reactor-fuel-grade plutonium differently than one generate bomb-grade, and these things may well be determined from reconnaissance satellites.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
December 3, 2007 1:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is actually reasonable to conclude that after seeing the US go crazy and lash out at non-enemies, keeping a bit lower profile was wise for Iran.
But that theory is weakened by the election of Ahmadinejad, which seems the opposite---a bristling reaction to the bluster coming from 1600 Penn Ave.
Probably the contradiction is explained by the non-unitary nature of Iranian government and politics.
December 3, 2007 4:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
In American Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger wrote of three negotiating styles in international politics, and you may be seeing one of them in classic form.
Our system was described as bureaucratic-pragmatic, characterized by lawyers as representatives. When they aren't in an adversarial courtroom situation, lawyers try to hammer out something that is acceptable to everyone. In businesses or other organizations that have developed a culture, I've seen heroic battles between counsel and executives, telling the lawyers that certain core values were not negotiable.
In such businesses, the culture is often unwritten, and not necessarily obvious to all the insiders. Kissinger contrasted the bureaucratic-ideological, using the Soviets as an example, where he could know some of the hardcore Marxist-Leninist ideological values. By phrasing things in their terms, and invoking the dialectic, a negotiator might just find the Chief Ideologist of the Politburo his unwilling ally. Remember, Suslov, the longest incumbent, never wanted to be the king, only the kingmaker. It is possible that by putting some of our points in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, we might prevail with some of the stricter Islamist countries.
The third category was ideological-charismatic, often someone known as a key figure in breaking loose from colonialism. His example was Sukarno of Indonesia, who, for domestic political reasons, needed to be seen as defying the First, and possibly the Second, world.
Sukarno lived in "modern" times, but not with a 24-hour news cycle. While he was clearly in charge of Indonesia, he could make a statement, and it might trickle out through print media or the Murrow-Cronkite kind of news. How would Sukarno have been perceived if CNN, Fox, etc., were waiting on his every statement, some that he knew perfectly well were outrageous but were needed for his home constituency?
Now, move Ahmadinejad into Sukarno's media environment. Would he be perceived as such a wild man? Might a Cronkite have stopped to explain that the "President of Iran" is neither head of state or head of government, and having nowhere near the power of the President of the US?
How often does the media, especially the electronic instant media, even mention the "non-unitary nature of Iranian government and politics"?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
December 3, 2007 5:09 PM | Reply | Permalink