That said, I agree with your analysis; in fact, I made (admittedly fleeting) reference to that point in my original post: 'Clinton's star-power will also raise the profile of the (already high-profile) State Department. If Obama intends to shift the fulcrum of foreign policy conduct further from Defense to State this is a good way to do it.'

Perhaps, then, we're agreed on Clinton's merits and demerits, and what differs -- as you astutely pointed out in a previous comment -- is the relative weight we place on each of these factors.

That said, I'm leaning against the nomination. I think she'll probably be effective, but I feel that several of the other candidates are more qualified for the position. I also think she presents more of a risk, for many of the reasons I've outlined.

I agree -- I'm under no illusions that she'll form a 'shadow administration'. (Something I foolishly alluded to in my previous post.) There will probably be some internal policy squabbles, though, which is a good thing as long as they stay internal. I suspect that sometimes they won't. Clinton's advisers have tended to be leak-prone, and the media has salivated over any Clinton dirt they can get. It's not a major point, but a consideration.

I realize that my post would have been strengthened if I made clearer what I felt was most important, and why, in sum, I lean against the choice of Clinton. I don't really have the inclination to rewrite it (beyond the section headings). For what it's worth, I think the strongest arguments in Clinton's favor are the political capital her star power on the homefront will bring Obama and, quite simply, her smarts and affinity for policy wonkery. I think her lack of foreign policy experience and what appears from the outside to be poor diplomatic skills are the strongest arguments against. The essential point, however, is that we shouldn't simply weigh Clinton's strengths against her weaknesses -- I think her strengths would probably win -- but then compare that result against the net benefits (or detriments) the other candidates possess.

That said, I think your Rice and Rumsfeld examples sort of illustrate my point. Bush's foreign policy vision was fundamentally altered in the wake of September 11th, and the influence of folks like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and Cheney are a huge reason why. This was a change for the worse. While Rice has been less transformational, and in that sense less effective, she has also (as a result) been less destructive.

Having a 'star', or somebody strong-willed enough to shift (even hijack) a President's foreign policy, or both, can be a good thing if that star's foreign policy vision is superior to the President's. (Kissinger is perhaps the best recent example.) I don't think that Hillary Clinton's is.

So you're right that being low-key and being effective aren't always one and the same. But we have to consider both character or ability and the substance of one's ideas. Steinberg would be great as a headstrong NSA because he's at the top of his field. Joe Biden, had he been passed over for Veep, would have been a great Secretary of State because he knows more about foreign policy than almost any other elected official in the Democratic party. But I'm not convinced by either Clinton's foreign policy credentials nor her foreign policy ideas.

That said, I think you misconstrue my point. After arguing that Clinton's star power could allow Obama to focus on domestic policy while she holds down the fort at Foggy Bottom, I countered that the Bill Clinton's mistakes early in his first term suggest that policy delegation to cabinet members does not work very well in practice, and that Hillary's significantly different foreign policy views also argue against substantial delegation. I later made the point that internal policy squabbles can be embarrassing to the administration if leaked (as happened after Powell left the Bush administration), and Clinton has presided over a very leaky boat. The fact that Clinton was so recently an ambitious rival to Barack Obama really could be problematic (see Haig, Alexander) and could differentiate this situation from the examples you've provided.

Finally, your point with regard to Bill Clinton's finances and connections kind of misses my point. It's not that his shenanigans (or the perception that he's been involved in shenanigans) could hurt Obama's administration -- although it could. It's that they could produce real conflicts of interest in the conduct of American foreign policy. I'm not talking about 'Clinton Derangement Syndrome'. I'm talking about, for example, the Chinese not willing to believe the United States is an honest broker in some hypothetical conflict over oil in Kazakhstan because they think the Secretary of State's husband is in the pocket of the Kazakhstani government.

I'm not saying that any of this will come to pass. I'm not in the business of prognostication. But these are risks that should be considered. If, considering them, you still think Clinton's a better choice than the other alternatives, that's fine. I don't. So I think we'll have to agree to disagree.

There are, to be sure, plenty of people out there who simply dislike Clinton, sometimes for good reasons and sometimes not, but it debases discussion to accuse everybody who attempts criticism of Clinton of 'Hillary-hating'.

Secondly, my point about Bill Clinton is not 'guilt-by-association'. I am not, as that would imply, making or drawing any inferences about Hillary's character because of her husband. (And if I did they'd mostly be positive -- I like Bill!) But there are real-world consequences to apparent impropriety. I choose my words carefully here: it is not even impropriety that matters, but the appearance of it. It is reasonable to assume that the media will delve into the histories and acquaintances of both Clintons, especially Bill, and some of the things they uncover (as well as some of the things they've already uncovered -- hence my Kazakhstan example) would be politically damaging to Barack Obama and harmful to American interests abroad.

I'm not saying that Clinton is unqualified for State. But the question must be, first, is she the most qualified; and, second, are there potential negative consequences to her selection, political and otherwise, that act against her benefits? Again I'm being careful with my words: it's not even a case where the 'cons' have to outweigh the 'pros' before we reject Clinton as the first choice, because there are other candidates that might, on the balance, bring greater benefits to the table.

That said, thanks for your comments, and to repeat, I'll be writing something more substantive later. (Hopefully this afternoon but I have an old friend coming into town, so depending upon when he arrives it might not be till tomorrow night.)

So goals matter. But pragmatism helps. I'll take liberal pragmatism any day.

I agree with you on Summers. And I think the very fact that his views have evolved is a boon. It's the old adage that only Nixon can go to China: having a one-time champion deregulator, who is well-regarded on Wall Street, argue for expansive government stimulus probably makes it an easier pill for many centrists to swallow.

I don't want to spend too much time defending them, but for what it's worth a quick search pointed me to the two charts here comparing the growth of government spending as a proportion of GDP in the United States and Sweden (which, I think we can agree, has a very generous social welfare system) from 1790-1990. You'll notice that the Swedes did spend more up until the New Deal, at which point U.S. spending surged to roughly equal levels. Unsurprisingly, government spending during the Second World War was greater in the United States, but it remained greater after the war. The growth rate of government spending in Sweden was higher, however, and it appears to have surpassed American spending sometime around 1970.

The comparison is rough, I know, and it's a measure of total (and not just discretionary) spending. In a cursory search I couldn't find anything else appropriate I'm not sure it's worth further searching, as this is fairly tangential to my point. I'm happy to concede it if you'd like.

As to tighter regulation, it depends on which markets in which countries you're comparing. Obviously labor market regulation in France, for example, is substantially tighter than in the United States. What I was thinking about when I said 'market regulation' was banking and the financial sector, both of which tend to be more highly regulated than in competing nations. Again, I wrote rather crudely, which is my fault.

The comparison of racism to xenophobia better illustrates the point I was driving at. This is something that really isn't comparable between America and Europe. Xenophobia and racism both exist to different degrees in the different nations, but they differ as much in kind as in quantity. Attitudes toward race and nationality are fundamentally different in America and Europe. This makes it nonsensical, or at least problematic, to say that America is further to the right on race than Europe, or vice-versa.

Again, you're right to point out that I 'proceed[ed] to break down European and American politics into traditional left/right rubrics.' It was intellectual clumsiness on my part, and I hope that this comment clarifies it.

What my argument boils down to is that recent debate over America as 'center-right' or 'center-left' is moot. It doesn't make much sense to compare America to other nations in order to declare it center-right or center-left, and it doesn't make sense to compare it to itself. ('Compared to America, America is center-right!') Whatever is center-left in America is, then, by definition not the center.

But the liberal side in this debate seems intent to argue against that: to assert that the election proves the center-left is really now the center. That's a fine rhetorical justification for progressive action, but I don't think it can be sustained in the long run. I believe it's better if progressives realize that the median voter doesn't necessarily support center-left policies and priorities. That will place a greater (and healthy) impetus on communication and pragmatism.

We should not, as conservatives did after 2004, presume that we have a mandate and govern accordingly. We should push forward a progressive agenda, but make sure we bring as many voters along with us as we go. That's how to avoid over-reach, and that's how to move the center over time.

Admittedly, you're correct in saying that I'm not suggesting a new paradigm. I'm sure this has been said elsewhere (and said better). To be quite frank, I suspect that very few, if any, of my posts propose new paradigms. But I do hope that I have something valuable to add nonetheless, even if it's just to provoke thoughtful disagreement!

Many thanks once again for your comments. I hope that they've made my argument stronger upon reflection.

That said, in case you're interested, I've posted a follow-up to this at The Lion and Gun: Ideology and Elections

Thanks again!