"First came a helicopter and then a tank, which was a sign of a company, but was handled by soldiers," said Tamayo, who also suffered the effects of chemicals.

The priest, who observed when discharging chemicals, said a hundred citizens, who are in the building, most presented problems, such as dizziness, headaches, stomach and throat, vomiting and bleeding.

Truck allegedly delivering toxic gas to be used against Zelaya. Enough HCN to kill an army ... the army doesn't seem too nervous. (source: Teimpo.hn)

In the Mexican

Military Armed Forces of Honduras, with the logistical support of Israel advisers, gases released from neighboring homes into the interior of the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa, causing vomiting of blood to the refugees in the embassy.
[...]

He said that "people are vomiting blood, are closed to the airways, and cause other serious problems of intoxication" and therefore called on all nations "to stop this barbarism."

Zelaya also made a statement that was carried by several sources including Teimpo:

"They spread a toxic gas that the military used to evacuate people, here are sixty people all trying to breathe in the yard," said the president, who said he is using a gas mask and although it has a dry throat .

"There are people vomiting and urinating blood," said Zelaya.

Physicians were called to the scene including former Health Minister, Marco Rosa and Zelaya's personal physician Mark Rhodes. According to Teimpo:

Former Health Minister, Marco Rosa, confirmed a few minutes inside the Embassy of Brazil there are at least 25 to 30 people poisoned with some kind of gas.

Indicated, by means of television, outside the building, those affected with vomiting, headache, diarrhea and even nosebleeds
[...]
Initially, Rosa said he did not know if it was some kind of food or gas, but soon after confirmed that from inside it confirmed that they have found a hose through which the gas would be infiltrating.

So there's a group of people pissing/vomiting blood; Rosa finds a hose; a diagnosis is made; toxic gas! Let's pause for a moment and run down the symptoms that eyewitness sources within Zelaya's media team have reported:

-Vomiting
-Vomiting Blood
-Urinating Blood
-Dizziness
-Headaches
-Sore Throat
-Diarrhea
-Nosebleeds

Those conditions are no joke! Anything plus blood = not good. And don't forget, according to Tamayo, this attack began with gas delivered from a helicopter. Sure was lucky Zelaya had a gas mask ....

	Manuel Zelaya displays the "gas mask" that saved him. (source: Teimpo.hn)

Zelaya and his aides said at a news conference that a local public health specialist they identified as Dr. Mauricio Castellano took air samples near the embassy after the attack and determined that the gas contained HCN, an abbreviation for hydrogen cyanide. HCN can cause dryness and burning of the throat, shortness of breath, convulsion, coma and cardiovascular collapse.

Its most infamous application was the use of hydrogen cyanide by the Nazi regime in Germany for mass murder in some gas chambers during the Holocaust.

UN Guys looking pretty breezy for inspecting a embassy that has just been attacked with a toxic gas that may likely still linger in the air and on surfaces. Are they usually so careless if they think a situation may be toxic? (source: laprensa.hn)

	The road in front of the Embassy on Tuesday. (there were curfews until Thursday). (src: laprensa.hn)
	The same area shown shortly after the "gassing" (src: elHaroldo.hn)

... the main difference between Senator Clinton's plan and mine is the fact that she would force in some fashion individuals to purchase health care.

Now, Senator Clinton has not indicated how she would enforce this mandate. She hasn't indicated what level of subsidy she would provide to assure that it was, in fact, affordable. And so it is entirely legitimate for us to point out these differences.

And the last point I would make is, the insurance companies actually are happy to have a mandate. The insurance companies don't mind making sure that everybody has to purchase their product. That's not something they're objecting to. The question is, are we going to make sure that it is affordable for everybody? And that's my goal when I'm president of the United States.

On the -- on the point of many adults, we don't want to put in a situation in which, on the front end, we are mandating them, we are forcing them to purchase insurance, and if the subsidies are inadequate, the burden is on them, and they will be penalized. And that is what Senator Clinton's plan does.

SEC. 59B. TAX ON INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT ACCEPTABLE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE.
(a) Tax Imposed- In the case of any individual who does not meet the requirements of subsection (d) at any time during the taxable year, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 2.5 percent of the excess of--
            (1) the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income for the taxable year, over
            (2) the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer.
[..]

(5) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME- For purposes of this section, the term `modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross income--

(A) determined without regard to section 911, and

(B) increased by the amount of interest received or accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is exempt from tax.

(A) IN GENERAL- The tax imposed under subsection (a) with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed the applicable national average premium for such taxable year.

(B) APPLICABLE NATIONAL AVERAGE PREMIUM-

    (i) IN GENERAL- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the `applicable national average premium' means, with respect to any taxable year, the average premium (as determined by the Secretary, in coordination with the Health Choices Commissioner) for self-only coverage under a basic plan which is offered in a Health Insurance Exchange for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins.

(A) IN GENERAL.--In the case of any individual who did not have in effect qualifying coverage (as defined in section 3116 of the Public Health Service Act) for any month during the taxable year, there is hereby imposed for the taxable year, in addition to any other amount imposed by this subtitle, an amount equal to the amount established under paragraph (2).

(C) LIMITATION.--The maximum amount imposed under this paragraph with respect to any taxpayer shall not exceed 4 times the amount determined under paragraph (2)(D).

(A) REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH.--Not later than June 30 of each calendar year, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and with the States, shall establish an amount for purposes of paragraph (1).

(C) REQUIRED CONSIDERATION.--Subject  to the limitation described in subparagraph (D), in establishing the amount under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall seek to establish the minimum practicable amount that can accomplish the goal of enhancing participation in qualifying coverage (as so defined).

(D) LIMITATION
   (i) IN GENERAL.--Subject to an adjustment under clause (ii), the amount established under this subparagraph is $750.

(c) EXEMPTIONS.--Subsection (b) shall not apply to any individual--
(1) with respect to any month if such month occurs during any period in which such individual did not have qualifying coverage (as so defined) for a period of less than 90 days,
(2) who is a resident of a State that is not a participating State or an establishing State (as such terms are defined in section 3104 of the Public Health Service Act),
(3) who is an Indian as defined in section 4 of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act,
(4) for whom affordable health care coverage is not available (as such terms are defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under sec tion 3103 of the Public Health Service Act), or
(5) described in section 3116(a)(4)(C) of the Public Health Service Act.

(1) NOT TREATED AS TAX FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES.--The amount imposed by this section shall not be treated as a tax imposed by this chapter for purposes of determining--
(A) the amount of any credit allowable under this chapter, or
(B) the amount of the minimum tax imposed by section 55.

(2) TREATMENT UNDER SUBTITLE F.--For purposes of subtitle F, the amount imposed by this section shall be treated as if it were a tax imposed by section 1.

(3) SECTION 15 NOT TO APPLY.--Section 15 shall not apply to the amount imposed by this section. [note: HR3200 states this as, "The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not be treated as a change in a rate of tax for purposes of section 15 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986."]

(e) USES.--Amounts collected under this section shall be dedicated to premium credits established under section 3111 of the Public Health Service Act.

#1
Myth: The Honduran court declared the referendum proposed by Zelaya illegal.

Fact: The issue was never tried on it's merits. The Honduran court issued a temporary injunction against the referendum. It found that without an injunction, remedy for the plaintiff would become moot and public money spent on the poll would be unrecoverable in an event where a hearing on merits found the referendum illegal and it had already taken place. This injunction was upheld on appeal.

#2
Myth: Zelaya was removed from office for trying to extend his term.

Fact: Zelaya was removed from office for what amounts to contempt of court because of ignoring the injunction and subsequent court orders.

#3
Myth: The legal challenge to the referendum was based on an allegation that Zelaya wanted to extend his term in office.

Fact: The argument against the referendum was based on two issues, one statutory and one constitutional. The statutory argument involved jurisdiction: if Zelaya had legal authority to authorize the expenditures and conduct the poll, or if the authority is granted to a different government organ as alleged by the plaintiff. The constitutional argument is based on the nature of the November ballot question proposed in the referendum.  Based on the Honduran constitution, certain articles can not be changed. Additionally the method for legal changes to the constitution is strictly defined in Article 373 which itself is one of the protected Articles. The court cites constitutional Articles 373, 374, and 375 as the basis for the legal challenge. Article 239, limiting presidential terms, is simply not mentioned or used as the basis for any legal argument.

1. On May 27, 2009, the Administrative Law Tribunal issues a ruling in relation to [the request an injunction be imposed on] Executive Decree PCM-05-2009. The court dictated a "sentence interlocutoria" ordering the suspension of the proposed consultation by the President or any of his subordinates in the administrative structure.

WHEREAS (4): That in this sense it is important to note that when the request is resolved suspension of the contested measure has been taken into consideration that the remedy is not effective if the final rule, it is difficult or practically impossible satisfaction of the claim contained in the demadnda, so the correct decision of this application requires balance and harmonize the two conflicting principles, on the one hand, the effective judicial protection, and secondly, the effectiveness of administrative action, that the presumption of legitimacy of the act, seeking to avoid beginning with implementation of the act of injury difficult or impossible to repair, the absence of a suspension of the act is challenged, so when order the suspension of the effects of a particular act which is to provide that when issued a final ruling is merely declaratory and inefficient with respect to the plaintiff's claims.

4. On June 16, 2009 the Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the May 27 injunction. Rejecting the request presented by President's Council Velasquez Diaz to overturn the Administrative Law Tribunal ruling. Lawyer Rosa America de Galo representing the Soliciter General presented the argument in favor of upholding the court order. The appeals court confirmed the legality of the May 27, 2009 injunction as well as the additional clarification issued on May 29. 2009.

6. On June 18, 2009, the Administrative Law Tribunal issue third communication to the Presidency through the Secretary General to order to respond within five (5) days to the court with jurisdiction acknowledgment of intent to comply with the "sentence interlocutoria" as clarified in the May 29, 2009 notice.

8.On June 26 the court found that the Presidency had not complied with the June 18 court order to provide acknowledgment of intened compliance with court injunctions within five days, which expired on June 25, 2009. The court found that Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, as leader of the executive branch was in contempt of court orders and was responsible for the crimes against the GOVERNMENT FORM, TREASON TO the MOTHER COUNTRY, ABUSE OF OFFICE AND USURPATION OF FUNCTIONS that damaged the administration. The panel found unanimously that the President would be suspended for contempt on June 30, 2009 in the event of continued noncompliance. The Supreme Court designated a magistrate to contact the Presidency and determine the status of the required filing. The court issued formal charges and a warrant for arrest.

...In this regard, the convening of a Constituent National Assembly, it is clear that it intends to repeal the current Constitution, acts constituting the crime at issue in light of the provisions of Articles 373, 374 and 375 of our Constitution not lost its validity, or no longer fulfilled and can not be subject to modification, but by any other means and procedures other than that she has, therefore, under no circumstances may dictate and approve a new constitution because this would with the reform of stone articles, which can not be reformed in any case.

Another sergeant shot a man in the head without cause while questioning him, Needham said, then mutilated the body, lashed it to the hood of his Humvee and drove around the neighborhood blaring warnings to insurgents in Arabic that "they would be next."

Other Iraqis were shot for invented reasons, then mutilated, Needham said.

The sergeants particularly liked removing victims' brains, Needham said.

Needham offered a photograph of a soldier removing brains from an Iraqi on the hood of a Humvee and other photos as evidence. His father supplied copies to The Gazette.

The Army's criminal investigation division interviewed several soldiers from the unit and said it was "unable to substantiate any of his allegations."

This is a really amazing piece of journalism. The author does not go for a simple account of horrible behavior in Iraq. Instead, Dave Philipps provides a chilling deconstruction of what is happening to our soldiers. It follows the progression of young soldiers deployed with a unit called the "Lethal Warriors" through battle experiences and subsequent return to the US to an ultimate end in prison for violent crimes.  It is a stark statement of the deadly results putting soldiers through a meat grinder and bringing them home with no mental health support has for American communities and the soldiers themselves.

Soldiers from other units at Fort Carson have committed crimes after deployments -- military bookings at the El Paso County jail have tripled since the start of the Iraq war -- but no other unit has a record as deadly as the soldiers of the 4th Brigade. The vast majority of the brigade's soldiers have not committed crimes, but the number who have is far above the population at large. In a one-year period from the fall of 2007 to the fall of 2008, the murder rate for the 500 Lethal Warriors was 114 times the rate for Colorado Springs.

Equally amazing are the prison interviews with infantry specialist Kenneth Eastridge. In two parts, he describes activities in Iraq that led to reprimands and a fatal incident that occurred when he and fellow soldiers returned, resulting in the death of a fellow Iraq War veteran on his birthday.

One thing that I find inexcusable is that the military has treated these soldiers with PTSD like the private insurance companies treat patients with cancer: try to find some way to kick them out.

"As soon as I got out [of the mental counseling facility], I had a scheduled bitching session with the sergeant so he could yell at me about what a liar I was," he said. "After they found out a guy was getting evaluated for PTSD, they would try to find any little thing to kick him out."

Dozens of soldiers who screened positive for PTSD received an "other than honorable" discharge from the Army -- the equivalent of being kicked out -- for infractions such as missing duty and drug use, Pogany said. If soldiers are kicked out, they often aren't eligible for free health care, counseling or other benefits that soldiers who are medically discharged with PTSD receive. Often, Pogany said, that means veterans who need help the most don't get it.

There is no way any blog on the subject is going to do this article justice. It is quite long ... but well worth the time to read.

• The time line is primarily based on the SASC report. Just for fun, I've been rolling in additional information over the last week; so that's where the other stuff came from.
  
  
• This evolved from personal notes, so some may still be in a bit of shorthand - especially the use of names without titles.
   
• Some of the unknown dates [??] have likely been nailed down by other sources, the dates here are gleaned directly from the reports.
  
  
• Mostly the list has been cleaned up to the point of being sensical, but is still kind of rough there are likely typos and a few unfathomable entries. Also, some of the notes were taken before I started keeping track of page numbers and not all those entries have been nailed back down (usually have a ?? page number). If any major cleanup issues pop up, I'll try to update.
  
  
• Links to the reports used in the time line are at the bottom of the post.

7:
Ground operations in Afghanistan begin. Afghan SMU-TF deploys(officially).

Nov 2001:

15:
Memo for John Bellinger from John C. Yoo and Robert J. Delahunt Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ARM Treaty
(Pg 47 - Yoo Army Torture Memo)

Dec 2001:

[??]:
DoD Council (Haynes) requests information from JPRA about detainee "exploitation"
(pg.3/4 - SASC Report)

14:
Memo for Alberto R. Gonzales from Jay S. Bybee Re: Authority of the President to Denounce the ABMTreaty
(Pg 47 - Yoo Army Torture Memo)

15:
Mohammed al Khatani captured in Pakistan.
(pg.57 - SASC Report)

17:
JPRA (Baumgartner) sends DoD GC (Shiffrin) memo on "exploitation process" offers JPRA on "exploitation and how to resist".
(pg.6 - SASC Report)

26:
Mohammed al Khatani turned over to US Forces.
(pg.58 - SASC Report)

[late]:
SERE psychologists Mitchell and Jessen review information on Al Qaeda resistance training.
(pg.6 - SASC Report)

Jan 2002:

9:
DoJ Attorneys write memorandum to DoD General Counsel William "Jim" Haynes II, advising Geneva did not apply in Afghanistan.
(pg.1 - SASC Report)

18:
Alberto Gonzalez advises President Bush of DoJ opinion regarding Geneva.
(pg.1 - SASC Report)

19:
Donald Rumsfeld instructed Joint Chiefs Chairman(Myers), to inform Combatant Commanders al Qaeda/Taliban "not entitled to prisoner of war status" under the Geneva Conventions.
(pg.2 - SASC Report)

21:
Order goes out to field commanders the Geneva doesn't apply
(pg.2 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Powell asks Bush to reconsider Geneva policy
(pg.2 - SASC Report)

25:
Gonzolez writes "Geneva Quaint" memo.
(pg.2 - SASC Report)

Feb 2002:

2:
State department memo indicating opinion CIA bound by military restrictions; but CIA argues Convention is policy and can be circumscribed in relation to CIA.
(pg.3 - SASC Report)

7:
Bush signs memorandum setting aside Geneva protections for Armed Forces.
(pg.2 - SASC Report)

The President's order was not followed by guidance that defined the terms "humanely" or "military necessity."; those in the field left to interpret order.
(pg.3 - SASC Report)

12:
Mitchell and Jessen submit Al Qaeda resistance / countermeasures paper to Moulton.
(pg.7 - SASC Report)

13:
Mohammed al Khatani transferred to GTMO. Questioned by JTF·170, CITF and FBI personnel at Camp X-Ray.
(pg.58 - SASC Report)

14:
Moulton forwards Mitchell/Jessen plan to JFCOM. Cover email recommends training mission to GTMO, and mentions [REDACTED-JSOC?] command also requesting techniques.
(pg.7 - SASC Report)

20:
Email from Pema to Jessen etc. describing JPRA two week crash course at DIA request for [REDACTED] personnel going to SOUTHCOM [??] {Doesn't seem to be discussing Mar 2002 training?}
(pg.8 - SASC Report)

28:
JPRA (Jessen) provides GTMO (Col. Cooney) "Prisoner Handling Recommendations".
(pg.11 - SASC Report)

March 2002:

8:
First acknowledged training of Armed Services by JPRA in response to DIA request for unit heading to SOUTHCOM.
(pg.8-10 - SASC Report)

12:
Jessen reports to Moulton on training program.
(pg.10 - SASC Report)

18:
Jessen pitches idea for a formalized exploitation training program.
(pg.10 - SASC Report)

22:
Harrington makes recommendations for GTMO that seem to protest some JPRA mandated handling procedures.
(pg.12 -14- SASC Report)

28:
Abu Zubaydah captured by CIA in Pakistan.
(pg.16- SASC Report)

[SPRING 2002]

CIA sought policy approval from the National Security Council to begin an interrogation program for high-level alQaida terrorists (Rice testimony)
(pg.16- SASC Report)

April 2002:

16:
Jessen circulates draft exploitation plan to JPRA and DoD.
(pg.14-16 - SASC Report)

May 2002:

17:
JPRA Maj Steven Kleinman, releases report "Support to DoD Interrogation Operations" detailing interrogation problems at GTMO
(pg.171 - SASC Report)

[??]:
CJTF-180 Takes over in Afghanistan.

Jun 2002:

[early]:
FBI refuses to continue participating in Abu Zubaydah interrogation, leaves GTMO.
(pg.19 - SASC Report)

[??]:
BSCT team deploys to GTMO
(pg.38 - SASC Report)

[??]
SOUTHCOM (Speer) requests Joint Chiefs review of GTMO intelligence, initiates Custer review.

17:
[REDACTED (JSOC?)] command requests JPRA training prepare officers for rotations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
(pg.20 - SASC Report)

20:
John Prior writes memo about [REDACTED (JSOC?)] request to JPRA and DoD (Prior doesn't remember it).
(pg.21 - SASC Report)

27:
SecDef approval for JPRA training of [REDACTED (JSOC?)].
(pg.21 - SASC Report)

Jul 2002:

[1-2]:
JPRA Training of [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. Trained in waterboarding and other SERE techniques.
(pg.21 - SASC Report)

13:
CIA OGC provides overview of Abu Zubaydah interrogation plan to NSC Legal Adviser, Dep. Ass. AG from OLC, DoJ criminal div head, Council to President in meeting.
(pg.3 - SSCI OLC Opinion Report)

15:
BSCT (Bourney) Team requests modified JPRA training USASOC/SERE Psychologist Louie "Morgan" Banks works out plan.
(pg.40 - SASC Report)

16:
JPRA Joseph Witsch issues memo describing Jul. 1-2 training for [RED - JSOC?]. Indicates use of harsh interrogation by these forces (Afghanistan) is approved by CIA, for harsher techniques (specifically waterboard) DoJ approval required.
(pg.21-23 - SASC Report)

17:
DCI Meets with National Security adviser, CIA Authorized to proceed with Abu Zubaydah interrogation, needed legality determination by OLC.
(pg.3 - SSCI OLC Opinion Report)

[??]:
Jessen provides training to "OGA"
(pg.23 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Jessen, Mitchell & others leave JPRA and start contracting company.
(pg.24 - SASC Report)

22:
Memo from Yoo to Alberto R. Gonzales regarding the applicability of the Convention Against Torture.
(Pg 47 - Yoo Army Torture Memo)

[24?]:
Shiffrin requests information on exploitation techniques from JPRA at behest of Haynes
(pg.24 - SASC Report)

24:
JPRA psychologist Ogrisseg writes report on long-term effects of SERE techniques.
(pg.29 - SASC Report)

OLC Verbally informs CIA that AG has determined certain techniques permissible.
(pg.4 - SSCI OLC Opinion Report)

25:
JPRA responds to Shiffrin Jul. 24, 2002 request with sample lesson plans already in use.
(pg.25-26 - SASC Report)

26:
JPRA sends second exploitation memo in response to questions Haynes' office at DoD.
(pg.26-31 - SASC Report)

Another command; [REDACTED] also requested copy of JPRA report to Haynes.
(pg.31 - SASC Report)

OLC Verbally informs CIA that AG has determined all techniques permissible.
(pg.4 - SSCI OLC Opinion Report)

27:
FBI Start involvement in Mohammed al Khatani questioning.
(pg.58 - SASC Report)

Aug 2002:

1:
Bybee Memos I & II Covering DoD(I) and CIA(II) released.
(pg.36-37 - SASC Report)

12:
[REDACTED - JSOC?] commanders request additional JPRA training support.
(pg.36-37 - SASC Report)

JPRA discusses creating a CONOP for [REDACTED - JSOC?] (Operating instructions in DoD directive 1300.7 used in SERE school training).; creates "Project 22b" to protect information associated with [whoever REDACTED is] specifically in case of congressional investigation.
(pg.37-38 - SASC Report)

19:
JTF-170 (Beaver) indicates leaning against stress positions

28:
JPRA Creates "Plan of Instruction" for September 16 training.
(pg.44 - SASC Report)

[SUMMER 2002]:

GTMO requests JPRA assistance developing a program based on [REDACTED] plan.
(pg.38 - SASC Report)

GTMO gets increased pressure from command and DoD (Wolfowitz) {possible instructions to ask about Iraq links?}
(pg.41 - SASC Report)

SEP 2002:

[??]:
4 Day training for GTMO personnel at Ft. Bragg. Hosted by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Psychological Applications Directorate Chief LTC Morgan Banks (likely sept 16. training).
(pg.142 - SASC Report)

5:
JFCOM Notified of upcoming training on the 16th (But only for Army).
(pg.43 - SASC Report)

10:
Custer submits finding from GTMO intelligence operation to Joint Chiefs. Notes (and protests) the coined phrase "Battle Lab".
(pg.42-43 - SASC Report)

16:
BCST, CIA, JTF-170, Army personnel trained by JPRA at Ft. Bragg (Followup to Jul. Request). Complain of limits (including wanting longer interrogation times). (likely 4 day training hosted by USASOC)
(pg.43 - SASC Report)

19:
FBI End lead of interrogation in Mohammed al Khatani questioning as JTF-170 proposes more harsh plan.
(pg.58 - SASC Report)

23:
FBI (CITF) Protests JTF-170 interrogation plan for Mohammed al Khatani
(pg.58 - SASC Report)

25:
Gonzolez, Addington, Haynes, Chertoff, Rizzo & others visit GTMO review intelligence operation. Opines Commanders should have leeway to authorize techniques (remove Koran) per Pres. order.
(pg.49 - SASC Report)

Oct 2002:

2:
Email from SERE psychologist LTC Morgan Banks to GTMO (Paul Burney) & [???] warning SERE techniques are different when used on detainees
(pg.5 - SASC Report)

GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) memo written upon their return from the JPRA training at Fort Bragg. Define the levels of interrogation (I, II, III) used in future interrogation discussions.
(pg.50-52 - SASC Report)
(pg.68 - SASC Report)

CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman has discussion with GTMO staff about "effective" techniques (phobias,dripping towel).
(pg.62 - SASC Report)

Jonathan Fredman meets with DoD officials at GTMO; stated that the "CIA rallied" for the Conventions not to apply.
(pg.3 - SASC Report)
(pg.53-56 - SASC Report)

JTF-170 Takes over interrogation of Khatani at GTMO.
(pg.60 - SASC Report)

5:
JTF-170 uses Dogs used in interrogation of Khatani at GTMO.
(pg.60 - SASC Report)

8:
FBI describes unsuccessful sleep/sensory depravation on Khatani at GTMO.
(pg.60 - SASC Report)

SMT-TF assessment team arrives at GTMO from Afghanistan.
(pg.149 - SASC Report)

10:
JTF-170 ends sleep/sensory depravation on Khatani at GTMO, returns to brig, interrogation unsuccessful.
(pg.60 - SASC Report)

SMT-TF assessment team leaves GTMO.
(pg.149 - SASC Report)

11:
LTC Phifer submitted a memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Dunlavey requesting approval to use "counter-resistance" interrogation techniques based on Oct 2 BCST memo. Went up chain of command to General Hill.
(pg.61-62 - SASC Report)
(pg.38 - SASC Report)

Lt. Beaver submits Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques as cover to Phifer memo. Recommends permission or immunity in advance from the convening authority.
(pg.63-65 - SASC Report)

Afghanistan SMU-TF issues memo covering GTMO trip recommends JPRA mobile training unit.
(pg.149 - SASC Report)

Photograph of Abu Zubaydah interrogation taken (still classified).
(Vaughn Index 2)

16:
JPRA Drafts a new plan to train GTMO personnel in Oct. 11 requested techniques.
(pg.72 - SASC Report)

25:
General Hill submits Phifer request to Richard Myers with request for DoJ / DoD review of Oct. 11 request.
(pg.66 - SASC Report)

26:
Afghanistan SMU-TF submits proposal to commander for proposed interrogation techniques based on JPRA training.
(pg.150 - SASC Report)

27:
Afghanistan SMU-TF commander produces memo proposing SMU-TF handle own interrogations separate from CJTF-180.
(pg.150-151 - SASC Report)

28:
CITF (Mark Fallon) email to Legal Counsel (Sam McCahon) re Oct 2. GTMO DoD/Freedman meeting minutes; concerned about language.
(pg.57 - SASC Report)

29:
Draft order circulated regarding training at GTMO for Oct 11 techniques.
(pg.73 - SASC Report)

30:
Joint Staff J5 requests comments on JTF-7 GTMO request from Armed Services
(pg.67 - SASC Report)

Nov 2002:

[??]:
BSCT-GTMO SOP Established
(pg.39 - SASC Report)

1:
Air force sends response to JTF-7 request expressing concerns about legality, and admissibility of information received. Suggested more in-depth review.
(pg.67 - SASC Report)

SMU TF Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) analyzed legal authorities and constraints relevant to SMU TF personnel's participation in interrogations [at UNDISCLOSED SITE] expresses some concerns.
(pg.152 - SASC Report)

3:
Afghanistan SMU-TF produce CONOP presentation detailing exploitation plan.
Afghanistan SMU-TF produce "Decision Briefing" for JCTF-180 approval to build own facility.
(pg.151 - SASC Report)

4:
Marines send memo to Joint Chiefs indicating immunity is unrealistic under UCMJ. Disagrees with many techniques and legal analysis.
(pg.64 - SASC Report)
(pg.68 - SASC Report)

Navy responds to JTF-7 indicating there should be a more detailed review across all branches.
(pg.67 - SASC Report)

CITF responds to JTF-7 proposed techniques expresses serious concerns.
(pg.69 - SASC Report)

7:
Army responds to JTF-7 proposed techniques expresses serious concerns, asks for a legal review.
(pg.68 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Dalton directs staff to arrange video conference with DIA, SOUTHCOM, Joint Chiefs, GTMO, Huachuca to review Armed Services concerns with Oct 11 GTMO request. Haynes tells her to shut down analysis.
(pg.70-71 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Miller takes command of GTMO.
(pg.73 - SASC Report)

12:
Miller approves all Category I & II aggressive interrogation techniques for Khatani at GTMO.
Phifer issues 4 page interrogation plan to Miller verifying the approval.
(pg.75 - SASC Report)

[UNKNOWN] Agency approved for training. Training conducted "Mid November" in aggressive interrogation including Waterboarding.
(pg.91-94 - SASC Report)

13:
Khatani Nov. 12 plan is emailed to GTMO interrogators. Proposed start date is Nov. 15.
(pg.76-78 - SASC Report)

14:
GTMO SJA Beaver issues email to CTIF stating "NSC has weighed in and stated that intel on this guy is utmost matter of national security.. We are driving forward with support of SOUTHCOM. Not sure anything else needs to be said."
(pg.76 - SASC Report)

CTIF Commander COL Mallow objects to Nov 12 plan.
(pg.78 - SASC Report)

15:
CTIF Commander COL Mallow objects to Nov 12 plan.
(pg.78 - SASC Report)

Miller places Khatani interrogation on hold to review CTIF (Mallow) objections.
(pg.79 - SASC Report)

20:
FBI, CTIF meet with JTF-GITMO staff to discuss mutually agreeable plan for Khatani interrogation.
(pg.79 - SASC Report)

21:
Video Conference with Miller, Phifer, CTIF, FBI, SOUTHCOM, DoD General Council to discuss Khatani interrogation.
CTIF, FBI present Miller with alternative plan.
(pg.79 - SASC Report)

22:
NCIS psychologist, Michael Gells drafts formal review of Khatani interrogation plan expressed concerns counterproductive.
(pg.79 - SASC Report)

Revised Khatani interrogation plan created and proposed to Miller.
(pg.80-84 - SASC Report)

FBI Sends memo to Miller protesting plan.
(pg.84 - SASC Report)

23:
Miller approves Nov. 22 Khatani interrogation plan, and authorizes start.
(pg.85 - SASC Report)

CITF Informs GTMO SJA Beaver that CTIF staff would "stand clear" of interrogation.
(pg.88 - SASC Report)

Aggressive interrogation of Khatani begins (continues to Jan 16, 2003). Is subject to 20 hour interrogations, forced to do dog tricks, doused with water (poured water over head), menaced with working dogs.
(pg.87 - SASC Report)
(pg.135-136 - SASC Report)

27:
Haynes recommends SecDef approves SOUTHCOM blanket use of most of the techniques from Oct. 11 JTF-7 GTIMO request. Asserts all requested techniques are legal, but not warranted for blanket authorization.
(pg.94 - SASC Report)

Dec 2002:

2:
SecDef approves all techniques recommended in Nov 27. Haynes memo including dogs, stress (forced workouts), nakedness at GTMO (famous "why only 4 hrs. of standing").
(pg.208 - SASC Report)

FBI Agent (attorney) does analysis of Oct. 11 JTF-7 GTMO plan and concludes illegal - sends to FBI OGC Marion Bowman.
(pg.85 - SASC Report)

3:
Bowman responds to FBI concerns that agents should stand clear and collect information
(pg.85 - SASC Report)

5:
Miller meets with FBI to hear concerns, prefers JTF-7 techniques
(pg.87 - SASC Report)

14:
GTMO DI Phifer presents new SERE based SOP to CITF agent, includes removal of clothing, stress, physical contact, hoods, etc.
(pg.97 - SASC Report)

LTC Beaver makes recommendations for SOP changes to Phifer.
(pg.99 - SASC Report)

16:
BSCT psychiatrist Paul Burney warns of proper training and possible unwanted effects.
(pg.100 - SASC Report)

17:
Pfifer leaves position at GTMO replaced by Col. Sanders (JIG). Sanders inherits SOP final draft.
(pg.100 - SASC Report)

Navy CG Mora is informed of objections in CITF.
(pg.106 - SASC Report)

18:
Second draft of GTMO interrogation SOP issued with Sanders & Moss signature blocks (neither signed?).
(pg.97-99 - SASC Report)

Mora meets with NCIS psychologist Gelles who provides interrogation logs indicating abuse and with Army GC and is shown Oct. 11 2002 request and Dec. 2 2002 SecDef authorization.
(pg.106 - SASC Report)

19:
Mora briefs Navy Secretary on NCIS abuse reports and gets authorization to contact Haynes. Extensively briefs Haynes on the problems and warned that some techniques were torture, advised suspension of authorization.
(pg.106 - SASC Report)

30:
SERE Specialists Rankin & Ross arrive in GTMO to provide training. Authorized by directive of SecDef. Instructors were provided Dec. 18 Draft SOP.
(pg.103 - SASC Report)

31:
SERE Specialists begin training for personnel at GTMO.
(pg.103-104 - SASC Report)

Jan 2003:

3:
SERE training ends at GTMO - concerns expressed about implementation commander expresses concerns.
(pg.105 - SASC Report)

6:
NCIS Director informs Mora Dec. 2 interrogation authorization is still in effect at GTMO.
(pg.107 - SASC Report)

8:
Mora meets with assistant to Wolfowitz and assistant Rumsfeld expressing concerns again.
(pg.107 - SASC Report)

9:
Mora meets with Haynes and presents Gallotta report summarized and attached comments that the military Services had submitted in November 2002 in response to the Joint Staff request.

Mora also meets with CAPT Jane Dalton, the Service General Counsels and senior Judge Advocates General, Army General Counsel Steven MoreUo, Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, and the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Del'Orto.
(pg.107 - SASC Report)

CIA Attorney makes 5 page memo related to interrogation video tapes.
(Vaughn Index)

10:
Afghanistan SMU-TF Commander approves SOP for TF interrogations based on the SecDef Dec 2 authorizations. Seeks authorization for Cat II techniques.
(pg.153 - SASC Report)

15:
Mora delivers draft memo to Haynes declaring the techniques authorized in Dec. 2 were torture. Threatens to sign if Rumsfeld doesn't repeal Dec. 2 authorizations.
(pg.107 - SASC Report)

Rumsfeld issues memo rescinding blanket approval of Category II & III techniques.
(pg.108 - SASC Report)

Haynes requests OLC craft another opinion on interrogation techniques.
(pg.118 - SASC Report)

16:
Aggressive interrogation of Khatani ends.
(pg.87 - SASC Report)

Aggressive interrogation plan for (?)Mohamadou Walid Slahi created based on the interrogation of Khatani. (Submitted in July 2003)
(pg.135 - SASC Report)

17:
Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 produced detailing interrogation of of Khatani.
(pg.88-91 - SASC Report)

Haynes directs the creation of "Detainee Interrogation Working Group" Under Sec Def, DIA, GC/JAG Army, Navy Air force, marines, Joint Staff Council / J5.
(pg.110 - SASC Report)

23:
Detainee Working Group has first meeting task DIA's Becker with determining techniques in use. Briefed by the OLC.
(pg.110 - SASC Report)

21:
Miller responds to Working Group with 9 "essential" techniques (including false reports/documents). Also includes modified version of Jan 17. Khatani interrogation description memo.
(pg.113 - SASC Report)

24:
CJTF-180 SJA approves dogs, stress, clothing removal, etc. in Afghanistan
(pg.208 - SASC Report)

CENTCOM (Cotell) issues report describing "current and past" interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 to Working Group and SecDef - based on Dec 2 (Oct 11) techniques (JPRA/SERE training techniques). Indicates that unless other guidance is provided will continue to assume it's legal to employ listed techniques.
(pg.115 - SASC Report)
(pg.155-156 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Becker provides Working Group list of 36 techniques (including waterboard, drugs, female interrogators, Sleep Deprivation)
(pg.111-113 - SASC Report)

25:
Working group floats a draft legal analysis. Provides to Haynes and OLC. Calls into question (or rejects) most Category II & all Category III techniques.
(pg.118-119 - SASC Report)

27:
Draft OLC opinion presented to Working Group as "controlling authority for all questions of domestic and international law". Working group told to disregard the Jan 25 legal analysis and only consider OLC opinion.
(pg.119 - SASC Report)

30:
Working Group requests information from JPRA regarding what techniques they had trained forces on, they refused to provide the information.
(pg.116-117 - SASC Report)

Feb 2003:

4:
Draft "Final" Working group report. Recommends 36 techniques, plus 4 questionable ones.
(pg.122-126 - SASC Report)

5:
Maj Gen Jack Rives to Mary Walker Expressing concerns over Working Group Feb. 4 draft (notably silent on UCMJ, civilian/international liability, etc.).
(pg.126-127 - SASC Report)

12:
SOUTHCOM LTC Beaver sends email pressing for 20 hour interrogations and isolation.
(pg.128-129 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Afghanistan SMU-TF starts using dogs.

15:
SOUTHCOM LTC Beaver followed up pressing for techniques - indicates a Feb 19 approval promise.
(pg.129 - SASC Report)

27:
Brig Gen Kevin Sandkuhler memo to Mary Walker Expressing concerns over Working Group Feb. 4 draft (notably silent on UCMJ, etc.).
(pg.126-127 - SASC Report)

Mar 2003:

6:
Detainee Working Group circulates Final recommendation. Recommends authorization of 36 techniques and lists but does not recommend 3 additional.
(pg.128 - SASC Report)

10:
Email from Col James Walker to Daniel Ramos wanting Working Group report to indicate authors were forced to accept OLC opinion and didn't necessarily agree with "Yoo".
(pg.128 - SASC Report)

11:
Meeting with Rumsfeld, Haynes, (SOUTHCOM) Hill, and (Joint Chiefs) Myers. Myers raises concerns some might techniques be illegal combined. SOUTHCOM promises a report on his desk by Mar 20.
(pg.129 - SASC Report)

12:
SOUTHCOM LTC Beaver notified of the Mar. 11 meeting.

14:
OLC "Yoo" Memo is finalized. (Was used as "controlling authority" for detainee group's legal Analysis which was finalized on Mar 6th).
(pg.119-122 - SASC Report)

20:
War in Iraq begins forces under control of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
(pg.157 - SASC Report)

SMU-TF deployed to Iraq with interrogation SOP identical to Feb 2002 Afghanistan SMU-TF SOP.
(pg.158-159 - SASC Report)

21:
Hill issues memo to Myers listing 9 essential techniques for SOUTHCOM.
(pg.129 - SASC Report)

Myers issues a memo stating He and Miller agree all 36 identified and the additional 3 should be viewed as "critical"
(pg.129 - SASC Report)

28:
Rumsfeld meets with Wolfowitz, Haynes, Myers, Cambone, Feith & Billingslea to discuss techniques being considered by Working Group. Authorizes 24 techniques explicitly. Additional techniques on case by case basis.
(pg.130 - SASC Report)

31:
Joint Chiefs briefed on Rumsfeld's Mar 28 decision.
(pg.131 - SASC Report)

Apr 2003:

[??]:
"Physical Training" of detainees begins (maybe late March) at GTMO.
(pg.132 - SASC Report)

2:
Joint Chiefs council (Dalton) alerts CENTCOM of CIA concerns over aggressive interrogation; requests list of CENTCOM approved techniques.

4:
Detainee Working Group final version created. Not circulated to dissenters.
(pg.131 - SASC Report)

5:
Myers requests 24 techniques from Working Group recommendations to Dep. Ass. SecDef Billingslea.
(pg.131 - SASC Report)

9:
Khatani provides actionable intelligence (3 months after harsh techniques stopped?).
(pg.109 - SASC Report)

10:
SecDef Billingslea sends memo to Sec Def and recommends he approve all 35 techniques recommended by working group.
(pg.131 - SASC Report)

11:
CENTCOM (deLong) sends email asking for Pace's help getting approval for Jan 24 requested techniques.
(pg.156 - SASC Report)

16:
SecDef authorizes commander to use 24 techniques, and the ability to request any of the Working Group's recommended as needed.
(pg.132 - SASC Report)

17:
Female interrogator sits on detainee's lap as part of interrogation.
(pg.133 - SASC Report)

19:
Miller provides Khatani report to SOUTHCOM
(pg.109 - SASC Report)

May 2003:

2:
Miller instructs JIG stop the use of "Fear Up Harsh" until retraining.
(pg.133 - SASC Report)

[mid?]:
Ronald Burgess informs Miller to expect a request to assist HUMINT in Iraq
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

15:
CJTF 7 Takes over control from CFLCC, Sanchez asks for assistance with intel exploitation. CFLCC withdraws forces. Pappas indicates may need techniques help.
(pg.164-165 - SASC Report)
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

Jun 2003:

[First Wk]:
ISG Becomes aware of Iraq SMU-TF aggressive interrogations.
(pg.162 - SASC Report)

8:
[REDACTED] sends CENTCOM list of SMU-TF interrogation techniques from Iraq and Afghanistan.
(pg.159 - SASC Report)

10:
CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent message to Joint Staff Director Casey r.e. SMU-TF stating "I have confirmed that the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq (Nama)] and Bagrarn are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF direction."
(pg.159 - SASC Report)

[Summer 2003]

Continued ISG reports (from Cropper) of detainees with abuse from Iraq SMU-TF. Continues through the fall.
(pg.163 - SASC Report)

Iraq SMU-TF calls Moulton to request JPRA assistance with training.
(pg.170 - SASC Report)

July 2003:

1:
Miller submits Salashi interrogation plan to SOUTHCOM based on Jan 16 draft. (Interrogation begins?)
(pg.136-138 - SASC Report)

6:
Enhanced interrogation of Salashi Begins (Phase II) {NOTE: The interrogation plan calls for 3-5 days of standard, then an increase. This is the day long interrogations started making the 1st a likely date for interrogation to start}
(pg.139 - SASC Report)

15:
First post-invasion SOP drafted for SMU-TF in Iraq. Includes 20 hour sessions, dogs, isolation, stress, sensory overload. Commander refused to sign orders, but implemented the policies.
(pg.160 - SASC Report)

[Mid]:
205th MI interrogation team dispatches to prepare Abu Ghraib for operation "Operation Victory Bounty"
(pg.165 - SASC Report)

18:
SOUTHCOM Gen Hill forwards Salashi interrogation request to SecDef.
(pg.138 - SASC Report)

24:
Marshall Billingslea issues memo recommending Salashi interrogation request be approved.
(pg.138 - SASC Report)

26:
Wood submits interrogation plan for Abu Ghraib based on Iraq SMU-TF program to CJTF-7 command. Proposes harsh treatment limited for EPWs; but also indicates no EPWs at Abu Ghraib to her knowledge.
(pg.167 - SASC Report)

28:
Wolfowitz approves Salashi interrogation plan.
(pg.138 - SASC Report)

Aug 2003:

2:
Salashi GTMO interrogation increased (threats of rendition, to family, increased pressures, etc.).
(pg.139 - SASC Report)

4:
Carolyn Wood assumes OIC interrogation duties for 205th MI (519th Battalion) at Abu Ghraib.
(pg.165 - SASC Report)

7:
Salashi agrees to cooperate at GTMO (Reports indicate cooperative throughout Aug-Oct).
(pg.139 - SASC Report)

13:
Rumsfeld approves Salashi enhanced interrogation plan.
(pg.138 - SASC Report)

Miller sends email to Wolfowitz indicating interrogation plan for [REDACTED (class of detainee / military group?)] is complete.
(pg.142 - SASC Report)

14:
CJTF-7 sends out request for interrogation "wish list" to subordinate commands (205th MI/519th MI, etc.).
(pg.168 - SASC Report)

21:
Salashi placed into sensory depravation at GTMO. Reports indicate that despite cooperating, full Jul. 1 2003 interrogation plan was being implemented.
(pg.139 - SASC Report)

25:
SMU-TF in Iraq formally requests a JPRA "interrogation team." for 3 weeks to assist with interrogations.
(pg.170 - SASC Report)

27:
CPT Wood 519th MI at Abu Ghraib resubmits interrogation plan to CJTF-7 based on one submitted Jul. 26. Adds sensory deprivation.
(pg.169 - SASC Report)

JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF Iraq request for support.
(pg.171 - SASC Report)

29:
CJTF-7 lawyers meet with CPT Wood 519th MI at Abu Ghraib to inform they approve plan and are sending it up the chain of command.
(pg.170 - SASC Report)

31:
GTMO commander Miller trip to Iraq starts
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

Sept 2003:

1:
Miller meets with Sanchez and Fast (Ack. Geneva?)
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

Originally scheduled deployment of JPRA support team to Iraq SMU-TF.
(pg.171 - SASC Report)

2?:
Miller, Sercy, Beaver visit Cropper
(pg.191-193 - SASC Report)

3:
Col, Moulton contacts Centcom re expanded JPRA mission?
(pg.186/187{footnotes} - SASC Report)

[4-10]:
Miller adds Nama (SMU-TF) to itenery tries to schedule initially "no"
Miller visits Nama (SMU-TF) for 45 minutes. Not allowed to see SOP, recommends "interrogation authorities" (commander later won't sign)
(193 - SASC Report)

[4-10]:
Miller Visits Victory
(194 - SASC Report)

Beaver meets with SMU-TF Legal advisor who expresses concerns "punching,choking,beating"; tried to report; "risking life" with meeting.
(193/194 - SASC Report)

[4-10]:
Miller Visits Abu Ghraib
(194-197 - SASC Report)

Recommends Sanchez draft formal rules modeled after SecDef April 16, 2003 guidance (with Geneva limit - for POWs).
(197 - SASC Report)

4:
JPRA team arrives in Iraq for 3 week mission to support SMU-TF.
(172 - SASC Report)

Start of email conversation between Moulton, LTG Wagner, and RADM Byrd about JPRA mission creep and "offensive" deployment. (Emails on 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th).
(173 - SASC Report)

5:
JPRA Iraq SMU-TF training team briefed and informed to request modified ROEs to allow participation in Interrogations. Approved to participate and employ full range of SERE school physical pressures.
(174 - SASC Report)

6:
Moulton approved JPRA team participation in Iraq SMU-TF training. JPRA participates in first interrogations. (NOTE: Description of interrogation matches several public descriptions of Camp Nama run by JSOC under several aliases)
(174-176 - SASC Report)

JPRA participation in interrogations begins. There is much disagreement in the team with Lt Col Steven Kleinman stopping several interrogations, Russel disagrees with his decisions.
(177-183 - SASC Report)

10:
Miller trip to Iraq ends
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

11?:
Miller writes staff report on Iraq trip and briefs Wolfowitz (Cambone?)
(pg.199 - SASC Report)

14:
Sanchez issues first formal interrogation SOP - "requires Geneva limits" for EPWs(POW), but asserts most prisoners do not have this status.
CENTCOM notified policy will be implemented immediately unless otherwise directed (indicates policy is reigning in behavior).
{{FM 34-52 left the "universe of approaches to the imagination of the interrogator" and demanded additional structure}}
(pg.200/201 - SASC Report)

Interrogation policy goes into effect at Abu Ghraib (and rest of CJTF-7?)
(pg.200/202 - SASC Report)

15:
COL Warren (CJTF-7 SJA) sent a copy of CJTF-7 policy to CENTCOM SJA Col. Pribble and deputy William Hammill.
(pg.203 - SASC Report)

16:
CIA Director briefs SoS and SecDef on CIA interrogation techniques pursuant to a request from the National Security Adviser.
(pg.7 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

17:
Ricci (Chief of International Law at CENTCOM) responds to CJTF-7 policy, concerned about going beyond field manual for EPW prisoners. Indicates non-EPWs don't need SecDef approval.
Ricci calls Warren who agreed to rework policy(to put limits on EPWs?).
(pg.203-4 - SASC Report)

22:
JPRA Pulls Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Miller from SMU-TF training mission in Iraq. (Severe friction)
(pg.186 - SASC Report)

23:
JPRA creates CONOP for Iraq detainee exploitation, sent to JFCOM; requested from [SMU-TF Commander?] (JPRA personnel considered the Working Group report authoritative guidance on U.S. policy and law).
(pg.184-5 - SASC Report)

JPRA Pulls Russel from SMU-TF training mission Iraq. (Severe friction)
(pg.186 - SASC Report)

26:
Email to Col Moulton; Capt. Donavan comments on "SMU-TF" warning against using WG as "authoritative WG guidance"
(pg.187 - SASC Report)

[29ish] :
(days after 26th) CAPT Donovan raised his concerns about the SMU-TF CONOP to LTG Wagner, JFCOM's Deputy Commander, and Maj Gen James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of Staff, in anticipation of a scheduled visit by the two to JPRA
(pg.188 - SASC Report)

Oct 2003

3:
CITF Reissues Order for Agents to "Stand Clear" of Aggressive Interrogations.
(pg.143 - SASC Report)

email from GTMO's ICE Operations Officer described interrogating a detainee for 15 hours, allowing him 5 hours of uninterrupted rest in his cell and then moving the detainee to a new cell every half hour until the 24 hour period expired.
(pg.148 - SASC Report)

12:
Sanchez issues revised CJTF interrogation policy where explicitly approved treatment limited to army, interrogator could approve more harsh techniques (for non EPWs?) with 9 examples.
(pg.204-206 - SASC Report)

CJSOTF-AP secret interrogation policy interrupted. Possible additional policy created for CJSOTF-AP (or may have been subject to basic CJTF policy?)
(pg.220 - SASC Report)

16:
Iraq SMU-TF "New commander" [McChrystal?] officially takes command - Note "new commander" mentioned in JPRA reports.
(pg.206 - SASC Report)

17:
Salashi reports "hearing voices" after prolonged sensory deprivation at GTMO.
(pg.140 - SASC Report)

25:
SMU-TF issues independent SOP (Unreleased) with extended approved techniques
(pg.206/7 - SASC Report)

Nov 2003:

[??] Harrington commissioned to look at operation in iraq.
(pg.217 - SASC Report)

13:
GTMO (Miller) requests authority from SOUTHCOM to use "Sound Modulation" and other [SECRET] methods on [SECRET individual or class]. (seems to match class mentioned in Aug 13. memo).
(pg.142 - SASC Report)

GTMO (Miller) requests authority from SOUTHCOM for two interrogation plans to be carried out on specific individuals based on Salashi/Khatani plans.
(pg.143 - SASC Report)

19:
Hill sends GTMO plans ??,#3,#4 to SecDef requesting approval. Tom O'Connel (Asst Sec Def) recommends approval.
(pg.146 - SASC Report)

20:
Dog teams arrive in Iraq
(pg.208 - SASC Report)

24:
First reported use of dogs at Abu Ghraib.
(pg.208 - SASC Report)

Dec 2003:

9:
Harrington meets with Fast over Abu Ghraib
(pg.217/218 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Harrington returns from Iraq, debriefs Keith Alexander, the Army G2, and his deputy Terry Ford; Issues report
(pg.217/218 - SASC Report)

19:
Dogs prohibited from interrogation at Abu Ghraib
(pg.208 - SASC Report)

27:
[Unknown, JSOC/SMU-TF] commander issues interrogation policy for [Unknown, JSOC/SMU-TF?] forces based on Sept 14. CJTF-7 policy. Gives authority for some approvals to [Unknown, JSOC/SMU-TF] commander/deputy commander.
(pg.220 - SASC Report)

31:
Principal Deputy DoD General Counsel, Daniel Dell'Orto approves Nov 13, 2003 GTMO interrogation plans.
(pg.146 - SASC Report)

Latest date Hanyes can claim not having been notified Goldsmith retracting March 14 2003 Yoo memo (could have seen as early as Dec. 25). Indicated need to get additional guidance to go beyond Sec Def. April 2003 memo.
(pg.146 - SASC Report)

[Early 2004]:

CJTF Taskforce investigates Herrington report and concludes "can't recreate conversations" - no problems
(pg.219 - SASC Report)

Jan 2004

[??]:
Iraq SMU-TF commander discusses removal of clothing, affirms use.
(pg.161 - SASC Report)

2:
Joint Chiefs GEN Myers approves Nov 13, 2003 GTMO interrogation plans.
(pg.146 - SASC Report)

Feb 2004

27:
CJSOTF-AP [REDACTED] commander issues policy for [REDACTED] to use techniques based on Sep. 14, 2003 JCTF-7 policy. Dogs, Stress, Environment, Noise, Light. Required JCTF-7 commander approval for EPWs; non-EPW required only [REDACTED] commander or deputy approval.
(pg.220 - SASC Report)

Mar 2004

18:
Salashi prosecutor LtCol Stuart Couch protests interrogation methods used to collect evidence and refuses to participate in prosecution.
(pg.141 - SASC Report)

23:
Secret memo issued having to do with cautions implementing Feb 27 [REDACTED] interrogation policy memo.
(pg.220 - SASC Report)

26:
Unified interrogation policy set for SMU-TF in both Iraq and Afghanistan authorizing harsh techniques
(pg.222 - SASC Report)

Memo for record documenting "Frequent Flier" and other harsh tactics in use (location unknown?).
(pg.147 - SASC Report)

27:
SOP issued for CJTF-180 in afghanistan authorizing harsh techniques
(pg.221 - SASC Report)

April 2004:

7:
Harrington notified his SMU-TF concerns were unsubstantiated
(pg.219 - SASC Report)

22:
Use of dogs rescinded from Mar 2004 SMU-TF authorized SOP
(pg.222 - SASC Report)

May 2004

[early?]:
IG JPRA mission Report Initiated (Narrow: did events reported by Kaufman reSMU-TF flow up chain of command)
(pg.188 - SASC Report)

[??]:
CIA IG completes report on detainee interrogation for ultimate release to SSIC
(pg.7 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

[??]:
CIA GC meets re CIA interrogation and IG review with Counsel to President, Counsel to VP, NSC Legal Adviser, and senior Department of Justice officials.
(pg.8 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

6:
John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, suspended use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques.
(pg.222 - SASC Report)

12:
CENTCOM requests JPRA training in Afghanistan floats initial CONOP
(pg.225 - SASC Report)

13:
Revised CONOP for proposed JPRA training, concerns expressed over mission
(pg.227 - SASC Report)

13:
JPRA Mission to Afghanistan called off

23:
SMU-TF issues memo to [Unknown] demanding suspended techniques be re-approved.
(pg.223 - SASC Report)

27:
[Unknown] requests authority for SMU-TF to use extended techniques.
(pg.223 - SASC Report)

Jun 2004

[??]:
CIA IG Releases report on detainee interrogation to SSIC
(pg.7 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

3:
Hill has press conference acknowledging SERE influence.
(pg.66 - SASC Report)

4:
Abizaid approved the use of some techniques for SMU-TF
(pg.222 - SASC Report)

[??]:
Aug 1, 2002 Bybee I memo rescinded, Bybee II memo still in place.
(pg.8 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

20:
CENTCOM makes second request for JPRA mission to Afghanistan.
(pg.228 - SASC Report)

30:
JPRA training team told to stand by for deployment to Afghanistan.
(pg.229 - SASC Report)

Jul 2004

12:
Flurry of emails leading to final cancellation of JPRA training mission to Afghanistan.
(pg.229-30 - SASC Report)

14:
Associate Deputy Attorney General provides written testimony to SSIC explaining limitations, and "not yet convicted" explanation.
(pg.9 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

21-26:
JPRA Brass starts work on "offensive" deployment policy.
(pg.230 - SASC Report)

22:
OLC confirms to CIA that all techniques (including "limited" waterboarding) authorized by Aug 1, 2002 BybeeII memo were legal.
(pg.9 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Sep 2004

29:
JFCOM issues formal guidance memo on JPRA "offensive" deployment
(pg.231 - SASC Report)

Dec 2004

30:
OLC issues opinion indicating differences with BybeeI, but that they affirmed the legality of the techniques approved in the Aug 1, 2002 memo.
(pg.10 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Feb 2005

1:
DoJ responds to Arlen Specter about Bybee II - says the conclude CIA's proposed program was legal.
(pg.??? - SASC Report)

May 2005

[??]:
OLC Issues three secret memos assessing specific techniques used by the CIA.
(pg.10-13 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Sep 2005

23:
IG JPRA mission Report complete - Though some verbal events did flow up chain of command
(pg.189 - SASC Report)

Dec 2005:

30:
Detainee treatment act goes into effect.
(pg.13 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Jun 2006:

29:
Hamden v. Rumsfeld holds Geneva applies to Al Quaeda.
(pg.13 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Aug 2006:

[??]
OLC issues 2 secret opinions re CIA program in relation to Geneva and the Detainee Treatment Act.
(pg.13 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Sep 2006:

6:
Bush publicly discloses CIA detention/interrogation program.
(pg.14 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Oct 2006:

[17]:
Congress passes and Bush signs Military Commissions Act.
(pg.14 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Jul 2007:

[20]:
Bush issues executive order 13440 and and OLC opinion interpreting DTA, Geneva, etc. Concludes the purpose of legislation was to approve CIA techniques.
(pg.14-15 - SSCI OLC Opinion)

May 2008

19:
CIA provides SSCI with access to all OLC opinions.
(preface - SSCI OLC Opinion)

Jul 2008

24:
Heavily redacted Bybee II memo released. Yoo indicates applies to more than single case.
(pg.34 - SASC Report)

(SASC Report)
Senate ASC, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Nov 20 2008
(.pdf 15.21MB)

(Vaughn Index 1/2 via. Empty Wheel )
DOD Vaughn Index 1 (.pdf)
DOD Vaughn Index 2 (.pdf)

(SSCI OLC Opinion)
Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence (.pdf),

(Yoo Army Torture Memo)
Memo from John Yoo R.E. Military Interrogation of Combatants Held Outside the US,

"I want to emphasise that these photos that were requested in this case are not particularly sensational, especially when compared to the painful images that we remember from Abu Ghraib."

"These pictures show torture, abuse, rape and every indecency. ... The mere description of these pictures is horrendous enough, take my word for it."

Obama, explaining his change of heart on releasing the other photos, said they already had served their purpose in investigations of "a small number of individuals." Those cases were all concluded by 2004, and the president said "the individuals who were involved have been identified, and appropriate actions have been taken."