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Vested self interest and the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac


Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac take credit risk and interest rate risk.

They take credit risk primarily by guaranteeing mortgages.

They take interest rate risk primarily by owning mortgages and financing them on their own balance sheet.  They also trade the interest rate risk of that book using derivatives.

The anti-GSE lobby always asserted (and I once erroneously believed) that Fannie and Freddie Mac would come to grief on their interest rate risk.  Taking interest rate risk is what the once-extensive anti-GSE lobby meant by charter creep.

Well the anti-GSE lobby were wrong.  So was I.  Fannie and Freddie did not blow up on interest rate risk – they blew up on credit risk.  Mainly they blew up on credit risk from non-charter mortgages but they still have had no noticeable interest rate problems during this cycle.

The Anti-GSE lobby always had an agenda

Wall Street always hated Fannie and Freddie taking interest rate risk – it encroached on the profitability of Wall Street trading desks.  Trading interest rate risk is the core business of Wall Street trading desks – and they hated having GSEs (with funding advantages) crowding them out of their own game.

But Wall Street loved Fannie and Freddie taking credit risk – that meant that Wall Street could splice and dice mortgages all they like – and know that eventually Uncle Sam will pick up any credit losses.

So they always pushed for limits on the interest rate risk that the GSEs could take.  I never heard FM-Watch or other anti-GSE lobbyists arguing for limits on GSE credit risk acceptance.

When the anti-GSE lobby now say “I told you so” they are lying.  They said the GSEs would blow up on interest rate risk and they were wrong – but they are falsely claiming intellectual credit anyway.  It helps their lobbying.

So how do the proposed reforms of Fannie and Freddie look?

All public proposals for GSE reform have the same feature.  They all allow Fannie and Freddie (or their replacement entities) to stay in the credit risk business by guaranteeing mortgages – but they insist that Fannie and Freddie shrink their balance sheet – and hence take less interest rate risk.

In other words they leave all the credit risk with the GSE – solving nothing from a taxpayer perspective and give all the interest rate carry (and most the revenue) to investment banks.  They do nothing to solve the problems that caused the GSEs to fail

That is also the structure of the conservatorship agreement by Hank Paulson forced the GSEs to sign – an agreement constructed by the staff of Morgan Stanley.  The agreement gave Wall Street precisely what it wanted – which is not surprising because it was drafted by Wall Street investment banks. 

The Mortgage Bankers’ Association proposal is even more egregious – but that is the subject for another post.  Even the Government Audit Office report leans heavily towards the wishes of investment bankers.  (You would think they would be better than that – but it seems they are only as good as the people lobbying them.) 

So here is a hope for the Obama administration.  Be very sceptical of the the vested self-interest behind anyone making GSE proposals.  [Whilst that includes me I am just shooting from the sidelines.  Investment bankers drew up the conservatorship agreement in the interest of investment bankers.  That sort of power should not go unchecked in America.]   

Read more at John Hempton's Weblog


7 Comments

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That is a great post summarizing great work. It gives a well argued example of of how the Washington/Wall-Street nexus works.

If I may make a recommendation, your detailed analysis was probably flying over the heads of most readers. You should have started with this claim, and then explained the evidence for it, providing links for more detailed analysis for those who wish and can check the accounting work.

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Excellent work. I appreciate, as always the clarity, but I'm especially grateful for your keeping your expert eye on this topic, which means: remembering which lies which groups have promulgated. I tend to get muddled, which is exactly what the perpetrators rely upon, which is why we need your analysis.

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Here's what I think is meant by interest rate risk and why, based on that understanding I always believed it was probably a non problem

Assume investor Flavius purchased an AAA $100,000 mortgage paying $6,000 interest every year. 6%. Because the mortgage was negotiated at a time when interest rates were low. Now let us assume interest rates rise so that a new $100, 000 AAA mortgage has to pay $9K in interest in order to get investors to buy. In that case and at that time Flavius can't sell his old mortgage for $100,000. He'd have to cut the price to $66,000 because at a priee of $66,000 that $6K of annual inerest will be a 9% return.

So shouldn't Flavius mark down that mortgage by $34,000?

Not unless he's fixing to sell it. If he intends to just hold that mortgage to maturity, he'll get his $100,000 . There's no reason to pretend he'll only receive $66,000.

What's sauce for Flavius is sauce for the GSEs.
Isn't it?

Under mark to market the GSE will have to reduce the value on its balance sheets of mortages with a face value of $100,000. All the way down to $66,000 So the interest rate risk causes the GSE to take a loss of $33,400

And that seems logical enough provided the GSE has any intention or selling that $100,000 mortgage and consequently turning that theoretical loss of $33,400 into a real loss of that amount.. But suppose the GSE intends to hold that mortgages until it maturea. Then they'll collect the full face value.

Does it make sense to reduce its value in 2008 from a $100,000 to $66,000? Sure if it's going to be sold this quarter.No if the GSE intends NOT to sell it.


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That's why 'trading accounts' and 'investment accounts' should be clearly labeled and segregated at these firm and all other banks. We got into trouble when dereg allowed the free flow between the two and the ability to hide the real shit 'off balance sheet' in an SPE.

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Thanks

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This has been a great series John. I really appreciate you researching and writing it. I have learned a lot.

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Ah Flavius -

There is real interest rate risk here. The reason is that Fannie may own fixed interest rate mortgages but have floating rate funding.

If interest rates rise they get killed - because the funding cost goes up but the yield on the mortgages does not. They will wind up with negative margins and will go bust.

They could solve this by fixing the funding - so they have fixed funding and fixed mortgages.

BUT if rates fall the mortgages all refinance - and the funding remains fixed - which means they could wind up with negative margins.

They hedge this with derivatives and callable debt . The hedging is complicated - and both companies do it differently. (Freddie uses more callable debt and less derivatives.)

On a trillion dollar balance sheet levered 40 times the interest rate risk is non-trivial. However they have managed it very well.

John

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