On the competence side, the fact that Obama has not seen fit to push Lieberman over the cliff may be seen as useful, in the following sense.  All observers agree that Lieberman appears to have been incompetent or at least negligent in his oversight of Homeland Security.  But that might be fine with an administration that needs to fix the problems.  Not having investigations while cleaning house may be useful.   It depends, or course, on whether an investigation will help in cleaning house or not.  Obama may well including the calculation that Lieberman's negligence/incompetence provides less oversight and more room for internal reviews without the peskiness of an oversight committee.

On the political side, now Lieberman owes Obama.  Big time.  It will be interesting to see what he will be expected to pay.

In 1991 a book called "The End of Realignment?" was published.  In it five essays by five authors argued over whether realignment theory was useful in understanding the development of American politics. The question mark at the end of the title was added only after one of the contributors, Walter Dean Burnham, requested it. Realignment theory captivated students of American politics for three decades, from 1955, when V. O. Key, Jr. first published an essay about it. The essence of the theory is that some elections are more important than others. These elections had changed the partisan coalitions that supported the two major political parties. These shifts, once made, were fairly durable, until the next critical election. Key had identified five such elections: Jefferson in 1800, Jackson in 1828, Lincoln in 1860, McKinley in 1896, and FDR in 1932. They were characterized by a shift in voting preferences. One party captured control of the presidency and both houses of Congress, and held them all for at least ten years.

At first realignment theory seemed to explain much about American politics. It was an exciting pattern: these upheavals occurred almost like clockwork: once every 28 to 36 years or so. Why did the pattern hold? The political system was a relic of the 18^th century: it was designed to make change difficult. Once a coalition got in power, it would tend to stay there. But the American society was remarkably vibrant, and its economic advancement was astonishing. Over time, the issues that caused one election were solved or faded. New issues arose, and new generations of Americans had different concerns in their ever-evolving economic and social environment. The entrenched political powers resisted such change, but events would overtake them. Finally, a crisis of some sort would lead to a change in partisan alignments with the major parties.

This pattern seemed to work for American political history up to the 1960's. If the pattern followed, then the nation was due for a major realignment in the late 1960's or early 1970's.

This realignment never happened; or if it did, it looked different than the others. Because the 1960's saw the beginnings of a shift of Southern Conservatives from the Democratic Party to the Republicans. But this shift did not occur in one election; it was not truly complete until the late 1980's at the earliest. The election of Nixon heralded not only this Southern strategy by the Republicans, but also an era of divided government. From 1969 until 2001, the only years of unified party government were from 1977-81 (the Carter years), and from 1993-95 (first two years of Clinton). Students of realignment theory became discouraged as Reagan became elected in 1980, but without Republicans capturing the House of Representatives (although note that there were still plenty of Southern Conservative Democrats who today would run as Republicans). Some thought that 1994 was a realigning election, as Republicans triumphed wildly in an off-year (non-presidential year) election. But with Clinton gaining re-election in 1996, the pattern of electoral realignment seemed to be dead. Instead it looked like gradual change--one election was not necessarily more important that another.

In the meantime, the media had picked up on the term realignment, but did not use it in way that academic scholars did. The term had lost its theoretical significance.

The election of Barack Obama leads me to question whether or not realignment still lives. Back in that 1991 book, Burnham claimed that 1968 was indeed a realigning election, but that it was a different type of realignment. Each critical election was about a different thing. 1832 was about widening the franchise and representing the common man. 1860 was about slavery in the territories. 1896 was about which would prevail: democracy or capitalism. 1932 was about solving the Great Depression. Burnham claimed that 1968 was about an increase in distrust in government, and cited a study that showed this disaffection.

Most (but not all) critical elections were associated with a crisis. 1860 reflected a growing divide over free labor in the North, and slave labor in the South, with a conflict over whether one would prevail in the Western territories. 1896 occurred during one of the worst depressions in history. The Great Depression was the crisis leading to 1932.

That brings us to 1968, one of the most tumultuous years in American history. The Vietnam was had become a morass, leading Lyndon Johnson to decline to seek reelection. Americans felt they could not trust their president. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. So was Bobby Kennedy. There were riots in the streets, riots outside the Democratic National Convention, and an immense split over race issues within the Democratic Party. The various crises led to an increase in cynicism, and a decrease in trust in the government.

The decline in trust in government as a major theme pervaded the Reagan era. After all, Reagan claimed that "government is not the solution, government is the problem." A belief in the sanctity of unregulated markets was a hallmark of this ideology, run rampant in political statements during the Gingrich/Bush era, even if actions by Republicans in power did not reflect consistency with this ideology.

If you think 1968 was indeed a realigning election, the election of Barack Obama comes right on schedule to vindicate realignment theory. It has been forty years. And if this is the case, we may be on the verge of a Democratic era, just as we have been in an era more or less dominated by a conservative ideology.

Of course we cannot yet know if this will be the case; all we can say now is that it is possible. We can examine the changes in the coalition basis of the Democratic party. For example, we can note the generational change in young voters and Latinos that shifted significantly to the Democrats. We can also examine ideology. Obama represents, I suspect, a new pragmatism towards economic and social issues. Having taught at the home of Milton Friedman, he is versed in both the virtues of the market place, and also where and when markets fail. He is steeped in American Constitutional history. He thus will have an opportunity to reconstruct important aspects of American politics, understanding all the way what he is doing.

All of this is to say, that the organizational imperatives of the Obama campaign are potentially epoch-making. It is a new kind of party organization that he has built, and that he I am sure intends to maintain. It is a political juggernaut on his personality, that he will likely try to institutionalize, so that it lasts. The work of people who create, and who read TPM are part of this institutionalization. It is a new way of getting informed, of getting active, of organizing and supporting each other. In the grand scope of American party politics, this is an exciting thing to observe and at the same time to take part in.

Realignment may live.  And we are all part of it.

Josh Marshall's take on Joe the Plumber is spot on.  But it is worth remembering that he represents a fake demographic: plumbers that make over $250,000.  There were reports following the last debate the Joe actually makes around $42,000 or so.  Note that he needs to make SIX times that income to qualify for Obama's proposed tax increase.  He claimed he wanted to buy a business that would make $280,000.  But that is just a pipe dream (pun intended).  He would like to make 6-7 times the income he now does.  But there is no indication he ever will do so.  After all, he doesn't even have a plumber's license, which presumably he will need to go into business for himself.

I don't mind him taking advantage of his media opportunity, but he represents a demographic that does not exist.  He is not part of the "quarter-of-a-million-dollars-a-year" plumber's demographic.  I suspect that there are some plumbing contractors who make that much; but I would be surprised if they get their hands dirty by the time they can achieve this.  And a contractor or builder is a very different demographic than he is representing.

So, not only does he appear to be a skinhead, but he is a fabricator.  This is entirely appropriate for the McCain campaign, where EVERYTHING is made up. 


The McCain campaign is truly reprehensible.  Once this campaign is over, President Obama might well forgive him; but we don't have to.  We can keep active, keep organized, and call McCain out for the repulsive campagin he waged.  And keep at it.  And keep at it.  And do it again.  So that such disrespectible tactics have consequences, and are less likely to happen again.

The Associated Press Poll today gave Obama a 1% lead over McCain.  This was substantially different from other polls released about the same time.  And one might think it is merely an outlier.

Polls often report the margins of error, say plus or minus 3% that is typical of a sample size of around 1000 observations.  This means that the real value is likely to be within the range of the poll, but we don't know precisely where.  And note that here the range is 6 points.  So if Obama has a score of 44%, the real value is presumed to be between 41% and 47%.  Most political junkies understand this now.

But there is another element of the calculations that is usually not stated in reporting the results.  That is the confidence level.  All of these reported levels of support for a candidate have a measure of likelihood that the true value lies within the plus or minus range reported.  And the most common confidence level is 95%.  Thus the proper way to read a poll that gives Obama a 44% rating is that "we can be 95% confident that the true rating is between 41% and 47%."  Notice that 95% is 19 times out of 20.  Thus one time out of twenty will not even be within the confidence interval: it will be outside the confidence interval. 

Next question, how do we know which polls are these (extreme) outliers?  Answer: we don't.  And that is precisely why measuring a large number of polls is an important exercise.   Because some of them will be outliers.   Averaging out a number helps to control for this, which is exactly what TPM does.

Finally, there have been dozens and dozens of polls; hundreds in fact.  When there are so many polls it would be surprising if there were no (extreme) outliers.  And there should also be a few polls that overstate Obama's lead.  Again, it would be surprising if there were not.

Also overlooked in the Palin interview with the Roe question is the fact that Palin, in supporting States rights called herself "a federalist."  Typically, that is a term that refers to someone who advocates a strong central government.  After all, the Federalist Papers were written by three men who advocated what at that time would be a stronger central government.  Later, Alexander Hamilton and John Adams were termed Federalists because they favored making the national government strong and capable.  The use of the term since then typically refers to centralizers, not decentralizers.

Now, Sarah Palin probably merely refers to herself as a federalist because she favors federalism. And federalism allocates some tasks to the central government, and leaves others to the states.  The states rights crowd wants more limitations on central power:  "the Federal government is a limited government of assigned powers, all others being left to the states; it has only enumerated powers, and those implied powers absolutely necessary to effect the enumerated powers."  I have not heard such advocates called Federalists.


I suppose in the context of the "right to privacy" in Roe (and Griswald v. Connecticut), this is really being snarky.  But while we are piling on . . . .