British Sailor Incident in Iran would not have been tolerated in Nelson’s Navy – or in the US Navy
In the happy after-glow of the return of the British sailors and marines, one might now ask how this unfortunate event happened.
There appear to have been some fairly egregious failures of seamanship and basic naval force protection doctrine.
During a hostile boarding operation, the small rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) that carries the boarding party is expected to operate under the direct protection of both the “eyes” (the radar and other detection equipment) and the “muscle” (the mixture of small arms and larger weapons) of the principle ship. The boarding party commander (typically a Navy Lt ) leads a mixture of sailors and marines (SEALS if the boarding party is American).
The small RHIB always operates in a manner that keeps it in full view of the home vessel, allowing a clear field of fire for the shooters and maximum observe-ability for the radars and other electronic surveillance equipment. The commander of the boarding party is in continuous and instant radio communication with his/her shooters and the bridge of the home vessel is in continual and instant communication with the commander of the boarding party. If the situation is dicey, a helo from the home vessel flies cover.
The British boarding operation is reported to have failed to observe a critical number of these elementary force protection procedures. The target vessel was close inshore, in relatively shallow waters, so the home vessel stood off at a greater distance than is normal in a hostile boarding.
More significantly, the British RHIB is reported to have approached the target vessel from the side not visible from the home vessel – placing the target vessel in the line-of-sight between the RHIB and its home base shooters. All these mistakes in basic procedure appear to have transpired at a time when the Iranians were known to be setting traps for unwary coalition maritime operators.
The British Navy, while much smaller than our own, is usually characterized by a higher level of individual seamanship than the US Navy and the quality of command at sea is characteristically of the highest order.
We seem to have observed the results of a quite spectacular failure of British Naval leadership – a failure that would certainly have led to the ignominious and instantaneous loss of command in Nelson’s Navy.
JOHN STUART BLACKTON
A question: why is it a "failure of leadership" and not operational sloppiness of junior officers in the field? This question is based on the description in the blog entry.
However, was it a "hostile boarding" that the sailors were engaging in? In press, it was described as "routine inspection". If it WAS a "hostile boarding", it would suggest that the boarded merchant vessel was running away, and thus perhaps it was overzealously pursued into Iranian waters, or at least too close to those waters.
The most puzzling statement about the incident was Blair statement that British Navy was there to "enforce a UN mandate". To me it suggest simple piracy -- what mandate??!! Against Saddam, per chance?
April 6, 2007 1:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
"why is it a "failure of leadership" and not operational sloppiness of junior officers?" (Piotr)
For a hostile boarding op, the skipper would have signed off on the op-plan. In this case one can surmise one of several possibilities:
1) the fact that the hostile vessel was lying close to shore in shallow waters required a greater standoff distance than usually required & the skipper signed off on this despite the fact that the Iranians were known to be setting "ruses" and trying to snatch coalition RHIBS. This could be found to be a command failure in the naval board of inquiry that will follow in the coming weeks.
2) Standard hostile boarding procedures were followed, but the home ship's radar and surveillance gear were malfunctioning. This could have been determined before the RHIB was out of range, and the RHIB could have been recalled. Again, a possible command failure
3) The LT in command of the boarding party departed entirely from procedure by taking the RHIB to the "blind" side of the hostile vessel, putting the boarding party out of the field of fire from their defensive shooters. This would have been a failure of the junior commander as Piort suggests.
4) Some combination or variation of these three with varying locations for primary responsibility.
5) Other operation failures included:
(a) not deploying the helo for cover in a setting where the hostile intent of the Iranians was a given;
(b) the apparent lack of effective guidance to the boarding party on proper behavior if/when taken prisoner;
(c)apparent poor "situational awareness" on the part of the skipper and the boarding party commander
(d) apparent lack of a tight, continuous communications triangle amongst the Bridge operators, the shooters and the RHIB.
The boarding was definitionally "hostile" given the location and the nature of the boarding party. Uncontested boardings at sea - which are much more common, do not include Royal Marines/USNavy SEALs in the boarding party.
When the skipped determines in his/her judgement that the boarding conditions are hostile or contested, the boarding party is appropriately augmented.
In normal hostile boardings, there would be three snipers on the home vessel, each one sighted-in on a visible leadership figure (Skipper, first mate, etc) on the hostile vessel. These fire on a single word command from the commander of the boarding party.
Other small arms shooters (the 50's and the 7.62 SeaWhiz gattling guns etc ) would have shooters at the ready who are in radio communications with the RHIB.
The Mark 19s would be prepared to deal with "swarm tactics" and the larger weapons systems would be ready to deal with any new vessel entering into the area of the operation.
The home vessel would launch a helo 10-15 minutes before the dispatch of the RHIBs to do a 360 overhead recon.
Under these standard procedures, the incident would not have transpired as it did.
There is clearly an element of command failure in the mix. The specifics of that failure await the board of inquiry. John Stuart Blackton
Professor John Stuart Blackton
April 6, 2007 1:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, I suppose if it had turned into a full fledged firefight, then people would have died, things would have gone blooey, and perhaps we might have a war on our hands right now.
I'm not necessarily prepared to say that a non-fatal border incident which was resolved peacefully a week or two later.
I don't know enough of the circumstances to really suggest that resistance would or would not have been an option.
We can all sit back a bit and claim that they should have fought to the last man.
On the other hand, if they found themselves surrounded and outgunned, there's not a lot of merit to letting a few rounds off. Even where the forces were evenly matched or the British had a military advantage, its a big ugly question as to whether you pop a few rounds into the darkies and start a war.
As a person who has had guns pointed at me, I think it looks a little bit different up close and personal, than it does in academic forums or conference rooms. Don't get me wrong, in the comfort and safety of my living room I'm as bloodthirsty as the next guy in the comfort and safety of his lving room. But I just acknowledge things go a little wider.
The thing with blood, is that its not like water. It don't necessarily run downhill. In fact, once it starts to run, there's never any telling which way it'll go, or how much there'll be.
April 7, 2007 2:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Valdron: "if it had turned into a full fledged firefight.... we might have a war on our hands right now."
Had the British skipper followed procedures, I doubt that there would have been any firefight - full-fledged or otherwise.
US and UK hostile boarding procedures have been devised to ensure overwhelming force. Deterrence is the conceptual principle.
The US Navy has done more than a thousand boardings in the OIF theater and none of them has produced a full-fledged fire-fight. The number of boardings that reached even the "warning shot" stage is quite small.
The Iranian's two speedboats (carrying sailors with RPGs and a 50Cal) would have been so-over-matched that they would (in all probability) have retreated without a shot. They have retreated in this fashion countless times in the past few years.
The Iranians designed a ruse that was asymmetric in nature and depended on poor procedure on the part of the UK commander.
The Iranian coastal forces do similar speedboat-gambits weekly (sometimes daily) and call them off because the coalition ships follow procudure.
They do the same thing with coalition aircraft, putting spurious english language air-controller messages up to get unwary coalition pilots to make an unplanned left turn into Iranian air-space.
This has been going on for years on the sea and in the air.
This is why I find the British Navy's failure to follow procedures so disappointing.
Had they done so, instead of the firefight suggested by Valdron, we simply would have had the 1213th unsuccessful Iranian ruse event of the year.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
April 8, 2007 10:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
. . . . coalition ships . . . coalition pilots . . . .
I've followed this rather uninteresting story at third hand, but I did think that I'd understood that the involved Brits weren't acting as part of the "coalition."
I had thought that they were engaged in a United Nations' sponsored policing effort, one which Iran had, by virtue of its membership in the United Nations, impliedly endorsed.
I don't see why the Brits had to be at general quarters for a simple inspection of a commercial shipping carrier.
April 8, 2007 7:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
When you board a non-compliant ship (the vessel had been hailed and requested to accept boarding & had ignored the request), you are in a "non-compliant" condition.
When you have this situation in the Shatt al Arab at a time when the Iranian forces are known to be using ruses to snatch unwary US/UK personnel, you follow naval force protection measures to the tee.
This is not calling the ship to "general quarters". General quarters is something quite different.
This is the application of standard operating procedures for non compliant boardings.
Failure to follow these standard force protection procedures appears to have resulted in the incident - an outcome that was embarassing the the British Navy and to the UK government.
Nval accountability procedures will, in due course, illuminate who made what errors.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
April 9, 2007 11:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
In what way did the fact* that the subject ship's actions were "non-compliant" constitute the proximate cause of the "incident"?
* Links would be helpful.
April 9, 2007 11:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen, please read carefully:
"Failure to follow these standard force protection procedures appears to have resulted in the incident - an outcome that was embarassing the the British Navy and to the UK government."
It was the UK naval commander's failure to follow SOP force protection measures that was the proximate cause, not the non-compliance.
The latter, however, establishes the operative SOP. So the non-compliance was a contributory factor, but not the proximate cause.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
April 9, 2007 12:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
Professor, please read carefully:
"Links would be helpful."
April 9, 2007 1:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
RE: Links would be helpful.
Ellen, My primary sources of information about matters military are from my professional work and my professional relationships, not from the internet.
In my work I am in regular and continuing contact with senior UK military officers (and US Navy officers) who are familiar with both the specific case at hand and the general case of hostile and non compliant ship boardings by US and allied naval forces.
I leave it others, who are not professionals, to find websites about these matters - if websites are your preferred sources. But don't expect me to waste my time on them.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
April 10, 2007 8:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
~
Basic "naval force protection"?Maybe our Navy learned something from the past...
As you know well Professor Blackton, the US government spent 11 months ironing out the diplomatic challenges of a very similar incident we faced back in 1968...
And what did we learn about force protection?
http://www.usspueblo.org/v2f/attack/attacked.htm
~OGD~
April 9, 2007 3:18 PM | Reply | Permalink