Primer for Next Military Moves in Iraq
I did not know enough about the military plans prior to the start of the war in 2003. With the decreasing probability of withdrawal in the near term, I want to understand at least 2 things: what does this "Surge" strategy mean and what might be the thinking behind a different military strategy, Counterinsurgency.
The scariest is this Surge strategy, a significant increase in troops. Pat Lang [blogger, retired intelligence and special forces] provides a 52 page presentation from an AEI/military group chaired by Frederick Kagan. [Link for pdf file]. Lang's commentary:
... cast of contributers at the end reads very much like one of the great neocon "papers" ... military men listed among the supposed authors are a mystery to me ....
The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.
... This concept is a recipe for a grand and climactic battle of attrition between US and Iraqi forces on one side and the some combination of Sunni and Shia forces on the other....
President Bush may well accept the essence of this concept. He wants to redeem his "freedom agenda," restore momentum to his plans and in his mind this might "clear up" Iraq so that he could move on to Iran.
The carnage implicit in this concept would be appalling...
U.S. military's new counterinsurgency doctrine takes issue with some key strategies that American commanders in Iraq continue to use, most notably the practice of concentrating combat forces in massive bases rather than dispersing them among the population ... field manual ... seeks to bring together the best practices in fighting sustained insurgencies that the [US] has learned during the Iraq war. It also lists tactics that have tripped up American forces,
Link to the manual. [If you have trouble go to the bottom of the article for a link.]
... subject headings, just how radically Petraeus believes the military needs to reexamine the way it fights a war without conventional battlefields or an obvious end. Consider these headings in ... Chapter One titled "Paradoxes":
The More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You Are
The Best Weapons for COIN Do Not Shoot
Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction
Most Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals.
Counterinsurgency warfare is ... "war at the graduate level," where every unit commander must be a kind of "strategic lieutenant" calibrating the right balance between soldiers' killing power and the exercise of restraint that can turn potential enemies into allies....
A critique of this "surge" strategy by Spencer Ackerman:
December 16, 2006 5:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
How many countries are there now in the Coalition?
How many men (and women) in suitable age, say between 18 and 48, live there?
Of course there are more troops to send!
That's not the issue.
The issue is if dispatching them would pay of in comparative advantages for the sending countries. Or if the mission would have any reasonable chances to achieve any realistic goals.
Could, for instance, the United States be moved to change its ideas about how to use the occupation armies - in a way that maybe increased the civilians perception of security instead?
But, no, probably not under the current president, and if the impresseion of the Democrats in Congress are to be trusted, not under any Democrat successor either.
December 17, 2006 4:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ackerman gets to the heart of the matter with his comment about having to reassert direct political control for Kagan's notion of locking down Baghdad to be anything more than a military operation without a cogent purpose.
The disconnect from a process of legitimate political authority, however, is what has been left undiscussed by most of those who put forward plans of what to do next in Iraq.
The ISG study, for instance, notes that a constitutional review is needed to correct that document's recipe for dissolving the nation into autonomous regions. Since such a process of review is, strictly speaking, entirely in the hands of a sovereign Iraq government, any meaningful arbitration of national reconciliation undertaken by an outside agency would mean "suspending" that sovereignty in order to open the ground for a new arrangement.
Baker/Hamilton hint at this suspension when they say that the "issue of the withdrawal of U.S. forces has to be placed on the table as a matter of negotiation". What is not said but would follow naturally from such a negotiation is that the use of force by the U.S. could be explicitly authorized for a specific purpose. That sort of authority is what is conspicuously absent in the logic of the "U.S. standing down as the Iraqis stand up." According to the present Iraqi constitution, the United States simply does not exist.
December 17, 2006 10:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
Kagan and the generals.
Interesting contrast of past behavior given the current roles of the 2 named generals from Spencer Ackerman:
December 16, 2006 5:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
irishkg, these are great references/resources/links. I've been reading about COIN for a while and have collected some good papers. Do you have an opinion on whether or not COIN would work in these late stages of the hostilities?
"I don't want to say that George Bush is a lame duck, but this morning, Cheney shot him". Bill Maher
December 16, 2006 8:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
My opinion is that of a layman who reads and listens.
From what I've read about and heard from David Petraeus I'd love to hear him say what can and cannot be done in Iraq given where we are. Then after that I'd want to think long and hard about what I think this Administration is capable of doing. Just because military or foreign policy experts say it can be done I don't have faith that this Administration can execute a sophisticated strategy with the required finesse and precision.
Long way of saying that even if the Administration picks a strategy that I would support, I have so little faith that they can do it. Now that is a disheartening feeling.
December 16, 2006 10:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yep, coming from the same layman space, my 2 cents is that there has been very little written that gives much encouragement. And the military experts that we have publicly heard from are suspect. As Metz and Millen note (link below):
If brutal honesty and a willingness to admit failure are critical elements, there is no way the US is going to change tactics and strategy, as the Bush administration is not capable of or willing to do either one.
Interestingly, British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster (link below) compares David Petraeus' success in Iraq with other US commanders who focused only on the kill and destroy strategy. In a footnote he commented on Petraeus' subsequent promotion and said, "I was privileged to share an office with this inspirational officer for 4 months."
Fred Kagan is a puzzle. In 2003 he wrote War and Aftermath, which is critical of Bush and Rumsfeld and reads like something Petraeus would approve. I'm going to try and see if I can find what changed in his head since then.
"I don't want to say that George Bush is a lame duck, but this morning, Cheney shot him". Bill Maher
December 16, 2006 11:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
December 18, 2006 11:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
Other COIN resources:
Mentioned in the new manual's annotated bibliography, from the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 21st CENTURY: RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Nov. 2004. A Key Quote:
Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations is written from the British perspective. Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster served in Iraq with the US Army and covers operations through mid 2005. Using lessons learned by the British in Malaya, Aylwin-Foster discusses COIN in terms of the usual "hearts and minds" strategy and the doctrine as practiced by the US in Iraq. It was published in the US Military Review. Key Quotes:
Last, Why the Strong Lose by Jeffrey Record (Army War College) explains exactly why the US is losing in Iraq. A few Key Quotes:
"I don't want to say that George Bush is a lame duck, but this morning, Cheney shot him". Bill Maher
December 16, 2006 10:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
A surge of troops, if it happens, seems like too little too late. What are they supposed to do, except become targets? We broke it; we own it, but there doesn't seem to be an elegant way for us to fix it. I see three options, and none of them are appealing:
Stay the course and hope the Iraqis can actually forge a coalition government. A troop surge seems to me to be a stay the course move. I imagine we'll eventually see a coup of sorts, given the discontent shown for Maliki. The fly in the ointment is Sadr. I doubt he will be a passive observer in all this. If he really has 60,000 men under arms, it won't be pleasant. It also bleeds our country in terms of lives lost, money borrowed, and prestige squandered.
We become a true colonial occupier. Call everybody up and use massive force to subdue the country and install a colonial government. I think the negatives of this are pretty much self-evident.
We withdraw over the horizon and let the Iraqis hash it out for themselves.
Like eveyone else, I just don't see any good choices. Damn, what a screwed up mess.
Glenn (aka ges)
All that is gold does not glitter, not all those who wander are lost; the old that is strong does not wither, deep roots are not reached by the frost. From the ashes a fire shall be woken, a light from the shadows shall spring;—J.R.R. Tolkien
December 17, 2006 10:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
Glad to see this attempt to figure out what's going on rather than just denounce it as usual here.
Sorry I don't have time to contribute much beyond encouraging more of this sort of post.
Just quickly though.
1. I wouldn't take either Pat Lang's or Spencer Ackerman's analysis of the AEI report very seriously. For that matter I wouldn't take the AEI report very seriously. All 3 ignore the imminent realignment of Iraqi governing coalition which will either see Sadrists backing off (already some hints about a 1 month ceasefire) or being excluded with support from Sistani for a coalition relying on moderate Sunnis as well as secular Shia already openly backed by SCIRI. (Most likely with Daawa still keeping the PM position but no longer relying on Sadr and Fadlillah). Iraq is now governed by a democratically elected government which ultimately takes the decisions. That is of course viewed as an incomprehensible disaster by advocates of the old Middle East but its worth remembering it is precisely what the Bushies aimed at and are being attacked for. Don't expect serious analysis of military strategy and tactics from people who just don't grok the goal.
2. Its clear that there will be both an increase in US Army and Marine strength and an increased level of US troops in Iraq. But the political realignment in Iraq is far more important. The additional forces merely ensure that US remains committed so neighbours cannot intervene and Iraqi factions cannot hope to overthrow the government in the Green Zone by force or start operating in formations that would be exposed to US firepower while the ISF are still being stood up.
3. The corresponding realignment in US politics is also more important than the military impact of the first increment. Voting for the first increment will commit most Democrats in Congress to support for the war instead of carping about it. The mainstream "debate" is now between ISG "stay the course" (while pretending to pull out) and AEI "escalate" with defeatists already marginalized, despite their triumphalism immediately after the elections.
4. With both SCIRI and the Saudis as well as the bipartisan ISG all pointing out that a US withdrawal would be a disaster for the region and hence fot the US there really isn't much room for mainstream Democrats to keep pretending otherwise.
5. Internalization of that fact is necessary before serious discussion of strategy and tactics will become feasible outside the very narrow circles that actually support the war at present. Up to now public discussion has been primarily aimed at keeping people confused and disoriented (especially the US foreign policy establishment) since hardly anyone even grasped that the aim is to destabilize the whole region and replace the corrupt tyrannies the US still calls "moderate Arab allies" with more democratic anti-American islamist regimes that are less likely to keep breeding jihadis than the current regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia etc. That wasn't a Grand Strategy that could ever be openly proclaimed in launching the war and it still isn't, but public opinion is starting to get used to parties like Daawa and SCIRI being allies in Iraq, Fateh being an ally in the Palestinian occupied territories etc. The next phase involves acceptance of Hamas and Hezbollah and then the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
6. Distracting attention by shouting at Iran a lot is central to this Grand Strategy (especially for helping Israeli public opinion forget they used to be fighting for "Judea and Samaria") and accept withdrawal from the West Bank.
7, The military plans at the start of the war were to overthrow the Baathist regime and suppress its party and armed forces etc so ending Sunni domination and unleashing democratic revolution. Not to establish a puppet regime and US occupation. Sunni resistance has been unexpectedly fierce and has now triggered Shia backlash but that's still the conception - that it's up to Iraqis, not friends of the USA, to govern Iraq. Hence military tactics that make no sense to people trained under previous US strategic conceptions.
December 21, 2006 12:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
So the Administration is going to do both. They plan to do the surge to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign led Gen Petraeus who wrote the most recent manual.
There is no end to the chutzpah and delusion. They pick the admired leader to implement the newly refined doctrine of counterinsurgency while deluding themselves that this is still principally an insurgent fight.
By picking Petraeus they can quiet many critics since he is an articulate leader, has a good media reputation and a record of on the field success in combat/post combat. They hope that the facade of his accomplishment while leading Iraqi security force training will be overlooked.
The administration is set on a course where the probability of success on the ground is so very low and I can't see any case that the action will have a causal effect to increase the likelihood that the Iraqi government will really govern. It's one thing if we were just throwing money away, but the impact is deeper and longer term -- military lives and bodies and the soft American power around the world.
January 6, 2007 10:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm afraid that this tragic comedy called Iraq will be played out for the next two years. I wonder if the administration even knows anymore what it wants to accomplish or what "victory" will look like. Maybe it never knew, except that some divine plan would magically unfold. Everyone—the administration, the Congress, the us of the U.S., and mostly our troops—are caught between the proverbial rock and the hard spot. We have succeeded in creating a lose-lose situation. It's becoming a cliché, but Iraq's destiny truly resides with the Iraqis. We broke it, but we can't fix it, and that's the most troublesome part, at least for me. Deciding where our moral obligation to ourselves, and most especially our service members, starts to outweigh our moral obligation to Iraqi citizens, not the ones in the Green Zone, but the people who live and die in Baghdad, Fallujah, and the other places is the challenge. We're bleeding our own country dry and don't seem to be accomplishing anything. Too many hard questions that have no good answers seem to be what our fears and the administration's Oedipus complex and imperial visions have spawned. But that's enough lamentation and diatribe for now.
Glenn (aka ges)
All that is gold does not glitter, not all those who wander are lost; the old that is strong does not wither, deep roots are not reached by the frost. From the ashes a fire shall be woken, a light from the shadows shall spring;—J.R.R. Tolkien
January 6, 2007 11:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Tragic comedy" has some sense of dignity but as I am seeing a picture that needs another label and "bizzare tragic comedy" doesn't do it.
Picture 3 simeltaneous, overlapping "clear and hold" campaigns in Baghdad:
While there is a continuation of what is already underway (per reports from Juan Cole 1/6/07):
January 6, 2007 11:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
The label I actually keep coming back to is "mess." Iraq is both complex and complicated. I don't know; nothing about it felt right to me from the beginning. We opened a Pandora's box and made a mess; I just don't have a better description.
Glenn (aka ges)
All that is gold does not glitter, not all those who wander are lost; the old that is strong does not wither, deep roots are not reached by the frost. From the ashes a fire shall be woken, a light from the shadows shall spring;—J.R.R. Tolkien
January 6, 2007 12:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
The label for the new Iraq plan just changed and I believe I watched the change. What was "surge" is now a "retooled" plan. The word change is part of getting Americans to believe that the President heard them in November and Frank Luntz thinking must be the driver.
In the hours before the speech the Administration rolled out the message. The media stories about the speech are using "retooled" to describe the plan ["retooled" and "iraq" yield almost 300 Google hits]. "Surge" is limited to the quotes from opponents.
Just the day before the speech Frank Luntz, consultant renowned for finding the language that most appeals to voters/consumers, told Boston interviewer Emily Rooney [WGBH, daughter of Andy] that "surge" was a bad label. It made the listener think of escalate and then Vietnam.
Rooney asked what would be more effective to describe the new Iraq plan. Luntz said words with "re" as the prefix were positive and indicated a change from what is. Amongst the "re" words he suggested were "retooled, realigned, reevaluated.
For Luntz it’s what people hear that matters so I have to believe that Luntz, or a Luntz believer, weighed in to change the war plan language prior to the big speech.
January 10, 2007 2:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
In other words, Surge is a Not Cool Plan and Retooled Plan =
Iraq in the Garbage Can and The U.S. in the Frying Pan
Frank Lutz is over paid if he made more than $50 for that Sad Plan.
I was sad, also, yesterday. Really down.
Impeachment: It's Not Just for BJs Anymore
January 11, 2007 8:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
The blame for the plan content still rests with the Administration. Luntz is a label man so that we the public get the gist they want us to get in just a couple words.
In any case I was wrong that the administration was following him by replacing "surge" with "retool". 3 days later "retool" is disappearing from media reports (a quick google now is around 700). We know that would not be true if the Administration wanted us to think "retool."
A couple days ago Iraq looked bad for the US, as of this morning the danger is way more, the Administration appears to be putting the whole region in play. Sen Chuck Hegel was almost ranting on Charlie Rose about the Administration wanting to widening the war into Iran and Syria. He doesn't strike me as a guy who gets spooked easly and not a guy who was unable to stop talking.
Ever so quickly late yesterday and moving into today serious foreign policy veterans are jumping all over the risk of the US making it regional. They would not be moving so fast and so loudly if they didn't think Administration action was imminent.
January 12, 2007 9:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
Frank Luntz on Wartime Linguistics:
January 12, 2007 1:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
The "surge" stuff was in the Baker commission with an emphasis on temporary.
Bush's speech simply states that he's increasing the numbers of troops without equivocation and has stopped pretending the US commiment can be drawn down in the relatively near future - spelling out the disasterous consequences if it was. He does not use the word "retooled" either.
Also the Baker commission advocated increased embedding without mentioning that this implies higher US casualty rates, whereas Bush is much more straightforward:
Not quite Churchillian "blood, sweat and tears" but it does respond to November by speaking more honestly than before.
He's still not spelling out just how disasterous a defeat would be. For a more vivid description see The Consequences of Failure in Iraq by Gerecht.
January 11, 2007 4:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
Listening to speech analysis what stands out to me:
-- Continuing to mischaracterize the conflict.
It's way more than insurgency and AQ. With Shia on Shia, Shia on Sunni, Sunni on Shia and the Kurds in the wings US soldiers are either in the middle or helping one side against one of the other sides.
-- Overwhelming dependence on Maliki
Even if I assume the military strategy and troop level are correct, and I don't, the Maliki government must do so many things that are showstoppers if not done and there is no evidence he has the self interest to do them or the ability if he did have the self interest to do them.
-- In some ways we are being played as chumps because everyone knows that the Bush Administration will not leave.
Maliki and the other governing/political leaders have failed to do what they need to do and we send more troops and money; regional leaders don't have to do any work because as long as they are absent the Administration feels it is the only thing stopping regional chaos; Iran can sit back and help foment some trouble and for very little effort see their regional power increased by the day. We are doing their work with our people and money and the prospect of getting what we want is infintesimal.
As to "retooled" it was certainly invisible. I wonder if it appeared in so many stories yesterday afternoon because it had been used in the media briefings.
In the end I was left thinking that this speech, less bellicose and more realistic (although still some gapping holes), and stepped up effort needed to be done in 04, not January 07.
I am sad for the country today.
January 11, 2007 8:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
More on the US doing the work of everyone else who lives there and how the others would need to do more if the US were not doing what it is doing:
And how we are working for Iran:
January 11, 2007 9:59 AM | Reply | Permalink