An interview published in Saturday's Washington Post with a member of the Iraq insurgency reveals another example of the deadly postwar cooperation between members of Saddam Hussein's former ruling party and al Qaeda in Iraq. In the piece, written by Joshua Hartlow, the insurgent identifies himself as "Abu Sarhan" and revealed that he "had been an officer in the Fedayeen (pictured right via Answers.com), the black-clad paramilitary force of the ousted government of Saddam Hussein."

"Sarhan" went on to describe how he later became the "'general coordinator' between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Omar Brigade, an insurgent group founded in July 2005 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." The Omar Brigade is a group set up by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, before his death, to counter Shi'ites, particularly the Badr Brigade, an enemy of both al Qaeda in Iraq and Baathists.

The Post also managed to interview

An associate of Abu Sarhan's vouched for his leadership credentials. And a college student in Amiriyah, who said he is not an insurgent but that he had met Abu Sarhan briefly about two weeks earlier, said the Sunni insurgent is considered the leader of the Omar Brigade.

As Strategy Page analysts recently wrote (there are also Baathist linked groups who are confronting al Qaeda) the destination of choice for many al Qaeda members fleeing the U.S. surge in Iraq is areas like parts of Baghdad and Baqouba where Saddam Hussein loyalists continue to still have a foothold.

cross-posted at www.regimeofterror.com

cross posted at www.regimeofterror.com

Lt. General Michael DeLong discusses intelligence behind U.S. concern over Ansar al-Islam terror/poison camp in Northern Iraq

A recent conversation Lt. General Michael DeLong revealed new information on prewar intelligence on Iraq that has received little, if any, public attention thus far. General DeLong was the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and was directly involved with the pre-invasion preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He offered the observation that Bush administration officials appear to have been reluctant thus far in explaining the prewar intelligence and evidence tying members of Saddam Hussein’s regime to the al-Qaeda-linked Ansar al Islam terrorist group.

One of the reasons cited in justifying the Iraq invasion was concern over an Ansar al Islam camp in Northern Iraq and its role chemical weapons production. While the camp was often cited by political leaders, the camp was also of specific concern to U.S. military strategists and leaders. What was particularly worrisome to military planners was the reports of possible links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Ansar al Islam. What was (and continues to be) debatable is how high up Iraqi knowledge of and contact with the camp had been, if at all. According to Gen. DeLong, the United States had credible intelligence reports of Senior Iraqi leaders and Ministry Officials not only being aware of the camp, but meeting with terrorist leaders involved with the camp.

These comments are nearly identical to what Gen. DeLong told PBS Frontline during their interviews for their special “The Dark Side.”

“When are you first aware that Iraq and Saddam Hussein are on somebody's gun sights somewhere and that it may be job two?”

“We also knew we had thoroughly good intelligence that there was an Al Qaeda base on the Iraq-Iran border, that the Al Qaeda were coming through Iran into Iraq. We'll call it a dual-use base; in other words, chemicals that could be used for putting on your crops or chemicals that you could mix together and make a chemical weapon out of. We had on the ground intelligence that they were coming through there, and then some of them were meeting with some of the senior people in the Saddam administration, not with Saddam himself. We knew there was a tie to Saddam, to Iraq. And nothing happens in Iraq without Saddam knowing about it, so we knew that was true.”

Were you aware that by the 21st of September, say, Tenet and the CIA had already delivered to the president and to others that there was no Al Qaeda-Saddam connection? (Regimeofterror.com note: Tenet's 2002 testimony to Congress was actually quite supportive of an al Qaeda-Saddam connection)

Yeah, we didn't agree. Now, the only place we saw it was this one compound on the Iraq-Iran border, which was so troubling to us. We almost took them out three months before the Iraq war started. We almost took that thing, but we were so concerned that the chemical cloud from there could devastate the region that we chose to take them by land rather than by smart weapons. ...

DeLong, who briefly mentions the intelligence on the camp in his book "Inside Centcom" (new paperback "A General Speaks Out"), says that the camp on the Iran-Iraq border had been in existence for a "long time" and the intelligence indicated that it was indeed a dual use chemical factory intended for AG (agricultural) and warfare. Some background on what AG warfare might look like has been detailed by Mark Wheelis of the University of California.

DeLong also said that there were enough concerns about the amount of chemicals in the area( bombing could produce a lethal chemical cloud large enough to affect numerous civilians in the region), that ground troops were used to check the place for chemical weapons early in 2003 . By the time the troops got there "most" of the chemicals had been removed and the site was more or less sanitized.

“A General Speaks Out”, by Zenith Publishing, can be ordered through Amazon.com.

http://regimeofterror.com/archives/2006/12/what_does_congressman_elect_ch/

Newly elected Pennsylvania Congressman, Democrat Chris Carney, a former Senior Terrorism and Intelligence Advisor at the Pentagon, has recently been quoted in a number of publications discussing his knowledge of and role in prewar Iraq intelligence, particularly on the issue Saddam Hussein’s links to al Qaeda. His views on the subject are a stark contrast to many in his party, particularly Senator Carl Levin, who has long expressed his belief that any link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al Qaeda was a manufacture of the Bush administration. Carney's comments and experience on the issue may even put him in the cross-hairs of Sen. Levin's reported investigation into the matter in the coming months. What did Congressman Carney say? What does he know?

In a piece for the New Yorker, Jane Mayer spoke with Carney, also a reserve officer in the U.S. Navy, about his work at the Pentagon examining Saddam Hussein’s links to al Qaeda.

Carney said that he came to his conclusion about Saddam’s links to al Qaeda being a 2.5 on a 10 scale while “looking at terrorist links between Al Qaeda and state sponsors of terrorism, including Iraq,” He went on, “Saddam had links to every terrorist group in the region. I still think there were links to Al Qaeda.”

Having links to “every terrorist group in the region” sounds similar to the prognosis made by the U.S. State Department in 2002 about Iraq's involvement in terrorism.

In a New York Times piece by James Risen, Mr. Carney is quoted as saying:

“It was a relationship of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer,” he added. “Saddam was a savvy guy, and I think he wanted to make sure that if Al Qaeda someday became a force, that he wanted to keep his options open. I thought that there was a relationship. Whether it was strong enough to go to war, that’s the president’s decision.”

While serving his post at the Pentagon Carney's responsiblities included briefing a number of high ranking officials on the subject, his conclusions were not well taken by "some in the government."

In the summer and fall of 2002, Mr. Carney was at the center of the storm, briefing George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, and Stephen J. Hadley, then the deputy national security adviser, on the Feith unit’s assessment of any links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. At the time, the unit was creating controversy within the government for arguing that there was significant evidence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

Risen's piece does not illuminate who in the government was opposed to Mr. Carney's observations or why, though it was likely the CIA.

Greg Miller of the L.A. Times quoted Carney on why he thought there were different conclusions amongst those in the intelligence community, including the CIA.

“Carney and another DIA analyst, Christina Shelton, spent months poring over thousands of raw intelligence reports. They quickly concluded that the CIA, which had been skeptical of any serious relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, was getting it wrong.

"I found it kind of curious the way they were so equivocal in the analysis," Carney said of the CIA reports. "It was frustrating to me and others with all the caveating that was going on."

But according to the recent Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) investigation Saddam Hussein did not approve of al Qaeda’s ideology and ordered members of his regime not even to meet with al Qaeda.

Does Congressman Carney know of additional (and still classified) intelligence that even the SSCI has yet to see that counters Saddam Hussein's assurances that members of his regime were ordered not to meet with al Qaeda?

Is there a specific meeting, photo, document, detainee or intercepted transmission that Congressman Carney is privy to that links al Qaeda not only to Saddam Hussein's regime but all the way up to Hussein himself in some way?

If additional intelligence is still classified that links Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda (and the intelligence won't compromise ongoing missions) then that intelligence being made available to elected officials and the public is long overdue and should have been turned over the SSCI for their investigation into the issue.

Perhaps it is this still-classified intelligence, yet to see the eyes of members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and many members of the intelligence community, that is the explanation behind those from members of members of both political parties who continue to challenge the "conventional wisdom" on the subject.

What does Congressman Carney know that his Congressional colleagues don't know about Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and when will this information be allowed to enter the public debate?