Series of intelligence articles on Wikipedia
Some of you know that I have been writing, or heavily modifying, a series of articles, at Wikipedia, on various aspects of intelligence. I just put up several that are higher in the hierarchy than where I had started.
I'm not going to make hot links here from all of these, since they are linked from Wikipedia.
As I work on this, I'm reminded of the trial, under the Official Secrets Act, of a British intelligence officer. Asked by the judge if he had likened the Secret Service to a Marx Brothers movie, he responded, more or less, "No, my Lord. I said that compared to the Secret Service, a Marx Brothers movie was pellucid reality."
Right now, the articles I've written, or heavily modified, include:
Intelligence cycle management
..Intelligence collection management
...SIGINT
...MASINT
....Electro-optical MASINT
....Nuclear MASINT
....Geophysical MASINT
....Radar MASINT
....Radiofrequency MASINT
....Materials MASINT
..Intelligence analysis management
...Intelligence analysis
Related are National Technical Means of Verification, Arthur C. Lundahl, and Dino Brugioni
Howard, you are indeed a polymath! That's about the only lucid comment I can make here, but you deserve a comment for all the hard work you're doing.
October 29, 2007 8:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
You actually might find some of the cognitive principles interesting, which are in the article on "Intelligence analysis".
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 29, 2007 8:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for pointing me to something in my league. I have no shame in admitting my ignorance in many areas. Your ability to amass facts and manage concepts is astounding!
I'll go where you pointed me. Thanks.
oops...
Ok. Here's an ignorance. I though you might have linked to each. Failing a link, how do I find the article you mentioned?
October 29, 2007 8:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here's one to Intelligence analysis. There are a number of links in the text, but if you look at any page, type in the desired page name in the search box and hit "go".
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 29, 2007 8:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
Will do. I did try Google and found an intriguing book on it. Biases, work of Tversky and Kahneman, that would interest me. I'll take a look at what you've done. Thanks for the link - and advice for further searching.
Just had a thought: intelligence in political campaigns?
October 29, 2007 8:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
My first thought is that intelligence in political campaigns is more oxymoronic than jumbo shrimp or military intelligence, but, in reality, there are similarities. Opposition research is organized much as a biographic register, a reference subdiscipline of intelligence analysis.
Heuer, Krizan, and Johnston are all available free online. Heuer is more the psychologist and philosopher, while Johnston is more an industrial ethnographer.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 29, 2007 8:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Heuer is the one I found. I've marked that and your article - for when I have a bit more time for intensive reading. Once again, I appreciate you drawing that to my attention. (One never knows how useful it can be to admit ignorance!)
October 29, 2007 9:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
Howard, I've found these posts, comments and other items on intelligence disciplines to be educational. They are a means for intellectual challenge and improvement. Thanks for them.
October 30, 2007 1:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
I appreciate the thought. For some of the issues we now face as a country, all too often, there's neither a knowledge of how we see where we are, what the other sides are doing, or what we need to do.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 30, 2007 2:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Off Thread Howard, but this was the closest relevant recent entry in you blog. This is in regards to our past discussion regarding indigenous manufacture of rockets by Hamas and Palestinians. A recent published analysis by The Power and the Interest News Report seems to accept as a proven given that the Palestinians have the ability to produce the Qassam easily, and probably a limited ability to produce the Katyusha, while they imply that Hamas in lebanon has the tech to produce great numbers of both.
An excerpt:
I thought you might be interested in this. The analysis is regarding Israel's plan to devise a shield against the rocket attacks, and the issues regarding implementing that plan.
November 21, 2007 1:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
On one level, I agree completely with you. The problem, however, is that Israel seems to have suspended or stopped the anti-rocket programs, as well as some plausible defense techniques and means of proportionate response.
Let's set aside the Arrow and PAC-3 systems, a US-Israeli joint development and the later US, which are nicely complementary systems, but also aimed more at MRBM/IRBM threats.
MTHEL (now the Nautilus) laser system, as well as two systems unfortunately named Skyguard (one from Oerlikon and one from Raytheon, with Israeli input), all have real probabilities against the Qassam/GRAD (descendant of Katyushka), but seem to be on hold.
Putting more launch detection systems beyond the wall, well-hardened and with a clear message getting even close to them means you die, could cut warning into the 15 second or less, rocket launch from coordinates going to counterbattery guns/rocket, range, as well as possible warning assistance from US DSP-type satellites would help, but again there's no evidence is happening.
It's also hard to judge passive defenses. Believe it or not, domes of chain-link fence could have some role, when the target geometry fits, of defending against these rockets, causing them to predetonate and reducing fragmentation danger. In other cases, people might have to be underground, as was the case at Quemoy and Matsu.
I don't see any evidence that any of these things are happening.
Incidentally, I just put up another Wikipedia article on "Clandestine HUMINT Operational Techniques", which has, I think, an interesting analysis of the different sort of cell structures used by al-Qaeda and possibly some Palestinian organizations.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
November 21, 2007 2:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
Further thoughts, Howard.
As I read your main post this morning, the word "trial" stood out. You said:
For some reason my instant association was to Kafka. And honestly that would fit too, wouldn't it?
So thanks for a chuckle you didn't intend. Amazing how the mind works!
I am also thinking that, were you ever interrogated, there would be no end to what you could tell them.... might not get them what they'd be looking for, but with your polymath skills.... they'd be listening for a long, long time!
November 21, 2007 6:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
Do lasers currently have enough punch to take out a flying rocket, and if so, what sort of recharge time is involved?
I am not that familiar with the material strength of these rockets. Would a close hard concussive airburst be enough to break them apart in flight, and if so, why not go low tech with an aimed array of self-propelled ordnance much like the type of fireworks that explode in a short white burst, followed by an eardrum hammering? This could be implemented with shells that are not fragile like fireworks, and could be left armed without severe danger, as long as they were pointed up and had a very high probability of detonation where they were supposed to blow. Kind of like low elevation WWII ack ack.
It would need accurate as hell radar, but the 15 second launch window seems doable if the timing is precise enough. Also, if the concern is dense population areas, maybe some sort of cable and balloons like the UK used against low flying aircraft in WWII as a support framework for high tensile screening.
The rockets aren't accurate, and it takes a big number of them to pose a substantial threat. Even if only a significant percentage of them could be blocked, it affects the enemy. They may be dirt cheap materially, but it still takes skills that must be learned: good machinists, and persons with a fairly strong engineering background, at least in chemicals and aerodynamics. There still need to be physical plant for manufacturing. There is a significant goodwill valuation that should be added to the simple material costs when making cost/benefits analysis of possible solutions.
What did you think of PINR? They are presently one of my favorite sources for good brief wonkage. You can sign-up for email notification for all publically published analysis (pop-up registration when homepage loads), and/or their RSS feed, to stay up to date without having to actually work through their web site. I use both. They use a widely diverse group of experts, and seem to try hard at doing what they say; looking at only the powers and the interests involved, leaving the moralising to the readership.
Also, I just remembered these guys, although I wouldn't get too excited about them quite yet, as I found them because of an ugly story. (One - Two)
oops, on a reread of your last post, I see you do indeed know of Rheinmetall, but I'll leave the links anyway. - - -cheers
November 21, 2007 7:17 AM | Reply | Permalink
MTHEL (mobile tactical high-energy laser), which has been renamed Nautilus, has shot down such rockets, as well as artillery shells. Originally a US development, it went into joint development with the Israelis, but for reasons not totally clear, Israel defunded it, which, as you'll see in the link, was not a popular decision with a good many Israeli experts. Seems like they might have diverted some dollars coming in as US military aid; this, like Arrow, is a legitimate joint development from which both countries could benefit. A working system could also be used to defend against similar terrorist threats elsewhere.
Generally speaking, Nautilus is more of an area defense system. Israel had been working with the Swiss firm, Oerlikon, to adapt the Skyguard 35mm cannon system as a close-in weapons system, with higher energy shells than the US Phalanx. These rockets come in on a much easier-to-intercept trajectory than the lastest US Navy Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), which has to deal with supersonic seaskimmers, which are in the radar envelope for a much shorter time.
As far as detection, radar exists, especially LCMR with software updates, and AN/TPQ-36 which clearly identifies such rockets; they are operational in Afghanistan. Israel has at least one, if not both, of the Firefinders (AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37). There is active US engineering on enhanced versions. At the link above, scroll down to counterartillery radar.
Current thinking is that the tracking system ideally will be multilayered. From the page I gave you, follow the links to acoustic and electro-optical systems; the acoustic article goes into the historical development of artillery (rocket) location by sound and flash. When I have spoken of putting sensors in settlements and possibly other areas in the Territories, I've been thinking more of acoustic and electro-optical MASINT sensors that detect the launch, and then help cue the radar where to start tracking and back-predicting the trajectory.
All these sensors can send coordinates of the target to US M109 155mm howitzers and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and have them firing in 15-30 seconds. While most of those rockets are in 155mm range, MLRS has much longer range. MLRS itself, is not the problem, it is the M26 cluster bomblet rockets that the UK, US, and most of NATO has destroyed or explored converting to safer warheads. The XM31 unitary warhead rockets are replacing them, and is in operational use with good reports.
You may have seen tanks and other armored vehicles that have improvised coverings of chain-link fence. Hitting this causes a shaped-charge rocket predetonate and not produce the proper geometry to punch through armor. It may sound odd, but chain-link fence sheets/domes, or possibly a very strong fabric like nylon or Kevlar, could predetonate these rockets, and could be very useful for point passive defenses of schools, hospitals, and the like.
IDF doctrine seems to involve massive bombardment of the general area of the launcher, as a more general deterrent. I believe a multilayered defense is quite within their capabilities: acoustic and electro-optical sensors near the launch areas, counterbattery radar that both feeds coordinates to the counterbattery howitzers or rockets, and can signal alerts. The next layers would be MTHEL, then Skyguard cannon for point defense, and then screening for passive point defense of above-ground buildings. Putting buildings underground where possible perhaps is not scenic, but may be wise near the areas in range.
Incidentally, I'd make live feeds of all sensors involved, and preferably the counterbattery targeting, available to independent peacekeeping observers. I would harden the first-line sensors against RPG fire and the like, and make it clear that deadly force would be used against anyone that gets near them, without warning. Of course, they should be behind razor wire and barriers.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
November 21, 2007 10:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
The IDF isn't stupid, and they know damn well this is not a deterrent. This solves nothing, and in my mind encourages an escalation of violence. I don't think that the IDF is the actual source of the policy though. This is done either as a political palliative for the people, or as for an evil strategy to justify further acts of violence.
The people who launch these rockets do not live where they launch, and have preplanned methods of escaping as soon as they launch. Unless the IDF has a gunship in the air at the moment of the launch, it improbable that their 'deterrent' is going to hit the actual militants. It will instead hit civilians, who have no means of preventing the militants, even if they were motivated to do so, as they are not allowed to be lawfully armed.
I still think that Israel screwed up badly after Hamas was elected by not forcing them to become political bureaucrats. Leave them alone, and make them answer to the electorate about the garbage pickup and streetlights. Instead, Israel's policies gave Hamas an excuse for the own ineptitude. With few exceptions, most notably Castro, revolutionaries make for piss poor politicians.
November 21, 2007 11:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's possible, but not definitively, to get the people who launch, if they use the technique of setting up the disposable ramp, then run wire to the launch control box in a nearby vehicle. If they just push a button and drive like hell, they still might not get out of the impact zone of airbursting warheads.
If they just put it on a ramp and set a timer, then spotting it first is the only way to intervene. I can think of some ways that a good intelligence service, with lots of analysis of imagery might get some good guesses -- but no guarantees. Still, the US practice in Iraq, a good deal of the time, is to put vehicle-borne patrols and helicopters into the likely launch areas, and they sometimes ambush or capture the firing team. Whether the IDF would have a sufficient edge on locals to protect themselves is an open area; the US-Iraqi balance seems a little more favorable.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
November 21, 2007 12:04 PM | Reply | Permalink