Michael Gerson, in the August 10 WaPo, speaks of

"The United States has immediate responsibilities as well -- to provide airlift support through NATO, training for command staff, communications and computer equipment, and generators. America is obligated to pay 27 percent of the cost of the peacekeeping force, which will probably require a supplemental funding bill from Congress in 2008."

In my response (below), I suggest that anyone blithely suggesting this needs to look at transportation maps.

I’m afraid that quite a few national and international leaders are ignoring realities of a Darfur intervention. It’s a cliche that amateurs talk tactics, dilettantes talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics, but the point is very relevant here.

You wrote, "The United States has immediate responsibilities as well -- to provide airlift support through NATO, training for command staff, communications and computer equipment, and generators. America is obligated to pay 27 percent of the cost of the peacekeeping force, which will probably require a supplemental funding bill from Congress in 2008."

Please look at what would be required to provide that airlift support. Right now, the US is providing airlift to the African Union force in Darfur. These flights now go from Nigeria to El Fasher, which is the best airport in Darfur. There is, however, no regular supply of aircraft fuel to El Fasher, which means that the C-130 transport aircraft in use have to carry fuel for the return trip. This is a huge restriction on the amount of cargo they can carry. Darfur is not Berlin, where airlift can shuttle from nearby bases well supplied with fuel. There are alternatives, but none are trivial.

Ignoring political considerations and the possibility of sudden interruptions, one alternative would be to stage airlift out of Khartoum International Airport. There is a Sudanese oil refinery near Khartoum, and, even if it does not now make aircraft fuel, it’s plausible to have tankers unload at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, and then to ship it by rail to Khartoum International.

A creative approach to minimizing interference by the North Sudanese part of the coalition government might be to change the approach from overall economic sanctions on Sudan, to active investment in South Sudan. Remember, the Power-Sharing Agreement includes a 2011 referendum in which the South can vote for independence. South Sudan is already issuing its own currency and conducting foreign relations, which cannot help but be a major concern to the Northern factions under al-Bashir.

An example of creative investment could be encouraging the speculative railroad-building effort of the German consortium, led by Thormaehlen, from South Sudan into Kenya and/or Uganda. Connecting to Kenya would provide an alternative export route, not dependent on Khartoum, for the oil fields in South Sudan, linking to the Kenyan pipeline to oil facilities (in need of improvement) at Mombasa. Connecting to Uganda would provide access to the World Food Programme logistic center outside Kampala. The Kenyan branch could put extreme economic pressure on the North. The Ugandan branch would help get relief supplies into Darfur, although the railroad is out of service, and the roads to central Sudan and Darfur are mined.

To avoid dependence on the heart of the Khartoum government, a more desirable alternative would be to get an independent fuel supply to El Fasher, and probably improving other airports (very minimal ones) starting with Nyala. Nyala is on a currently insecure railroad that runs from Babanusa in central Sudan, and on into Chad.

While shipping from Babanusa has advantages in building infrastructure in Darfur, there are several major downsides. As with Khartoum International, the staging area is in the main part of Sudan, and could easily be interrupted by the government. A railroad line stretching for several hundred miles is very easy to sabotage, either by free-lancers or proxies for the North Sudanese factions of the national government.

Another alternative would be to try to secure the railroad from Nyala into Chad, which takes most of it out of Sudanese control. There is fighting in western Chad, presenting the same sort of railroad security problems. While Chad has oil, the present capabilities are limited to shipping crude oil, by pipeline, to Cameroon. Again ignoring political considerations, the most direct supplier of jet fuel to Chad would be Libyan refineries or seaport. There are, however, no heavy-duty roads, rail lines, or pipelines between Libya and Chad, and these are not going to be built overnight.

I’m sorry, but I do not see any simple way of providing immediate logistical support, by air, for peace enforcers or humanitarian organizations in Darfur. Even if security of transportation routes can be maintained, construction of adequate links would take months to years.