Who does the President call at 3:15am?; or Mark Penn, Foreign Policy Advisor
"On no stormy sea has Penn been more of an anchor for Clinton than on
Iraq, so far the defining issue of the 2008 election. "I don't think
there's any gap in their thinking," said Douglas Schoen, Penn's former
business partner." - from Clinton's PowerPointer: With Data and Slides, a Pollster Guides Campaign Strategy, by Anne Kornblut, Washington Post, April 30, 2007.
Senator Clinton has grown more aggressive in trying to call into question Senator Obama's credentials as a potential Commander-in-Chief. The Obama campaign has consistently taken the position that his judgment in opposing the war in Iraq early on is what distinguishes him from Sen. Clinton in this argument. Obama justifiably claims that he more clearly saw the potential pitfalls of diverting attention away from the war in Afghanistan and towards a dubious adventure in Iraq. Obama clearly has the better of the argument, and there is little to debate. Even should we be able to extricate ourselves from Iraq with something resembling success, few would call the war that Sen. Clinton helped enable an exercise in good judgment.
More than just displaying better judgment about strategy and tactics however, Obama's position showed disregard for what was at the time considered politically smart. In other words, his strategic and tactical position in foreign policy was not swayed by political expediency. It is easy to forget that early on the war in Iraq was politically popular. Even more importantly, for Democrats, it was considered a political poison pill. Not supporting the war would give Republicans an opportunity for criticism that Democrats were weak. At the time Sen. Clinton's vote for the war seemed politically smart for someone who had their eye on the Presidency. She may have seen that war was potentially a mistake, and she may even have been personally against it, but her political calculations dictated against opposing the war.
And this is precisely why Sen. Clinton is, in fact, weak on foreign policy. The question is not, "What does the President do when the Red Phone rings at 3am?" The question is, "Who does the President go to for advice when he or she puts down the phone?" From her vote on the war, it is fair to argue that as President, Sen. Clinton would pick the phone right back up and call a pollster like Mark Penn. Her judgment on the Iraq war vote demonstrated that she is too willing think of foreign policy not in the national or global interest, but in terms of her own political position vis-a-vis electoral strategies.
A similar argument could be made about the first term of Bill Clinton's administration, and in fact the Democratic Party in general for quite a while. Foreign policy was secondary to domestic concerns. Not until the second term did it seem that the Clinton team was willing to engage in international leadership. The slow transformation in US policy toward the Balkans, from disengagement to reluctant engagement to leadership is a telling case study. By the end of that second term it seemed that lessons had been learned and the center-left of US politics had started to formulate a position on the post-Cold War international security environment. Hillary's vote on the war was a clear indication however that she was still thinking of these issues in the context of domestic electoral politics. At 3:15am, in the wake of a crisis, she's still going to call her pollster, whether its Mark Penn or someone else. Over the course of the campaign its become clear that those who have learned the lessons of the new international affairs have mostly gravitated to the Obama team. Those are the people that I want to see called in when the crisis happens.
Senator Clinton has grown more aggressive in trying to call into question Senator Obama's credentials as a potential Commander-in-Chief. The Obama campaign has consistently taken the position that his judgment in opposing the war in Iraq early on is what distinguishes him from Sen. Clinton in this argument. Obama justifiably claims that he more clearly saw the potential pitfalls of diverting attention away from the war in Afghanistan and towards a dubious adventure in Iraq. Obama clearly has the better of the argument, and there is little to debate. Even should we be able to extricate ourselves from Iraq with something resembling success, few would call the war that Sen. Clinton helped enable an exercise in good judgment.
More than just displaying better judgment about strategy and tactics however, Obama's position showed disregard for what was at the time considered politically smart. In other words, his strategic and tactical position in foreign policy was not swayed by political expediency. It is easy to forget that early on the war in Iraq was politically popular. Even more importantly, for Democrats, it was considered a political poison pill. Not supporting the war would give Republicans an opportunity for criticism that Democrats were weak. At the time Sen. Clinton's vote for the war seemed politically smart for someone who had their eye on the Presidency. She may have seen that war was potentially a mistake, and she may even have been personally against it, but her political calculations dictated against opposing the war.
And this is precisely why Sen. Clinton is, in fact, weak on foreign policy. The question is not, "What does the President do when the Red Phone rings at 3am?" The question is, "Who does the President go to for advice when he or she puts down the phone?" From her vote on the war, it is fair to argue that as President, Sen. Clinton would pick the phone right back up and call a pollster like Mark Penn. Her judgment on the Iraq war vote demonstrated that she is too willing think of foreign policy not in the national or global interest, but in terms of her own political position vis-a-vis electoral strategies.
A similar argument could be made about the first term of Bill Clinton's administration, and in fact the Democratic Party in general for quite a while. Foreign policy was secondary to domestic concerns. Not until the second term did it seem that the Clinton team was willing to engage in international leadership. The slow transformation in US policy toward the Balkans, from disengagement to reluctant engagement to leadership is a telling case study. By the end of that second term it seemed that lessons had been learned and the center-left of US politics had started to formulate a position on the post-Cold War international security environment. Hillary's vote on the war was a clear indication however that she was still thinking of these issues in the context of domestic electoral politics. At 3:15am, in the wake of a crisis, she's still going to call her pollster, whether its Mark Penn or someone else. Over the course of the campaign its become clear that those who have learned the lessons of the new international affairs have mostly gravitated to the Obama team. Those are the people that I want to see called in when the crisis happens.
