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The Magic of May 20

There's a curious pas de deux being danced this afternoon. Hillary Clinton is vowing to stay in the race "until there's a nominee." That's unsurprising; her determination hasn't wavered thus far, and her promise gives the appearance of steely resolve while retaining just enough ambiguity to allow her to exit whenever she pleases. Yet it's worth wondering what she thinks her continued candidacy can achieve.

The Obama campaign, meanwhile, is doing everything it can to persuade superdelegates to come down off the fence and endorse him. It's looking to its donors for a new wave of support. To these groups, the argument is unambiguous - the race is essentially over. And the campaign is shifting its focus to John McCain.

Others have reached the same conclusion. Countless pundits are declaring a nominee today. Former Clinton supporters like George McGovern are calling for Hillary to quit. But on that subject, there's an eerie silence from Chicago. And surrogates like Claire McCaskill are adamant on the point: "I think it would be inappropriate, awkward and wrong for any of us to tell Sen. Clinton when it is time for this race to be over."

Now that's more than a little strange. Why is the Obama camp prepared to tell everyone that the race is over - everyone, that is, except the one person who could actually end it?

And the mystery deepens. Because while the Obama campaign thinks it would be a travesty to force Hillary from the race today, it's devoting a huge amount of effort to convince the public and the media that she ought to quit on May 20th. That's the date, the campaign says, when it will have the majority of the pledged delegates. David Plouffe called that "an incredibly important moment in the campaign." And that, Obama's folks argue, is the moment when the race will be over.

Most pundits seem prepared to accept this. Obama, they believe, is being typically gracious and positive. He doesn't want to alienate Hillary's loyal supporters by pushing her out; and since he's already won, he doesn't have to. He'll wait until the party coalesces around him, and Hillary will then read the writing on the wall and withdraw. The problem with this narrative is that it's nonsensical - there is nothing that will happen on May 20th that will fundamentally alter the race.

There's something else that's driving both these candidates in their decisions, and that's the forthcoming primaries in West Virginia and Kentucky. Obama is going to lose those primaries. And it's going to be ugly - the current polling shows roughly 30-point leads in each state. That will narrow somewhat, but they'll still be tough losses for him to absorb. The fact that they're widely anticipated will help - as will Obama's presumptive victory on May 20th in the far larger state of Oregon.

But pause and consider, for a moment, what would happen if Hillary were to withdraw from the race this evening. Her name would still be on the ballot a week from now in West Virginia. And the odds are excellent that she'd still win - at the very least, she'd pull an impressive chunk of the vote. Obama can absorb the hit of losing rural, southern states to Hillary - but losing those states after she's withdrawn is another matter entirely. Once there's a presumptive nominee, he's supposed to win. And if he loses, that's troubling. At the very moment when the party is supposed to coalesce behind him, the media will be consumed with concern that Obama can't unify the party, can't reach out to white working class voters. It's a nightmare scenario that's almost certainly keeping Plouffe and Axelrod awake at night.

Hillary, on the other hand, looks forward to those two states for validation. She doesn't want to go out like this, after a pair of disappointing primaries. She wants the clout that victories will confer; she wants to be the tribune of the white working class. Whatever her plans for the future - whether she wishes to be the vice-presidential nominee, to run again in 2012, or to become a force in the senate - winning WV and KY can only help. And after all she's been through, there's remarkably little cost to soldiering on for another two weeks.

So it serves both candidates' interests to continue the battle a little while longer. The next few races are unlikely to be as divisive. Hillary will camp out in West Virginia; Obama is likely to contest it only perfunctorily - he'll train his sights on McCain, and work on pulling in the superdelegates, instead. He won't try to end the race until he reaches another highpoint - with KY and WV safely behind him, he can use his win in Oregon and the arbitrary milestone of a pledged delegate lead to declare victory, or at least to provide enough cover to the remaining superdelegates to achieve the same result.

So we'll go through the motions for another two weeks, because that way, everyone wins. Just don't believe that there's something magical about May 20th - all that date marks is the end of Obama's exposure to political embarrassment.

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.

Louisiana Blues

Yesterday, Don Cazayoux defeated Woody Jenkins in a special election in Louisiana's 6th CD,  49.2% to 46.3%. The race had assumed national significance in the past few weeks, not only as a bellwether of congressional races this fall, but also for its links to the contentious race for the Democratic presidential nomination. Both the NRCC and the 527-group Freedom's Watch ran particularly nasty ads, tying Cazayoux to Obama. A "vote for Cazayoux is a vote for Obama," the NRCC claimed, while Freedom's Watch said "Cazayoux and Obama would create a huge bureaucracy" for healthcare, raising taxes and empowering bureaucrats over doctors and patients. Nevermind that Cazayoux hasn't even endorsed Obama, much less his healthcare scheme.

Naturally, it didn't take long for both parties to spin the results. The DCCC put out a statement, crowing that "House Republicans tried to nationalize this election," but that "Don won by focusing on the concerns of LA-06 voters." Speaker Pelosi concurred, but added an extra edge, arguing that Americans "demand a New Direction," and citing Cazayoux's "positive message" and his "ability to work across party lines and build consensus" as evidence that Americans "want real solutions and reject Republicans’ negative attacks." Now where have I heard that before?

The NRCC was quick to fire back:

When Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi were introduced into this campaign, Don Cazayoux was leading by a large margin in the polls. Since then, Republicans saturated the Baton Rouge airwaves in an effort to nationalize this contest and make the election about the real life consequences of a Barack Obama presidency and a continued Pelosi-run Democratic Congress. In that time, Republicans made substantial ground. This election speaks to the potential toxicity of an Obama candidacy and the possible drag he could have down-ballot this fall.... By nature, special elections tend to be competitive and their results are not always a harbinger for the November elections, but what we do know is that a Democrat was clearly favored to easily win this election before Republicans invoked the names of Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi. This should come as a warning shot to Democrats. The elitist behavior of the Democratic frontrunner and the liberal and extremist positions that he and his fellow Democrats in Congress have staked their claim to, do not appear to be as salient as they once hoped.

Well, who's right? Is the DCCC correct that the election provides that all politics is local - and that Cazayoux was just a better candidate than Jenkins? Is Pelosi right to argue that Cazayoux's triumph in a heavily Republican district reflects the appeal of Obama's basic message? Is the NRCC correct that Cazayoux would have won in a blow-out, but for their efforts to nationalize the race? Or is some combination of these three perspectives most accurate?

Let's go to the numbers. First, the crucial statistic. Cazayoux prevailed by 2.9%, or 2,961 votes. He won in very a red district, held by Republicans since white southerners switched over to the GOP. But he beat Jenkins, who won his party's nod over the wishes of the RNCC, and who was a deeply flawed candidate. Moreover, there's ample evidence that voters in the district remain generally more conservative than the results of this race suggest. A recent SurveyUSA poll found that they approve of Republican Governor Bobby Jindal, 64-20%, and disapprove of Democratic Senator Mary Landrieu, 40-44%. Moreover, Jenkins' own favorability was at a shockingly low 36-49%, with independents slightly more sour on the guy than Democrats, and fully a quarter of registered Republicans disapproving. Cazayoux, by contrast, scored a respectable 43-28%. But all of that speaks to consequence, not cause. We know that Cazayoux prevailed yesterday partly because he was an attractive candidate, with high crossover approval and low negatives, but also because the electorate deeply disliked the Republican contender. But we don't know why that was so.

The NRCC is saying, in essence, that Jenkins dug his own grave. Then, with their candidate deep in the hole, they battled back by tying Cazayoux to Obama, dragging him down. Their evidence for this is the same SurveyUSA poll cited above, which showed Cazayoux with a nine-point lead. But there's a problem with this spin. The poll showed Cazayoux up 50-41, with a +/-4.5% margin of error. But, as the pollsters themselves noted:

Turnout in a special election is difficult to forecast. The outcome of this special election, in particular, is turnout dependent. If voters are older and/or whiter than SurveyUSA here foresees, the Republican will outperform these numbers.
And the Republican did indeed outperform these numbers. But what's really fascinating is that despite the barrage of last-minute attack ads, Cazayoux didn't lose any support. SurveyUSA put him at 50%, and he polled 49.2%. In other words, if you take the poll at face value, Jenkins' gains came at the expense of third-party candidates. And there's more evidence to back that claim. Cazayoux' internal polling, taken March 16-20, showed him leading 49-44%. Anzalone Research, his firm, polled the race twice more in April, finding Cazayouc on top 49-44% on April 8, and 49-42% on April 15. So that's four polls, taken over the span of a month and a half. And all three showed Cazayoux receiving between 49 and 50% of the vote - which is precisely what he garnered yesterday.

But wait - there was an outlier! According to a news report on April 24, Jenkins' internal polling showed him leading 45-40%, with Cazayoux's negatives soaring. So take your pick - either we witnessed a backlash against GOP attack ads, or the danger of self-delusion that comes with paying your own pollster to tell you what you want to hear.

So where does that leave us? We can safely say, based on an abundance of polling, that the barrage of attack ads against Cazayoux didn't dent his support among voters in his district. He held remarkably steady for a month and a half. It's possible that the ads helped to rally some number of the GOP faithful, and brought back some voters who, in their disgust for Jenkins, would either have stayed home or chosen third-party candidates. So we'll split the difference. Attacking Obama may fire up the conservative base, which is good news for the GOP, but it clearly has little effect on Democrats and Independents - and that presages a devastating November for a party with dwindling registration and diminishing support in generic polls. As for Pelosi's contention that Cazayoux's hopeful message of bipartisanship and rejection of politics-as-usual played a key role, there seems to be good reason to believe she's right. Cazaoyux kept his negatives remarkably low in an extremely unfavorable district, and managed to win substantial crossover support, as well as the overwhelming majority of independent voters. So selling hope and change would appear to be a great recipe for prevailing in red and purple districts.

But at the end of the day, the D-Trip's Chris Van Hollen was probably closest to the mark. This race was local. The GOP ran a terrible candidate; the Dems ran a very strong contender. The GOP tried to make the race about Obama, but that didn't work. And that's encouraging news for all those Red State Democrats worried about November. 

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.


Red State Superdelegate Math

Red State Democrats like Barack Obama. Or at least, their elected officials and party leaders seem more predisposed to back him than do their blue-state counterparts. One site puts Obama ahead among red-state superdelegates, 57-30. Their list is neither comprehensive nor current, but that 2-1 ratio looks about right. Nor is his edge restricted to superdelegates. From grey-hairs like Sam Nunn and David Bowen, to 29 Tar Heel legislators, he's been drawing heavy support from unexpected quarters.

It's one of the most puzzling questions of the race. Why does Obama fare so much better than Clinton among superdelegates who live in states that have generally voted for Republicans in recent presidential elections?  What accounts for his red-state edge?

Until recently, the answer seemed fairly clear. Obama polled better nationally than Hillary against McCain; polled better in most red states, even when he lost; and had vastly lower negatives than Hillary. Then America became acquainted with Rev. Jeremiah Wright. The Clinton campaign pushed hard to convince red-state Democrats of Obama's guilt-by-association, to no apparent effect. That was followed by our profound national dialogue on the role of base and superstructure, and the problems of false consciousness. Yet even after a week of such coverage, Obama's support remained fairly strong.

Only now, the terrain is shifting. Obama's lead in the general election polls has vaporized; his campaign is left touting month-old results, while the same average now shows an edge for Clinton. His negatives are up. And he's become a target, used to drag down promising Democrat candidates through racial demagoguery. So not surprisingly, red-state superdelegates are now breaking overwhelmingly for Clinton...

Or not. Actually, Obama's still doing remarkably well. In the past week, he picked up support from a number of red state Democrats, including Ben Chandler, the second of Kentucky's two Democratic congressmen. That's Kentucky, mind you, where not every voter is racially enlightened. Kentucky, where Clinton's outpolling him 2-1, and McCain by a similar margin. So what's the matter with Kentucky superdelegates? Clearly, this is worth a closer look.

First, let's acknowledge a few potential explanations. Perhaps Obama's fundraising strength and commitment to contesting every state is helping. Some will note that after Chandler was flooded with phone calls decrying his endorsement, the netroots flooded him with cash. But $20k is mostly symbolic for an incumbent with a million in cash on hand, and it's not clear that the money could offset genuine electoral liabilities. It's also possible that Chandler was swayed by sincere conviction. I'm sure that played a role, but this politics, and there's almost always more to it than that. It could be that these folks are simply recognizing that Obama's going to win the nomination, and that after he does, his numbers will rebound. But that should hold true nationally, and doesn't explain his red state edge. Finally, it's worth noting that Obama has generally done particularly well garnering endorsements among officials who came to office after the Clinton years. They were less tied to the Clintons in the first place, Obama assiduously courted them in the 2006 cycle, they tend to be younger than their peers, and many share his jaundiced view of partisan politics and the Washington establishment. There are very, very few Democratic electeds in red states whose hold on office dates back before 2000 (almost exclusively from majority-minority districts), and so part of what we're seeing is an artifact of this other broad split in support, between the future of the party and its past. But that doesn't account for Obama's success among party officials as well as electeds.

So here are two explanations of what we're seeing.

The first is that states aren't red or blue, or even purple. They're more like patchwork quilts. In Kentucky, Obama's endorsers hail from the 3rd and 6th CDs. The 3rd CD is Louisville. Not only is it 20% black, but the same poll which shows Obama trailing by 36 points statewide has him down by just 7 around Louisville. And we've seen that elsewhere - in red states, the CDs that tilt Democratic tend to be urban, where Obama runs strongest, not rural, which Clinton wins in the blue states. But that's not a sufficient explanation. The 6th CD is (probably) grouped in the north-central region for the purposes of the poll, and Obama's down 39 points there. And the polling of November matchups shows Hillary drawing 15 points more than Obama around Louisville, and 10 points in the north-central region. And even if the patchwork quilt explanation accounts for some of Obama's congressional support, it can't account for all the statewide officials.

But there's something oddly reductive about looking at the numbers in this fashion. After all, in 2004, Ben Chandler took his district with 58.6% of the vote - while statewide, voters split their ballots roughly evenly in the senatorial contest, and went 60-40 for Bush over Kerry. And Chandler won reelection in 2006 with 86% of the vote, while John Yarmuth squeaked into office in a district that had voted for the GOP incumbent 60-40% just two years before. If the vote margins of presidential candidates had good predictive value, neither of these congressmen would be in office today. And the senatorial race would've been a blow-out.

Which is not to say that it's unimportant who tops the ticket. If Kerry had run a better campaign in Kentucky, he might now serve alongside Senator Mongiardo. But it's worth noting that the impact is subtle, non-determinative, and complex.

So let's reflect on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two potential Democratic nominees, as Red State Democrats have surely done already. Senator Clinton runs much, much more strongly among the Democratic base. But while that's a worrisome fact for David Axelrod, I doubt it particularly bothers John Yarmuth or Ben Chandler. The typical dissaffected white Democratic voter - reluctant to pull the lever for Obama - is still going to vote for the incumbent Democratic congressman. That holds true across the nation. Even if Obama loses these voters (because of his race, or because of his putative affinity for arugala) that's unlikely to hurt the down-ticket candidates too much. Polls show these very same voters are still looking for change; they're angry at the Republicans over the war and the economy; and they're choosing Democrats in generic match-ups by huge margins.

Contrast that, if you will, with the typical conservative voter. Many of these folks are profoundly discouraged. They worked for decades, and in 2000, finally assembled GOP control over all three branches of government. And what did it get them? Record deficits, rampant corruption, foreign entanglements, and stare decisis. They're not going to get fired up over John McCain. And while many of them are distressed that we may elect our first Muslim, Farrakhan-loving, flag-pin-shunning, terrorist-endorsed President and have him sworn in on the Koran, they just can't seem to muster quite the same degree of visceral hatred for the guy as they can for Hillary. In other words, a Hillary candidacy will draw most of the same Democrats to the polls who normally vote, but it will also turn out larger numbers of conservative voters than might otherwise vote this cycle.

And Obama? He's driving record Democratic registration across the board, and investing resources in a 50-state voter registration drive. These new registrants (and others who vote only periodically) will come to the polls in November if Obama is the nominee. They're very likely to vote for Democratic candidates in the down-ballot races, too - and those are votes which local Dems can't generate on their own. After all, they've been running in elections for years without this kind of a registration surge. Not only that, but Obama's legion of committed supporters will volunteer for local coordinated campaigns, and help the party build a local infrastructure even in areas where it's typically fared poorly. And since voter preferences are often set for life in the first cycle in which they vote, the benefits of a surge of young Obama supporters are likely to be enduring, even in Red States. He delivers a long-term demographic edge that will work its way through elections for decades to come. So with Obama at the top of the ticket, conservative turnout is down, the party's base expands, and its infrastructure is strengthened.

And here's the kicker. It's quite likely that a generic Red State Democrat will draw more votes with Obama at the top of the ticket even if Hillary would have performed better against McCain. Let me repeat that, because it's such a vital point in understanding the present dynamic of the race. A Red State Dem is likely to get virtually the same number of votes from the Democratic base, irrespective of who tops the ticket (that is, even if some of those voters defect to McCain). But with Obama, they're likely to see depressed turnout among conservatives and huge numbers of new voters flocking to the polls. With Clinton, they get to rerun the last two presidential cycles, with a highly polarized electorate motivated on both sides.

That, more than anything else, explains the riddle. Red State Democrats view politics through a profoundly local lens. They're supporting Obama because they'll do better if he's at the top of the ticket, even if Obama himself fares worse than Clinton would in their state or district. 

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.

Signals, Noise and Polling

The week started off in classic campaign form: a report of remarks made by Obama percolated through the media and came to dominate the news cycle. In typically circular fashion, the exhaustive coverage came to provide its own justification, as journalists covered the controversy that they had largely created.

The Oracle of Lancaster, G. Terry Madonna, took to the airwaves to proclaim that "unless [Obama] figures out a way to explain it in manner that makes more sense, I think this is probably going to damage his campaign in this state," and compared the remarks to gaffes that had sunk prior Pennsylvania campaigns, writing that they were "likely to do serious damage to his campaign in Pennsylvania." And he was among the more moderate critics. One thing that almost all of the reports shared was their focus on perception, rather than substance - the remarks were generally held to be newsworthy because they were likely to damage Obama politically, and so represented a turning point in the race.

But a funny thing happened on the way to the forum in Philadelphia. It turns out that despite the fuss, the remarks have had no discernable impact on the levels of support enjoyed by either candidate. We've had seven Pennsylvania polls released over the past two days, and not one shows a statistically significant gain for Hillary. The Quinnipiac poll spanned the weekend, but the pollsters found "no noticeable difference" in the responses after the news broke. And the national polls found no movement towards Hillary, either. Gallup dove back into its tracking poll data, breaking out voters by race, income, education, religion, and financial concerns - but whichever way it sliced the data, it reached the same conclusion:

It certainly appears that, as of April 14 interviewing, Obama's remarks have not hurt him -- either among the Democratic electorate as a whole or among the Democratic constituencies Obama was referring to....Gallup's general-election tracking data -- like that for the Democratic nomination -- have so far shown no deterioration in Obama's standing versus presumptive Republican nominee John McCain.
The lessons of this affair extend beyond the particular incident. Let's imagine, for a moment, that a few of these polls had shown Hillary picking up support, even by statistically insignificant margins. That's not an improbable scenario - the race seems to have held steady this week, and random variation alone might produce such results. Alternatively, Hillary could have made gains in the polls for reasons unrelated to the controversy. If, for example, most undecided voters are leaning her way (and there's evidence to support that), it'd be unsurprising to see her numbers rise in the final days before the election. In either case, though, those polling results would have been seized upon as conclusive proof that the controversy had damaged Obama, and fanned the flames. In fact, it's quite likely that this will still happen. In that same release, Gallup hedged that "Wednesday night's debate may shine a spotlight on those comments and make them known to a wider audience, so the possibility remains that Obama has not completely weathered the storm."

That's the danger of this sort of analysis, which focuses on transient controversies and then turns to volatile measures of public opinion to substantiate their significance. If you wait long enough, you'll get a poll that tells you what you want to hear. In fact, there are rarely this many polls in the field during a campaign, and the fewer polls, the greater the chance that random variation will seem to support the narrative. The only thing that seems able to prevent this conflation of correlation with causation is the eruption of another controversy, to which the apparent shifts can instead be ascribed.

It's a problem endemic to real-time coverage of campaigns. Many things become clear only in retrospect. When the longue durée is measured in days, not centuries, we often mistake signal noise for significance. Think, if you will, of the coverage of the stock market - you can get updates every 30 minutes, explaining in detail why the market is moving as it does, even though expected levels of volatility alone can explain most of these movements. I can tell you with a high level of confidence why the market moved as it did over a decade, a year, or in many cases even a quarter, but only a fool would claim to know why it moves as it does every half hour. These reports tend to focus on whatever economic indicator or earnings report has just been released as the causal explanation for broad movements. In a similar fashion, shifts in opinion polling tend to be ascribed to the stories that are dominating a given news cycle, and those stories receive much of the attention they do because they are presumed to be capable of shifting opinion. But the laws of probability tell us that some of those apparent shifts are bound to be illusory. Others may be the result of grass-roots organizing or social networking. And some will simply stem from voters becoming better acquainted with the candidates. Sorting the wheat from the chaff is no mean feat, but that humbling truth doesn't seem to impact coverage.

I don't mean to suggest that gaffes or controversies never change the minds of voters. Certainly, they do. And on occasion, after we've had several days to take stock of the data, the polling can even help us spot these crucial episodes. But all too often, the relentless focus on controversy serves to reinforce a superficial narrative that obscures the underlying forces and concerns that actually drive voter behavior. And that's a shame.

So I have a suggestion for reporters. The next time a controversy breaks, take a deep breath. Write it up, by all means, and put it on page A-3. And then give it a few days. If it's having an impact on voters, if it's altering the behavior of candidates on the stump, that'll become clear soon enough. When it does, you can run the sort of thoughtful, engaging piece of journalism that takes several days to prepare. And if it doesn't? Then you can focus on more significant stories. Either way, your coverage will improve. Isn't it at least worth a try?

McCain on the Mortgage Crisis: Plus ca change...

So yesterday, McCain unveiled a new response to the housing crisis. (Tracking McCain's evolving economic policies isn't just enlightening; it's downright entertaining.) I posted my thoughts on his last proposal, and I thought I'd follow up with a post on his latest speech. There are a host of problems raised by the details of his proposal, but we'll save that for another day. For now, I want to focus on the big picture, because it's all too easy to lose sight of what's really going on here.

The Wall Street Journal argues that:

Sen. McCain's new plan, combined with a recent White House overture in the same direction, may mark a turning point in the Washington debate over how to help more than 10 million homeowners who owe more on their houses than the property is worth. For weeks, the question has been whether the federal government should act to help them. Now the question seems to be how big the package should be and how such a complex new program would work.

Well, that's one way of looking at it. Perhaps what we have is a consensus about strategy and a dispute about tactics. That's certainly how Bush, McCain, and the GOP would prefer to frame the debate: We all want to help, it's just that Democrats want to waste money and reward speculators, and we want to limit help to the deserving.

But it's worth remembering that the brilliance of Rovian politics lies in its ability to rhetorically embrace popular positions even as it works to undermine them. So, in the tradition of Clear Skies and Healthy Forests, we bring you John McCain's HOME plan, guaranteed to help "every deserving American family or homeowner"! 

The problem, as one TPM reader pointed out, is that among those 10 million families and homeowners, McCain thinks that somewhere between 1 in 25 and 1 in 50 are deserving. And that's if you credit his adviser's optimistic estimates. The Frank-Dodd plan, by contrast, is aimed at helping 1-2 million borrowers - as many as half of all the borrowers currently delinquent in their payments, and perhaps ten times as many homeowners as McCain would assist. Let me repeat that. McCain wants to help a few hundred thousand, most of whom already qualify for aid under existing state and federal programs; Democrats propose helping millions, almost all of whom do not. Calling that a dispute over "how big the package should be" is tantamount to saying my house is just like Versailles, only smaller. They're fundamentally different because of their scale; that's the whole point!

Let's be crystal clear about what's going on here. Two weeks ago, McCain stood up and announced that if millions of Americans are struggling to hold onto their homes, they need to work second jobs, take fewer vacations, and tighten their budgets. In fact, he suggested, they have no one but themselves to blame for their present predicament, and shouldn't go looking for government assistance. Not only was that disastrously bad economic policy, it was also a stunningly tone-deaf position to take. Senator Mel Martinez, a crucial McCain supporter, took the trouble to say that McCain's speech "fell short," and that "we need to do some things that can help families, that can help people.” It was clear to McCain, and to those around him, that his penchant for straight talk had not served him well here - that his position was so extreme, and so unpopular, that the blunt truth was political poison.

So McCain took yet-another crack at economic policy. This time, he thundered that "priority number one is to keep well meaning, deserving home owners who are facing foreclosure in their homes," even if that takes government intervention. It's what the public wants to hear. Virtually all of those ten million American homeowners consider themselves well meaning and deserving - when they hear the speech, they assume McCain's talking about them. Of course, whether we label this a refinement or a reversal, it's not much of a change. The rhetorical shift is enormous - McCain has now assumed a posture that is compassionate and proactive. But the policy shift is negligible: he used to think that 10,000,000 homeowners should be left to their own devices, even though millions of them may suffer foreclosure; now he wants to cut loose 9,600,000, give or take. Color me unimpressed.

But it's even more of a sham than it initially appears. The HOME Plan, McCain's bold new initiative unveiled on Thursday, is a near facsimile of the expanded FHA Secure plan the Bush Administration announced on Wednesday. There are a handful of differences, and they're important - they're the reason why the Bush Administration expects their plan to help some 100,000 additional homeowners, fewer than McCain claims his would reach. In practice, though, the difference in the impact of the two plans isn't likely to be nearly so great, since both estimates are inflated. The key point is that McCain's much ballyhooed "reversal" amounts to a retroactive endorsement of something that was announced the day before.

But wait, it gets better. Because it turns out that not even John McCain can keep track of his constantly evolving positions on the mortgage crisis. Two weeks ago, he inveighed against bailouts. Then he denounced the Dodd-Frank proposal as a bailout, because it would refinance troubled loans and write down their value. Over the weekend he applauded the bipartisan reform package that was passed yesterday in the senate, but in his Thursday speech he again hailed those efforts before proceeding to denounce, one by one, virtually all of the bill's provisions. Finally, he announced his own plan to refinance troubled loans and write down their value. Confused? So is he.

I suppose all of this could be viewed as a strength - McCain is once again demonstrating his heterodoxy, and his willingness to adapt his positions to changing circumstances. Of course, we could also label it a flip-flop. But what's really going on here is some shameless duplicity. John McCain discovered that his actual position on an issue was unpopular, and so he's put forward a fig-leaf to provide political cover. Now, when the issue's raised, he can simply reply that he hopes to help every deserving borrower. That his plan still amounts to sitting on his hands is almost immaterial; very few voters are going to dissect the competing proposals in all of their mind-numbing detail. This disguises the fundamental policy dispute between McCain and his rivals. John McCain believes that the market will correct itself, and that government intervention should be limited in every way possible, so as not to interfere with the proper distribution of pain. His rivals believe that non-intervention is likely to produce a devastating downward spiral, as millions of foreclosures drag the entire economy into a needlessly deep and prolonged recession. They propose, instead, restrained intervention to apportion the costs of failure in such a way that the damage to the overall economy is limited. That, in a nutshell, is the difference between aiding a few hundred thousand and aiding millions - the former proposal aims to help a few "deserving" borrowers, but not the economy as a whole; the latter helps borrowers, even some of the less deserving, so that the economic damage to the rest of us will be limited.

Some people are denouncing McCain's new position as a reversal, and to be sure, it is. But ask yourself which attack is more likely to be effective: That McCain has changed his public stance to reflect the desires of the American people? Or that McCain says he's now prepared to help the millions of Americans who are struggling to say afloat, but really, he still thinks they brought it on themselves, and he isn't going to lift a finger to help almost any of them?

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.


Expediency, Morality, and the McCain Economy

Last week, I picked on the Democratic candidates, for their failure to accurately diagnose the causes of our present economic crisis, or to offer effective proposals for dealing with it. Since then, both Obama and Clinton have sharpened their critiques. There's a lot to praise in their speeches, and a fair amount to criticize. But sometimes it's worth pausing to remember that, for all our internal debates, the gaping chasm between Republicans and Democrats on these issues makes our own divisions all but vanish in comparison. So let's take a good look at the economic address McCain delivered on Tuesday to prove his sound grasp of the issues.

He begins with a classic McCain line, a reminder of why so many Americans find the man's approach to politics refreshingly honest:

Let's start with some straight talk: I will not play election year politics with the housing crisis. I will evaluate everything in terms of whether it might be harmful or helpful to our effort to deal with the crisis we face now.
Fantastic stuff. A no-nonsense approach to the crisis. The trouble is that he repudiates it in the very next line:

I have always been committed to the principle that it is not the duty of government to bail out and reward those who act irresponsibly, whether they are big banks or small borrowers.
Here's the rub. McCain starts by promising to apply a basic standard of expediency. He'll weigh his policies solely in terms of their effectiveness in responding to our present crisis. Then he reframes the issue in moral terms. Those who have acted irresponsibly will get their just deserts - the government won't intervene to help them. There's just one problem with that - what happens an effective response to the crisis serves to aid those who acted irresponsibly?

Enter the McCain double standard:

Government assistance to the banking system should be based solely on preventing systemic risk that would endanger the entire financial system and the economy.
Let's translate that. When banks and other financial institutions behave irresponsibly, McCain's saying, he'll bail them out if allowing them to fail seems likely to cause collateral damage. In other words, when his two principles come into conflict, he'll choose expediency over morality - not because the banks deserve to be rewarded for their sins, but because failing to act could endanger the interests of innocent parties.

And when it comes to the millions of ordinary Americans facing foreclosure?

In our effort to help deserving homeowners, no assistance should be given to speculators. Any assistance for borrowers should be focused solely on homeowners, not people who bought houses for speculative purposes, to rent or as second homes. Any assistance must be temporary and must not reward people who were irresponsible at the expense of those who weren't.
Suddenly, morality trumps expediency. McCain is focused on punishing the guilty. When it comes to the financial sector, he suggests our guiding principle ought to be the intent of our actions - so long as we act in the furtherance of the general good, we can overlook incidental benefits to the guilty parties. But when it comes to homeowners, his overriding concern is the effect of our actions - if policies would, in part, deliver relief to people who behaved irresponsibly, they must be rejected, even if they offer the most effective response.

Undergirding this double standard is a very particular understanding of the origins of the present crisis, which McCain traces to two specific problems. The first of these was the creation of a speculative bubble in housing. "Some Americans bought homes they couldn't afford," explains McCain, "betting that rising prices would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable rates....and those homeowners are now facing the reality that the bubble has burst and prices go down as well as up." But it's not all 55 million mortgage borrowers in America whom McCain blames for our present troubles, but rather the 4 million whose lenders have foreclosed or who are more than 30 days late with their payments and so considered delinquent. The other "51 million," he says, "are doing what is necessary -- working a second job, skipping a vacation, and managing their budgets -- to make their payments on time." Note the implication. If the other 4 million had just worked a little bit harder and tightened their belts a little more, we wouldn't be facing this mess. 

That borders on delusion. I'm sure there are some examples of profligacy leading to foreclosure. But for the most part, the folks facing foreclosure are doing everything they can to stave it off. They may take third jobs, in addition to the second jobs they were already working just to make ends meet. Forget vacations - they're spending less on food, or their children's clothing. And in most cases, it's still not enough. When the first balloon payment hits after two years, when the adjustable rate starts to float, when they get hit with an unexpected medical bill, when a spouse gets laid off in the faltering economy - they still fall behind on the payments. Their attempts at home ownership were doomed the moment they signed their loan papers, and their hope of escape was sealed by the declining market. And yes, they certainly deserve to be blamed for their original mistakes in borrowing as they did. But the 4 million already falling behind - and the millions more who certainly will in the coming year, absent intervention - aren't in trouble because they're taking too many vacations, or because their family budgets are bloated and wasteful. They're in trouble because they can't afford to repay the loans they signed, and in many cases, because they can no longer sell their homes for enough to repay their loans, either. 

McCain demands, later in the speech, that henceforth, borrowers "should be able to understand easily the terms and obligations of a mortgage" and that "every lender [must be] required to meet the highest standards of ethical behavior." But it's not clear why such reforms are necessary - after all, he never claims that borrowers weren't able to understand the terms of the deals they were signing, nor that lenders failed to meet the standards of ethical behavior. All the lenders were guilty of, says McCain, was growing "complacent," enjoying "a false sense of security," and lowering "their lending standards." The lenders erred, in short, by failing to be on guard against those unscrupulous borrowers.

But that's just one cause of the crisis. There's also the turmoil in the financial markets, the result of "an explosion of complex financial instruments that weren't particularly well understood by even the most sophisticated banks, lenders and hedge funds." These instruments "weren't always managed wisely because people couldn't properly quantify the risk or the value of these bets." As a result of complexity and a basic lack of transparency, "the initial losses spawned a crisis of confidence in the markets." 

Let's line those two explanations up, side-by-side. In the housing market, millions of ordinary Americans displayed remarkably little financial sophistication by taking out irresponsible loans, offered to them by a variety of lenders and then packaged and resold by our most sophisticated financial institutions. The borrowers alone are to blame for this mistake. But in the financial market, the problem was that everything grew too complicated, and none of the analysts, brokers, or executives really had any idea what it all meant or how to manage it. So these experts, these financial wizards, piled on risk without understanding what they were doing. It's not clear to McCain that anyone should be blamed for this.

You read that correctly. John McCain believes that Joe Average needs to be punished for his irresponsible speculation, buying a home by signing a mortgage he didn't fully understand, thereby shouldering risk he failed to manage properly. But John Banker, who irresponsibly speculated by creating and trading in complicated securities he didn't fully understand, thereby shouldering risk he failed to manage properly? Well, if it helps the economy, he should be bailed out. Not only that, but since his irresponsible speculation and ineptitude have drained his bank's reserves, we need to replenish them by "removing regulatory, accounting and tax impediments to raising capital." And then, because the credit crisis has severely shaken our economy, we need to respond by "reducing our corporate tax rate" and "eliminating the Alternative Minimum Tax," so that neither John Banker nor his employer will be unduly restrained from seeking to maximize their profits by fear that the government will make them share. 

I'm not arguing that we should blindly bail out borrowers, or that intevening to shore up financial markets is a mistake. Clearly, we need to weigh any response carefully. But I do think we need a single, consistent standard. We need to acknowledge that there's more than enough blame here to go around - that borrowers, brokers, lenders, banks, investors and regulators all behaved with breathtaking irresponsibility. And then we need to take appropriate action, ensuring that the damage doesn't cascade through the economy. It's immensely gratifying to moralize, but weathering this crisis will require making difficult choices and compromises. There's no room for inflexible, rigid approaches.

Not to worry. McCain offers us these comforting words: 

In this crisis, as in all I may face in the future, I will not allow dogma to override common sense.
Of course not. Dogma is what the other guy believes. Sticking inflexibly to your own irrational views? That's just plain common sense.

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.

E Pluribus, Unum

Four years ago, Barack Obama burst upon the national stage with an inspirational address, decrying those who would seek to divide the nation. "There's not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America," he thundered, "there's the United States of America."

Yesterday, an embattled Obama articulated a far more realistic vision of the role race plays in our society. He acknowledged that there is indeed a black America and a white America. That a racial divide runs so deeply through our nation that we fail to credit or understand each other's grievances. That anger on either side of that divide is so real, and so profound, as to have produced a racial stalemate. 

And yet, precisely because of that dour realism, this second speech was far more compelling than Obama's debut. To understand that apparent paradox, it's worth considering what Obama actually said about the state of race in America.

First, let's sketch the broad contours of the debate into which he was inserting himself. There are those on the left who contend that race is chimerical, a tool used by elites to divide the working classes. On the right, culture has largely supplanted genetics as the explanation of choice for racial disparities, in either case, rendering the problem all-but-intractable and absolving society of blame. And, as Obama himself pointed out, in the broad American center silence has been the rule - resentments fester just below the surface, but are rarely voiced in public. Into that void stepped the junior senator from Illinois.

As is his wont, Obama drew upon the most compelling elements of each of these visions, without succumbing to their excesses. He echoed the classic leftist critique of political and business leaders who exploit racial divisions to distract "attention from the real culprits of the middle class squeeze." And he affirmed the right's insistence on the danger of "becoming victims of our past" and the need for "taking full responsibility for our own lives."

Then he went a step further. "Trinity," Obama said "embodies the black community" in all its richness and all its shortcomings, and he is as much a part of that community as it is of him. And buried in that is a radical claim about the nature of America. By speaking of the joys of communal life and the strength he draws from his Christian faith, Obama was making the case for the importance of the particular amidst the universal. That's why he chose to read aloud from his memoir a passage describing his sudden epiphany that Trinity was built upon a foundation of collective experience. That much, one suspects, Reverend Wright would have applauded.

But Obama was not finished: "Our trials and triumphs became at once unique and universal, black and more than black." There, in a single sentence, is the essence of Obama's insight. Our identity as Americans neither elides nor erases our other affiliations. Quite the contrary. It is our strong grounding in our own particular communities and traditions that allows us to unite around our shared American values. That's why the young community organizer on Chicago's South Side struggled to connect with his audience until he found a church of his own - a particular community to ground him, and to allow him to reach for the universal. It's why communities of faith and of ethnicity, of shared values and activities, have always formed the basis of our vibrant civic life. When Obama speaks of "binding our particular grievances...to the larger aspirations of all Americans," he's simultaneously arguing for the importance of particular identities, which provide the basis for mobilization, and for the primacy of shared national goals. We are a United States of America because, instead of simply denying or suppressing our differences, we choose to build upon our unique identities in the pursuit of a more perfect union. E pluribus - out of the particular - Unum - we construct the singular.

And that's the second key insight that Obama offers. Differences need not be divisive. They can provide the basis for cooperation as readily as the grounds for animosity. In fact, Obama may be uniquely positioned to make this argument, born into a family "of every race and every hue." He reminds us that our separate communities blur at the edges, that they are fluid things, that they overlap and intermingle. That if we choose, our tragic racial history can at last be consigned to the past. That America is not static. That "our America can change. That is true genius of this nation."

It is, in the end, a subtle shift - but no less profound for that. If four years ago, Obama asked us to subsume our particular identities in the furtherance of collective goals, yesterday, he called upon us to harness our particular needs in the service of national aims. A call to unity that asks us to draw upon our separate identities is far more likely to provide a lasting basis for cooperation than one which relies upon our forgetting our differences. With his speech in Philadelphia, Obama finally offered a vision of unity that was sufficiently mature and sophisticated to be more than inspirational - it was convincing.

It's the Economy, Stupid

I think it's fair to say that, as of this morning, economic concerns have fully and firmly eclipsed other issues in the presidential race. We're likely already in recession; the Federal Reserve is taking unprecedented steps to bail-out the financial markets; consumers are reeling from higher prices; and this may only be the tip of the iceberg. But you wouldn't know it to listen to our presidential candidates, who have remained resolutely oblivious to the nature or extent of the present crisis. For the most part, they continue to recite the poll-tested bromides that have dominated economic policy discussions on the left for much of the past decade. When they turn to the economy, the candidates compete to denounce free-trade pacts and decry excessive corporate pay. It's tough to believe that they're changing the minds of uncomitted voters that way. If the Democrats are going to prevail in November, they need to explain to voters how the Republican Party managed to derail the world's most powerful economy - and then they need to convince them that Democrats have a plan to get it back on track. But even a cursory review of the rhetoric on the trail reveals how poorly the candidates have performed at that essential task.

Let's start with Obama. A speech he delivered last month in Wisconsin lays out his approach in a fair amount of detail. It begins promisingly enough by assigning responsibility for the present disastrous state of affairs in clear and direct language:

We are not standing on the brink of recession due to forces beyond our control. The fallout from the housing crisis that's cost jobs and wiped out savings was not an inevitable part of the business cycle. It was a failure of leadership and imagination in Washington - the culmination of decades of decisions that were made or put off without regard to the realities of a global economy and the growing inequality it's produced.

But what are those decisions? Obama simply recites the standard litany of Democratic complaints: tax cuts, trade deals, Iraq, corporate lobbying, CEO pay, and outsourcing. The mortgage crisis, he argues, was simply "the straw that broke the camel's back." You'll forgive me, senator, if I don't join you in blaming NAFTA for this recession. Obama seems to have mistaken the peripheral for the central, and the central for the peripheral.

Hillary, remarkable though it may seem, has been even further from the mark. She, too, starts by assigning blame:

[T]he problem with our economy is not the American people. Instead, the problem is, in part, the bankrupt ideas that have governed us for the last seven years. They have rewarded the very few at the expense of the many.
But it's tough to tell, from her speeches, precisely what's gone wrong - just that it's all Bush's fault. The speech almost immediately turns into a laundry-list of popular policy proposals, many with their own catchy names. The highlights include suspending foreclosures and adding green-collar jobs in the short-term, and then looking forward by addressing the energy crisis, investing in infrastructure and education, expanding unionization, reforming the tax code and health care, and encouraging saving for retirement. It's all part of her Economic Blueprint for the 21st Century. And they may all be worthy notions, even if the particulars are debatable. But other than suspending foreclosures, none of them is more than remotely connected to the present crisis.

So let's detail what neither candidate seems willing or able to say on the stump. The present crisis is indeed the result of decades of poor decisions made by successive administrations, compounded by the specific policies embraced by President Bush and his appointees. But it's not (mostly) about any of the problems listed by the two candidates.

We face our present crisis because the government chose to abdicate its regulatory responsibilities in favor of blind faith in the marketplace. Seventy-five years ago, after the worst financial catastrophe in our nation's history, FDR oversaw the passage of an extensive regulatory regime intended to insure that such a collapse could never happen again. Over the subsequent decades, as the financial system evolved and banks found innovative ways to evade these regulations in the pursuit of profits, those rules were updated in an effort to keep pace with the changes. Then, during the Reagan administration, there was a fundamental change of course. Instead of trying to keep up with changes, regulators began racing in the opposite direction, hurrying to remove regulatory hurdles in the interests of growth.

The theory was simple. Spreading risk over a broader array of institutions and investors would serve to diminish the exposure of individual banks, thus accomplishing by market forces what once required regulation. These institutions could then offer an array of innovative products that would benefit consumers. The theory was also spectacularly wrong.

The result was a failure on two separate (though related) levels. The first failure has become evident over the past couple of years. A frenzy of irresponsible lending and borrowing, fueled by structural innovations like the securitization of mortgages, fueled a spectacular real estate bubble which is now collapsing. That led to the second failure, which is now being revealed in spectacular fashion. Financial institutions assumed risks they neither accurately assessed nor fully understood, while outdated rules and passive regulators failed to curtail their excesses. Now the music has stopped.

Two particularly vivid incidents can serve to illustrate this two-tiered failure. In 2001 and again in 2004, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency successfully pre-empted the attempts of state regulators to reign in some of the worst excesses of the marketplace, arguing that only the federal government had the right to intervene. It will come as little shock to learn that OCC is a classic captive agency, receiving 96% of its funding from the banks it's supposed to be supervising. Its primacy affirmed, OCC sat on its hands, refusing to act until it was far too late.

The second incident is unfolding this morning. Investment banks like Bear Stearns became, in effect, lending institutions - buying up mortgages and repackaging them for sale, thus effectively setting the standards for loans in the marketplace. Banks have long been subject to extensive regulation, in part on the theory that since the Federal Government effectively guarantees their deposits, it ought to have a say in how they shoulder risk. This weekend, we learned that taxpayers will also foot the bill for the collapse of investment banks. Alas, there is no similar regulatory scheme in place to limit their risks.

So let's return to the campaign trail, to explore the remedies being proposed by Obama and Clinton in response to the present crisis. To his credit, Obama has gone further than Clinton in focusing attention on the problem of irresponsible lending and borrowing. His platform highlights two particularly useful proposals: the STOP FRAUD Act, which would crack down on some of the most abusive lending practices; and the HOME score, which would provide a simple metric (like an APR) for borrowers to measure the costs and obligations to which they are agreeing, empowering them to act more responsibly. Both candidates have proposals to limit foreclosures. Hillary wants to do "everything possible to ensure that we don't lose any more homes" to foreclosure, calling for a 90-day moratorium, a five-year adjustable-rate freeze, a $30 billion fund for local communities, and a package of similar measures. Obama proposes bankruptcy reform (which would effectively pressure lenders to be more proactive in restructuring loans) and a generous mortgage tax credit targeted at lower income households. Most economists are agreed that Hillary's bailout would trade the possibility of short-term relief for the certainty of long-term problems; the verdict on Obama's proposals is more split.

It's easy to get wrapped up in the debate over these specifics, but that debate omits what the candidates have left unsaid. Both remain firmly committed to the notion that homeownership is an unequivocal good that ought to be enjoyed by the broadest possible number of Americans. That's the sort of thinking that landed us in this mess in the first place.

So here are two heresies that both candidates need to embrace if they're going to address the present crisis and convince voters that the Democrats have faced up to our economic problems, and have the solutions we need:

Regulation is what makes free markets function:
Every speech the candidates deliver this spring must include this essential theme - We're plunging into a recession because Republicans removed the regulations that make our economy run smoothly. And, of course, its corollary: We can rebuild our economy by standing up to special interests, and passing rules to make the markets run freely and fairly. There's no need to shy away from this sort of talk. Most Americans understand instinctively that's something has gone horribly wrong, that financial institutions have behaved with breathtaking irresponsibility, and that it shouldn't be allowed to happen again. John McCain, to the extent he pays attention to the economy at all, tends to embrace the gospel of the free markets. He and his party are largely responsible for what's gone wrong; Democrats can make a compelling case that they can set it right.

Sometimes, homeownership is a nightmare, not a dream: 
When ownership can only be achieved on terms that rely on rising prices or the prospect of future wealth to finance the deal, then families are better off renting. By extension, some families are now in homes that they can't afford and shouldn't have purchased. We don't just need policies that will prevent foreclosure - that amounts to denial, and will perpetuate this mismatch of resources and obligations. We need to develop mechanisms to ease the painful adjustment, enabling families to extricate themselves from ill-advised loans without either fully absolving them of responsibility for their decisions or sentencing them to financial ruin, and without precipitating a further collapse in the market. We need to admit that home prices were artificially inflated, and aren't going back to where they were anytime soon. And then we need to change the huge array of federal homeownership incentives to embrace a more reasonable goal - equal access to homeownership for all who can afford it.

There's still time to make this economic case. Each candidate can frame it in the terms with which they are most comfortable. Obama can speak of the failure of leadership in Washington, which has allowed special interests to defeat regulation, and preyed upon the aspirations of Americans. Hillary might unveil seven discrete proposals, all part of her New American Dream Plan, designed to reform the financial industry and homeownership. I'm not going to detail the specifics. Reasonable people can disagree over both the precise nature of the failures and the proper remedies. The whole point of a campaign is to hear the candidates articulate their own understandings of the crisis, and to lay out their particular solutions. So far, however, all we've heard is silence and denial. And that's not going to put anyone in the White House.

Transforming the debate requires three simple steps. The first is to pin blame where it belongs - not on NAFTA or the decline of unions or an inequitable tax code or an unaffordable war, but on a failure of regulation and on policies that fueled a housing bubble. Then the candidates need to stop pretending that everything will be fine again, and speak a truth most Americans already know and are ready to hear - we've had a binge, and we're going to have a long, painful hangover. And that will set the stage for a message that can win in November - policies and proposals to set us on a path toward renewed and responsible growth, consistent with our values and consonant with our aspirations.

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome your comments and corrections, and thank you for your feedback.

Crazy Like an Uncle

Fox News ran a typically sensationalistic report last night on the Reverend Dr. Jeremiah A. Wright, Jr, retiring pastor of Obama's own Trinity United Church of Christ. The ostensible news hook for the story was a sermon delivered by Wright on January 13, which the network suggested may have violated the church's tax exempt status. Let's get that out of the way up-front. Wright never uttered the magic words "endorse" or "vote," which would have been clear violations. If discussing the candidates were grounds for the revocation of nonprofit status, whatever the rules may technically say, then the IRS would first have to clear a substantial backlog, revoking the 501(c)(3) status of thousands of other churches before it got to Trinity.

But the real news in the report was an incendiary clip of the Reverend Wright in high dudgeon, framing the election in starkly racial terms. "Jesus was a poor black man who lived in a country, and who lived in a culture that was controlled by rich white people," he says. Perhaps enough to raise some eyebrows, but pretty much par for the course at Trinity. What followed was not. "It just came to me within the past few weeks, y'all, why so many folks are hating on Barack Obama." Unlike Hillary and Rudy, he says, Obama doesn't fit the mold of elites. Hillary has never experienced racial discrimination, he argues, and can not know what that's like. "Hillary ain't never been called a Nigger!" he shouts. "Hillary ain't never had her own people say she wasn't white enough." It's not in the clip I link to above, but Fox reports he even took a direct shot at Bill Clinton: "Hillary is married to Bill, and Bill has been good to us. No he ain’t! Bill did us, just like he did Monica Lewinsky. He was riding dirty."
 
First, let's be clear about what's being said. Wright is targeting those in the black community who were inclined to support Hillary. The sermon was delivered less than a week after Obama's loss in New Hampshire, but well before the Illinois primary, and his frustration is almost palpable. His argument, such as it is, is that Obama (like Jesus) knows what it is to live in a society that turns its back on him and his kind. That Hillary cannot know that. That there is no reason for blacks to feel indebted to the Clintons. And so, at least by implication, that it is incumbent on black people to support Obama and not Hillary.

I understand the man's point, but the fact remains - this is every bit as divisive and polarizing an argument as that advanced by Geraldine Ferraro. If it is wrong to suggest that gender alone entitles a candidate to votes, that the experience of being a woman in a man's world is uniquely difficult - then it is also wrong to suggest race play a similar role. Wrong, polarizing, and ultimately self-defeating.

Indeed, Obama's campaign was quick to recognize that these remarks were beyond the pale. Campaign spokesman Bill Burton issued this response:

Senator Obama has said repeatedly that personal attacks such as this have no place in this campaign or our politics, whether they’re offered from a platform at a rally or the pulpit of a church. Senator Obama does not think of the pastor of his church in political terms. Like a member of his family, there are things he says with which Senator Obama deeply disagrees.
That, I'm afraid, isn't going to cut it this time. Obama may not think of Wright in political terms, but it's quite clear that the converse is not so.

It's worth exploring the relationship between Obama and his pastor in somewhat greater depth. Here's Senator Obama, in perhaps his most affecting explanation of that relationship:

It is true that my Pastor, Jeremiah Wright, who will be retiring this month, is somebody who on occasion can say controversial things....It is also true that he comes out of the 60s; he is an older man. That is where he cut his teeth. That he has historically been interested in the African roots of the African American experience...
He is like an old uncle who sometimes will say things that I don't agree with. And I suspect there are some of the people in this room who have heard relatives say some things that they don't agree with...
And as I said that last point I would make is that you know my Pastor is going to be retiring over the next month. So my general view, and the reason that I raise this, this is always a sensitive point, what you don't want to do is distance yourself or kick somebody away, because you are now running for President and you are worried about perceptions, particularly when someone is basically winding down their life and their career.

I find myself empathizing with Obama, and admiring his instincts. He doesn't want to denounce a man who played a crucial role in his own life, who was a friend and a mentor when he needed one, just because it's now expedient to do so. He understands that Rev. Wright hails from a different generation (what, in another context, he labeled the Moses Generation) and Obama's entire candidacy is premised on the notion that that generation's day has passed, that it is now time for the next generation to take the reins of leadership, to transcend the divisiveness of earlier battles, to move us forward to a better future without neglecting the sacrifices of the past. I'm even sympathetic to the problem of a controversial spiritual leader. Who among us attends religious services with regularity, and hasn't squirmed in the pew from time to time, as the pastor or preacher or reverend or rabbi gives voice to a thought with which we adamantly disagree? Perhaps even a thought that is politicized or prejudiced? Or hasn't had an elderly relative do the same?

That's why I've always moved the scurrilous, conspiratorial e-mails to the trash bin on my computer. I was content to know that Obama was attracted to Reverend Wright and his church for the "cultural community" that they embodied; for their recognition that not just material interests, but also "hopes and dreams and...ideals and...values" motivate actions; and yes, for their Christian faith. If there's a single theme to Obama's intellectual achievements, it's been his ability to sieze upon powerful words and themes, lifting them out of their original context and reframing them to be inclusive and uplifting. Thus, Rev. Wright's fiery sermon on "The Audacity to Hope" in a racialized world becomes the title of Obama's serene meditation on the possibilities of transcending political and racial polarization. That seems to hold true more broadly. It's how Obama is able to credit the honorable motives of his opponents even as he disagrees with them. It's how Obama took the best of what Reverend Wright had to offer - community, inspiration, rebukes for his congregation's shortcomings - and set aside the anger and divisiveness that seemed to him relics of an earlier time.

The problem is that, with just weeks to go before he stepped down and removed himself as an ongoing issue, Reverend Wright crossed the line. Obama was succesful in his efforts to distance himself from Wright's opinions on myriad other subjects; he simply said he disagreed. That won't work for Wright's opinions on Obama. If these sorts of attacks have no place in our political dialogue, then a generic denial by a campaign spokesman isn't going to cut it. Obama himself will need to forcefully and clearly reject the logic of Wright's claims, the tone of his remarks, and the words that he used. Then he has to take the most painful step - he needs to distance himself from Wright.

There's a lot of glee on these boards this morning regarding the Ferraro debacle. I don't share it. Ferraro has left us weaker, as a party and as a nation. "I don’t think identity politics has served the Democratic Party well. I think it’s been an enormous distraction," Obama said in response to her comments. As usual, the man had the right words for the occasion. But now that one of those closest to him has made statements that are at least as divisive and egregious, he needs to find similarly powerful words to express his rejection of those statements.

It's not that the Clinton campaign, or for that matter, conservatives or the media, have gotten in his head, or that Obama's too weak, or that he needs to prove his manhood. Not every incendiary remark made by a supporter is a test of a candidate's ability to withstand attacks, to hit back, to give as good as he gets. Sometimes, those remarks are a test of what the candidate believes, and of the ideas he's prepared to embrace, even implicitly, in his pursuit of power. It's a test Clinton failed with Ferraro. And without denouncing these remarks, Obama fails it twice. He loses on a tactical level, because a campaign that splits along racial and gender lines is a campaign he loses. And he loses on an ideological level, because he has devoted his political life to convincing Americans that those divisions are less important than the things we share in common.

This one's not going away until Obama puts it to rest. So, Senator, what do you have to say?

Convention Math: Clarifying the Caucus-State Confusion

Josh put a post up in the wee hours of the morning examining the intricacies of delegate selection in caucus states. The main thrust of the piece was that since delegates have yet to be fully allocated in the caucus states, there's still significant room for on-the-ground maneuvering, which might ultimately lead to swings as large as "twenty to thirty" new delegates. I'll admit that there's still some uncertainty regarding a portion of these delegates, but much of the speculation in the post seems rather more breathless than the facts appear to justify.

Now one of the things I love about Josh is that he's always careful to hedge when he wanders beyond the bounds of his own expertise, and he flags those elements of his posts that are speculative or that rely on information obtained from others. It's probably a vestige of his academic training, but whatever the cause, it elevates him above a lot of other bloggers who are considerably less careful concerning facts. So it's not Josh with whom I'm taking issue here, but rather, the sources he cites in his post.

There's also been a fair amount of speculation along similar lines in recent days. The Associated Press put out a story back in February focusing on the caucus issue, particularly the process in Nevada; diarists at DailyKos have been waxing incandescent about the goings-on in Colorado; Iowa is still up in the air; and right here at TPM Cafe we've seen some conspiratorial thinking about Texas. So it would seem to be time for yet another long-winded, overly detailed post detailing the surpassingly strange Democratic nomination process.

Let's start by noting that not all caucus states are created equal. They fall, broadly speaking, into three general categories (plus Texas, which as usual, does things in its own special way). In the first category, nothing's definitively settled until the state convention (e.g., AK, CO, IA, ME, and NV). Most of the room for maneuver comes in this small handful of states, which will ultimately hand out 162 pledged delegates. In their systems, hundreds or thousands of delegates elected at the precinct level, many of whom have little prior experience and are all-but-unknown to the campaigns, have to show up at the caucuses at the next level and vote the way they pledged in order for the initial results to be translated into strength at the state conventions. We're already seeing some signs that in Colorado the Clinton campaign is enjoying somewhat more success at this task than Obama's folks. 
 
But that's just one category. The second uses the actual vote tallies at the precinct level to apportion its district-level delegates, some two-thirds of the pledged delegation. The caucuses also elect delegates to state conventions, sometimes via a multi-tiered process, who then choose the statewide delegates (or, in the case of Washington State, it's the district-level delegates to the DNC who make the selection). So it's possible that poor attendance or faithless delegates could affect the apportionment of the statewide delegates in these states, albeit unlikely. Overall, 95 of the pledged delegates in these states are already locked down by binding rules, and 51 are technically still in play (KS, NE, WA, WY). 

The AP story glosses over the third category - states in which the allocation of every pledged delegate is determined by the initial vote, and in which all that's left for the state conventions (where they are held) is to determine the identity of the delegates, not their allegiances (e.g, AS, HI, ID, MN, ND, VI). There are 129 pledged delegates from these states, all of whom will be allocated in accordance with the vote tallies.

Texas, of course, is sui generis - its rules mandate that the delegates selected at the county/senate district conventions reflect the presidential preferences of voters at the precinct level, but then allow those delegates to vote as they please at the state convention. And of course, there's an outside chance of some shenanigans in the Lone Star State because the vote tallies at the precinct level, though binding, weren't centrally recorded. But on the whole, the incomplete tallies we have are likely to be highly predictive of the ultimate allocation of the 67 pledged national delegates, both because we have no reason to presume them to be an unrepresentative sample, and because only the (much smaller number of) delegates to the state convention are allowed the freedom to vote as they please. That makes it easier for the campaign to vet the folks they'll back for those slots, and to keep tabs on them moving forward.

So when Hillary blithely uses the term caucus delegates, she's lumping together some radically different processes. The 72 pledged delegates from Minnesota, for example, are no more in doubt than the 72 pledged delegates from Missouri - all were fully allocated on February 5. (That's reason enough to conclude that's she's challenging their legitimacy, and not making a procedural distinction.) None of the 45 from Iowa, however, have yet been allocated. To be sure, it's always wise to take any of these tallies with a grain of salt before the totals are officially certified. But I can't see any valid reason to distinguish between Minnesota and Missouri at the moment.
 
If you add up all the caucus-state delegates, you find that 224 have been locked down, with 280 technically still in play. But it's in the first of our three categories, among the five states with 162 delegates, that we're most likely to see swings. Let's dismiss the notion that "twenty to thirty" delegates might be in play - the only way to get a tally anywhere close to that number is to count the 14 Iowa delegates that Edwards' share of the vote suggested he would claim. And it's not at all clear that his backers intend to relinquish those slots. The Colorado experience is instructive in this regard - one county showed a five-point swing toward Hillary, another a four-point gain, and a third ran true to the precinct results. A two- or three-point swing statewide for Hillary would enable her to take a delegate from Obama; a five- or six-point swing would allow her to take two. And that in the largest of the undetermined states. We're just not talking about huge numbers of delegates, and it's unclear that the dynamic will favor Hillary across the board. Of course, there's another dimension to these defections. If Hillary or Obama were to garner more than 50% of the state convention delegates in any caucus state, including those in which the pledged delegates are already locked down, they'd be able to win that state's UADs. But the margins in the caucus states make that even more unlikely than a significant swing in pledged delegates.

The bottom line is that the possibility of faithless delegates is the sort of process story that makes political reporters and insiders salivate, but is extremely unlikely to happen. (I'll qualify that by saying that if the race is effectively over by the time state conventions meet, as it was in 1984, we could see some substantial number of defections.) Both sides, to be sure, have to turn out their supporters and do their homework in selecting higher-tier delegates. But there's no indication that either campaign will fail egregiously in that task, and despite all the jockeying, we'll probably see less overall delegate movement here than we saw in the primary state of California.

If you've enjoyed this, please share it with other readers by clicking the 'recommend this' link. You can find more analysis on my blog. As always, I welcome comments and corrections.

The Perils of Indecision: How Clinton Cost Herself the Race

Hillary Clinton's latest gambit is raising eyebrows across the political spectrum today. In an interview with Newsweek, Clinton explained that the electoral math:

...doesn't look bleak at all. I have a very close race with Senator Obama. There are elected delegates, caucus delegates and superdelegates, all for different reasons, and they're all equal in their ability to cast their vote for whomever they choose. Even elected and caucus delegates are not required to stay with whomever they are pledged to. This is a very carefully constructed process that goes back years, and we're going to follow the process.
There's so much packed into that short paragraph that it's necessary to unwrap it at some length. Let's begin with the latest Clintonian coinages of elected delegates and caucus delegates. It's a clear effort to advance the notion that the primary contests are inherently more legitimate than caucuses. I've done my best to bat down these sorts of invidious distinctions before, but it seems each week the Clinton campaign rolls out a new means of adding up the votes to produce a clear edge for Hillary. Rather than recapitulate those arguments, I'll simply say that the rules vary more between some primary states than they do between some of those states and firehouse caucus states, making these groupings rather arbitrary; that any representative system will fail to produce a perfect translation of the popular vote; and that complaining about the rules only when they prove inconvenient is hardly an honorable tactic, and can only serve to undermine the legitimacy of the eventual outcome. At any rate, I suspect that caucus delegates will soon be consigned to the same fate as automatic delegates, a nomenclature that even Clinton has evidently already abandoned.

The real stunner here is Clinton's blithe assertion that pledged delegates and superdelegates are "all equal in their ability to cast their vote for whomever they choose." For the most part, she's absolutely right about that. But it's not an idle observation, it's an apparent appeal for their support. And that's a line which no recent candidate has been willing to cross - enticing delegates pledged to support a candidate to abandon that pledge. In the next breath, Clinton vows to "follow the process." There's a narrow legalism to this approach, a willful disregard for the spirit of the rules coupled to a faithful adherence to their letter.
 
In this case, I rather doubt Clinton is contemplating a serious run at the pledged delegates. Those folks have been carefully vetted by the campaigns, and are unlikely to prove faithless in any significant number. It is, instead, yet another effort to soften the ground for the superdelegates. She is attempting to reframe the debate. It's not that Obama will enter the convention with a triple-digit pledged delegate lead, Clinton's suggesting; rather, when 4,048 delegates convene in Denver, we shouldn't consider any of them really committed to either candidate. All the delegates are ultimately free to vote as they please. So if when the votes are cast, Obama happens to garner more support among pledged delegates and Hillary a decisive edge among the superdelegates, then that's just the way things fall out. No one overturned a pre-existing outcome - it was all up in the air until that final vote. Her caucus vs elected distinction likewise seems aimed at persuading superdelegates that if they squint hard enough, they can still see Hillary holding on to some sort of lead, and that their votes for her would really be ratifying the popular will and not overturning it.

But as easy as it is to pick on Clinton for her endless attempts to reframe the process in her own favor, I think that such an approach misses something significant in her argument. Hillary is genuinely, thoroughly distrustful of the caucus process. At the urging of her advisors, she swallowed her misgivings and campaigned in Iowa. Her defeat in Iowa left her feeling burned, and confirmed her doubts. She had, reports the Washington Post, "become allergic to caucuses, deeming them unfair." That aversion, as much as anything else, is the reason why Clinton now finds herself facing an all-but-insurmountable chasm among the convention delegates. 

For that reason alone it would be important to understand the origins of Clinton's self-defeating disdain for caucuses. It's not solely an instrumental position, nor (contra the Post) is it an expression of her pique at being spurned in Iowa. The truth is more nuanced. Hillary was not willing to roil voters in those states when her nomination appeared inevitable by using her substantial clout on the DNC Rules Committee to eliminate caucuses, nor to mandate changes to their procedures, back when the primary rules were being debated and enacted. When she thought she could win in Iowa, she poured time and resources into the state, never uttering a word about her dislike for its process. In Nevada, she held her fire until the Culinary Workers endorsed her rival, and then focused her ire on the at-large caucus sites, which (somewhat ironically) were designed to remedy many of the inequities she decried. But it seems fairly clear that her distaste for the caucus system is genuine, and deeply rooted.

My problem with Clinton's present approach is that she has crossed over from critiquing a system she dislikes to attempting to subvert it. It's instructive, in this regard, to recall her response to an earlier electoral controversy. In the fall of 2000, it became clear that although Al Gore had won the popular vote, he was likely to lose narrowly in the electoral college. At the time, more than a few activists suggested a simple means of reversing the outcome - persuade three electors to switch their votes. The most prominent advocate of this solution was Mario Cuomo, who observed: "Why should [Gore] concede as long as it’s still possible that electors might change their mind, which they’re free to do?"

But Cuomo was pretty much alone among prominent Democrats. Gore himself repeatedly said that he would not encourage any electors to switch their votes. It remained, for the most part, an expression of grass-roots frustration. Senator-elect Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the fray just a few days after the election. On Nov. 10, she told an upstate NY audience:

I believe strongly that in a democracy, we should respect the will of the people. And to me that means it's time to do away with the Electoral College and move to the popular election of our presidents. And particularly in this situation where we have a popular vote total that favors the Vice President, I think it sends a message to everyone. Many of us who have run for office in this last election have spent a lot of time telling people their votes would count. ... We need to make it clear that your vote counts and that the total votes cast for a person running for president in our country should determine the outcome.

Let's set aside, for a moment, the delicious irony of a woman about to take her seat in the United States Senate, perhaps our system's most extreme expression of republican distrust for popular democracy, decrying the inequities of a system that stands in the way of the people's will. We'll set it aside because, as best I can tell, Clinton was perfectly sincere. Then, as now, she distrusted processes that failed to embrace the popular vote. For all that, she never took the next step. She never crossed the line and encouraged electors to switch sides. In fact, less than two weeks after her initial assault on the electoral college, she backtracked on a pledge to make its abolition the subject of her first bill, calling the idea unlikely to be successful and opting to focus instead on reforming the electoral machinery to ensure more accurate vote counting.

Back in 2000, Clinton seemed to understand that the integrity of our Democratic system is more important than the outcome of any given election. The time to challenge its legitimacy or to reform its byzantine processes is between elections, not halfway through them, or after their results appear to be distasteful. In her seven years in office, Clinton never did follow through on her initial pledge to discard the electoral college. Her work on voting reform never extended to the primary system. She never pushed the DNC to change its guidelines. She never spoke out before Iowa against the caucuses, nor did she choose to boycott the process in that state. Last week, she decided to (once again) swallow her objections and to campaign full-bore in Wyoming, even as she continued to mock the caucus system there.

This morning, The New York Times ran a remarkable piece on the dissension within the Clinton campaign:

Mrs. Clinton accepted or seemed unaware of the intense factionalism and feuding that often paralyzed her campaign and that prevented her aides from reaching consensus on basic questions like what states to fight in...
One pundit they quote was considerably less charitable:

It’s a legitimate question to ask: Under great pressure from two different factions, can she make some hard decisions and move ahead? It seems to just fester. She doesn’t seem to know how to stop it or want to stop it.

Hillary's approach to the caucus system suggests that Thurber is closer to the mark. Had she trusted her own instincts, and either pushed the DNC to change the rules or skipped Iowa entirely, she'd probably have locked up the nomination by now. If, instead, she'd followed Ickes' advice and competed vigorously in caucus states, the outcome would have been the same - smaller margins f