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   <title>Amitai Etzioni&apos;s Blog</title>
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   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009:/talk/blogs/etzioni//48</id>
   <updated>2009-09-08T14:14:23Z</updated>
   
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<entry>
   <title>Make Health, Not War</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/09/08/make_health_not_war/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.288603</id>
   
   <published>2009-09-08T14:14:00Z</published>
   <updated>2009-09-08T14:14:23Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Afghanistan needs more sociologists, not more troops. Sociologists would point out that Americans tend to see this country as one nation, with a central government and national security forces. But it actually is a collection of tribes--(including Tajik, Uzbek and...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>Afghanistan needs more sociologists, not more troops. Sociologists would point out that Americans tend to see this country as one nation, with a central government and national security forces. But it actually is a collection of tribes--(including Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara). The first loyalty of most members of these tribes is to their own kind, not to the national government. Most Afghans correctly perceive the national government as corrupt to the core, in cahoots with drug lords, promoted by foreign powers, and the beneficiary of fraudulent elections.<br />
</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>We have been trying for eight years to straighten out this government, to no avail. We should now work with the local tribes and their natural leaders, rather than seek to impose a false national order on them.We should let the people of Afghanistan duke it out with the Taliban, to determine how much of a sharia regime they are willing to tolerate. However, we should not allow our young people to be killed for rights most Afghans do not want. Surely, they show no sign that they are willing to die for them.</p>

<p>We should make it clear that if the Afghans ever again allow their turf to be used as a base for terrorists, we shall bomb the daylights out of them. However, we need not be in Afghanistan to do this.Finally, we should not lump the Taliban--keen to run their own country-- in with Al Qaeda, which seeks to harm us. True, these two are now allies, but this is the case at least in part because we treat them as if they were of one kind.</p>

<p>President Obama conducted a strategic review of Afghanistan. It concluded that we should seek "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future." This is a precise and narrow goal that can be achieved, as long as we understand that we cannot get there by nation building--a task which is simply beyond our reach. Let the Afghan people form the local governments they favor, and let these form inter-regional alliances, and let us leave them be. Most of the Afghans will be happy in return to let us be.</p>

<p>A someone who was around during the Vietnam War, I predict that whatever number of troops President Obama will now agree to add to the war in Afghanistan, the generals will come back and ask for more. If those are not sent, critics will attribute to this "failure"--the reason Afghanistan will not be stabilized. Best to get off this bloody escalator now.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University. For more discussion, see his book: Security First (Yale, 2007), or http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html.   email: icps@gwu.edu</p>

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<entry>
   <title>Sacrificing for spin?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/07/08/sacrificing_for_spin/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.278594</id>
   
   <published>2009-07-08T14:29:35Z</published>
   <updated>2009-07-08T14:33:57Z</updated>
   
   <summary>I yield to no one in my delight that President Obama is bringing a whole new attitude to international relations, and I salute his consistent efforts to restore the good name of the United States across the world. The new...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="4002" label="american foreign policy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="790" label="nuclear non-proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="792" label="nuclear proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="278" label="nuclear weapons" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="12215" label="obama administration" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="820" label="Russia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="11551" label="united states" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>I yield to no one in my delight that President Obama is bringing a whole new attitude to international relations, and I salute his consistent efforts to restore the good name of the United States across the world. The new goodwill was supposed to make it easier for the US and other nations to work together. What is happening instead, at least in dealing with Russia, is that the Obama administration is making major concessions--in order to make it seem that the new spin is working. </p>

<p>The Russians are very excited about the Bush-designed plan to position a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Obama administration is moving toward an agreement to place the missile defense some other place, one the Russians approve of, and to make it into a joint defense project. Thus, the US satisfies in full a major Russian demand--getting what in exchange? A temporary pause to Russia cussing us out?  </p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>The Russians are very keen to reduce the number of strategic nuclear arms they keep deployed because their economy is in shambles, their military is very poorly equipped and they have a very hard time to find the funds needed to keep it going. The United States agreed to a reduction, in exchange for what?</p>

<p>At the same time the Russians have not granted the US what it most needs from them: Using their leverage with Iran to convince it to stop its program that will lead it in short order to command nuclear weapons. This is despite the fact that objective observers agree that an Iran as a nuclear power, and the resulting arms race in the Middle East, poses at least as much threat to Russia as it does to the US and its allies, the Saudis and the Israelis.</p>

<p>You may ask, how can anyone dare to call the main part of the Obama-Medvedev agreement "spin," when it entails cutting nuclear arms? However, the agreement--yet to be worked out--is anticipated to call for reducing the number warheads from the existing treaty's range of 1700 - 2200 by 2012, to a range of 1500 - 1675 by 2019...and reference is merely to <u>deployed</u> warheads. Those offloaded may be kept in storage, from which they can be readily redeployed. If this is not spin, what is? <br />
 	<br />
I am not saying that the US should bully Russia or demand unilateral concessions or stop striking the new, more congenial, tone. However, one very good way to achieve a new tone for both sides is for them to truly help each other rather than one making major concessions and the other--taking them to the bank.</p>

<p>**I will respond to the comments of those persons who are willing to identify themselves, because I hold this essential for a civilized dialogue.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University and the author of <em>Security First </em>(Yale, 2007). He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu. www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html<br />
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<entry>
   <title>More about Amitai Etzioni??</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/06/26/more_about_amitai_etzioni/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.277097</id>
   
   <published>2009-06-26T18:21:02Z</published>
   <updated>2009-06-26T19:58:30Z</updated>
   
   <summary>I&apos;m blown away by the fact that scores of people took the time to comment on the &quot;silliness of Amitai Etzioni&quot; here. In Iran they are shooting protestors; in Iraq people are killing each other because they hold different interpretations...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="22307" label="Amitai Etzioni" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="5695" label="blogging" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>I'm blown away by the fact that scores of people took the time to comment on the "silliness of Amitai Etzioni" <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/destor23/2009/06/the-silliness-of-amitai-etzion.php">here</a>. In Iran they are shooting protestors; in Iraq people are killing each other because they hold different interpretations of Islam; in many countries millions of people are thrown out of their jobs and homes--and you want to waste your key strokes on me? I mean not my ideas, they may deserve to be taken apart, but on my persona? How trivial can you get?</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>Yes, I do agree that under some conditions hiding one's identity behind an alias is justified. Often, though, it is merely a sign that the person wants to rant and rave but not take responsibility for what they are saying. After all, no one is going to lose their job because they call me names; they may even get a promotion. The trouble is not an absence of blog space for those who hide behind false names, after all they own 98% of the territory. The problem is that there is next to no place for those people who are willing--voluntarily--to show their faces and have a serious dialogue. I wish TPM would set aside forum for us. If not, Arianna, where are you when we need you?</p>

<p>As long as we are going to discuss me--a subject I promise to return to as little as possible--I have a confession to make. I do try to give legs to ideas I care about. I hence try to get them air time and space, in as many places as possible. I do not get paid; I am typically cussed out; this is about my only reward. Once in a while, when least expected, among the stream of abusive comments, there is someone who digs it and supports policies and measures that are close to my heart. Thanks much. You make my day. The fact that I am still here, is all your doing. (Now you better duck.)</p>

<p>Josh Marshall is a great guy. He uses his real name, although as a result he has to take all kinds of guff for allowing people like me to express themselves, even though he surely often disagrees with us.</p>

<p>Finally, in a previous posting, anonymous comments tried to dismiss what I had to say on the basis of my affiliations (a McCarthy specialty). It was said that I was "previous member of the Council on Foreign Relations." Actually, I am a card-carrying, current member. However, this organization has not hurt a fly and I doubt very much that it could if it tried to. It was also stated that I was an "Israeli commander" some sixty years ago. Actually, I was an Israeli commando. Having been at both ends of a gun has made me strongly averse to violence of all kinds and active in the anti-war movement. Anyhow, if previous affiliations are relevant, surely we cannot tell those if people hide their true identities.</p>

<p>==<br />
I will respond to comments from those who reveal their true identity--as long as they discuss something more important than me.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is University Professor at The George Washington University and author of The New Golden Rule. For more information, visit his website: http://dspace.wrlc.org/handle/1961/137 or email him at icps@gwu.edu.<br />
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<entry>
   <title>Reconstructing Afghanistan?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/06/24/reconstructing_afghanistan/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.276617</id>
   
   <published>2009-06-24T15:45:10Z</published>
   <updated>2009-06-24T15:50:03Z</updated>
   
   <summary>In the year I spent in the White House, I kept being surprised by government agencies that simply ignored the president&apos;s instructions and directives. In some cases, the political heads of the agencies were more liberal than the president and...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="3994" label="Afghanistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="12215" label="obama administration" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="4008" label="reconstruction" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="22264" label="Stanley McChrystal" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>In the year I spent in the White House, I kept being surprised by government agencies that simply ignored the president's instructions and directives. In some cases, the political heads of the agencies were more liberal than the president and had their own political agendas; in others, the civil servants just refused to play ball. (Dealing with high levels of inflation I suggested that the government issue some gold-based bonds, which I hoped would demand a much lower interest rate and hence reduce the costs to the public. The president sent me across the street to the Treasury to discuss the matter with the civil servant in charge of the issuance of bonds. The guy in charge said that he did not consider this a sound idea. When pushed, he responded: "you and your president will soon be out of here. I have seen four come and go. And--I will still be here." My little idea was never tested.)</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>All this came to mind when President Obama recently conducted a carefully crafted and deliberate review of the United States' goals in Afghanistan. After the review was completed, the president announced that he would seek "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda," period. There was no mention of democratization, reconstruction, or promoting open markets. However, it seems that his voice has not carried very far. General Stanley McChrystal, who has just been appointed the new commander of US troops in Afghanistan, is pushing development of that country as an essential step for stabilization. To be fair, some of his goals are properly narrowly crafted, like those focused on essential security. He states that his measure of success in Afghanistan "will not be enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence." More ambitious is his drive to form a social contract with farmers and small business leaders, so if they plant legitimate crops rather than poppies and pay taxes, they will be guaranteed secure transportation routes to markets without the pressure of bribes at illegal checkpoints. This is a very tall order. </p>

<p>Others have pushed for more reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan: the British have pledged more than $43 million for reconstruction projects in the Helmand province of southern Afghanistan, while Canadian soldiers have begun what some have dubbed an "adopt-a-village" program in which soldiers secure Afghan villages and remain in them for weeks after doing reconstruction projects like building roads and installing solar-panel streetlamps. However, given the level of corruption in Afghanistan, the huge profit drug dealers make off the opium trade, the poor conditions of the country and the high illiteracy rates, major economic and social and political development in the foreseeable future is just not going to happen.  </p>

<p>People who believe we can effectively develop nations through massive, foreign-funded and -guided social engineering projects best study a   report on USAID's efforts in Afghanistan. Rajiv Chandrasekaran recently provided an extensive and rich account of such efforts in The Washington Post: A $40 million strawberry plantation was launched on soil too salty to grow crops; a highway from Kabul to Kandahar was finished quickly but the asphalt was too thin to withstand melting snow; cobblestones used to build roads hurt the hooves of Afghan camels, and so on and on. For scores more tales of American misadventures in regime change and reconstruction, one should read Chandrasekaran's book, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, which chronicles similar tales of gross incompetence in Iraq.</p>

<p>A new book, Unexpected Encounters in the Changing Middle East, by Neil MacFarquhar, details many other examples of US failures in the region. A typical sample: The United States tried to help the Lebanese combat hashish cultivation by promoting dairy farming and so granted them 3,000 high-quality American dairy cows, but the farmers could not afford the cows' upkeep. When Iran learned about the American debacle, it provided the farmers with cows that were cheaper and easier for the farmers to maintain.</p>

<p>Before the Neo Cons' support of forced regime change was discredited, they made a good point about changes in the United States: changing society through public programs is a very challenging task. It is odd to see that they--and others who do not share their philosophical persuasion--act as if what the United States cannot do in LA and Detroit and West Virginia and New Orleans, it will be able to do in Kandahar and Kabul and Herat. Promising too much has its own costs. Sadly, we must learn to accept that development will be slow, expensive, and must largely be advanced by the people whose nation is being developed.</p>

<p>**I will respond to the comments of those persons who are willing to identify themselves, because I hold this essential for a civilized dialogue.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale, 2007). He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu. www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html<br />
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<entry>
   <title>Why Not Love the PSI?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/06/12/why_not_love_the_psi/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.274811</id>
   
   <published>2009-06-12T17:41:18Z</published>
   <updated>2009-06-12T17:46:22Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution today which calls for U.N. member states to inspect all ships entering or leaving North Korea if there is a reasonable suspicion that the cargo contains banned nuclear or missile technology. Now, this...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Election Central" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution today which calls for U.N. member states to inspect all ships entering or leaving North Korea if there is a reasonable suspicion that the cargo contains banned nuclear or missile technology. Now, this mission will fall on a little know body, the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative). The PSI, an activity launched in 2003, meets all the criteria progressive people have been promoting for a new international approach to the exercise of power--yet they are curiously mum about the merits of putting the PSI to work.</p>

<p>The PSI works mainly by sharing intelligence among the participating states, who patrol the seas and interdict ships that are suspected of carrying WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials </p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>The work of the PSI is illustrated by the following development. Although it involves a nation that is not an official participant in the PSI, the operation reflects the type of cooperation the Initiative relies on. In August 2003, US intelligence indicated that a North Korean ship, the <em>Pegaebong</em>, was bound from Thailand to North Korea with a cargo of phosphorus pentasulfide, a precursor for chemical weapons and possibly rocket fuel.  Taiwanese authorities were informed of the shipment, they searched the ship when it docked in their Kaohsiung Harbor, and they confiscated the cargo.</p>

<p>The PSI is <u>multilateral</u>. Its members include more than ninety nations, including the United Kingdom, France and Russia. The mission of the PSI may seem <u>legitimate</u> on the face of it, especially if the ban on the dissemination of nuclear contraband were applied to all nations. However, the means of enforcing the ban raise serious questions about its legitimacy in terms of transnational normativity, international law, and governing treaties.</p>

<p>For instance, one may argue that its searches violate the right to innocent passage in the territorial waters of the nations of the world. However, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in Article 19, provides circumstances under which the passage of a ship is considered "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Perhaps the most relevant of these are where the ship engages in "any threat or use of force," "the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device," or "the loading or unloading of any commodity...contrary to the...laws and regulations of the coastal State."<br />
	<br />
To further square the PSI with international law, it draws heavily on <u>bilateral agreements</u> between the US and countries such as Liberia and Panama,  known as flag of convenience states, whose ships carry large portions of the world's total tonnage. The agreements allow the US to inspect these ships based on very short notification of the government involved--or on the basis of <em>a priori </em>understanding. For instance, in February 2004, the United States and Liberia signed a mutual boarding agreement whereby each nation is authorized to inspect naval vessels registered under the other country's flag upon suspicion that the vessel is transporting weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, or related items. By 2007, the US had formed similar agreements with Panama, Belize, Croatia, Mongolia, the Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus, and the Marshall Islands--other nations in which many of the world's ships are registered.<br />
 <br />
Furthermore, UN Resolution 1540, passed on April 28, 2004, declares that "all states shall (1) refrain from providing support to nonstates seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws prohibiting nonstate actors from acquiring WMD; and (3) take measures to prevent proliferation." It is widely considered to provide a sort of legal imprimatur to the PSI. A few question if this is the case, arguing that the UN considered including a specific reference to the PSI, and decided not to do so. However, the text stands on its own--any straight reading of it makes it seem as though it were tailor-made for the PSI, and surely there is no hint in this resolution of opposition to the Initiative. Indeed, the resolution has been cited as being "complementary" to the PSI.<br />
	<br />
I do not claim that the legitimacy of the PSI meets every standard of international law, or that no questions can be asked about its purpose or its modus operandi. However, it seems clear that considerable efforts were made to form and operate the PSI on a multilateral basis in ways that are compatible with international law, treaties and UN resolutions.<br />
              <br />
True, everyone would much prefer to solve all international conflicts with the mere use of soft power. And if North Korea can be stopped from proliferating by being granted food, fuel, development aid, prestige, and assurances against forced regime change by outsiders--this is surely a preferred course. However, if soft power fails, activating the PSI seems justified by all the criteria progressive people have promoted. They should feel free to say so.</p>

<p>For more discussion see Amitai Etzioni's article "Tomorrow's Institution Today: The Promise of the Proliferation Security Initiative" in the May/June 2009 Foreign Affairs, <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64976/amitai-etzioni/tomorrows-institution-today">here</a>. Etzioni is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University and the author of <em>Security First </em>(Yale, 2007).  He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu.  www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html</p>

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<entry>
   <title>President Obama&apos;s June 4th speech to the Muslim world</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/06/01/president_obamas_june_4th_speech_to_the_muslim_wor/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.272913</id>
   
   <published>2009-06-01T14:53:09Z</published>
   <updated>2009-06-04T13:38:52Z</updated>
   
   <summary> &quot;To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
      <category term="Special Features" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="122" label="islam" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="12958" label="muslim world" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="124" label="muslims" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
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      <![CDATA[<p><a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/special-features/"><img src="http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/images/bug-obama-cairo.jpg"></a></p>

<p>"To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." President Obama could hardly improve on this line, from his inaugural address, during his forthcoming much-heralded major speech to the Muslim world on June 4th. Better yet, he has already further reinforced this position when he announced--after an extensive strategic review--that the United States' goal in Afghanistan was "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda," full stop. To further this message, we have outlined here points we hope the President will include in his scheduled speech.	</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>There are two positions on Islam that are best avoided: (a) claiming that Islam is a religion of love and peace that has been hijacked by terrorists, and (b) claiming that Islam is inherently supportive of violence. (c) The preferred position: Like all great religions, major Muslim texts and traditions are open to different interpretations and understandings. We will walk with those who reject violence in statements (by violence we mean terrorism, invading and threatening other countries, acts of genocide as well as military build-ups and WMD proliferation). We will walk with those that view Jihad as a journey of self-development, or as solely defensive ("Fight those in the way of God who fight you but do not be aggressive: God does not like aggressors" [Qur'an 2:190]), but not with those who see it as a requirement to decimate all non-believers. We will walk with those who recognize that "There is no compulsion in matter of faith" (Qur'an 2:256); that when Muhammad exclaimed, "Oh Lord, these are certainly a people who do not believe," Allah responded to him, "Turn away from them and say: 'Peace'" (Qur'an 43:88-89); and that no human can force a change of heart over which God alone has control ("If your Lord had willed, all the people on the earth would have come to believe, one and all.  Are you going to compel the people to believe except by God's dispensation?" [Qur'an 10:99-100]) - and not with those who seek to "Slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them" (Qur'an 9:5) and "...fight against people so long as they do not declare that there is no god but Allah" (Muslim, 1.9.30).	 <br />
	<br />
Additionally, we hope the President will emphasize further that the finding--based on several public opinion polls--that the overwhelming majority of Muslims embrace the nonviolent versions of Islam does not mean that they necessarily also accept our list of human rights and embrace our form of democracy.<br />
	<br />
Among the then 140 million Muslims in Indonesia, 69.5 million in Turkey, and 32.3 million in Morocco, fifteen per cent or fewer support suicide bombers, according to a 2005  Pew survey. Support for suicide bombers has dropped sharply in Pakistan, from 41% in March 2004 to 5% in spring 2009. It has also dropped dramatically in Jordan, from 57% in May 2005 to 25% in Spring 2009. When asked about attacks on civilians in the United States, the large majority of respondents in Egypt (84%), Indonesia (73%), Pakistan (55%), Jordan (68%), Turkey (74%) and the Palestinian territories (59%) stated that they disapprove, a 2008 poll found.<br />
	<br />
Seventy percent or more of respondents to a 2008 Pew poll in Indonesia, Pakistan, Tanzania and Lebanon are concerned with the rise of Islamic extremism in the world, and majorities in Egypt, Nigeria, and Jordan feel the same way.  Additionally, the majority of Egyptians (57%) see terrorism a "very big problem" in their country, and the vast majority of people in Indonesia (72%) and Pakistan (90%) feel the same. Large majorities in these three countries also believe that violent attacks that are carried out to achieve political or religious goals are not justified. Other reports have indicated little support for terrorism among Muslims in India, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. Thus, the threshold for reliable partners in peace must be a rejection of violence (or again, as the President put it, to "unclench one's fist"). On all other matters, reasonable people can differ.<br />
	<br />
We hope he stresses that as people of faith we respect faith, and do not view secular beliefs and practices as the only enlightened basis for one's government and lifestyle. And that when it comes to building a democracy and expanding the reach of human rights, there are numerous pathways. Expanding the opportunities for competitive parties, increasing access to the media, building civil society, revising the constitution, as well as holding local and national elections are all avenues that can be used by those seeking to travel this road.<br />
	<br />
To highlight the difference between violence-rejecting Muslims and those who also favor liberal democracy, the United States might make a gift of, say, ten million dollars to the Library of Alexandria for it to select, working with other institutions of its choosing, major texts by moderate Muslims. These are to be translated into English and other languages the Library will favor, to make these texts more accessible to people all over the world who are not sufficiently familiar with the moderate face of Islam.</p>

<p>____________________</p>

<p>**I will respond to the comments of those persons who are willing to identify themselves, because I hold this essential for a civilized dialogue.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of <em>Security First </em>(Yale, 2007). For more, go here:  http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html.  He can be reached at icps@gwu.edu</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>A Disarmed Palestinian State?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/26/a_disarmed_palestinian_state/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.272102</id>
   
   <published>2009-05-26T20:49:55Z</published>
   <updated>2009-06-12T17:02:00Z</updated>
   
   <summary>One can disagree with everything the new Israeli prime minster says and does and still admit that he raised an important question during his recent visit to the White House. Benjamin Netanyahu stated &quot;I want to make it clear that...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>One can disagree with everything the new Israeli prime minster says and does and still admit that he raised an important question during his recent visit to the White House. Benjamin Netanyahu stated "I want to make it clear that we don't want to govern the Palestinians. We want to live in peace with them. We want them to govern themselves, absent a handful of powers that could endanger the state of Israel." The same issue was addressed by two leading foreign policy mavens not suspected of a pro-Israeli bias, to put it mildly, namely Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. Both favor pushing a two state solution on Israel, as they see it as  the way to turn around the Middle East (which they define as including Afghanistan and Pakistan). Three elements of the plan the US is to push are well known (no refugee return, a divided Jerusalem, and redrawn 1967 borders), but the fourth is much less often explored. Namely that the Palestinian state be disarmed and that US or NATO troops be stationed along the Jordan river. They pointed to this condition in a new book <em>America and the World</em>,  composed of interviews with Brzezinski and Scowcroft, conducted by <em>Washington Post</em> columnist David Ignatius. In the book both authors agree that "they [Israel and the Palestinians] need a heavier hand by the United States than we have traditionally practiced" (87). Furthermore, Brzezinski suggests "an American line along the Jordan river" and Scowcroft favors putting a "NATO peace keeping force" on the West Bank. That is, they do not want the Palestinians to have what most people consider a true state, one that is free to arm itself.<br />
    </p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>There are several problems in this approach. First of all, while the first three conditions are almost impossible to reverse once in place, the fourth one can be changed by a simple order from Congress or future American president, or even the current one. Aba Evan once compared a UN force stationed on the Israeli-Egyptian border, which was removed just before Nasar attacked Israel, to an umbrella that is folded when it rains. The new umbrella is not much more reliable.<br />
	<br />
Second, the American troops in Iraq and the NATO ones in Afghanistan are unable to stop terrorists' bombs and rocket attacks in these parts. There is no reason to hold that they would do better in the West Bank. </p>

<p>Third, there are very few precedents for demilitarized states--by force.  A two state solution means to practically everyone involved, except a few foreign policy mavens, two sovereign states. A sovereign state is free to import all the arms and troops it wants. One second after the Palestinian state is declared, many in the Arab world, in Iran, and surely in Europe, not to mention Russia and China, will hold that "obviously" the new free state cannot be prevented from arming itself. And if this not allowed, any therapeutic effect the Palestinian state could have would have on the Middle East is about the same as the end of the Israeli occupation of Gaza: Either too small to measure or a negative one.<br />
	<br />
A strong case for a two state solution has been made, but it better be based on the Palestinians developing their own effective peacekeeping troops and, arguably, on an Israeli presence on the Jordan river. Neither can rely on the United States, beleaguered as it is, or on the conflicted and casualties averse NATO to show a staying power for peacekeeping that neither has mustered in Kosovo,  Bosnia, and Haiti, and which they never provided in Sudan and the Congo. <br />
          <br />
In short, the Palestinians are surely entitled to govern themselves. However, if the West Bank is not to be turned into one giant terrorist base, part of the solution will have to be a credible way to ensure that the two states will live in "security and peace" with each other. It is a line practically all those who advocate the two state solution repeat--but rarely detail in full. </p>

<p>__________________<br />
**I will respond to the comments of those persons who are willing to identify themselves, because I hold this as essential for a civilized dialogue.</p>

<p><br />
Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washington University. For more discussion, see <em>Security First</em> (Yale 2007). For more, go here: http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html. He can be reached at icps@gwu.edu</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Non lethal promotion of democracy </title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/11/non_lethal_promotion_of_democracy/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.269682</id>
   
   <published>2009-05-11T18:31:13Z</published>
   <updated>2009-05-11T18:35:10Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Many observers have suggested that Obama&apos;s foreign policy agenda has abandoned the Bush Administration&apos;s emphasis on promoting democracy, including human rights. Much was made of President Obama&apos;s statement in his inaugural address: &quot;To those who cling to power through corruption...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="1616" label="democracy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1617" label="democratization" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="12215" label="obama administration" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>Many observers have suggested that Obama's foreign policy agenda has abandoned the Bush Administration's emphasis on promoting democracy, including human rights. Much was made of President Obama's statement in his inaugural address: "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." Others have pointed out, critically, that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton did not raise objections to China's deplorable human rights record during her first visit to that country as an Obama administration official. <br />
</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>The Bush Administration's policy and the related Neo Con position relied on the observation that only democracies make reliable partners in peace because only democracies do not wage war against other democracies. Hence, when the United States encounters non-democratic regimes (such as those of Saddam's Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), changing these into democratic ones was regarded not merely a matter of promoting political justice, of creating a regime we believe in, or of bringing the fruits and joys of freedom to oppressed people, but was regarded as a prerequisite for peace and security. Forced democratization for the sake of security was a common rationale given for the 2003 invasion of Iraq; for the military and national reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; the CIA support for opposition groups in Iran, and other Bush administration policies.<br />
	<br />
This forced democratization approach has been questioned on several grounds: the same US government that promoted such changes has supported non-democratic regimes in a considerable number of other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt; the correlations between democratic regimes and peace is much overstated (e.g., Israel invaded Lebanon); the imposed regimes are at best very flawed democracies; and the human costs of forced regime change are very high. Hence, the suggestions to forgo such regime changes altogether.<br />
            <br />
Several influential foreign policy mavens have argued explicitly for lowering the bar for admission to the international community--for allowing a nation to become a member in good standing without first democratizing.  Some of them draw on John Rawls, one of the most highly regarded liberal philosophers of our age, who, in his 1999<em> The Law of Peoples</em>, argued that liberal societies ought to build an international community that reflected the liberal value of toleration of difference, and which would thus include not only liberal societies, but all "decent" ones--including hierarchical, non-democratic societies.  In a recent article in <em>Democracy: A Journal of Ideas</em>, Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount suggested that "the terms of the next [international] order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not" and should include all nations that are broadly responsive to the needs of their members--that is, which serve their wellbeing. The authors use the term autonomy, but it is clear that they mean to include and accord full measure in rule-setting to such nations as China and Russia. The only nations that would not qualify under this "autonomy rule" are nations that commit genocide or are otherwise abusive of their people such as North Korea and Burma. In short, in sharp contrast to the Bush administration, a democratic regime is not deemed to be a prerequisite for being a full member in the new global order. Earlier, in the November/December 2007 issue of <em>The American Interest </em>as the Bush administration was entering its final throes, Barry Posen called for a foreign policy of "restraint" and "modesty", arguing that "the United States needs to be more reticent about the use of military force; more modest about the scope for political transformation within and among countries..."<br />
	<br />
These discussions and many others like them ignore a key distinction that is crucial for the issue at hand: the difference between forced regime change and the non-lethal promotion of democracy.  In <em>Security First</em>, I suggested that as long as a nation does not support terrorism, did not develop or acquire WMD to threaten with other nations, and did not commit genocide or ethnic cleansing, it should be considered as having met the minimal requirements for membership in the international community (Libya, which abandoned its WMD program and renounced terrorism, is a case in point.) And I detailed the difficulties in developing democracy through long distance social engineering, by a foreign power. I stressed, however, that the rejection of forced regime change as a strategy to promote peace and security need not be understood to mean that we should cease promoting democracy, but only that we must limit ourselves to doing so by non-lethal means. <br />
	<br />
Like most stark dichotomies, the notion that we either promote democracy or we do not, disregarding differences in means, is a false one. I see no reason the US should cease to educate, persuade, and lead by example toward the development of democratic regimes anytime any place, and--if other nations are so inclined--for them to use such non-lethal means to promote their ideas of what a good regime makes. The list of non-lethal means is well-known and, indeed, very widely employed, usually with little ill effect. These include dissemination of texts, educational films, lectures and the use of scores of other cultural means; exchanges of leaders, students, professional and others; supporting local NGOs; sending of election observers; leading by example by improving our own democracy; providing people with new means of communication such as low costs radios, access to the internet and even cell phones, among others.<br />
	<br />
To favor the use of non-lethal means of democratization and to reject forced regime changes does not mean that one favors hectoring other regimes, denouncing them publicly, or lecturing them about the defects of their system and the virtues of ours. As with all educational means, the tools of non-lethal democratization are best tailored to fit those we are trying to reach. By and large, humiliating other nations does not work any better than humiliating students in a classroom. True, there are occasions when the conduct of a nation is so outrageous, as when China massacred protesters in Tiananmen Square, that public condemnations are called for. But, most times, being judicious rather than judgmental is more effective.<br />
             <br />
Economic sanctions do not fit neatly into either category. They are not lethal in the same way as occupations and extensive bombing runs are, and do not constitute outright forced regime changes. At the same time, sanctions are not strictly non-lethal means which seek to change the hearts and minds of the people involved rather than deprive them in order to coerce them to yield; Saddam and many human rights organizations claimed that hundreds thousands of children died as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq by US and its allies in the 90s.<br />
	<br />
Three notes are hence called for in assessing the merits of economic sanctions for democracy promotion. First, truly non-lethal measures are to be preferred to economic sanctions, because the latter can have some lethal effects. Second, sanctions should be rarely applied. I expect that a full study would show that under most conditions engagement is much more effective than sanctions (typically coupled with other isolation measures). For instance, the US has isolated and sanctioned Cuba and North Korea for decades--policies which have not led to democratization or regime change--while it engaged China and Vietnam and achieved comparatively much more favorable results. Finally, even if economic and other sanctions do work under some conditions, there seems to be no reason to doubt that truly non lethal means of the kind listed above--when they work, however slowly--lead to changes that have lower human costs and lead to people and regimes who truly embrace democracy rather than merely pay dues to gain reprise from sanctions.<br />
	<br />
In short, in the new era, we should not cease promoting democracy in the name of a new global tolerance and pluralism, but rather, should limit such promotion to non-lethal means for all nations that do wage war and terrorize others or their own people.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of <em>Security First </em>(Yale, 2007). For more, go <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html">here</a>.</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Zero is too much</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/08/zero_is_too_much/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.269463</id>
   
   <published>2009-05-08T20:23:32Z</published>
   <updated>2009-05-08T20:25:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Unfortunately, the Obama Administration has adopted, hook, line and sinkers--the vision of a world free of nukes. It is a vision that has been promoted previously by four very senior statesmen, all of whom made their names during the Cold...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately, the Obama Administration has adopted, hook, line and sinkers--the vision of a world free of nukes. It is a vision that has been promoted previously by four very senior statesmen, all of whom made their names during the Cold War. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. They have popularized the idea that the best way to protect the world from nuclear weapons is for the United States and Russia to lead--by first reducing their nuclear stockpiles, and eventually moving to zero. This move in turn is expected to inspire other nations to reduce their stockpiles or give up on their ambitions to acquire nuclear arms--and to pressure those so inclined, to desist.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>One Obama official suggested that by going for zero we will occupy the moral high ground, take away "one of Iran's talking points" and "stop the Indians from whining." (Indians are among those who have frequently complained that they are asked to join the NPT and live with its restrictions while the US and Russia, France and Britain are not living up to their treaty obligations to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles.)  <br />
	<br />
If one refuses to shut down one's critical mind, one soon notes that this approach is based on shiploads of wishful thinking and may well distract attention from urgent priorities. The precept that because the United States and Russia talk up a world without nukes (a world which is indeed very far over the horizon, given the grave dangers for a nation that disarms if the other successfully hides a few nuclear bombs) this will inspire other nations to give up their bombs or nuclear ambitions, has no legs. This is even more true for the notion that if the United States and Russia reduce their stockpiles to 1,500 warheads (below the current ceiling of 2,200)--or some other such number-- this too would somehow inspire other nations to pack in their nuclear ambitions.</p>

<p>Above all, one must fear that pursuing such pie in the sky schemes will distract attention from the most serious threat to our security, that of our allies, and to world peace, which is very widely agreed to be that terrorists will get their hands on a ready-made nuclear weapon. (Making new ones is much more of a challenge), The most likely place for terrorists to steal, bribe their way to, or otherwise commandeer nuclear weapons is Pakistan.  <br />
	<br />
No one serious thinks that if the United States and Russia live up to their commitments under the NPT, this will lead Pakistan to give up its bombs, given that the main reason Pakistan has them is that they serve as a deterrent against the much larger Indian conventional forces, which Pakistan cannot match. Hence, even if not only the United States and Russia but also India gave up their nuclear bombs (an extremely unlikely event), Pakistan is most unlikely to follow. The same holds for Israel's stockpile and Iran's plans to build bombs. These and other such nations have strong reasons of their own to hold such arms. These reasons will not be modified by whatever the United States and Russia do or do not do regarding their own stockpiles. New evidence in support of this point: the morning President Obama announced his plans to move to zero, hoping to inspire others to relent, North Korea tested a long-range missile which could carry a nuclear warhead.  A few days later, Iran announced that it is making good progress in its nuclear development efforts. Other nations barely yawned.</p>

<p>Moreover, in dealing with Russia, the greatest priority for the United States is to encourage Russia to further improve its controls over the fissile material from which nukes can be made and over the thousands of tactical nuclear arms it possesses. Reducing the Cold War instruments, the long-range missiles and strategic nuclear weapons--on which Henry A. Kissinger and his colleagues focus--are much less of an issue. They are already relatively well-controlled and, moreover, are not well-suited for terrorists equipped with speed boats, shipping containers, and trunks. It follows that dismantling these Cold War arms is much less urgent. Similarly, the United States is keen to gain Russia's cooperation in stopping Iran's nuclear militarization. Neither mission is affected by the number of nukes the two powers hold.</p>

<p>The fate of the curbs on the spread of nuclear arms in the near future is going to be decided in Iran. If it is allowed to gain a bomb, there will be no stopping Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations from going down the same road, and Japan and South Korea are likely soon to follow, to countervail North Korea. Nuclear terrorists are looking for bombs in Pakistan (and for fissile materials and small bombs in Russia). These burning matters are enough to occupy a president who has shown that he can work on half a dozen issues at the same time. Zero can wait.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of<em> Security First</em> (Yale, 2007). For more, go here:   http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html.  He can be reached at icps@gwu.edu<br />
</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Pakistan, outside the box</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/06/pakistan_outside_the_box/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.269126</id>
   
   <published>2009-05-06T20:27:31Z</published>
   <updated>2009-05-06T20:32:40Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Social scientists have long used systems theory to point out links that are sometimes overlooked. Such a link now leads to the suggestion that to deal with the crisis in Pakistan and the mounting difficulties in Afghanistan, one should go...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2547" label="india" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="19341" label="kashmir" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="790" label="nuclear non-proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="792" label="nuclear proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3551" label="Pakistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2935" label="taliban" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>Social scientists have long used systems theory to point out links that are sometimes overlooked. Such a link now leads to the suggestion that to deal with the crisis in Pakistan and the mounting difficulties in Afghanistan, one should go to, of all places, India. The main reason the Pakistani army is reluctant to take on the Taliban, who threaten to overrun the country, is that the army considers India its enemy.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>The main source of tension between the two countries is the question of who will control Kashmir. At first, any suggestion of solving this tricky problem in order to get the Pakistani army to refocus would seem truly far-fetched, if not visionary to the nth degree - like asking someone to improve the climate by first stopping earthquakes. Dealing with the internal tensions in Pakistan is difficult enough; add to the mix a conflict that has been simmering for decades and seems to resist any solution, and your way seems completely blocked.</p>

<p>The good news is that secret negotiations between India and Pakistan about Kashmir have been taking place. Those now need to be restarted, supported, and accelerated. In the process should we also dump the obsolete notion that India should be made to "balance" China, and we may then be on our way to a more stable region in this much contested part of Asia. Both steps require some elaboration.</p>

<p>India and Pakistan have fought three wars and come close to blows on several other occasions, mainly over Kashmir. The Pakistani and Indian armies' training, formations, and alignments are focused on deterring each other, and are largely concentrated on their mutual border. The terrorists who recently attacked Mumbai, and before that the Indian Parliament and markets in New Delhi, see themselves as Kashmiri freedom fighters. It is hard to imagine major repositioning of the troops involved and changes in the strategic planning of both countries until the Kashmir issue is resolved. <br />
            <br />
A large variety of suggestions have been made about the way to determine the future of Kashmir. Some favor that the people of the area be allowed to vote on which nation they wish to join, as was prescribed by the UN Security Council after the partition of India; others favor dividing the area between the two nations; still others favor turning it into an area which enjoys a large measure of independence. The secret negotiations that took place between India and Pakistan during Pervez Musharraf's tenure as president appear to have focused on the idea of 'making borders irrelevant,' that is, granting Kashmir a great deal of autonomy to avoid either country having to lose face by giving up their claims to control. Since General Musharraf stepped down these negotiations seem to have stopped. The Obama Administration would do well to apply here the same system-wide approach it is revealing in the Middle East: follow the links. In this case, encourage, cajole, and help Pakistan and India to move toward settling the Kashmir issue. Eliminating this source of terrorism and war, and the reason both nations are keen to maintain nuclear arms, is of course worthy in its own right.  It will also pay off handsomely in getting the Pakistani army to focus on the Taliban, including both those who threaten the government at home and those who cross the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan.<br />
           <br />
Obama seems not to shy away from complexities. In this case, dealing with India must take into account two more related matters. One involves a Bush Administration-backed deal with India which allows US companies to sell it nuclear fuel and other nuclear technologies to be used only in India's civilian reactors. However, the net effect it that this deal allows India to shift from civilian to military use the limited uranium it has from other sources. (Bush assumed that it is acceptable for 'good' governments--like that of India and Brazil--to develop their nuclear industries, while only those of 'bad' governments, such as Iran and North Korea, need to be reined in.) However, as we now fear in Pakistan, government can change overnight, and above all, if the norm against proliferation is to have a chance to take hold, the fewer nations that go down this road, the greater the chances of enforcing a non-nuke global regime. This means is that even if the US can't get India and Pakistan to give up their nukes, at this stage at least, it is ill-advised to help them increase their armed nuclear program. Hence the Obama Administration should renegotiate the agreement to provide nuclear fuel and technologies to India, and both India and Pakistan should be encouraged to scale back on the nukes and join the NPT, as their conflicts are resolved. </p>

<p>All this assumes that one drops the obsolete notion that nations can be used to balance each other and that a militarily powerful India somehow will serve to countervail a rising China. China is focused on its economic development, and its military has a very long way to go before it will pose a threat to the United States, even if there was reason to believe that it would seek such a confrontation. And if China has such intentions, whether India has a few extra nukes or not would hardly matter, given the size of the American arsenal. In short, to the extent that the US has any influence on India, it can be used to scale back its nuclear program without any discernible loss to American strategic interest. <br />
	<br />
I will be the first to grant that this kind of social science thinking leads one to try to tackle some very tough and persistent international problems as a way to treat some very acute local problems inside Pakistan and in Afghanistan. In that sense, it is truly far-fetched.  However, these pestering international conflicts call for resolution anyhow, and if they can at least be curbed, such progress would help on the local fronts.  Dealing with the Taliban may entail going to Kashmir, New Delhi, and Islamabad, and forgetting for now about China.</p>

<p><br />
Amitai Etzioni professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale 2007). For more, go <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html">here</a>.</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>The mother of all deals</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/04/28/the_mother_of_all_deals/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.267895</id>
   
   <published>2009-04-28T20:33:33Z</published>
   <updated>2009-04-28T20:36:47Z</updated>
   
   <summary>I arrived in Moscow from Washington highly optimistic, a day after the vigorous, historic handshake between President Medvedev and President Obama in London. I left--after visits with officials and colleagues--more than a bit concerned. My optimism was not based on...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="3476" label="Iran conflict" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="790" label="nuclear non-proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="792" label="nuclear proliferation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="278" label="nuclear weapons" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="820" label="Russia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>I arrived in Moscow from Washington highly optimistic, a day after the vigorous, historic handshake between President Medvedev and President Obama in London. I left--after visits with officials and colleagues--more than a bit concerned. My optimism was not based on such cheerful gestures as pushing reset buttons, although such tone-setting steps have their place. I believed that a major deal between the two countries could be made, one based not on identical or even complementary interests of Russia and the United States--but one that would build on profound differences in saliency.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>Allow me to explain. When Party A has some things that Party B deeply desires but Party A does not care much about--and Party B has some things Party A keenly wants but Party B is not much invested in, a mother of all deals is plausible. The fact that this notion has some legs became clear when the Obama Administration, which is far from invested in building a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic while Russia is rather troubled by it, offered (in effect) to trade it in. That is, exchange it for Russia's help in encouraging Iran to give up on its nuclear arming program. As the US sees it, an Iran with nuclear bombs would gravely endanger America's allies (not just Israel but also Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan) if not the United States itself; that is, Iran's nuclear program is highly salient for the US, but Russia seems not to have a great stake in a nuclear armed Iran, to put it mildly. </p>

<p>In addition, it seemed that another such exchange could be built into the mother of all deals: The Obama Administration's interest in expanding the membership of NATO in the foreseeable future is far from salient, while this issue matters a great deal to Russia. At the same time, the United States is much interested in accelerating the Nunn-Lugar programs that aim to neutralize fissile material from which terrorists can make nuclear bombs and further improve the security of tactical nuclear arms, matters which Russia has little reason to oppose. Voila, the conditions of a major deal seem to be in place.</p>

<p>Why did I leave less optimistic, much less optimistic? Both sides seem to have decided to pile on a large number of additional items, some of which have a rather different profile of needs and interests than those mentioned above, including items that gravely concern both sides, especially the quantity and quality of nuclear arms to be maintained. In addition, Russia seems keenly interested in changes in trade and economic policy, such as the additional opening of American markets to Russian products and membership in the WTO and OECD, issues that are particularly difficult to deal with currently given the recent tendency to increase rather than lower national barriers to trade. Half a dozen additional items have been raised, ranging from the incentives Russia seems to have provided to Kyrgyzstan which led it to move to close a major supply line for American troops in Afghanistan to helping Russia secure its "territorial integrity". (Still other points were raised in a recent editorial by President Medvedev in the <em>Washington Post</em>.) <br />
 	<br />
The escalation of ambitions and expectations are by no means one-sided. President Obama's trademark is thinking big and moving on many fronts at once. Up to a point, one cannot but admire such a drive not just to remake the United States internally, but also to build a new global architecture, with a partnership with Russia as a key element. However, such ambitions become problematic when they pay little mind to matters of relative saliency and respective pace. </p>

<p>Thus, it is rather obvious that the more items that are thrown into the mix, the more complex the negotiations will become and the less likely they are to succeed, especially as they involve items of similar rather than different saliency. Even more detrimental is the fact that some of these processes and policies have internal clocks that run at very different speeds.</p>

<p>This is especially true when one considers Iran's nuclear arming program, which may well cross a red-line within a year, while matters of trade or even those concerning the conflict in Afghanistan have a significantly longer trajectory. It would be much better to focus first on those items that have hard and short deadlines rather than mixing them up with those that do not. Finally, all items that require action by the US Senate--such as approving treaties or changing laws (e.g., Jackson-Vanik)--must be assumed to face a slow journey, even given the Democratic majority.	</p>

<p>I have not lost faith in the dawning of a new era in the Russian-American relationship. I am especially encouraged to find mountains of goodwill (mixed with some residue of feelings of distrust). I just hope that matters that need to be and can be settled in short order will not be undermined by those that cannot and those that must be allowed time to be worked out.</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University. For more discussion, go <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/index.html">here</a>, and see his book: <em>Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy</em> (Yale, 2007) Email: icps@gwu.edu</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>The bizarre case of pirates&apos; human rights</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/04/21/the_bizarre_case_of_pirates_human_rights/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.266746</id>
   
   <published>2009-04-21T15:04:30Z</published>
   <updated>2009-04-21T15:09:48Z</updated>
   
   <summary>We are told that the reasons we have such a hard time stopping the pirates is that our forces have a very hard time locating them in the vast sea. An odd statement, given that the pirates have no trouble...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="788" label="human rights" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="9188" label="pirates" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="9170" label="Somalia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>We are told that the reasons we have such a hard time stopping the pirates is that our forces have a very hard time locating them in the vast sea. An odd statement, given that the pirates have no trouble locating our ships in the same sea, and they have no drones, satellites, AWACS, and all the other means of modern technology. Moreover, we hardly need to look for them; they present themselves to us, quite regularly. Most recently they captured six ships with a few weeks.<br />
	</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>The main reason pirates roam freely is only whispered in the corridors of power, because it is very politically incorrect to openly state that pirates are protected by a radical interpretation of human rights. The various navies involved are operating (or more precisely, are not operating) because of one or more of the following points:<br />
<ul><br />
	<li>Do not capture the pirates because if you do, they will have to be brought to trial in some national court. There are no international courts in which they can be tried. To try them, you will need evidence that will hold up in such courts. Most ship hands do not have the kind of police training needed to collect evidence properly, observe the chain of evidence, and so on.</li><br />
	<li>Once brought to your homeland, the pirates may seek--and possibly be granted--asylum. (In several European countries one can gain asylum by showing that he or she is coming from a part of the world in which there is a sufficient level of indiscriminant violence that one's life would be in danger by remaining there. One need not show that he or she was specifically persecuted.) Thus, courts may let them walk and you would then have dozens of Somali marauders roaming free in your country. </li><br />
	<li>You will be unable to ship them back to Somalia for trial because there they would likely be subject to torture or execution. </li><br />
	<li>Piracy is a crime and crimes are a matter for the police to deal with, not armed forces. But national police forces have no jurisdiction, a high seas catch-22.</li><br />
	<li>Pirates cannot be shot when they close in on your ship because they may be fishermen engaging in their peaceful business. The fact that they are armed cannot be used as evidence because in these parts of the world practically all men are armed.</li><br />
	<li>If you fail to respect their rights, you may be hauled in front of one or more of your national courts, the European Court of Human Rights, condemned by United Nations, and excoriated by the parts of the media and by human rights activists.</li><br />
</ul><br />
Ignored is the fact that human rights--which ought to be observed--must be balanced with concerns for the common good, as they are in the domestic courts of all free nations. No reasonable interpretation of rights allows them to trump all other considerations, especially gross violations of the safety of innocent people going about their business, business which, in the case of the Maersk Alabama, consisted of carrying humanitarian aid destined for Somalia! Thus, while even pirates, if captured, should not be tortured or held indefinitely without a hearing, a ship's national sovereignty should be extended to an area around it. Any armed party entering this zone, should be asked to leave or surrender; if they refuse and do not heed a warning shot, they should be treated as a hostile force. Civilian airlines have armed marshals. Our commercial ships and cruise ships may need some of those now, equipped with a 007 license.<br />
	<br />
At least the way I see it, to treat human rights on the high seas the way we do at home is a much preferred alternative to the desperate suggestion--now increasingly mentioned--that we ought to invade Somalia, in order to get at the pirates' bases. Such a land-based operation is surely going to involve killing many innocent Somalis, aside from inflicting a considerable number of casualties on our own troops.    </p>

<p>    <br />
Amitai Etzioni professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of <em>Security First </em>(Yale 2007). For more, go <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/index.html">here</a>.<br />
</p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Vaclav Klaus&apos; ego</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/04/03/vaclav_klaus_ego/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.264920</id>
   
   <published>2009-04-03T14:44:49Z</published>
   <updated>2009-04-07T14:50:57Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Vaclav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic, will be meeting with President Obama this weekend. Given his previous statements about President Obama, it should be an interesting meeting for them both. The following piece on Klaus is excerpted from...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>Vaclav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic, will be meeting with President Obama this weekend. Given his previous statements about President Obama, it should be an interesting meeting for them both. </p>

<p>The following piece on Klaus is excerpted from my book, <em>My Brother's Keeper </em>(Rowman and Littlefield, 2003):</p>

<p>The hostile reception new communitarianism encountered from some of the Czech leaders mirrored concerns initially raised by leaders and intellectuals in other former communist countries when they were first exposed to our message. It also reflected the particular position of its prime minister, Václav Klaus. Klaus has been credited with the quick transition of the Czech Republic from a communist to a capitalist economy. He defines himself accurately as an extreme Milton Friedmanite and has taken great personal umbrage to my book The Moral Dimension, which challenges libertarian assumptions of Friedmanite economics. When Klaus ran into me during the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1997, he grabbed my lapel, waved his index finger in my face, and announced in a booming voice, "You are crippling my republic! You are undermining what we are trying to do! You do not understand that egoism and the profit motive are the best part of human nature. You work for those who want to return my country to communism!"</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>Fortunately, I was aware before this encounter that understatements and mincing words were not Klaus' trademark. Rather than punching back, I tried to calmly defend the communitarian position. My main argument was that by providing people with a strong but community-based social fabric, they would not react to rough and tumble capitalism by running back into the arms of a communist-ordered social life.</p>

<p>After the translation of my first communitarian book, <em>The Spirit of Community,</em> into German, Klaus joined a seminar I was conducting in Alpbach, Austria, for the European Forum in 1998. For a short while, he listened, but then he pulled out a prepared statement and read in a voice that vibrated down the corridors, and up the Alps.</p>

<blockquote>
    Communitarianism... in its aversion to individualism and its advocacy of coercive means of fostering human association, is another form of collectivism.</blockquote>

<p>Klaus next voiced concern alluded to by other leaders of previously communist countries:</p>

<blockquote>
    Communitarianism wants to socialize us by forcing us into artificial, not genuine, not spontaneously formed--groups or groupings.

<p><br />
    Communitarianism cannot win through preaching only.... they try to reach the legislators and to legislate the world according to their dreams.</blockquote></p>

<p><br />
By this time the seminar was familiar with our viewpoint. It seemed that most present considered Klaus's barrage to be way off the mark. It made it easier for me to respond gently one more time.</p>

<p>After the seminar Klaus and I went for a long stroll and then joined a few others for a lunch that lasted nearly three hours. It soon became obvious that Klaus's bluster was skin deep. He rushed to emphasize that "there was nothing personal in my statements" and that "I just enjoy debating."</p>

<p>During lunch he regaled us with stories about his boxing days, about testing a new racing car and other daredevil acts he was involved in. When others chimed in with their anecdotes, Klaus would soon work to recapture the center of attention. It did not take a psychologist to figure him out. Moderation, whether as a brand of communitarianism or lifestyle, did not suit Klaus's personality any more than a society could be based on his extreme libertarian principles. The fact that his government fell apart, despite his very considerable economic achievements, suggested that there might be more room for communitarianism in the Czech Republic than Klaus favored. (It would not take much.)</p>

<p>The best evidence to that effect was the leadership of Václav Havel. When Klaus heard that Havel had invited me to participate in his Forum 2000, Klaus simply said, "He is not my kind of a guy!" and for once Klaus was very much on the money. Every bone in Havel's body--and more importantly, the depths of his soul--is dedicated to the civic society and, through it, to his version of communitarianism. Havel carried his vision not merely to his people but to large parts of the world, through speeches that have won him great acclaim and following.</p>

<p>I was very much looking forward to exchanging ideas with him. On arrival in the pompously elegant, baroque Prague Castle in which the Forum took place, I found that Havel was surrounded by VIPs, including Hillary Clinton, Henry Kissinger, Adam Michnik (a flamboyant, well-known Polish dissident), Wei Jingsheng (a leading Chinese dissident), a bishop, a chief rabbi, and an Indian poet-philosopher who kept reciting the same poem about the inner beauty of lotus flowers. Moreover, Havel was absent from a good part of the proceedings; his staff explained that his health required that he rest frequently.</p>

<p>When I finally found myself alone with Havel, I found that his command of English was not much better than mine of Czech, in which I could not so much as buy a Pilsner Urquell. I did, though, not leave Prague completely empty-handed. I brought with me the text of a new address by Havel that we published in our quarterly <em>The Responsive Community</em>. In it, Havel predicted that in the next century the nation-state would cease to evoke the kind of emotional and irrational commitments it had in the past. Loyalty to the state would instead be divided among families, communities, and organizations of which we are members. Above all, he called for a commitment to principles higher than the particular interest of this or that nation, especially to human rights, freedom and human dignity, which Havel suggested are a reflection of an "infinite" and "eternal" force.</p>

<p>I have no firsthand evidence to support my hunch that the Czech people's views lie somewhere between Klaus' hostility and Havel's natural communitarianism. Possibly, as the distance from the communist days increases, Czechs will find it less onerous to acknowledge their own communitarian bases and expand on them.</p>

<p>One thing I can conclude with much confidence: citizens of all former communist societies cannot go long without some new, shared moral understanding. Those in older capitalist nations need them too, but their absence is merely more glaring in the vacuum left by collapse of communism. Communitarianism has a lot to suggest to these people--especially if we are better able to show to that it has no affinity whatsoever to communism.</p>

<p>***</p>

<p>Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor at the George Washington University, and the author of <em>My Brother's Keeper: A Memoir and a Message</em> (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu. </p>]]>
   </content>
</entry>

<entry>
   <title>Huntington revisited</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/02/18/huntington_revisited/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.257598</id>
   
   <published>2009-02-18T21:25:50Z</published>
   <updated>2009-02-18T21:32:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>After Professor Samuel Huntington passed away on December 24, I held off commenting on his work during the first 30 days of mourning out of respect for the norms that govern such a period. I believe we are now ready...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
      <category term="Coffee House" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="14423" label="clash of civilizations" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3263" label="communitarianism" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3264" label="community" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="14424" label="huntington" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/">
      <![CDATA[<p>After Professor Samuel Huntington passed away on December 24, I held off commenting on his work during the first 30 days of mourning out of respect for the norms that govern such a period.  I believe we are now ready for a balanced review of his work.</p>

<p>The theme that runs throughout Huntington's various works is best characterized as a theory of fear. His books typically identify a mounting threat, such as Mexican immigrants, Islamic civilization, or democratic proclivities, and then point to the need for strong national-unity building measures and mobilization of the people (including militarization) in response to the barbarians at the gates. Sometimes, the argument is formulated in basically analytical terms: If the required vigorous responses to the particular challenge at hand are not forthcoming, various calamities will ensue (e.g., the U.S. will lose a large part of its territory to Mexico and its Anglo-Protestant identity will be undermined) that will implicitly call for stronger countermeasures. In other cases, advocacy for powerful antidotes is quite explicit. As Huntington puts it in the Foreword to <em>Who Are We?</em>, he is writing as a patriot and a scholar, in that order.<br />
</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>Taken on its own, the threat-response thesis is unproblematic, a correlation the validity of which even people without social training can readily discern, and one that has often been repeated in the annals of social analysis. When the Nazis were about to overrun Britain, the country suspended habeas corpus. And few, even among the strongest supporters of Israel, would deny that while continuous threats from armed neighbors and terrorists and the responses to these threats have helped keep the segments of Israeli society together, they have also involved a measure of militarization and have imposed limits on civil rights.</p>

<p>The key issue then is to determine whether a nation truly faces particular threats or whether such concerns are largely drummed up, if not totally manufactured--say, in order to keep a nation under the control of one powerful elite or another and to make its citizens accept various governmental measures that they otherwise would not tolerate. These measures might include the curtailment of rights, economic belt-tightening, and discrimination against foreigners, among others. It is a familiar issue, seen for example in the debates over whether or not Saddam actually possessed nuclear weapons that could pose an imminent threat to the United States. Even more recently, it has been witnessed in the argument over whether or not Social Security is indeed in "crisis." We must ask: If the various threats are <em>real</em>, what is their magnitude? And if the dangers are vastly exaggerated, what purposes are served by such a politics of fear? </p>

<p>In <em>Who Are We?</em>, Huntington argues that immigrants, especially those from Mexico, are undermining the "Anglo-Protestant creed" and destroying the shared identity that makes us Americans. These immigrants do so by refusing to assimilate, learn English, and become American citizens and by maintaining a segregated society centered on un-American values. According to Huntington, it is not entirely the Mexicans' fault; it is also the doing of liberal policies. He writes:<br />
<blockquote>In the late twentieth century, developments occurred that, if continued, could change America into a culturally bifurcated Anglo-Hispanic society with two national languages. This trend was in part the result of the popularity of the doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity among intellectual and political elites, and the government policies on bilingual education and affirmative action that those doctrines promoted and sanctioned.</blockquote><br />
<blockquote><br />
The driving force behind the trend toward cultural bifurcation, however, has been immigration from Latin America and especially from Mexico. <br />
(Huntington 2004: 221)</blockquote></p>

<p>Huntington argues that if this development is allowed to continue, it may lead to a profound breakup of the nation, or as he posits, "The possibility of a de facto split between a predominately Spanish-speaking America and English-speaking America ...with...a major potential threat to the cultural and possibly political integrity of the United States" (ibid. p. 243). However, Huntington's concerns go beyond the mere threat of a linguistically, culturally, and politically fractured American society. He ultimately fears that Mexicans might grab a large part of the United States: "No other immigrant group in American history has asserted or has been able to assert a historical claim to American territory. Mexicans and Mexican-Americans can and do make that claim" (ibid. p. 229). He later writes, "Mexican-Americans, in turn, argue that the Southwest was taken from them by military aggression in the 1840s, and that the time for <em>la reconquista</em> has arrived. Demographically, socially, and culturally that is well under way" (ibid.p. 246).<br />
              <br />
To avoid conflicts between Mexican immigrants the white population, Huntington implies, it is best to curb immigrations. Also, fostering unity and suppressing differences would be greatly helped by putting the nation on war-footing. According to Huntington, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed an external threat through opposition to which America derived a major source of identity: "The end of the Cold War deprived America of the evil empire against which it could define itself" (ibid. p. 11). Al Qaeda, he writes, provides a new threat, filling a void and offering hope for a reinvigorated American nation and Anglo-Protestant creed. Huntington emphasizes that a return to this creed is especially called for because Al Qaeda targeted the United States as a Christian nation.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>A PROFOUND MISCONCEPTION</strong><br />
	<br />
At the very core of <em>Who Are We?</em> lies Huntington's basic misleading conception as to what makes America great. Throughout American history, and again recently, alarms have been sounded when immigrants did not seem to assimilate (or did not do so quickly enough) and appeared to maintain subcultural distinctions. As a result, various coercive measures have been advocated, both to stop immigration and to deal with those immigrants already in the country.</p>

<p>However, I join with those who see no compelling reasons, sociological or other, to assimilate immigrants into one indistinguishable American blend--to apply, as James Bryce put it, the great American solvent to remove all traces of previous color, stripping Americans of their various ethnic or racial hyphens. There is no need for Greek-Americans, Polish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, or any other group to see themselves as plain Americans without any particular distinction, history, or subculture. Similarly, Americans can maintain their separate religions, from Greek-Orthodox to Buddhism, and their distinct tastes in music, dance, and cuisine without constituting a threat to the American whole. Indeed, the American culture is richer for having had an introduction to jazz and classical music, the jig and polka, Cajun and soul food, and so on.</p>

<p>A melting pot is what Huntington has in mind. In contrast, the image of a mosaic, if properly understood, depicts the way in which American society actually functions in these matters, and very well indeed. A mosaic is enriched by a variety of elements of different shapes and colors, but it is held together by a single framework. The mosaic symbolizes a society in which various communities maintain their cultural particularities, proud and knowledgeable about their specific traditions, but they also recognize that they are integral parts of a more encompassing whole. As Americans, we are aware of our different origins but also united by a joint future and fate.</p>

<p>Huntington's profound misunderstanding of, if not contempt for, the genius of American society is revealed in his treatment of language, often used throughout history and in many societies both as a major factor in assessing the integration of immigrants into a society and as a metaphor for their relationship to it. Huntington writes,<br />
<blockquote><br />
If the second generation does not reject Spanish out of hand, the third generation is also likely to be bilingual, and the maintenance and fluency in both languages is likely to become institutionalized in the Mexican-American community.... (Huntington 2004: 232)</blockquote></p>

<p>That is, Huntington holds that if Mexican-Americans learn English but maintain Spanish as their second language, it is an indication that they are refusing to become good Americans. But there is nothing un-American in maintaining a subculture and with it a command of the homeland language. (I note as an aside that regrettably many third-generation immigrants, Mexicans included, do not maintain such a command of their native tongue.)</p>

<p>Most important, the framework of the mosaic can be, and has been throughout American history, both reinforced and recast by immigrants. This cannot be stressed enough, as often reference is made only to the enrichment that the addition of pieces (or immigrants) brings to the American mosaic (or society) by providing greater diversity through the incorporation of a growing range of cuisine, music, and holidays. Certainly, the mosaic has been made more varied. But of equal importance are the changes made to the framework of the mosaic--to what unites us and makes us Americans. These days you can be a good American without being a Protestant or even a Christian. I am.</p>

<p>According to Huntington, American identity was defined for 200 years by Protestants--in opposition to Catholics. Slowly, over the generations that followed, Catholic immigrants acculturated and either joined Protestant churches or changed their faith to make it Protestant-like by developing community services, adopting lay trustees, and recasting the Church in an American, national way--a truly odd list. I fail to see what is Protestant about community services; lay trusteeism is a minor adaptation of the kind that the Catholic Church (like other religious establishments, Protestant included) made many over the centuries. But most notably, American Catholics chose not to break away from the global, hierarchical Church--a course that has defined Protestants. Instead, they merely increased the local autonomy of the American chapter. This is akin to increasing states' rights, not to seceding from a federation.</p>

<p>Most important, American society's core of shared values (call them a creed if you must) and the social institutions that embody them have changed over the generations and now accommodate different religions as well as secular bodies of belief. Indeed, differences on the key moral and spiritual issues of the day are often between fundamentalist and moderate Americans (found in all belief systems, Protestant included) rather than simply between the practitioners of different belief systems. It then follows that Huntington's concern that Mexicans are not Protestantizing, is a problem not for America but only for his assimilationist approach.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>IN PERSPECTIVE: A GLOBAL ISOMETRIC PATTERN?</strong></p>

<p>Huntington's particular slant stands out more clearly when his take on the threats that he claims Anglo-Protestant America is facing is viewed in the context of his previous works. Among these, the best known is his 1996 <em>The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order</em>. It has become one of those books that educated people feel they ought to have read, and if they have not, pretend to know its content. Many people outside of the United States view the book as just one more significant piece of evidence as to how hostile the United States is to other belief systems and nations. (In 2002, I was a guest of the reformers in Iran at a meeting that they held at the new Center for the Dialogue of Civilization. And practically all of those who attended, from many different nations, railed against this work of Huntington's).</p>

<p>There is, hence, no need here to rehash the book's main thesis, but it is useful to revisit its main take on the world, which is surprisingly isometric to Huntington's take on the domestic fate of American society--as if he applied the same pattern to both, only on two different scales. In <em>The Clash of Civilizations</em>, the role of the beleaguered and threatened party is played not by the United States but by the West, which is still powerful but, like other previously great civilizations, at its peak and unaware that it is about to be overtaken--unless it heeds Huntington's warnings. The role of the threatening Mexican from <em>Who Are We? </em>is played by Islam in The Clash of Civilizations, and the roles played by other immigrants to the United States are reserved for other civilizations, especially that of the Chinese ("Sinic"). The same fifth column that bores from within the United States, helping the enemies of the state and the creed in <em>Who Are We?</em>, also exists in the West, this time as liberals in general and multiculturalists in particular.</p>

<p>Many scholars fell into the trap of treating <em>The Clash of Civilizations</em> as if it were a standard, scholarly text, questioning Huntington's definition of civilization and arguing that there might be greater or fewer civilizations than the seven that he lists, and so on. Others held that 9/11 validated Huntington (and Bernard Lewis') position. But, as I see it, the particular slant of the book is most evident in its dealing with Islam as if it were one body of belief. Actually, Islam is subject to fundamentalist and moderate interpretations. Thus, some Muslims see jihad as a call to holy war against all nonbelievers (including other Muslims who follow a more moderate line), while others interpret it as a spiritual journey. Seyyed Hossein Nasr describes this second interpretation, that of a softer Islam, as follows: "<em>jihâd</em> is therefore the inner battle to purify the soul of its imperfections, to empty the vessel of the soul of the pungent water of forgetfulness, negligence, and the tendency to evil and to prepare it for the reception of the Divine Elixir of Remembrance, Light, and Knowledge." Generally, Wahhabi Islam calls for a strict interpretation of the texts, but Sufi Islam is much more moderate and accommodating to democratic and modern economic systems. Indeed, there are hundreds of millions of Muslims in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Kyrgyzstan who are moderate and live peacefully together with people of other creeds. (Although the media has made much of some increase in militant Islam in these countries, most Muslims there continue to remain moderate).</p>

<p>It is not only empirically wrong but also psychologically troubling and strategically counterproductive to approach the world from an "us versus them" perspective and to hold that we bring light to the world through enlightenment, rationality, and democracy, while "they" are the force of darkness, the evil empire. A much more valid and healthier approach is to recognize that there are major moderate and fundamentalist camps in all civilizations and that the West should work with moderates everywhere and be on its guard against fundamentalists--everywhere. The West should also recognize that just as it brings to the world concerns of human rights and liberty, other civilizations also bring to the world valuable concerns that the West has increasingly neglected, for instance those of the common good and community.</p>

<p>The true dangers faced by those who buy into Huntington's world are revealed when one examines both <em>Who Are We?</em> and <em>The Clash of Civilizations</em> in light of his first book, <em>The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations</em>, in which he openly favors militaristic, authoritarian, and homogeneous regimes over democratic and pluralistic ones. Published in 1957, the book set off a furor in Harvard's Department of Government, where Huntington was then a young and untenured professor.</p>

<p>At the time, only a few years had passed since the world had faced the threat of a Fascist regime, and many military-authoritarian regimes still dotted the map. Indeed, <em>The Soldier and the State</em> so infuriated Carl Friedrich, a leading political scientist at Harvard and a refugee of Nazi Europe, that he led a successful campaign to deny Huntington tenure, prompting him to leave Harvard (although he was invited back, a few years later).</p>

<p>The citation of but a few quotes from the last pages of this work in which Huntington compares the military academy of West Point to the nearby town of Highland Falls provides an ample idea of his vision of America. He finds that in the military academy:<blockquote><br />
There join together the four great pillars of society: Army, Government, College, and Church. Religion subordinates man to God for divine purposes; the military life subordinates man to duty for society's purposes. In its severity, regularity, discipline, the military society shares the characteristics of the religious order. Modern man may well find his monastery in the Army. (Huntington 1957: 465)<br />
</blockquote><br />
Huntington goes on to conclude:<br />
<blockquote>West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many-colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon. Yet is it possible to deny that the military values-- loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication-- are the ones America most needs today? That the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street? Historically, the virtues of West Point have been America's vices, and the vices of the military, America's virtues. Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America." (ibid. pp. 465-66)</blockquote></p>

<p>Few lines in Huntington's work more effective summarize his viewpoint and provide the reader with a clearer insight into his way of thinking and a basis for evaluating his life's project.<br />
 <br />
Amitai Etzioni is a University Professors at the George Washington University and author of <em>The Monochrome Society</em>. For more discussion go <a href="www.securityfirstbook.com">here</a>.<br />
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<entry>
   <title>White House Council for Social Advisers (CSA)</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/01/23/white_house_council_for_social_advisers_csa/" />
   <id>tag:tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com,2009://14.253419</id>
   
   <published>2009-01-23T20:50:50Z</published>
   <updated>2009-01-23T21:01:44Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The suggestion that the President may wish to add to the White House&apos;s existing bodies a Council of Social Advisers (CSA) has two versions. One, suggested by Fritz Mondale, is one outlined here:...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Amitai Etzioni</name>
      <uri>http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/</uri>
   </author>
   
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      <![CDATA[<p>The suggestion that the President may wish to add to the White House's existing bodies a Council of Social Advisers (CSA) has two versions. One, suggested by Fritz Mondale, is one outlined here:</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>1.	<u>Mondale's version of a CSA</u><br />
Mondale's goals for CSA are:<ul><br />
<li>	The establishment of a Council of Social Advisers (CSA), modeled on the Council of Economic Advisers, to assist the President in the formulation and direction of national social policy.</li><br />
	<li>  The submission by the President of an annual Social Report to Congress, prepared by the CSA and comparable to the annual Economic Report.</li><br />
	<li>  The creation of a Joint Committee of Congress to review the President's annual Social Report just as the Joint Economic Committee exercises oversight in the field of economic policy.</li></ul><br />
Mondale's objectives are<ul><br />
	<li>	To provide an arm's-length perspective on the nation's social needs and conditions, free from the vested interests and tunnel vision of federal agencies and pressure groups.</li><br />
	<li>	To bring the expert knowledge and prestige of prominent social scientists to bear on the task of developing social information and the tools of social measurement.</li><br />
	<li>   To create a highly visible, public forum for the discussion of social goals and priorities capable of attracting the attention of the nation and with direct access to the President.</li><br />
	<li>	To ensure that the analyses and recommendations that emerge are subject to the review of the legislative branch, the academic world, and the private sector.</li><br />
	<li>	To develop effective social indicators for identifying social needs and for illustrating the progress--or lack of it--being made in meeting them over time.</li><br />
	<li>	To provide a framework for improving the coordination of social programs.</li></ul><br />
In short, Mondale saw it largely as a social statistical agency.</p>

<p><br />
2. <u>Our version of a CSA</u><br />
We envision the goal of the CSA as to advise the President on all matters of social policy other than those concerning economics or security. These include policies that strengthen the third sector, especially the country's hundreds of thousands of voluntary associations and civic bodies; that encourage faith based work within the confines of the 1st Amendment; that promote the fulfillment of civic duty via agencies such as the Peace Corps, Vista, AmeriCorps, the Teacher Corps, and the Citizen Corps;  promote understanding and dialogue among social groups that differ in their social backgrounds, identities, and beliefs (including racial, ethnic, and sexual orientation);  promote assimilation of new immigrants while assisting them in maintaining their sub-cultural heritages (i.e., promoting diversity within unity); promote community organizations;  promote dialogues about our responsibilities to one another, to the nation, and to the inchoate global community.</p>

<p>The CSA will be composed of social scientists who have shown a capacity to develop public policies. It could incorporate several existing bodies such as the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives. </p>

<p>To measure and call attention to the social state of union, the CSA would publish an annual report on various social indicators such as the number of Americans who served as voluntary firefighters, emergency medical technicians, or in other forms of volunteerism; the amount of funds raised for social purposes by various foundations and charities; and the number of hate crimes committed, among others, along the lines of the Mondale proposal.  </p>

<p>For more information, contact Amitai Etzioni at etzioni@gwu.edu or (202) 994-8190.</p>]]>
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