Thoughts on Stimulus (My own and those more educated).


It appears that Barack Obama has noticed there's an elephant in the room.  An elephant called "entitlement spending", which has over the past forty year slowly digested virtually the entire nondefense federal budget.  Apparently Medicare and Social Security spending are on the table (at last?).  I welcome the consideration, although the last time this happened (under a supposedly conservative President) we got a new liability (the Medicare prescription drug benefit) without any corresponding cuts in benefits.  If anyone's asking, I'd propose raising the eligibility age somewhat, and tightening up what counts as "disabled" for Social Security.  I've met several people whose only disability was terminal laziness (and I imagine that wasn't what Roosevelt had in mind).

Also, the best short article on stimulus I've seen yet, from a man with a very impressive job you wouldn't think existed unless you thought about it: the Chief Economist for Google, Inc., Hal (No relation to the computer in "2001: A Space Odyssey") Varian.

Chicken Little and the Great Stimulus Debate


[In which it is pointed out that the sky is not, in fact, falling, and that rumors of the fall of the American Republic, economy, and way of life have been greatly exaggerated.

Often, on purpose.]

It is fashionable in wonkish circles now to compare the present difficulties of the American economy to the Great Depression of the 1930's.  There are a few decent reasons for this (largely that things have been going so darned well since the 1930's that we have little else to compare it to if we want to imply that things are bad, and many people do), a few halfway decent reasons (it's attention getting!), and a few less savory (See Below).

The champion of the breed is probably Paul Krugman, who finds it difficult to complete sentences without using the words "depression", "Roosevelt", and "stimulus" these days.  Krugman is a great economist, but he's also a committed ideologue.  Very much like Milton Friedman, in that way.

Here's the thing.  Paul is interested in expanding government (he calls himself a progressive).  So fiscal stimulus, for him, isn't a means to an end, it is the end.  When he talks about expansion of employment due to government spending, he's talking about ideological victory.  Of course I'm not bashing Paul's ideology, nor are liberals solely responsible for the crying of wolf over the economic situation.  They just happen to be in charge right now, so they have control over the policy levers and buttons.  The point is that economic crisis permits much more far reaching and outlandish policy ideas to be considered (imagine proposing national public make-work programs under Clinton).  It's a great opportunity for anyone (anyone!) with a partisan or special interest axe to grind.

The facts are different.  Krugman himself notes that unemployment is 7%ish, and cites rhetoric from Obama that it might get into double digits.  Unemployment in the Depression was 20% or more.  In France, 7% unemployment would make policymakers heroes.  We are, at present, in the midst of a painful and ugly economic downturn, which appears as if it might be as bad as the 1981-1982 recession brought on by Paul Volcker's fight with the Demon Inflation.

It could still get worse.  2009 is going to be tough.  But there are reasons to think that the free fall is over.  CalculatedRisk has observed meaningful improvement in financial markets.  Home prices have fallen back to relatively reasonable levels in the bubble areas (though they have further to go).  And since this is our first real recession since 1991, we ought to expect a little bit of ugly for putting it off so long.

So when someone tells you the sky is falling, look around.  The situation is not that bad, and there isn't any indication that it will be.  Look at that person's agenda, too, and how they might have an angle, some hoped for benefit from your panic. 

A Response to Randall Wray's "Policy Advice, Part One"


This post is intended as a thoughtful and serious response to Randall Wray's "Policy Advice for President Obama (Part One)".  I decided I was likely to go on far too long for a good comment, because his advice to Obama is obviously the product of long thought on these issues.  Obviously, if I just agreed with him, I would have said so in the comments without the necessity of this post.  I'll take his points in order, breaking out sub issues where they arise.  I'm going to leave the overall issues ("Stability is Destabilizing") for another time and talk brass-tacks-policy.

1. Liquidity: Wray seems to be conflating two very separate issues here.  One is (obviously) liquidity, which is very much the Fed's job, and I agree that the Fed should have made money available faster than it did (such a thing being possible).  However, the FDIC, and deposit insurance generally, is a different matter.  Deposit insurance really is insurance; banks pay in, and depositors are paid out if the banks fail.

There's no reason to change the rules and raise deposit insurance limits after the fact.  To the contrary, it is important (for moral hazard reasons) to stick to the rules as written.  The $100,000.00 (or whatever number on whatever date) deposit insurance cap is a safeguard for the taxpayer.  Protecting depositors is the same as protecting any other lender; the taxpayer should not automatically cover their losses.

2. Paulson: Actually the capital injection plan has not been a complete disaster.  Government financed consolidation is a terrible idea, but hardly a big deal.  Nothing Paulson has done has changed the situation one way or the other, really.

3. Insolvency: Unfortunately, while the first statements in this section are admirable (a discussion of the accounting rules that determine insolvency would be helpful, but would muddy up the story as well), the remainder is nonsense.

Once again, the zeal for protecting lenders and depositors is misplaced.  Except to the extent of FDIC insurance, and equity if there is any, lenders and depositors should take the loss.  Taxpayers didn't risk their money on these banks, lenders (including uninsured depositors) did.  Also, closing a bank increases the losses to taxpayers; a going concern, even one operated by the FDIC, is better for the FDIC's principal (the taxpayer).  You can't close the bank and then wait for an economic recovery...

At this point, a pattern is emerging.  I think Mr. Wray is too eager to avoid collateral damage at taxpayer expense.  Most of the collateral damagees knew what they were getting into, and America has an interest in them taking the loss: we have an interest in ensuring that future actors recognize risk.

This is a reason to avoid too big to fail and too big to save as mantras.

4. Tax Relief: I question the use of a payroll tax holiday; payroll taxes feed into the trust funds that fund the enormous and too often ignored liabilities of the government: Social Security and Medicare.  (I can't say this often enough: George Bush wasted more money in ten minutes signing the prescription drug benefit for Medicare than he did in eight years at war).  We ought to look for ways to deny the government money to the general fund (or at least reduce somehow the future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security - probably by indexing them to prices rather than wages).

Also, at 6.2%, payroll taxes aren't at a marginal rate which substantially affects incentives to work and invest.  Cuts in marginal income tax rates would be more effective in stimulating economic activity.  Still, one cannot pretend this is a serious distinction.

5. I am impressed by the attention to state and local governments, a facet of this problem I have seen too infrequently mentioned.  Many states and localities are -raising- taxes in order to meet their boneheaded "balanced budget" requirements or for other reasons.  State highway funds should get block grants too; states all have plans underway or on the shelf for new highway money.

On infrastructure spending, none of it will get underway anytime soon unless there is also legislation exempting the infrastructure projects from the Federal, State, and Local regulations that make these problems take decades or be shelved.  Everything from the EPA to the EEOC to the State Historical Preservation Office of New Jersey needs to be explicitly preempted by Federal legislation in order to get infrastructure projects underway and money spent before the recession is over, even if we take advantage of the States' better planning and situation for beginning these projects.

6. Mortgage Relief: Here's where we part company.  Why is Wray so eager to protect stupid homeowners who got in over their heads, while so eager to slap down stupid bankers who got in over their heads?  These people weren't "duped", they got all the paperwork, and if they didn't read it, they should have.  Taxpayer money should not be used to protect fools from their comeuppance, even if they are individual fools rather than corporate fools.

This is a serious moral hazard issue, and it is just wrong to take money from responsible taxpayers and give it to idiots who took on payments they couldn't afford.

On a related note (according to Wray, since this is the only time he mentions deflation) debt deflation cannot occur unless there is deflation.  There will not be deflation unless the Fed fails to print enough money.  The Fed has shown little shyness in that department of late.

7. Criminal Prosecution: Again, Wray is quick to get on the mortgage lenders, but fails to mention prosecuting all the mortgage holders who lied on their loan applications, and are guilty of fraud.

Myself, I think it's a waste of time and money better spend on roads, trains, fiber optic pipes, and basic research.

This is Cliffs' Notes, folks, so if you have questions or want elucidation, ask and ye shall receive.

Finance #1: Why? Where to?


[In which our fearless correspondent tries to explain why a financial crisis occurred in 2007-8 and what we might do to prevent things like this happening again (if we want to).  Also, a few thoughts on why we might not want to prevent things like this from happening again, and why that's an important part of the story.]
 
1. Incentives
 
New Nobel winner Paul Krugman gets a nod (I took a look at what he'd been doing lately since I had little idea and he'd just won the Nobel Prize for it) for this.  (Pages 3-4 is the part I think I understand).  It's a neat way of explaining how accounting regulations encourage institutions with a lot of debt to keep risky assets on their balance sheets (and how if those assets depreciate, the margin-call selloff reduces both quantity demanded and, effectively, net demand for the assets themselves (the institutions losing equity now would demand less at -any given price-).
 
The point is, this sort of incentive existed at every level of the market.  Where there wasn't enough incentive already, through home mortgage interest deductions, government sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae, and low interest rates, the government provided all kinds of encouragement to borrowers to borrow more and lenders to lend more.  The Community Reinvestment Act (originally a civil rights anti-redlining law) was amended in the 90's to essentially require some subprime lending by FDIC-regulated entities.
 
Of course, the cheerleading for subprime mortgages among Congressmen ended with the boom in residential housing.  Barney Frank and others were shocked (Shocked!) to discover that gambling was going on.
 
2. Gambling
 
Because it was.  Everybody who was so shocked in Senate hearings to hear that Lehman was leveraged 30 to 1 had been eagerly legislating to encourage citizens without any knowledge of the markets at all to adopt nearly infinite leverage without any diversification.  (Zero down, negative amortization).
 
Now, I'm not crusading against leverage or speculation.  Both are perfectly reasonable activities in a healthy market.
 
Housing wasn't a healthy market though; it was a market high on an ever expanding cocktail of performance enhancing policies.  And once the market price internalized all of them, growth slowed unless something else was added.  And God help us if one of these things got taken away:
 
1. Home mortgage interest deduction.
2. Low interest rates.
3. Accounting regulations encouraging leveraged financial institutions to hold structured financial instruments derived from an ever expanding base of mortgages (inducing the institutions to offer attractive terms to mortgage originators).
4. Lax borrowing standards.
5. Progressively looser repayment terms.
6. Continual financing of the U.S. deficit on current account by foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds.
7. The implicit government guarantee to the GSE's (Fannie and Freddie) debt, reducing their borrowing costs and rates on certain mortgages, by extension.
8. Substantial speculative demand (as opposed to speculative activity - this means an effectively permanent stock held -off- the market) for housing stock by professionals in the United States.
9. Sufficiently positive economic growth to avoid substantial job losses and deterioration in the creditworthiness of borrowers.
 
I give this nonexhaustive list not to suggest that we should have seen this coming (many did), but to show just how complicit all the players had to be, from Congress to Lehman to Countrywide to Joe Six Pack.  They all got something for nothing on the condition that they kept fiddling while Rome burned.  So for several years, they madly fiddled away.
 
Note that 4, 5, 8, and 9 have -all- gone the way of the dodo.  Number 6 is at least potentially on the endangered species list, although the numbers aren't clear yet.
 
3. Ponzi Finance
 
A banking professor used to explain financial cycles as follows.  Businesses start out borrowing money to do things, and make money.  As times get tougher, they start borrowing to roll over debt.  This is fine, it's sometimes necessary to delay repayment even in a healthy business.  Then they start borrowing to pay interest on the debt.  That's bad, and an indication that there's a crash coming, because debt starts to grow exponentially.  He referred to the last stage as "Ponzi Finance".
 
Getting rid of all that debt can be done in two ways.
 
First, people go bust, lenders aren't paid, shops empty out and unemployment lines form.  Very ugly, but also temporary.
 
Second, people get protected, lenders keep loans on their books, businesses stay running, and excess cash is used to slowly pay down the debt (or at least service it).  This is not as ugly, but it can last forever.
 
The first situation is the United States in 1981-1982.  Very nasty recession, followed by, ahem, morning in America.
 
The second situation is Japan in 1990-2008.
 
It is probably obvious by now where I'm going with this; you can make a decent case that from a policymaking point of view with a time horizon of more than "the next news cycle", a recession isn't a bad thing.  Not that anyone in Washington now has a time horizon any longer than that.  Even supposedly clear eyed "policy" people, like Paulson and Bernanke, seem infatuated with day to day fluctuations in markets.
 
4. The Case Against Alan Greenspan
 
It has become ordinary in the past few years in certain circles to blame the Federal Reserve for a lot of the problems we're currently having (or -were- having, when we were having different problems).
 
The case goes like this:
 
The Federal Reserve, since 1987, has engaged in a massive money printing operation, keeping short term interest rates low in order to stimulate borrowing with the goal of [Keeping Republicans in power/inflating away entitlement benefits/weakening the dollar/generating debt to sell to China to support the dollar/No, really, I did just mention two precisely opposite justifications/just google "FED AND CONSPIRACY" already].
 
Interest rates have remained at historic lows for the entire period since 1987, causing investment in progressively less justified enterprises and encouraging speculation and leverage rather than profitable investment.  Low interest rates also caused the bubble in housing prices.
 
Since the housing boom ended in 2007, the Federal Reserve has attempted to use its old medicine on a progressively more massive scale, continuing to expand money in order to prop up the house of cards it created.
 
Given how I started this section, presumably it is obvious that that's all nonsense.
 
First of all, the statement underlying the whole concept doesn't happen to be true.  Rates controlled by the FRB have been low relative to the high-inflation period from 1970-1987, but are comparable with the previous era of low inflation midcentury.  Fed Funds Rate  :   Inflation
 
Second, as I belabored the last time I bored everyone with a really long description of something, a bubble in housing can't be created by low interest rates.  Low interest rates just inflate asset values generally (if money is cheaper, people will spend more of it).  They don't, and can't, cause overinvestment in any particular industry/asset class.
 
5. Change We Can Believe In
 
Oddly enough, for all the "mistakes" made by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the last year, they've both basically done the right thing.  The Fed has expanded its balance sheet, replacing private leverage with cash money to prevent a damaging and potentially depression-inducing deflation.  The Treasury has lopped some heads and twisted some arms, and thrown public money at the problem when it felt it had to.  One can quibble (goodness knows I have) with the process or the individual choices made, but that isn't the point.
 
Good policy isn't being right, that's too much to ask of a democratic system; it's not being so disastrously wrong you ruin it for everybody.
 
Blaming "derivatives" or "financial innovation" swings from the wrong end of the bat.  Good regulation doesn't foreclose innovation; good regulation -includes- it.  The failure of regulation isn't the existence of $40 Trillion in notional credit default swaps.  The failure of regulation is the fear that made them hard to trade.  Regulation of financial markets should be about counterparty risk.  People shouldn't fear intermediaries, but they -should- fear the parties they're ultimately investing in.  That's what investment is.
 
Giving counterparties (folks involved in a Lehman Bros.-written tri-party repo or CDS contract) and trustors (people investing in Lehman custodial accounts) of financial intermediaries first claim in the BK of an intermediary would be a start.  Limiting their leverage is probably worth the effort, as would be limiting the trading they do on their own account.  They can always start a hedge fund for that.
 
The financial sector in the United States has been a growth industry for some time, and there's nothing wrong with that.  If our business is being the world's MBA's and accountants, well, it's a living.  And the dollar's continuing, if shakier, status as the world's reserve currency gives American firms a certain competitive advantage (as do relatively open financial markets).  Still, the problem of regulation remains.
 
The point of this post is that regulation is usually thought about all wrong.  Regulation isn't supposed to prevent banks from failing.  Regulation should prevent bank failures from being disastrous.  Regulation shouldn't limit what products are offered; new ideas are always good (even if they fail, and even if they put the person who had them out of business).  And regulation should always be as limited (and simple) as possible... unintended consequences like encouraging Lehman to hold risky assets are always out there to snare the unwary.

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