In Sept. I was skeptical and wanted facts.  Couldn't get 'em.  Buy troubled assets which are a problem because they can't be valued?!  Uh, how do we set a sale price, esp. when some bad assets were dubiously "insured"??  Absent that kind of insight, the "stock injection" method seemed like a reasonable alternative:  Taxpayers get super seniority (in case of bankruptcy we get the good assets first and the private investors get haircuts) and even some income (if not a lot).  Banks get capital to improve their solvency and maybe make lending feasible again.  Confidence is restored, at least confidence in financial systems if not confidence in the fundamentals of the economy which McCain praised at the time.

My view of TARP is that it was sold as a productive lubricant to unfreeze necessary credit markets.  And my view is that credit markets have greatly improved (never mind the costs or whether other factors dominated).

The terms of TARP I are widely, if not universally, considered to have been too favorable to the banks.  To me, that is a marginal issue.  What concerns me are more fundamental or essential questions/issues:

1)  So, why more TARPs?  Has TARP N simply become a string of socializing losses, a giant con game run by the markets against the government (and eventually the taxpayers)?

2) No significant public money should go to the gambling/casino component of Wall Street.  The recent articles about BAC getting capital and guarantees up to about $118B supposedly on account of ML holdings being worse than expected mentions that "derivatives" are a huge fraction of this figure.  These "side bets" should not be covered by government funds.  What can be done in service to this principle?

3) GS is  reported to now estimate that total domestic financial losses will be about $2T.  Who will be taking those losses?  But remember that every real loss here (not just imaginary paper declines such as stock price changes) reflects someone else's gain(s).  At the fundamental real estate end, somebody sold a property at bubble inflated prices and made out like a bandit.  Someone was a counterparty to a "losing" derivative.  Someone sold the MBS and walked away with cash, leaving the current holder of the security to take the loss.  And so on...