Alan Greenspan won't lie down. His critics have, admittedly, been relentless, but so is the former Fed chairman. Here he mounts another defense of his reputation.
It is lengthy but no less of a misdirection than anything he has written since the Age of Turbulence was serendipitously published.
Greenspan: "I am puzzled why the remarkably similar housing bubbles that emerged in more than two dozen countries between 2001 and 2006 are not seen to have a common cause."
The assumption is that property bubbles in eg, Britain, Spain, New Zealand, South Africa and Dubai, have been driven by the same macro forces that fuelled the subprime bubble in America. Greenspan wants you to believe this. Greenspan, in fact, needs you to believe this.
Greenspan is on one level correct - long-term interest rates during this decade fell to unusually low levels in an almost unprecented convergence. And no-one really seems to know how to explain this convergence. It was one of those macro phenomena - like productivity growth in the 1990s - that you just saw but couldn't explain.
And in fairness, he admits that "each individual housing bubble has its own idiosyncratic characteristics". But what is beyond debate is that unless all these markets suffer similar abrupt declines in their real estate markets, caused by rising delinquencies and other real economic factors, then Greenspan is clutching at straws. What is very likely is that these markets will recede as a consequence of the credit crunch; so what Greenspan is hoping is that correlation and causality will throw up another helpful "forces of globalization" screen behind which he can hide.
It is against this backdrop that you should see his determination to argue that forces beyond his control - long-term interest rates, globally - were responsible for the American housing bubble, at least more so than his monetary or regulatory policy.
Thread 1 with which Greenspan weaves his argument is this - that the sustained, low Fed funding rate was not instrumental in "adding to the bubble". His reasoning - the people who have advanced this argument have been using models that are not able to predict macro trends. So therefore their findings are invalid. And actually, looking at inflation at the time, the Fed had no reason to tighten.
Thread 2 is this - ARMs did not fuel the bubble, because ARMs are a very weak forecaster of home prices. And long-term borrowing was pretty cheap anyway so you wouldn't have needed ARMs to fuel a bubble.
Thread 3 - "I do believe bank risk managers and loan officers are more knowledgeable than government bank regulators." It's not all that clear what the argument is, I can only infer that Greenspan is saying that regulators were powerless to prevent what the private sector could not avoid.
Because he goes on to argue that: "The problem is not the lack of regulation, but unrealistic expectations about what regulators are able to anticipate and prevent. How we otherwise explain how the FSA, whose effectiveness is held in such high regard, fumbled Northern Rock? Or in the US, our best examiners have repeatedly failed over the years. These are not aberrations."
I think he's saying regulators - and regulations - are useless.
Thread 4 is more specific - "The core of the subprime problem lies with the misjudgments of the investment community."
There's a fair bit of truth in this,, and then Greenspan goes on to say: "Subprime securitization exploded because subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were seemingly under-priced (high-yielding) at original issuance."
I think the better characterization, as pretty much everyone in the industry will tell you, is that in the low interest rate environment through the last several years, investors aimed at subprime secured debt because the yields on prime were anemic. The low interest rate environment, which Greenspan argues fueled the borrowing boom was also instrumental in drving the investment boom.
Greenspan adds a further more obvious point - that mortgage underwriting standards collapsed - but then reverts to Thread 3 to ensure that Thread 4 does not stick out as a reasonably coherent argument.
He says: "Counterparties, of course, also confront uncertainty but they appear invariably to know more about their customers than do regulators". This has nothing to do with anything.
Buyers of mortgage-backed securities do not have counterparty risk. They have market risk or credit risk, depending how you want to analyze the product. But not counterparty risk. The fact he uses counterparty and credit risk interchangeably tells a good deal about what Greenspan doesn't get about the mortgage business.
When Greenspan says, "Counterparty surveillance needs to be repaired, not abandoned", he confirms he doesn't know he's making no sense. Whilst pointing to the "collapse in bank underwriting standards", and simultaneously holding that "bank risk managers and loan officers are more knowledgeable than government bank regulators", it's hard to figure out who he's exhorting not to abandon counterparty (he means credit) surveillance. The regulators, who've left the market largely unchecked, or the market itself, which has proven it abandoned the surveillance already?
As an aside, this is my favorite fool's comment on mortgage-backed securities - "In the meantime markets are readjusting risk spreads". He should add: such that securitization models no longer work. Greenspan need only pick up the phone to one of his Wall Street contacts to have this confirmed.
Thread 5 is wonderfully defensive. It is Greenspan defending the fact, like everyone else, he has an ideology - Ayn Rand rules my world - and that it's no basis on its own for him to be criticized.
Yet he's prepared to say, in the middle of this, that "I have been surprised by the fierceness of investors in retrenching from risk since August".
Of course, it's Greenspan's ideology that results in his surprise when these investor stampedes take place. That's the point about his tenure as Fed Chairman, that when you have someone who believes in the perfection of the markets, who does not believe that regulators have a role even in establishing baseline standards, who is unable to recognize the risks of far-from-equilibrium positions, and who is blind to what regulators can do to bring a measure of stability to our economy... then, you've had the wrong man in the job. If someone believes:
The problem is not the lack of regulation, but unrealistic expectations about what regulators are able to anticipate and prevent. [...] in the US, our best examiners have repeatedly failed over the years. These are not aberrations.
Then there's no doubt that person cannot, ideologically, take responsibility for what played out under his tenure. This is not a man who wanted to regulate financial markets, and now ithinks it's acceptable to say, well heck, what could I have done?
America, and the world, is now relying on Ben Bernanke to teach him a lesson.