Richard N. Haass Agrees with Me
that the Obama Administration has it backwards when it claims that it must stabilize Afghanistan in order to stabilize Pakistan:
The United States is doing a great deal in Afghanistan -- and is considering doing more -- because it sees the effort as essential to protecting Pakistan. But this logic is somewhat bizarre. Certainly, allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to reestablish a sanctuary in Afghanistan would make it harder to defeat them in Pakistan. But the Taliban and al-Qaeda already have a sanctuary -- in Pakistan itself.
And further:
It is the government of Pakistan that is tolerating the very groups that the United States is fighting in Afghanistan in the name of Pakistan's stability. It is worth noting, too, that Pakistani officials are not asking the United States to commit additional troops to Afghanistan, in large part because many Pakistanis view Afghanistan as one of several fronts in their struggle against India and see the Taliban as foot soldiers in that contest. Pakistan's future will be determined far more by its willingness and ability to meet internal challenges than by anything that emanates from across its border.
Haass' (much watered down for WaPo and Obama Admin officials) recommendations are as follows:
1) Redirect the training of Afghan security forces to be loyal to their local and tribal affiliations, rather than Karzai's discredited central government.
2) Spend money on paying off the Taliban (rebranded as "Pashtun nationalists,' much as "Sunni insurgents" became the "Sunni Awakening" in Iraq).
3) Concentrate U.S. forces in the capital and major population areas. (I.e., make a strategic retreat in the face of evidence that current offensives are not only not working, but are actually worsening the situation.)
4) Consult with a regional consortium on all of these moves (including Iran, Russia, and India).
And over the border the Pakistan, take the following steps:
1) Spend more money in aid to Pakistan than Afghanistan. (But, of course, though Haass does not get into this, spend it with a modicum of wisdom. We need to be aware that the outrage sparked by the seemingly common-sensical Kerry- Lugar Bill is a reflection of a real crisis that we have carefully ensured would happen from years of assuming that the world revolved around us- and that the only terrorists were those who struck our shores and soldiers. Yesterday, for those keeping track, was "doomsday" in Pakistan, and this morning has been quite ominous as well.)
2) Spend much more time and diplomatic resources defusing the gravest threat to stability in the region, the relationship between India and Pakistan.
The last suggestion is the key to this particular patch of South/Central Asia, not the nearly nonexistent al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The reason for Pakistan's support of terror networks (including Taliban-affiliated ones that we are fighting so bitterly in Afghanistan) is because it cultivates these groups against India, and furthermore fears that the U.S. is trying to destabilize Pakistan in the name of stabilizing it, secretly taking India's side- even of trying to foment a civil war within Pakistan. Steve Coll's observation that when he was in Afghanistan in the 80s that shots fired against Soviets he was interviewing were funded on the American taxpayer's dime is even more true now than it was then- except they are being fired against our own soldiers now. That is the perverse logic of Obama's "necessary war."
Consider the outcry of the Pakistani military against the seemingly innocuous Kerry-Lugar Bill. They are upset that plank #1 in Haass' program to get us out of Afghanistan forces accountability on how Pakistan spends the billions we send them. They will not be able to blithely fund the people we are fighting a supposed "war of necessity" against- and what is this "necessity?" To prevent the people subsidizing them from "destabilizing" them!
Clearly more than a mere 'strategy' is needed here. The Peace Laureate must reverse himself now on his whole policy on the war. Haass paints this, misleadingly in my opinion, as a 'middle way' in Afghanistan. He is doing this because he knows Obama's love of splitting the difference. But what he calls it is no matter.
(And as a kind of postscript, consider this accusation the Afghan Government just hurled at Pakistan. It is very likely true- but in any case refutes the foolish suggestion that all we need is to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan will be a more secure nuclear-armed nation, with a reliable friend in Kabul. The Obama Administration has given many ludicrous rationales for continuing this war, but that one is the most egregious.)
The United States is doing a great deal in Afghanistan -- and is considering doing more -- because it sees the effort as essential to protecting Pakistan. But this logic is somewhat bizarre. Certainly, allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to reestablish a sanctuary in Afghanistan would make it harder to defeat them in Pakistan. But the Taliban and al-Qaeda already have a sanctuary -- in Pakistan itself.
And further:
It is the government of Pakistan that is tolerating the very groups that the United States is fighting in Afghanistan in the name of Pakistan's stability. It is worth noting, too, that Pakistani officials are not asking the United States to commit additional troops to Afghanistan, in large part because many Pakistanis view Afghanistan as one of several fronts in their struggle against India and see the Taliban as foot soldiers in that contest. Pakistan's future will be determined far more by its willingness and ability to meet internal challenges than by anything that emanates from across its border.
Haass' (much watered down for WaPo and Obama Admin officials) recommendations are as follows:
1) Redirect the training of Afghan security forces to be loyal to their local and tribal affiliations, rather than Karzai's discredited central government.
2) Spend money on paying off the Taliban (rebranded as "Pashtun nationalists,' much as "Sunni insurgents" became the "Sunni Awakening" in Iraq).
3) Concentrate U.S. forces in the capital and major population areas. (I.e., make a strategic retreat in the face of evidence that current offensives are not only not working, but are actually worsening the situation.)
4) Consult with a regional consortium on all of these moves (including Iran, Russia, and India).
And over the border the Pakistan, take the following steps:
1) Spend more money in aid to Pakistan than Afghanistan. (But, of course, though Haass does not get into this, spend it with a modicum of wisdom. We need to be aware that the outrage sparked by the seemingly common-sensical Kerry- Lugar Bill is a reflection of a real crisis that we have carefully ensured would happen from years of assuming that the world revolved around us- and that the only terrorists were those who struck our shores and soldiers. Yesterday, for those keeping track, was "doomsday" in Pakistan, and this morning has been quite ominous as well.)
2) Spend much more time and diplomatic resources defusing the gravest threat to stability in the region, the relationship between India and Pakistan.
The last suggestion is the key to this particular patch of South/Central Asia, not the nearly nonexistent al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The reason for Pakistan's support of terror networks (including Taliban-affiliated ones that we are fighting so bitterly in Afghanistan) is because it cultivates these groups against India, and furthermore fears that the U.S. is trying to destabilize Pakistan in the name of stabilizing it, secretly taking India's side- even of trying to foment a civil war within Pakistan. Steve Coll's observation that when he was in Afghanistan in the 80s that shots fired against Soviets he was interviewing were funded on the American taxpayer's dime is even more true now than it was then- except they are being fired against our own soldiers now. That is the perverse logic of Obama's "necessary war."
Consider the outcry of the Pakistani military against the seemingly innocuous Kerry-Lugar Bill. They are upset that plank #1 in Haass' program to get us out of Afghanistan forces accountability on how Pakistan spends the billions we send them. They will not be able to blithely fund the people we are fighting a supposed "war of necessity" against- and what is this "necessity?" To prevent the people subsidizing them from "destabilizing" them!
Clearly more than a mere 'strategy' is needed here. The Peace Laureate must reverse himself now on his whole policy on the war. Haass paints this, misleadingly in my opinion, as a 'middle way' in Afghanistan. He is doing this because he knows Obama's love of splitting the difference. But what he calls it is no matter.
(And as a kind of postscript, consider this accusation the Afghan Government just hurled at Pakistan. It is very likely true- but in any case refutes the foolish suggestion that all we need is to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan will be a more secure nuclear-armed nation, with a reliable friend in Kabul. The Obama Administration has given many ludicrous rationales for continuing this war, but that one is the most egregious.)
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2) Spend money on paying off the Taliban (rebranded as "Pashtun nationalists,' much as "Sunni insurgents" became the "Sunni Awakening" in Iraq)
No matter what we are in the middle of a war of propaganda besides a real war with real victims--many of whom are 'innocents', I suppose.
I am a peacenik. I just do not see how we are helping anyone or defending ourselves if in fact, as McCaffrey (a man I despise) is correct and there are less than 100 al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
ARE WE STILL FIGHTING THEM OVER THERE SO WE DO NOT HAVE TO FIGHT THEM HERE?
But this is a good post and I can see where it is more than worthwhile to read Mr. Haass.
October 10, 2009 11:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
thanks for the comments. It is true that AQ ran out of Af not long after Cheney/Rumsfeld/name your traitorous cretin let them escape at Tora Bora- Dec. 01.
If AQ returned to Afghanistan, it would be easy to get rid of them. That's why they're not there now.
As to what is there now- well, you decide how much it's worth.
And what is worth inestimable amounts- the well being of Afghanistan- is not helped by our continuing a war of vanity, not necessity.
October 10, 2009 6:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
two points, one technical, the other substantive. The 'quotation' software does not cooperate for me, and I always try to set qutations- in this case, from Haass- off by double spacing and italics. The italics cooperates. The double spacing does not. The quotes which are Haass' are the italicized portions in the first two paragraphs.(Damn this software- what I write and what turns up in posts are not identical AT ALL.)
Secondly, while Pakistan is a problem, we have to understand them a whole lot better than we do. Earlier this year- TWO MILLION REFUGEES from Swat. How many Katrinas is that? It is a tsunami, not a hurricane.
Those who get their news and views on Pakistan from Fareed Zakaria or like organs of propaganda need new organs of perception.
October 10, 2009 6:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Diachronic, Nice post. fyi-your "doomsday" link is not working.
Not sure how pouring more money into Pakistan is going to help when 60% of the population views us as the greatest threat to their existence.
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/08/20098910857878664.html
What a tangled mess.
October 10, 2009 6:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
thanks, Sal.
This should work
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\11\story_11-10-2009_pg7_4
I agree that I am not sure how pouring more money into pakistan will help either. I was trying to summarize Haass' article while pointing out where he was palpably playing for Obama's ear with the 'middle way' line.
Obama IMHO was absolutely wrong when he took a cavalier attitude to Pakistan during the McCain debates, and yet he believes his own bullshit. Haass, Gates, etc., know this and are trying to persuade, and part of that persuasion involves some harebrained ideas. Cf. Condi's brilliant idea to bring Benazir Bhutto into powersharing with Bush's beloved dictator Musharraf- our ideas are steeped in ignorance.
And I greatly appreciate your point re our unpopularity there. While you don't need to persuade me on this point, there are some here and elsewhere who believe our 'aid' earns gratitude.
'Aid' in scare-quotes, of course. Predator missiles landing in someone's backyard are not everyone's idea of a friendly gesture.
October 10, 2009 6:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Some of the complexities are well summarized in the post and its citations. A potential Obama "middle way" has already beeen demonized by those desiring absolutist solutions - conquer the Taliban once and for all or get out immediately. Neither of these bears any relationship to reality on the planet we inhabit. Diachronic and I have been exchanging views on this through multiple posts, and in fact, are views are divergent but not diametrically opposed (I don't think). We each see a limited but necessary role for U.S./NATO engagement in Afghanistan during an interval needed to bring indigenous forces to a level adequate to replace us. We both recognize tensions within Pakistan between civilian government officials who are not keen to support any insurgents, and ISI and some military personnel who see some elements of the Taliban as a useful protection against India. However, we both (I hope) also agree that a complete domination of Afghanistan by the Taliban would not serve the cause of stabilizing Pakistan nor suppressing Al Qaeda in either nation. As a consequence, we agree the U.S. needs to do something other than just pull out, and disagreements revolve around the question of specifics.
Based on a variety of opinions, I tend to favor those experts who believe in a wider Afghanistan campaign than one limited to Kabul and the border regions; in fact, without wider efforts, I think those limited tactics would be inherently unstable. I don't believe we can or should try to eliminate the Taliban from all of Afghanistan, and I doubt that Obama will seek to do that. I agree we must proceed carefully with Pakistan, but it's also true that our drone attacks have become less a source of resentment in recent months as Pakistani citizens have become increasingly outraged by Al Qaeda/Taliban terrorism, and have increasingly pressured the military to suppress the insurgents. Foreign as the concept may seem to some, I sense that in this one particular element of the problem, time is actually on our side.
Finally, I'll presume to repeat a point here I've already made elsewhere, and hope the repetition won't be too much of an annoyance. Most Afghans, we are told from numerous observers, hate and fear the Taliban. Our national security must be our primary goal, but we do have a moral obligation to Afghans I would be reluctant to betray if we can avoid it. In 2001, our successful campaign bestowed on Afghans a brief respite from Taliban oppression that is now under threat and already gone in some areas. The Afghan people haven't forgotten that for a brief interval, girls could at last go to school, everyone could listen to music, and men could walk the streets without fearing death or injury because their beards weren't proper. To the extent that anyone wishes to apply a moral calculus to the rightness or wrongness of what we are about to do, we shouldn't forget either.
October 10, 2009 9:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Incidentally, diachronic, I'm not impressed by your claim in the title that Richard Haass agrees with you. That is hardly worth noting. We had it from excellent authority, including the Reverend Pat Robertson and others, that God agreed with George Bush's decision to invade Iraq. Now that's the kind of agreement that would really get my attention!
October 10, 2009 9:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Fred, thanks as always for your comments. As a matter of fact, the title, as you can see, is merely the first part of the first sentence. I work on weekends, and so I dashed it off as fast as possible. I claimed Haass' authority in part because I think his article in WaPo today will/may be influential, as his war of choice/necessity dichotomy is one Obama has prominently invoked.
As for your other points, I will try to address them later today, but for now, I just want to indicate that the basic disagreement between us (which is not, as you say, a diametric opposition) regards how best to attain desired goals in the region, not (I think) the goals themselves.
No, we cannot just withdraw. t has to be an orderly, strategic retreat and plan for who will take our places. The concept that Rutabaga has mentioned, that of a "vacuum", is one that we should use here. Our leaving is not desired by many (not all) players and populations in the region. Since others can accomplish the same ends (I believe) that we can, the logistics make it imperative that we set that machinery in motion, now.
October 11, 2009 8:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
The problem, in a sentence, is that Pakistan will not allow us to win in Afghanistan.
The reasons for this, I have tried to suggest. But I will say more directly: They have no interest in seeing us win. If we win, the war is over and the taps of money and other aid turn off, and Pakistan's advantage in the South Asian Cold War- that the US needs its help to defeat AQ/Taliban/whatever, is lost. Its geostrategic upper hand on India is lost. And if that upper hand becomes in doubt- say, by our winning in Afghanistan, whatever that may mean (and I am afraid it means nothing), then holding the trump card of the Taliban and its ability to undermine Kabul is its main source of 'strategic depth.' The closer the US pulls to victory (again, whatever that means, likely nothing) gives Pakistan the perverse incentive of delaying that end- because that is its geostrategic advantage.
October 11, 2009 5:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
In case anyone happens onto this tomb of a thread, see this link
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/tal1-o24.shtml
Note that the article was written before Obama's delusions became the received wisdom about the Taliban.
Here is a good quote from the article:
"Pakistan has always been cautious about admitting any direct support for the Taliban, but the links are quite open. The Taliban has close connections with the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), a Pakistani-based Islamic extremist party, which ran its own madrassas in the border areas with Afghanistan. The JUI has provided the Taliban with large numbers of recruits from its schools, as well as a communication channel into the upper echelons of the Pakistani military and ISI.
The most telling sign of outside involvement was the military success of the Taliban. In little more than a year, it had grown from a handful of students to a well-organised militia that could muster up to 20,000 fighters, backed by tanks, artillery and air support, controlling large swathes of southern and western Afghanistan.
As one writer observed: “It is also inconceivable that a force composed mostly of former guerrillas and student amateurs could have operated with the degree of skill and organisation which the Taliban showed almost from the outset of their operations. While there were undoubtedly former members of the Afghani armed forces among their numbers, the speed and sophistication with which their offensives were conducted, and the quality of such elements as their communications, air support and artillery bombardments, lead to the inescapable conclusion that they must have owed much to a Pakistani military presence, or at least professional support” [Afghanistan: A New History, Martin Ewers, Curzon, 2001, pp182-3]."
October 12, 2009 1:09 PM | Reply | Permalink