We treated Al-Qaeda as if it were a state power when it's really a criminal organization.

Ahhh, destor. There's a nail you just hit on the neo-con head. Wolfie, Feith, Rummy, Cheney, Libby and the neo-con pundits truly believed that terrorists had to have state sponsors. Here is that little worm Feith defending his feithdom*** in the Pentagon that produced such bad intelligence:

...it was looking at global terrorist networks and the full range of state sponsors.. Its main conclusion was that groups and states were willing to cooperate across philosophical, ideological lines.

...what we have been stressing is that September 11th highlighted the special dangers that come from the connection of weapons of mass destruction to state sponsors of terrorism.

As many experts have noted, states aren't going to give terrorists access to their WMD for two good reasons: Terrorists aren't particularly known for their loyalty and unlike terrorists, states have a known address and location where retaliatory WMDs can be aimed and sent with devastating consequences.

Besides, there's another problem with this: terrorists can also function, and function well, in established, stable states.

One of the militant insurgents in Afghanistan has pointedly noted that the 9/11 terrorists did not come from Afghanistan and did not train there, either. The 9/11 terrorists, in fact, were mostly Saudis that trained in Europe and the United States. It is also true that AQ does not need Afghanistan anymore. After its retreat out of Afghanistan, it has further decentralized its operations so that it is spread out in small cells over the globe, making it hard to find and less vulnerable to total disruption of the entire organization. They adapt much quicker than we do to the realities on the ground.  

It is very hard for Americans to accept that 19 men armed with only box cutters were able to inflict as much damage as the 9/11 terrorists inflicted in one day. Our refusal to face the truths that came out of thin air that day has led to our ongoing eight year quagmires on the ground today.

***Office of Special Plans. (They were special alright -- they were all wrong, every one of them.)

The only thing I might contest in your post is your statement that Al Queda in Afghanistan could have been dealt with through any means other than military action. In the initial phase of the war, the Taliban very much protected Al Qaeda and shared a symbiotic relationship with that organization. Bin Laden had only recently orchestrated the assassination of the Taliban's top rival from the Northern Alliance. A somewhat cooperative government, or at least a government not openly abetting the suspects, is a precondition to even beginning police work. The mafia, gangs, and even the drug cartels still had to operate under the shadow of somewhat legitimate governments.

What police solution would we have for dealing with people who could openly transit to and from Afghanistan across he borders of both Iran and Pakistan? Open to suggestions.

Otherwise, great stuff from all.

Good post Destor!

You are exactly right about Al Qaeda being a criminal syndicate! They are the modern day equivalent of the pirates the US fought at the beginning of the 19th Century albeit it far more dangerous. We need to deal with them and appropriately. The armed forces of the US are not the best primary weapon to use against those thugs and cowards.

Yes, I too was, as they say, sucked iton Afghanistan. And in the immediate aftermath felt doubly justified as the truth of the way the taliban ruled became more clear.

Ultimately I beleive we need to begin to withdraw and I agree with you about how this failed state won't necessarily make us any less safe, nor diminish us as a power. In fact, without the drain on our military, most countries will realize that it will technically make us a stronger force to contend with.

The one facet, however, that we need to come to terms with, individually and as a country, is what the aftermath will potentially be for the civilians. Government forces are about 200,000, and the Karzai government is not going to just walk away from the seat of power. Chances are the Taliban will win, but there will be plenty of armed ex-soldiers, combined with the opium trade, to potentially lead to a much more bloody warlord power struggle. Again it will be the civilians that really suffer. And then there are those girls who only want to go to school...

And we in America will have to sit back and watch it unfold. In the end, it is for the Afghan people to work out. We cannot as you say go running into every failed state. But there is a connection to Afghanistan that isn't there with other countries (8 years of war will do that) and I have to admit I have a residue of a feeling that we have some moral obligation to the Afghan people to help them not fail (even though I know it pretty much hopeless and they don't want our help).

There are now too many Afghanistan blogs running concurrently. I feel like I'm to put out brush fires running from one to the other to explain why I think premature disengagement from Afghanistan would be very dangerous, and why the White House is therefore not about to do it.

The above tone was facetious, because I don't pretend to have all the answers - only respect for an Administration that is asking the right questions before proceeding - but my convictions are sincere and as objective as I can make them. I've provided details above and elsewhere explaining why I think as I do, and anyone interested can go back to read them. To repeat them would be to contribute to the repetitiveness that these discussions tend to exhibit.

Although I don't want to prolong the discussion itself, I believe the existence of these discussions is important as a means of alerting non-TPM readers that this site, despite its admirable inclination toward a liberal perspective (in which I join), is not monolithic on Afghanistan and other major issues. The readers can review what each of us says and make their own judgments.

There is zero good reasons to remain in Afghanistan.

The former Soviet excursion into Afghanistan tells us of the difficulties facing an outside force. In the case of the Soviets, that force was notably larger than our present one.

The possibility of a long term stable political regime is unlikely because the number of regional factions within national borders prohibits an effective central government. Decentralized power will remain no matter what.

Geographic inaccessibility to troubled areas, especially poppy growing regions, makes law enforcement an all but impossible task.

Citizen loyalties are centered on tribal cultures and customs and that will be honored before any allegiance to a central government.

Nothing short of a well equipped and well trained national force of 500,000 can ever hope to control the mountain border regions open to terrorist infiltration.

There is no viable economic influence to provide jobs for a sustainable economic unit.

The national population consists of Tajiks, Hazara, Aimak, Uzbeks, Uyghur, Turkmen and other small groups. Unification of these diverse ethnic groups is all but impossible.

Afghanistan is basically and ungovernable land. It has been that way forever and isn't going to change. Any thought of doing so on the cheap is ridiculous. Our generals or politicians who think it can be done are flat stupid. Or, more likely, their reasons for our presence in Afghanistan have nothing to do with any actually achieveable goal. No matter what is said, you can be sure it is a lie. The Bush legacy of preemption as a foundation of foreign policy is a failed idea that needs to come to an end.