This is not going to make me popular. It will probably have a great many "unrecommends," but here goes.
I have only read Liddy's letter in defense of the retention bonuses and don't really have knowledge of the details behind the bonuses. The best source for that information would be the employment contracts themselves, but to my knowledge they are not public. I am only writing this based on my general knowledge about these kinds of arrangements as a lawyer, more particularly a lawyer specializing in troubled and insolvent companies. Of course I share the overall outrage about these bonuses, but I'm posting this to give a bit of a contrarian view. While I am going to sort of defend the AIG lawyers who opined that these were "binding" contractual obligations, I am also going to offer a thought (albeit a weak one) about how to get out of them.
First, retention or "stay" bonuses are not uncommon when you are asking a high level executive to work for a company facing insolvency. I have a friend who was asked to stay on when his company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and he was guaranteed a $250,000 bonus to stay for six months and help the creditors sort through the mess and figure out how to get the most value for the assets that were being sold off. He had been an employee of the company and was present when a lot of the poor decisions were being made that led to the company's failure. Nonetheless, there were no accusations of wrongdoing, just a combination of market forces and not the best decisions leading to failure. His bonus, though was presented to the bankruptcy court and approved. Other creditors had a chance to object but no one did because he actually was going to deliver value into this troubled circumstance. Had this arrangement not been struck he would have either been out of a job or found another one and left the company as soon as he landed it. The 250K incentivized him and, like I said was disclosed and approved. If this is the nature of these bonuses, I have no trouble with them. Because every one is proclaiming shock and disbelief, however, I think these were not disclosed and approved by the creditors, nor by the Fed.
There are retention bonuses of a different sort that, most likely, are the kind we are talking about here. When a broker is hired in the securities industry he (and in 99% of the cases, it's a "he") is given an upfront bonus and/or is promised a bonus (or series of bonuses) if he stays for a given period of time, one year, 3 years, etc. Thus, a "retention" bonus. Typically those bonuses are not tied to performance, but they would be forfeited if the employee is let go for "cause," in other words if he's fired for doing something wrong - excessive absences, fraud, stealing, substance abuse, etc. You pay this because you've probably poached this person who has a track record at a competing company. The retention is so he doesn't jump to the next company that waves dollars at him.
Now this is the tricky part. I don't think these guys did anything that would amount to cause for termination. As sick and unfair as this sounds, they did their jobs. The derivatives they traded reflected insane unfathomable risk (discussed below), but they were not illegal. These derivatives essentially were side bets on whether a bond issue would default. Such bets make sense if you actually own (or have a financial interest as a buyer or seller) the bond you are betting on, but the huge problem with the bets AIG's little London group was making was that the betting parties (AIG and its contra parties like Societe Generale, Goldman Sachs, etc) had no interest in these bonds - they were just gamblers at a casino.
One comparison is the stock options market. There is a concept of writing a covered option versus a naked option. When you write a covered option, you own the stock and are hedging on your downside by making a side bet on the future of the stock. You buy 100 shares of company X for $10 a share. You sell an option (ie make a bet) to someone that gives them the right to pay $13 on June 16, 2009. The option cost $1 (or $100 for the 100 shares). Your cost of the stock is now $900. If the stock is $12 on June 16, you've won the bet. Your contra party will not exercise the option because he's not going to pay $13 (actually $14 because that person paid $1 already) for a stock that is only worth $12 in the open market. You've successfully hedged because your stock only cost you $9 and it's worth $12 now.
What if you lost the bet? Remember the option you sold was "covered." You owned the underlying stock. If it goes to $15, your contra party demands your stock and you sell it to him for $13, the agreed on price. You haven't made as big a profit as you thought, but you still made $4 a share.
If you didn't own the stock (selling a "naked" option), this transaction becomes more of a pure bet. You sold the option, so you made $100. If the stock doesn't hit $13, you win. If the stock goes to $15, you have to buy the stock when it gets called, so it costs you net $14 a share. That's what the AIG guys were doing except multiply each of these transactions by, say, $10,000,000 or a half a billion or some other ridiculous sum. Instead of betting on the price they'd reach, they were betting on whether the bond would default or not. And remember that until 2007 or so, no one ever had to pay off on these bets - the bonds would never default.
If you owned the bond - or had sold it, you had a financial stake in the bet. In other words you had either the cash proceeds from the sale or you had the underlying bond obligations themselves so you could pay up on the transaction. A bond may default because it wasn't generating cash to pay interest when called for, but remember the bond is a bundle of mortgage obligations - a thousand homewners on the dotted line. If a hundred or even three hundred default, there's still cash coming in. You can cover the bet.
But the AIG guys and every one else in this mess was betting on bonds they had no financial interest in. When they lost the bet they had to go out and pay the other side, say $50,000,000. Multiply that by 20,000 bond issues and you have today's crisis.
The thing is that the stock options industry is pretty well regulated. You can't play if you don't have the dough (the capital of the trading firm). This goofy derivatives market was/is totally unregulated. Nobody looked at anyone's capital. And after all it was AIG - the biggest insurance company in the world. Of course they had the capital. Or not.
The point of all this is that these traders (hired away from their old employers by big fat retention bonuses) did their job. They traded these idiotic investments that no one at the time thought were idiotic, and certainly no Bush-era regulator was going to step in and stop this. Hell, they refused to stop Madoff. (which makes the whole Cheney thing from yesterday so galling). So ultimately the AIG lawyers look at the employment agreements and say that they're locked tight. The brokers/traders earned their bonuses by showing up for work and, in essence, not being drunk or stoned.
Ok, enough on the "pro" side. How about the "con." The only thing I can think of is the insolvency of AIG. A company cannot make extraordinary payments (oustide of the ordinary course of business) if those payments would render it insolvent or if the company is insolvent when it makes the payments. The problem with this theory is that AIG would have to admit it was insolvent and those retention bonuses would have to be shown to be outside the ordinary course of business. Arguably these payments are standard operating procedure (galling again, I know). The reason auto union contracts can be challenged is because they can be thrown out in bankruptcy court. These bonuses could be tossed too but no one is seriously talking about AIG being in bankruptcty, unlike GM. Too big to fail. Hopefully the administration has lawyers much smarter than I am looking at this, but I think it would be tough not to pay the bonuses and not get sued successfully. Otherwise you have to rely on the good conscience of these traders. Good luck with that.